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The dissensus over Iraq on both international and national levels offers a rich setting for a 
cross-national research to test some assumptions about media-foreign policy relationship 
originating mainly from American political communication literature. This line of research 
suggests that the government policy line and national elite opinion (consensus/dissensus) 
are the most important factors in explaining how the media cover international politics.
This study focuses on three European states which adopted different policies with regard to 
Iraq: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). The study employs both 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis in order to determine the range of sources, 
selection of topics and the tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and controversial 
national Iraq policies.  Data consist of  two daily quality newspapers from each country 
from different ends of the political spectrum. However, in the absence of another national 
daily,  a  regional  quality  newspaper  and  the  biggest  national  tabloid  newspaper  were 
included from Finland. Main periods of analysis cover four weeks at critical phases of the 
crisis between February and May 2003.
The analysis indicated that governments' foreign policy line did not explain the differences in 
press coverage very well. In the case of Finland, opinion items were sympathetic to anti-war 
views but news articles often reproduced the US/UK case for war. Meanwhile, the national 
political  elite  had  little  interest  in  engaging  into  a  public  debate  on  such  issues  as  US 
motivations, the war's legal repercussions or potential consequences for the fragile Middle 
Eastern  security  system.  With  national  elite  unwilling  to  publicly challenge  the  US/UK 
claims, the Finnish press coverage did not stand out as particularly critical of the invasion 
although the US claims did not go uncontested in the Finnish newspapers either. 
In Ireland and the UK, clear differences between newspapers operating in the same political 
system indicated that government policy was not the most significant factor in explaining 
how the press covered the Iraq crisis. In both countries, the elites were divided over the issue 
of Iraq and the newspapers reflected these divisions. The  Independent and the  Irish Times 
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were more sympathetic to the political opposition's anti-war views than the Daily Telegraph 
and the Irish Independent. The Telegraph was the most consistent in its support for the war 
but the analysis also indicated that in the post-war situation the press coverage became less 
uniform both within the newspapers and countries. Overall, the opinions were much more 
polarised  than  in  the  Finnish  newspapers  clearly  indicating  that  the  elite  dissensus  had 
brought the Iraq policy in 'the sphere of legitimate controversy'.
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1.1 THE IRAQ CRISIS1
Soon after 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the invasion of 
Iraq  became  a  viable  policy  option  within  President  George  W.  Bush's  administration 
although it was decided that Taliban had to be removed from power in Afghanistan first. 
By early 2002, the planning of military and communications strategies for the invasion of 
Iraq was in full progress (Woodward 2004, Doig et al 2007, 28). In January 2002, the Bush 
administration's first major step was to argue that Iraq, Iran and North Korea formed an 
”Axis of Evil” and that the US could take preventive action against these states that were 
seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and supporting terror (Bush 2002a). 
Britain became involved in the planning early on and both the Bush administration and the 
Blair government used intelligence information selectively to exaggerate the alleged Iraqi 
threat  (Pfiffner  2004,  Doig  &  Phythian  2005).  In  the  absence  of  the  'smoking  gun' 
(conclusive evidence of Iraq being in breach of UN Security Council resolutions), the case 
for war was built on dubious intelligence on Iraqi threat allegedly manifested in its WMD 
capability  and  links  to  terrorism which  were  never  substantiated.2 Part  of  the  US/UK 
strategy  was  to  restart  the  UN  weapons  inspections  in  Iraq  to  ”wrongfoot”  the  Iraqi 
President  Saddam  Hussein  on  the  inspections  and  United  Nations  Security  Council 
resolutions (Meyer 2002). British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw saw that either Saddam's 
refusal  to  cooperate  with the UN weapons inspectors  or  new evidence of  Iraqi  WMD 
would produce a legal pretext for military action (Smith 2005). The UN inspectors led by 
Hans Blix returned to Iraq in late 2002 but failed to produce conclusive evidence against 
Iraq. Nevertheless, the Bush administration appeared even more committed to the use of 
1 'Iraq Crisis' is used in this study to refer to not only to the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 
March-April 2003 but also to the lead-up to the war and the immediate aftermath of the 
invasion. As this study also covers periods of analysis in February and May, Iraq Crisis 
was considered more accurate than 'Iraq War' which is how the US/UK invasion of Iraq 
has become commonly known.
2 At the beginning of the war, the ”Public Affairs General Strategic Themes” of the US 
Department of Defense (2003) argued that ”The threat posed by the Iraqi regime, its 
WMD, and its long-standing ties to terrorism is a threat to the safety and security of the 
American people, and peace and stability in the region and the world”.  
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force in early 2003. Robin Cook (2004), British Labour politician who opposed the war, 
later suggested that ”for Bush and Blair, the real reason why invasion was urgent was the 
growing realisation that Hans Blix was to remove their principal pretext for war”.
By early 2003, the war had proved to be a tough sell. Massive anti-war demonstrations 
took  place  around the  world  in  the  run-up to  the  war.  On 15  February,  various  non-
governmental  organizations  behind  the  global  protest  managed to  mobilize  millions  of 
people to voice their opposition against the looming war and, in some cases, against their 
own  governments  who  supported  the  US  policy  on  Iraq.  The  UN  Security  Council, 
including three of its veto powers – France, Russia and China – together with Germany, 
which held the presidency of the council, refused to sanction the use of force and called for 
continuation of the weapons inspections. Moreover, some of the non-permanent members 
of the UN Security Council such as Mexico, Chile and Pakistan refused to give in under 
heavy pressure from the Bush administration. Consequently, the UN route did not provide 
the  US-led  coalition  a  formal  authorisation to  invade  Iraq and,  eventually,  the  US/UK 
forces  attacked  Iraq  with  rather  limited  international  support  and  questionable  legal 
mandate on 20 March (Goldsmith 2006, 24). 
The war  became an unprecedented media  event  with thousands of  reporters  and  other 
media staff gathering in the Gulf region to cover the war from Coalition press centres and 
neighbouring countries. In contrast to the Gulf War of 1991, several international television 
news channels remained in Baghdad. These included Al-Jazeera and other Arab television 
news channels which did not exist during the 1991 war. Moreover, hundreds of journalists 
entered Iraq  with the  UK/US forces  enabled  by the Pentagon's  new media strategy of 
'embedding'  reporters  in  military  units. Pentagon's  new  media  strategy  relied  on  the 
concept of 'Information dominance' strategy which required that the media were kept on 
message by carefully coordinating the press briefings in Doha, Washington and London 
(Miller  2004c).  The  Commander  of  the  US forces,  General  Tommy Franks  called  the 
media the “fourth front” (WMD: Weapons of Mass Deception 2004) and the fact that the 
media was closely monitored by the Rendon Group, a Public Relations firm working for 
the Pentagon, is indicative of the importance attached to the image of war. Nevertheless, 
the Bush administration may have won the “public relations war” at its home front “but 
probably lost it abroad” (Hiebert 2003, 245).
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Soon after the invasion, the failure to find evidence to substantiate the pre-war allegations 
about Iraqi WMD capability led to a debate about the failure of the intelligence agencies 
and whether the US and UK governments deliberately deceived their citizens and the wider 
world in the run-up to war. This debate was further fuelled by a number of leaked official 
documents which revealed details about the discussions between the Blair government and 
the  Bush  administration.  Inevitably,  the  debate  about  media's  failure  to  challenge  the 
US/UK  case  for  war  followed.  Especially  the  US  media  were  complicit  in  the  Bush 
administration's efforts to sell the war to the American public which may not have come as 
a surprise to American political communication scholars.
1.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Large bulk of the research on the relationship between foreign policy and the media has 
emerged from the US. Several studies suggest that, in the US, the range of debate is set by 
the executive branch of the government (Herman & Chomsky 1988, Herman 1993, Entman 
1991) or a wider foreign policy elite (Hallin 1986, Bennett 1990, Mermin 1999). These 
notions are known as executive and elite versions of the manufacturing consent paradigm 
(Robinson 2001b, 525-526).
Especially in foreign policy domain, the government has an advantageous position in its 
relations with the media because “strong domestic constituencies contesting government 
propaganda campaigns are rare, and [...] the government can employ ideological weapons 
like anti-communism, a demonized enemy or alleged national security threats to keep the 
media compliant” (Herman 1993, 23). Herman's (1993, 45) argument reflects the executive 
view of top-down model of media-state relations: 
“Both structural analysis and empirical evidence of media performance support the view that 
the mainstream media tend to follow a state agenda in reporting on foreign policy [...] The real 
problem, however, is the already high level of subservience to government agendas and the 
media's  consistent  failure  to  provide  context,  and  to  encourage  or  even  to  allow debates 
extending  to  fundamental  criticism.  These  failings  are  incompatible  with  the  media's 
acknowledged obligation to serve the informational needs of a democracy.”
W. Lance Bennett's influential 'indexing hypothesis' suggests that wider elite opinion, not 
just the executive branch of the government, plays an important role in how the media 
cover issues. He argues that “mass media news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics of 
governmental  debate”  (Bennett  1990,  108).  In  effect,  this  rule  implies  that  the  views 
expressed in mainstream news are limited to those present in the elite debate. Therefore, 
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media  coverage  only  becomes  critical  of  the  government  policy  when  there  is  elite 
dissensus.
There are several studies that suggest that the national foreign policy and elite opinion also 
explain how the media cover wars in countries such as Britain (Glasgow University Media 
Group 1985, Riegert 1998), Sweden (Riegert 1998), Germany (Eilders & Lüter 2000) and 
Canada (Kim et  al  2007, Hibbard & Keenleyside 1995).  However,  there  are two main 
problems with applying US-originated theories of media-state relations to other localities. 
First, some scholars argue that there may be significant differences in journalistic cultures, 
political systems and other national characteristics that give the media a different kind of 
role than they have in the US (Archetti 2008a). Secondly, states and news organisations are 
part  of  hierarchical  international  system  in  which  the  US  has  a  unique  position. 
Accordingly, a number of studies have emphasised the ability of the US to influence media 
worldwide especially during international crises (Tunstall & Machin 1999, Soderlund et al 
1994, Thussu 2005). In accordance with such a view, some scholars argue that there is 
homogenisation of news leading to a situation where the media provide the same content to 
everyone anywhere  –  rather  than  adopting  national  perspectives  on  international  news 
(Ruigrok & van Atteveldt 2007, 69). 
There is already considerable amount of research on how the media covered the Iraq War 
in different countries (e.g. Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & 
Hakanen 2005).  However,  only a  few cross-national  studies  have emerged on the Iraq 
crisis coverage (Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2008, 204). A few anthologies on the international 
coverage of the war have been published but different methodological choices by different 
authors often make the comparison between countries rather difficult (see e.g. Nohrstedt & 
Ottosen 2005, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2005). Moreover, many studies have remained mainly 
descriptive with no explicit aim to find inferences in the media coverage of international 
conflicts.  Among  the  few  exceptions  are  Stolle  and  Hooghe's  (2005)  cross-national 
research on television news coverage, Dimitrova and Strömbäck's (2008) comparison of 
Swedish and US press coverage and Lehmann's (2005) analysis of German and US media 
coverage of the UN weapons inspections in the lead-up to the war. All three studies support 
the  notion  that  national  foreign  policy stance  and political  elite  opinion  explained  the 
differences between media outlets. These findings are congruent with previous research on 
war coverage across countries.  However,  other studies have put  more emphasis  on the 
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efficiency of the US strategic communications (Mucunguzi 2005, Comrie & Fountaine 
2005, Nohrstedt 2005, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005, Rafeeq 2007).
1.3 DESIGN FOR A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  improve  our  understanding  of  the  extent  to  which 
mainstream  news  are  constrained  by  the  national  political  environment  in  different 
countries by examining the press coverage of the 2003 Iraq Crisis in Finland, Ireland and 
the UK. Unlike the Gulf War of 1991 or Kosovo War in 1999, the international community 
was divided on Iraq creating a more fruitful research setting. Stolle and Hooghe (2005) 
argue that the invasion of Iraq ”offers us a unique test, not just to examine the mass media's 
role in the war but also to understand whether national media indeed tend to follow their 
governmental arguments and positions in framing the Iraq question.” This study focuses on 
three European countries which adopted different policies with regard to Iraq in the run-up 
to the invasion: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war).  If the media 
tend to reflect the positions of the government and political elites of their host country, the 
media coverage of the invasion of Iraq should be different in countries participating in the 
invasion and in countries that adopted neutral or critical positions on the war (Dimitrova & 
Strömbäck 2008,  203).  Thus,  the principal  hypothesis  is  that  the government  and elite 
opinion would be reflected in the selection of sources and topics as well as the salience 
given  to  pro-war  and  anti-war  arguments  in  newspaper  coverage  in  the  respective 
countries.
This study employs both qualitative and quantitative content analysis to detect differences 
in the press coverage of the Iraq crisis. The coding protocol was designed to detect the 
sources and topics in the press coverage. Moreover, it recorded not only the incidence at 
which some of the most important arguments about the war appeared but also the manner 
in which they appeared (invoked/questioned). 
Four key events – before, during and after the invasion – were identified:
 Colin Powell's presentation at the UN 5 February 2003,
 Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein 17 March,
 the fall of Baghdad 9 April,
 the end of "major combat operations" 1 May.
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The periods of analysis consist of seven days following each of these four events. Thus, the 
total  sample consists  of 28 days  of  press  coverage which amounted to  2960 items. In 
Britain,  the  conservative  Daily  Telegraph (DT)  and  the  left-leaning  Independent (I) 
represent different ends of the political spectrum and should provide an indicative sample 
of the range of debate in the mainstream press. From Ireland, the Irish Times (IT) and the 
Irish Independent (II) were chosen for analysis.3 They are the two biggest quality dailies 
and  represent  different  political  affiliations.  In  Finland,  party  parallelism  in  the  press 
system has significantly weakened over the last few decades leaving the remaining party 
press  marginalised.  Moreover,  the  Finnish  press  system  is  characterised  by  a  strong 
regional press. Therefore, the choice of Finnish newspapers was less obvious. The Finnish 
sample consists of the only national quality daily,  Helsingin Sanomat  (HS), the second 
largest  regional quality daily,  Turun Sanomat  (TS),  and  Ilta-Sanomat (IS) which is  the 
largest tabloid newspaper.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Chapter 2 provides a historical overview on media-foreign policy relationship from the 
Crimean  War  to  the  War  on  Terror  in  which  the  media  is  an  important  battleground. 
Chapter 3 discusses theoretical approaches to that relationship. Chapter 4 provides a rather 
detailed account on the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and US/UK efforts to persuade the 
international  community to  support  military action against  Iraq.  Chapter  5 presents the 
design of the study by discussing selection of countries, newspapers and methods. The 
chapter also discusses the national Iraq policies  of Finland,  Ireland and the UK in the 
context of their foreign policy traditions.
Chapters 6-9 deal with one week of press coverage each. Chapter 6 focuses on the pre-war 
debate which heated up after Colin Powell's representation at the UN Security Council on 5 
February.  Chapter 7 analyses the press coverage at the very beginning of the invasion. 
Chapter  8  discusses  how  the  selected  newspapers  covered  the  fall  of  Baghdad  and 
lawlessness that followed. Chapter 9 analyses the newspaper coverage during the week that 
followed President Bush's announcement of the end of major combat operations in Iraq. 
Finally, chapter 10 discusses the theoretical implications of the findings.
3 The sample includes their Sunday editions where applicable. Both news and 
commentary items were analysed while financial news was excluded from the sample.
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Chapter 2
PERSUASION, FOREIGN POLICY AND MEDIA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In a normative sense, the role of the media in a democracy is to inform the public, debate 
policies and scrutinize the government (Curran & Seaton 2003, 346). However, fulfilling 
these  tasks  is  particularly  challenging  in  the  area  of  foreign  and  security  policy. 
Transparency that  one might  expect  in  domestic  policy may not  apply as  “for  foreign 
affairs officials secrecy is the normal mode” (Newsom 1996, 25). When information is 
provided by  the  government  –  or  when  officials  working  in  the  state  apparatus  leak 
information  to  the  public  domain  – journalists  often  lack  the  means  to  verify  that 
information from other sources.  At the same time, the public has only limited first-hand 
experiences  in  matters  relevant  to  foreign policy issues  leaving the  media  in  a  crucial 
position in informing people about the wider world (Soroka 2003, 42-43; Cohen 1995, 
100). 
International conflicts have often provided fuel for the debate on the relationship between 
foreign policy and the media. Democracies have tended to set restrictions on the freedom 
of the press during crises but the media have also willingly engaged in self-censorship 
when  national  interests  have  been  at  stake.  Occasionally,  reporters  have  objected  to 
excessive secrecy around foreign policy issues while governments have also criticized the 
press for irresponsible reporting. 
Wars pose the ultimate challenge to the freedom of the press and have often strained the 
government-media relationship.  Robert Harris (1983, 152), who was a British reporter in 
the Falklands War, argues that the crisis “exposed habitual abuses by the armed forces, 
Government, Whitehall and the media; it did not create them.”4 This view is shared by Bart 
Cammaerts  and  Nico  Carpentier  (2006,  159)  who  argue  that  “certain  (media  and 
communication) processes become very visible and apparent” in armed conflicts. Hence, 
4  Italics in the original.
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an overview of media-government relations with an emphasis on international crises could 
point to some major tensions and dynamics of this relationship with regard to foreign and 
security policy issues.
This  chapter provides an historical overview of the role of the media in foreign policy 
especially during international crises. It attempts to identify factors that have historically 
influenced  reporting  on  foreign  and  security  policy  issues.  In  addition,  the  chapter 
addresses the changing nature of conflicts in the post-WWII world and its implications on 
media’s  role  in  conflicts.  The  chapter  discusses  media’s  role  in  foreign  policy  in 
democracies in general but the emphasis is on American military operations as the Iraq War 
was  essentially  a  US-led  operation.  However,  the  chapter  also  attempts  to  provide 
background for the countries that are the focus of this study (Finland, Ireland and the UK). 
2.2 EARLY WAR REPORTING AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL 
MEDIA SYSTEM
“Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than ten thousand bayonets” - Napoleon Bonaparte5
The global media system emerged between 1850 and late 1920s (Pike & Winseck 2004, 
644). News gathering from different parts of the world became possible with submarine 
telegraph cables which connected Britain and France in 1851, Britain and the US in 1866 
(by  1892  there  were  ten  transatlantic  cables)  and  Canada  and  Australasia  in  1902 
(Willmore 2002, 92).  The global cable network was dominated by two companies:  the 
British Eastern Telegraph Company and the American Western Union Telegraph Company 
(Thussu 2006, 7). News agencies – French Havas (est. 1835), American Associated Press 
(AP, 1846), German Wolff (1849) British Reuters (1851)  – soon began to operate in global 
news-gathering business to satisfy the growing demand for commercial information which 
was crucial in the emerging global economy (Pike & Winseck 2004, 651; Thussu 2006, 9).
This period also marked the beginning of professional war reporting which immediately 
had  political  ramifications.  William  Howard  Russell’s  (1820-1907)  reporting  of  the 
Crimean War  (1853-56)  included the famous article “The Charge of the Light Brigade” 
depicting disastrous British military tactics in the Battle of Balaclava in 1854. Despite the 
fact that the battle as a whole was a victory for the British-French troops, the British public 
5 Quoted in Laity 2005, 292.
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may not have seen it that way when The Times of London revealed that the light brigade 
had charged combined Russian artillery, cavalry and infantry resulting in heavy casualties. 
Eventually  this  blunder  led  to  the  resignation  of  the  Lord  Aberdeen's  government  in 
Britain.  Shortly  before  the  war  ended,  commander  in  chief  Sir  William  Codrington’s 
general  order  established  regulations  for  war  correspondents  so  that  a  similar  incident 
could not take place in the future. In effect, this order served as a precedent for censorship 
in the Boer War (1899-1902) and the First World War (Knightley 2003, 1-15).  
Another  often  cited  early  example  of  media  influence  on  international  politics  is  the 
Spanish-American War in 1898. It is also known as the “War of the Press” suggesting that 
it was a result of Joseph Pulitzer (1847-1911) and William Randolph Hearst’s (1863-1951) 
newspaper rivalry (Donald 1998). Mott (1962, 527) argues that
”… there seems to be great probability in the frequently reiterated statement that if Hearst had 
not challenged Pulitzer to a circulation contest at the time of the Cuban insurrection, there 
would have been no Spanish-American War. Certainly the most powerful and persistent jingo 
propaganda ever carried on by newspapers was led by the New York  Journal and  World in 
1896-98, and the result was an irresistible popular fervor for war which at length overcame the 
long unwillingness of President McKinley and even swept blindly over the last-minute capitu-
lation by Spain on the points at issue.” 
So, according to the conventional wisdom, the jingoistic press generated war fever that US 
President McKinley could not go against (Neuman 1996, 43).6 Yet, more recent research 
rejects this notion arguing that “[a]t most, the press reenforced attitudes shaped by other 
influences” (Paterson 1996, 351).7 
6  Neither the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ nor the notion of media-driven 
foreign policy was invented in 1990s. The Spanish-American War was an interesting 
precedent to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s for two reasons: 1) It became 
popularly known as the “War of the Press” suggesting a media-driven intervention – 
almost a century before CNN was founded and the debate about the CNN effect; 2) It 
was argued at the time that the US government intervened in Cuba for humanitarian 
reasons – to free the Cubans from the horrors of the Spanish policies (Offner 2004, p. 
57) and to give them democratic institutions. Of course, just like in the 1990s, the reality 
might have been a little more complex: “US intervention hastened Spain’s departure and 
robbed the Cubans of their independence. It was as if France, having intervened in the 
American war of independence, had demanded a naval base on Long Island and the 
right to send in troops whenever it deemed it necessary. Had this happened, the US 
people would hardly be grateful to the French for hastening the departure of the British. 
What is puzzling, and yet so consistent with the fantasy of the City on the Hill, is that so 
many Americans believed, and still believe, that the United States fought for Cuba’s 
independence and kept its promise” (Gleijeses, 2003: 718-719).
7  Auxier (1939) suggests that the “propaganda activities” of the Cuban Junta in the US 
might have contributed to the eventual intervention. Auxier (1940) argues that Middle 
Western newspapers were less enthusiastic about war than the yellow press.
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2.3 MEDIA IN THE TOTAL WAR
While the reporting of the Crimean and the Spanish-American wars was seen to have a 
direct impact on politics, the period that followed tells a different story. Total industrial war 
– which has its roots in the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) – was introduced in its full and 
horrendous scale in the early 20th century (Smith 2006, 60). The World Wars (1914-1918 
and  1939-1945)  required  not  only  the  mobilization  of  regular  armies  but  of  entire 
populations. This development put the mass media in a crucial role in organizing the will 
of the people – and all the existing resources with them – towards one single purpose, 
annihilation  or  unconditional  surrender  of  the  enemy (Brown 2002;  Hallin  1997,  208; 
Taylor  1981).  Soon  after  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  Carl  von  Clausewitz  (1831/1998),  a 
Prussian officer and military theorist, emphasised the importance of the unity of the state, 
military and people in this new type of war. Sir General Rupert Smith (2006, 58) argues 
that  “this  trinity  is  crucial  to  all  forms  of  wars,  to  this  very  day.”  This  had  major 
implications for the role of the media in wartime. Harold D. Lasswell (1971, 10) argued in 
his classic 1927 study Propaganda Technique in World War that
“International war propaganda rose to such amazing dimensions in the last war [the First World 
War], because the communization of warfare necessitated the mobilization of the civilian mind. 
No government could hope to win without a united nation behind it unless it controlled the 
minds of its people. The civilians had to be dependent upon to supply recruits for the front and 
the war industries. The sacrifices of war had to be borne without complaints that spread dissen-
sion at home and discouragement in the trenches.” 
The head of the British Military Intelligence spelled out what was expected of the war 
correspondents by saying that ideal reporter is someone “who writes what he is told is true, 
or even what he thinks  is  true,  but never what  he knows to be true” (Rai 2000).  War 
reporting was censored on all sides because news had become “a strategic commodity, 
building  morale  at  home  and  at  the  front”  (Pinsdorf  1999,  319-320).  Furthermore, 
photographing was not permitted and penalty for violation of this rule was death (Neuman 
1996, 206). The press quickly adapted to the new realities of total war. On 5 August 1914, 
an editorial in Manchester Guardian, which had earlier conveyed pacifist sentiments,8 said:
“England declared war on Germany at 11 o’clock last night. All controversy is therefore at an 
end. Our front is united. Now there is nothing for Englishmen to do but to stand together and 
help by every means in their power to the attainment of our common object, an early and decis-
ive victory over Germany.”9
8 In 1901, the paper had also published stories on the appalling conditions in the 
concentration camps, in which the British had gathered Boer women and children 
during the Boer War, having a considerable impact on the public opinion (Morgan 2002, 
11). However, it should be noted that ”the overwhelming majority of British newspapers 
were imperialist and pro-war to the very end” of the Boer War (Morgan 2002, 5).
9  Quoted in The Great War (1964) BBC documentary series, episode 2.
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In this total war, the uses of propaganda exceeded the control of information available at 
the  home  front.  Soon,  Britain  responded  to  German  propaganda  in  foreign  countries 
(Taylor 1980, 876) and both sides put considerable effort in persuading the US to join their 
side in the war. In the beginning of the war, Britain had cut the transatlantic telegraph 
cables connecting Germany and North America in order to control the American perception 
of the war (Putnis & McCallum 2005, 2). Furthermore, Britain created a mailing list of 
200,000 opinion leaders and provided English newspapers to 360 US newspapers (Sproule 
1996, 7-10). The British strategy was to influence foreign press so that the information 
would not be dismissed as a British propaganda (Putnis & McCallum 2005, 2). 
Since 1911, Reuters with its private international news network had cooperated with the 
British  government  and  distributed  British  government  statements  as  news.  Similarly 
during the Boer War (1899-1902) Reuters's ”reports supported the British cause and the 
British troops” (Thussu 2006, 11).  When the First World War broke out in 1914 Reuters 
became an important element in overseas propaganda operations as it provided the cover of 
impartiality to British war propaganda. Reuters’s General Manager Roderick Jones even 
worked  for  the  government  as  a  Head  of  the  News  Section  of  the  Department  of 
Information and as a Director of Propaganda in the Ministry of Information after it was 
established in 1918 (Putnis & McCallum 2005).
In  addition,  Britain  produced  a  so-called  Bryce  Report  (Report  of  the  Committee  on 
Alleged German Outrages) cataloguing alleged German atrocities in Belgium which had a 
considerable impact on US public opinion despite the fact that many of the stories were 
unverified and dubious (Carruthers 2000, 34). While Lord Bryce did “not seem to have 
been  acting  with  conscious  intention  to  deceive”,  the  context  should  not  be  forgotten: 
Britain had entered the war to guard Belgian neutrality and the mobilization of support 
against Germany might prove crucial for the outcome of the war (Wilson 1979, 379). In 
later wars similar atrocity stories have played a role in swaying the public behind military 
action.
When the US President Woodrow Wilson decided to join the war in 1917, Committee for 
Public  Information  (CPI)  began  convincing  the  masses  of  the  rationale  for  war  by 
distributing  fifty  million  pamphlets  which  were  accompanied  with  a  poster  campaign 
(Sproule 1996, 7-10). The Committee was chaired by a former journalist George Creel who 
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was in  charge  of  propaganda on  both domestic  and  international  levels  censoring  and 
controlling information (Lasswell 1971, 18; Pinsdorf 1999, 321). 
The First World War did not only rewrite the map of Europe but also had other far-reaching 
ramifications. Ross (2006a, 184) argues that the war propaganda 
“marked a significant shift away from nineteenth century panoptical and disciplinary forms of 
governance towards new mechanisms of persuasion and seduction. […] In the process, the un-
derstanding of political leadership changed, as the ability to sustain a popular following, not 
merely to govern effectively in the interests of the state, became the hallmark of modern polit-
ical power. In the years immediately after the war, these tendencies were powerfully reinforced 
by the introduction of new democratic constitutions and the doubling of the electorate with wo-
men’s suffrage, all of which together constituted a fundamental structural transformation of the 
‘public sphere’. The convergence of these interrelated trends—democratic suffrage, a new ap-
preciation of public opinion in the era of ‘total war’ saw, throughout much of Europe, the ad-
vent of a new political form: the modern media democracy.”
What was the role of journalism in this new governance? Schudson (1978, 164) argues 
that,  when  the  war  ended,  “editors  and  reporters  found  themselves  not  partners  to 
government, but instruments of government. They were valued—and feared—not for their 
capacity to represent public opinion, but for their power to control it.” Clearly, the First 
World  War  period  did  not  result  in “a  democratically  oriented  global  communication 
system,  and  especially  not  one  where  the  press  and  public  had  readily  available  and 
affordable access to information, either domestically or internationally” (Pike & Winseck 
2004,  666).  In  fact,  propaganda  gained  notoriety  as  some  of  the  Allied  propaganda 
activities were gradually revealed to the public in 1920s creating a sense that democratic 
governments had fooled their citizens (Miller 2005a, 28).
The first Propaganda State10 emerged in Soviet-Russia in 1917 and was followed by the 
Fascist  regime  in  Italy  and  Nazi  Germany.  The  trend  towards  increasing  opinion 
management could also be seen in democracies during the inter-war period. In Britain, 
several  issues  contributed  to  increasing  interest  in  opinion  control  within  the  polity 
between the world wars. These included the increasing international tension with the rise 
of  fascist  and  communist  regimes,  democratization  of  the  British  society  and  the 
development  of  both  new  communications  technologies  and  scientific  techniques  to 
measure and manipulate public opinion (L’Etang 1998, 419). 
10  According to Paul Rutherford (2004, 184),  “[a] propaganda state refers to a regime in 
which the governors, whether official or unofficial, employ a constant stream of 
messages to propel the population toward some desired condition of right thinking and 
right acting.”
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In 1922, Walter Lippmann (2004, 136), who had worked for the CPI during the war, argued 
that 
“The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died 
out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enorm-
ously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than rule of thumb. And so, as a 
result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the prac-
tice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant 
than any shifting of economic power.
Within the  life  of  the generation now in control  of  affairs,  persuasion has  become a self-
conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to understand the 
consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge how to create consent will 
alter every political calculation and modify every political premise.” 
In the following decades, professional opinion management and public relations developed 
into a significant industry while electronic media, radio and television, entered the arena. 
The Roosevelt administration engaged in growing public relations activities resulting in 
allegations of obstructing the system during 1930s (Schudson 1978, 166). Hadley Cantril, 
one  of  the  early  public  opinion  experts,  provided  his  guidance  to  President  Roosevelt 
(Holsti  1992, 441), who was the first  US president to start  polling (Eisinger & Brown 
1998). The US government supported propaganda research facilitating the establishment of 
social psychology and political communication as disciplines on their own right (Manheim 
1994, 4). Publicity organizations and campaigns were not only inspired by the success of 
war  propaganda but  also  built  on  the  wartime experiences  (Schudson 1978,  142-143). 
Advertising,  ‘commercial  propaganda’,  increased  significantly  and  proved  successful 
which only added to the perception that people in mass societies are easily swayed (Curran 
& Seaton 2003, 127).
The Second World War saw further refinement of manipulation techniques of the public 
opinion  through  the  mass  media.  All  the  practical  experiences  and  theoretical 
understanding  gathered  during  the  last  couple  of  decades  were  put  into  practice 
(Luostarinen 2006).  Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945),  the German minister  of Information 
and Propaganda from 1933 to 1945, wrote down “19 principles of propaganda” which are 
still valid today. The importance of opinion control was understood on all sides. Supreme 
Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower said that “public opinion wins wars, and I have 
always  considered  as  quasi-staff  officers  [the]  correspondents  accredited  to  my 
headquarters” (quoted in Katovsky 2003, x). War correspondents couldn’t challenge the 
official  accounts of fighting due to their  dependence on Allied armies to provide them 
access to the battlefields (Knightley 2003, 352). In addition, Code of Wartime practices 
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required that correspondents’ reports were checked by censors before publishing (Neuman 
1996, 220).
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the US media, including the news agencies, made 
a wartime agreement with the US government and disseminated anti-fascist propaganda 
(Tunstall 2008, 77). Hollywood also pulled its weight as directors such as Frank Capra, 
George Stevens and John Huston offered their film-making skills to the service of the US 
Army during  the  Second  World  War.11 Feature  films  were  produced  in  Hollywood  to 
contribute  to  the  war  effort.  For  instance,  films  such  as  Michael  Curtiz’s  Mission  to  
Moscow (Warner Bros, 1943), Lewis Milestone’s  The North Star (The Samuel Goldwin 
Company, 1943), Gregory Ratoff’s Song of Russia (Loew’s, 1944) and Jacques Tourneur’s 
Days of Glory (RKO, 1944) tried to improve the image of Soviet Union which now fought 
alongside the Western Allies (McNair 1999, 182).12
Similarly  to  the  First  World  War,  propaganda  targeted  also  foreign  audiences  and 
‘psychological warfare’ became a widely used concept. For example, ‘paper bullets’, as 
leaflets  were sometimes referred to,  were used in  an attempt to break the resolve and 
morale of the enemy (Davison 1963, 30). Britain dropped six million leaflets in Germany 
as  soon  as  war  had  been  declared  (Taylor  1981,  27).13 As  Germany invaded  Western 
Europe, the BBC engaged in promoting resistance in occupied Europe (Davison 1963, 34-
35)14 and  the  US started  radio  broadcasts  to  Asia  soon after  Japan had  attacked Pearl 
Harbour (Zaharna 2004, 220). Similarly to the First World War, the British tried to bring 
the US into the war. Michael Powell directed  49th Parallel (1941) after the Ministry of 
Information had requested him to direct a flag-waver. The film was designed to influence 
the American public opinion and to bring the US isolationist policy to an end (Taylor 1999, 
187).15 
11 However, it should be noted that John Huston's documentary San Pietro (1945) was so 
graphic in its depiction of a battle in Italy that it was shelved for many years (Combs 
1993, 269). 
12 Mission to Moscow was even Oscar nominated for best art direction but the 
screenwriters were blacklisted by the House of Un-American Committee (HUAC) when 
the Cold War began. Some had become increasingly concerned about Communist 
infiltration in American institutions and HUAC investigated and blacklisted many 
Hollywood script writers and directors (McNair 1999, 183).
13  This practice was first adopted by Germany in September 1914 (Taylor 1999, 53).
14  It has been argued that novelist George Orwell resigned from the BBC having grown 
disgusted with the propaganda and that this experience inspired him to write Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (L’Etang 1998, 431). 
15 However, the film premiered in the US only in March 1942 when the US was already at 
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Britain’s  war  efforts  were  facilitated  by the  fact  that,  even  though  news  agencies  had 
emerged to challenge government control over news, the cable lines within the British 
empire  allowed  censorship  and  intelligence-gathering  and,  in  effect,  the  British  could 
“control news-flow” (L’Etang 1998, 427). However, it has been argued that, in the post-
war period, the news agencies focused on supplying ”objective factual information and 
were no longer the servants of officialdom that they once were” (Humphreys 1996, 35). 
Nevertheless, in Britain, the Second World War resulted in institutionalization of opinion 
management with the establishment  of the Ministry of Information which was deemed 
necessary for the morale. After the war, the Labour government turned it into a permanent 
institution (Jacobs 1992a).16 
Ireland was one of the only five European states that remained neutral in the Second World 
War giving the Allies concern due to its strategically important position in the Atlantic. 
Nazi occupation of Ireland would have provided a springboard for the invasion of Britain 
(Cole 2006, ix). While, Switzerland, another neutral state, allowed a rather open public 
exchange of views on the war, even the Portuguese press under a fascist regime enjoyed 
more freedom than Irish journalists (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 288-289). John Horgan (2001, 42) 
argues that 
“[b]oth  the  Emergency  Powers  Act  and  the  1939  Offences  Against  the  State  Act,  which 
proscribed the IRA (some of whose elements were pro-German) gave the state an extraordinary 
armoury of emergency powers under which many civil liberties, including the freedom of the 
press, could be subject to more or less arbitrary limitation.”
After the outbreak of the war, the Irish government used these powers to both enforce the 
notion  of  Irish  neutrality,  which  was  supported  by  all  parties,  and  suppress  sensitive 
information  which  could  play  in  the  hands  of  the  warring  parties  (Horgan  2001,  42). 
Hence, “[r]eferences to any of the numerous Irishmen serving in the Allied forces were 
invariably deleted by the censor” and the Irish Times was even subjected to pre-censorship 
(Horgan 2001, 44-45). Meanwhile, the Irish Independent occasionally published editorials 
leaving empty space where they had been censored (Horgan 2001, 45). The  Irish Press17 
promoted the government's neutrality policy (Cole 2006, 3). The censorship was crucial in 
war with the Axis following Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. 
Propaganda films for the domestic audience included for instance The Lion Has Wings 
(1939) and Went the Day Well (1942).
16  Later transformed into Central Office of Information (L’Etang 1998, 433). 
17 A national newspaper published between 1931-1995. It was controlled by Éamon de 
Valera – a founder of the Fianna Fáil political party.
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“hiding the extent of Irish partiality and presenting a picture of correct neutrality to the 
Irish people and the outside world” (Ó  Drisceoil 1996, 292). When the war ended, the 
“extensive and pervasive” censorship was lifted (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 284-285). 
It  is  worth  noting  that  Dublin-based  newspapers  did  not  send  correspondents  to  the 
European war theatre making the Irish press dependent on other sources (Horgan 2001, 
43).18 Hence, the information available to the Irish public was filtered by several censors 
and, for instance, Dresden bombings were covered along the lines of the official Allied 
point of view (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 298-299).
2.4 THE COLD WAR ERA
In the US, the Congress formalized propaganda as a legitimate tool in the conduct of US 
foreign relations  in  1948 (Block 1948, 678).  Yet,  President  Truman did not  revive the 
Office of War Information (OWI) when the Korean War (1950-1953) broke out  partly 
because  of  hostile  attitudes  towards  propaganda  in  the  Congress  (Casey  2005,  705). 
However,  in  1951,  Truman  established  Psychological  Strategy  Board  which  was 
responsible for ‘psychological operations’ which the US Joint Chief of Staff defined as 
“operations designed to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence  their  emotions,  motives  objective  reasoning,  and  ultimately  the  behavior  of 
foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals” (Nelles 2004, 68). The US 
government adopted a position which maintained that only the enemy’s communications is 
propaganda and the US is engaged in providing accurate and impartial information that has 
nothing to do with propaganda. Hence, propaganda as a term was replaced with concepts 
such  as  ‘advertising’,  ‘marketing’,  ‘public  relations’  and  ‘psychological  operations’ 
(Luostarinen 2006). 
In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established US Information Agency, USIA, to 
communicate US policies to foreign audiences in the midst of the ideological confrontation 
of  the  Cold  War  (Blinken  2002,  104).  By  mid-1960s,  USIA  supplied  television 
programmes to “over eighty per cent of the nations of the world which have television 
service” (Browne 1967, 199). At best, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free 
Europe’s weekly audience reached 70 to 80 per cent of Eastern European populace and 50 
18 Germany had a radio broadcast service specifically targeting Ireland during the war ( Ó 
Drisceoil 1996, 143).
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of Soviet population (Blinken 2002, 105).19 Towards the end of the Cold War, development 
of mass communications technologies and infrastructures provided ever increasing access 
to domestic and foreign populations. The BBC, Radio Moscow, Voice of America, Radio 
Peking and Deutsche Welle all began broadcasts in Africa in short succession in late 1950s 
(Taylor 1997, 43). Finally, the communications satellites resulted in proliferation of cross-
border flows of information and the CNN – the first 24/7 news channel – was launched in 
1978.
The BBC played an important role throughout the Cold War as Tony Shaw (2006, 1353) 
argues:
“The cold war was, after all, as much of a propaganda conflict – a battle of words, sounds and 
pictures – as one fought between diplomats, soldiers and politicians. The BBC, as a broadcaster 
of news, comment and entertainment in Britain and large parts of the world throughout the cold 
war, stood at the very centre of this propaganda conflict. Indeed, its role was arguably unique – 
no other media organisation combined such a powerful domestic and external reach, with a 
reputation for independence, impartiality and accuracy.”
It  could be argued that  the legacy of the first  half  of the century was institutionalized 
opinion control and the expansion of government public relations finessed to mobilize the 
population for a total  war but  increasingly used also for more short-term political  and 
commercial  gain.  For  instance,  Britain’s  Prime  Minister  Eden  conducted  an  extensive 
propaganda campaign to secure the support of the British public and the US for his policy 
of  employing  military  force  in  response  to  Egypt's  decision  to  nationalise  the  Suez 
Company in 1956 (Shaw 1995). Consequently, there were notable “pro-government bias” 
in the BBC's coverage of the crisis although it was “on the whole straight and objective” 
(Shaw 1995, 342).
2.4.1 Finland and the Cold War
Finland, having fought against the Soviet Union alongside with the German forces, fell 
into the sphere of influence of the USSR in the aftermath of the Second World War. The so-
called Allied Control Commission led by Chairman Andrei Zhdanov resided in Helsinki 
and some worried that a socialist system would be imposed on Finland. Finland maintained 
its neutral status between east and west as well as its market economy throughout the Cold 
War years. However, the circumstances were a challenge to the freedom of the press. With 
19 Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were covert operations secretly 
funded by the US government via CIA till 1971 (Thussu 2006, 19). After the Cold War 
RFE/RL moved on to start broadcasting to former Yugoslavia (1994) and Iraq (1998) 
(Thussu 2006, 22).
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the Allied Control Commission in the country, the Finnish government warned journalists 
of making comments about the USSR which ran against the official line (Salminen 1999, 
6-7). President Paasikivi's remark reflects the tension between the state and the press: “The 
government  and  the  nation  always  have  to  pay for  the  window glasses  that  the  press 
breaks” (quoted in Rahkonen 2006, 106). 
The Paasikivi-Kekkonen's doctrine of neutrality was based on four pillars: 1) the neutrality 
is acknowledged by foreign governments, 2) that they trust in Finnish neutrality, 3) that the 
Finns  as  a  nation  support  neutrality,  and  4)  that  Finland  is  capable  of  countering  all 
violations of its neutral status. Rahkonen (2006, 106) notes that the second and third pillars 
were important for the media because they were related to public perceptions. Salminen 
(1999, 7) argues that “[b]etween 1944 and 1991, the image of the USSR in the Finnish 
press  was  tinted  by  self-censorship,20 and  this  concept  became  the  subject  of  much 
attention abroad”. The press had become very sensitive about publishing criticism of the 
Soviet Union due to difficult geopolitical position in the Cold War confrontation between 
the Socialist East and Capitalist West though the Finnish press “constantly maintained its 
criticism of the Soviet Union's totalitarian system – at least in a veiled form” (Salminen 
1998,  248).  Simultaneously,  the  reporting  on  the  US  was  “of  markedly  critical  tone” 
(Salminen 1999, 7). In other words, “[i]n spite of all the political disputes and various 
degrees of criticism towards the Soviet Union, the press was mainly loyal to the state and 
protected its efforts to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and at the same time 
get credibility to the Finnish neutrality” (Luostarinen & Suikkanen 2004, 5). 
In the 1970s, some Western observers started to talk about 'Finlandization' and “took the 
view that Finnish journalists  followed Moscow’s  lead to  an  unnecessary extent,  at  the 
expense  of  democracy  and  freedom  of  speech”  (Salminen  1998,  239).21 The  Soviet 
occupation  of  Czechoslovakia  in  1968 was covered  by the  Finnish  media  similarly to 
Western press but when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the tone of the Finnish 
media was less condemning (Salminen 1999, 174).22 Gorbachov’s glasnost policy, fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union gradually freed Finnish media 
20  Salminen (1999, 7) restricts the concept of self-censorship to ”Finland’s relations and 
policies concerning the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and the silence that 
reigned around them”
21 It should be noted that in the 1960s and 1970s there was wide consensus on foreign and 
security policy issues (Rahkonen 2006, 112).
22 For an analysis of Finnish press coverage of Czechoslovakia in 1968 see Mesikämmen 
2007. For an historical overview of Finnish Russophobia see Luostarinen (1989).
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of Cold War constraints.  Consequently,  there have been heated debates on foreign and 
security issues at times – especially with regard to possible NATO membership (Rahkonen 
2007). Since early 1990s it has not been a patriotic duty to support the official foreign 
policy line (Rahkonen 2006, 136). While public opinion is against the membership and the 
foreign policy elite remains divided on the issue,  “the media that  are against  Finland's 
NATO membership represent a minority in the Finnish public sphere” (Rahkonen 2007, 
88). For instance, an editorial in Helsingin Sanomat (10 November 2005) argued that “the 
opinion of the majority of the people cannot be a guideline for foreign policy wisdom. […] 
The government has to trust its own wisdom, but in big issues it should be able to turn the 
citizens to its side” (quoted in Rahkonen 2007, 84). So far, it seems that at least the media 
have  failed  to  convince  the  public  that  Finland  to  should  seek  membership  in  NATO 
(Rahkonen 2007, 91).
2.4.2 The Vietnam War
“Every newspaper asks itself, with respect to every story, ‘Is this news?’ All I suggest is that 
you add the question: ‘Is it in the interest of the national security?’”
John F. Kennedy in a speech to American Newspaper Publishers Association, 27 April 196123 
Conflicts that followed the World Wars were of limited and “non-industrial nature”. They 
did not require the same level of mobilization of populations even though the Cold War 
meant that readiness for a full-scale industrial war had to be maintained (Smith 2006, 152; 
Luostarinen 2006). Before the growing US involvement in Vietnam, the Korean War had 
shown that selling a limited war to the population was not without problems (Casey 2005, 
704). 
For a short moment it seemed that the press was given more freedom in reporting foreign 
and security policy issues as the Vietnam War (1964-75) – “the first television war” – was 
seen to tip the scale in favour of the media again. In accordance with the idea of free press, 
journalists had free access to the battlefield and they were not subjected to censorship. This 
was also meant to send the signal to the home front that the US was winning the war 
(Shpiro 2002, 78). Reporting of the war likened regular political reporting as the Johnson 
administration started to treat  the Vietnam War as just one issue instead of a total  war 
which  would  have  required  mass  mobilization  (Hallin  1997,  209).  Similarly  in  New 
Zealand, which was also militarily engaged in Vietnam, the war and government policy 
23 Quoted in Dadge 2006, 91.
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received  considerable  criticism  in  the  media  (Rafeeq  2007,  43-45).  It  has  also  been 
suggested that Agence France-Presse contributed to the critical tone of the international 
news coverage of the Vietnam War (Tunstall & Machin 1999, 79).
The Viet Cong strategy was to avoid military defeat – rather than to beat the US forces – 
and to create conditions in which US political victory would be impossible (Smith 2006, 
235). The popularity of the war had been declining in 1967 and a poll showed that the 
American  public  did  not  understand  what  the  war  was  about  (Knightley  2003,  441). 
President Johnson was concerned about the public perception of the war and he urged 
General Westmoreland to travel across the US trying to convince the public of the rationale 
of the war in the fall of 1967 (Culbert 1988, 254). While the American troops became 
associated with atrocities on a few occasions such as burning of villages and killing of 
civilians in places like Cam Ne and My Lai, it was the Tet offensive in 1968 that proved to 
be a turning point in terms of domestic support for the war.24 Despite being a disaster for 
the  North  Vietnamese  forces,  the  offensive  indicated  that  the  US  was  nowhere  near 
winning the war. Renowned CBS news anchor, Walter Cronkite, said that he no longer 
believed  the  war  was  winnable  which  eroded  the  support  for  the  war  even  further 
(Hammond 1989, 312; Herman & Chomsky 1988, 201). Years of fighting had taken its toll 
on the will of the Americans to continue fighting while the Viet Cong appeared as resolute 
as ever (Bishop 1978). The foreign policy elite grew more critical of the war and the Nixon 
administration,  which  followed  Lyndon  B.  Johnson’s  presidency,  opted  for 
‘Vietnamization’ strategy reducing the number of US troops while increasing the use of air 
power. Eventually,  US troops were withdrawn and South Vietnam was run over by the 
North  Vietnamese  troops  in  1975  (Smith  2006,  236-237).  Cameras  witnessed  the 
embarrassing evacuation of the remaining Americans from the roof of the US embassy into 
a helicopter in Saigon on 29 April 1975.
The conservative circles and the military became convinced that the war was lost because 
television consistently undermined the public support for the war by bringing the horrors 
of the battle into people’s living rooms (Kinnard 1975, 452; Hallin 1984; Knightley 2003, 
470; MacArthur 1993, 113). General William C. Westmoreland, the Commander of US 
24 In Britain, a protest at the US embassy in London resulted in clashes between the 
demonstrators and the police on 17 March 1968. Tet offensive had dominated the news 
for weeks prior to the demonstrations. Vietnam also divided political parties as the 
opposition wanted PM Harold Wilson to express Britain's support for the US fight in 
Vietnam while the Labour MPs wanted the Prime Minister to distance himself and 
Britain from the war (Whittaker 2005). 
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forces in South Vietnam, argued that “we in this country cannot send men to the battlefield 
unless the public is going to be behind them, and it is up to the politicians to ensure that 
such is the case” (quoted in Neuman 1996, 173). There were concerns whether the US – or 
any other democracy – would be able to sustain popular support for a war in the age of 
television. According to President Richard Nixon, television
“showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war. Whatever the intention behind such 
relentless and literal reporting of the war, the result was a serious demoralization of the home 
front, raising the question whether America would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad 
with unity and strength of purpose at home” (quoted in Hallin 1986, 3).
However, there are plenty of examples of how the media had engaged in self-censorship 
during the Vietnam War. For instance, CBS, ABC and NBC all had an editorial policy of 
shielding their viewers from graphic images which would have shown the true nature of 
war (Herman & Chomsky 1988, 200-201; Neuman 1996, 205; Williams 1993, 325-326). In 
another  example  of  media’s  readiness  to  self-censor,  two Newsweek  journalists  found 
about 1971 “Operation Speedy Express” in which the US 9th Division killed 11,000 people 
– almost half of them were civilians. A toned down version of their story was published 
only six months later (Rai 2000).
In fact, Nixon’s concerns seem surprising if one considers the extent to which news has 
been managed by democratic governments in the post-Vietnam era. The reluctance of the 
US to commit military force in future conflicts without a clear national interest and public 
support – known as the “Vietnam Syndrome” – was remedied by adopting strict limitations 
on the freedom of the press in later military conflicts. Restrictions that had been in place in 
American war reporting from the Spanish-American War to the Korean War in early 1950s, 
were reintroduced (Lansner  2006,  5).  This  strategy had proven to  be successful  in the 
Falklands/Malvinas War between Britain and Argentina in 1982.
2.4.3 The Falklands War
In  the  Falklands  War,  reporters  were  dependant  on  the  military  for  transport  and 
communications  in  the  remote  South  Atlantic.  This  forced  them to accept  Ministry of 
Defence rules in return to access to the battlefield enabling the MoD to control information 
flows (Knightley 2003, 478; Neuman 1996, 203-204). For instance, five weeks after the 
British task force was sent toward the Falklands with 29 reporters onboard, television was 
still  lacking  footage  which  is  almost  unimaginable  in  the  present  real-time  news 
environment (Harris 1983, 77; MacArthur 1993, 138). Harris (1983, 92) argues that 
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“[i]t is clear that in many respects the British people were not given the facts during the Falk-
lands war. Information was handed out slowly and often reluctantly by the Ministry of De-
fence; rumours were allowed to circulate unchecked; and the British authorities frequently used 
the media as an instrument with which to confuse the enemy.”25 
However, the lack of pictures was not BBC’s only concern as its coverage was blamed for 
lack of patriotism. The row over BBC’s war reporting started with Panorama program ‘Can 
We Avoid War?’ which, according to Glasgow University Media Group (1985, 128), was 
mostly supportive of the government policy despite the fact that some critical MPs were 
interviewed. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher found BBC’s use of ‘British troops’ instead 
of  ‘our  troops’ “chilling”  and  one  MP considered  it  almost  a  treason  that  BBC  had 
attempted  to  compare  the  accounts  coming  from  Buenos  Aires  and  British  sources 
(Neuman 1996, 204). Thatcher and other Conservatives’ attack on BBC led the BBC’s 
chairman to say in a press release that “BBC is not neutral” (Glasgow University Media 
Group 1985, 127). Moreover, it was later revealed that privately some senior broadcasters 
in  the BBC deemed it  more important  to cater  for  “the emotional  sensibilities” of  the 
audience than to provide objective and impartial reporting which in a BBC Weekly Review 
Board  meeting  was  considered  “an  unnecessary  irritant”  (Rai  2000).  And  yet,  BBC’s 
Richard Francis, a managing editor, argued that “[o]ur contribution to the national morale 
relies on telling the truth. We are not in game of patriotism. We are dealing with the job of 
finding out facts” (Glasgow University Media Group 1985, 125). 
The Falklands War merely set a precedent of what was to become a common practice of 
strict limitations on press freedom in American interventions in Grenada (1983), Panama 
(1989) and most notably the Gulf War in 1991. Discouraged by the Vietnam experience, 
the US military “excluded the press from the invasion” of Grenada and established press 
pools in Panama (Newsom 1996, 86). In the former case, not only the press but also Larry 
Speakes, spokesman to the Reagan administration, was kept in the dark and he had no prior 
knowledge of the invasion other than rumours (Newsom 1996, 25). Yet, ABC had managed 
to retrieve information about the invasion but withheld it in order to avoid endangering the 
lives of the US troops (Dadge 2006, 91). In Panama, press pools were deployed only after 
the invasion was practically over (Thrall 2000, 235). It was an important testing ground for 
US military’s  media management  strategy before the Gulf  War (Knightley 2003,  485). 
While the military developed ever more sophisticated media management strategies, the 
media also went through significant developments driven by technological innovations. 
25  Italics in the original.
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2.5 THE AGE OF CNN WARS
It  is  easy  to  forget  how  drastic  the  development  of  information  and  communications 
technology has been.26 For example, during the Vietnam War technology was so primitive 
that “footage was generally shot on film, not video, then shipped to a laboratory in Tokyo 
for development, and to New York for final editing” (Culbert 1998, 421). Moreover, actual 
combat footage from Vietnam was rare because the shooting team included a reporter, a 
cameraman and a  soundman and the  required  equipment  was  considerable  (Hammond 
1989, 315).  The first  significant  direct  communication earth  satellites  and the Apple II 
computer were not introduced until 1970s. The Lebanon crisis, in June 1982, was the first 
international  incident  that  was  handled  with  satellite  telephone  system which  enabled 
adequate contacts between Washington and US officials in the field (LaFeber 2000, 13).27 
Finally,  the  emergence  of  global  real-time  all-news  television  channels  reshaped news 
business in 1980s and 1990s; portable satellite dishes enabled transmission from distant 
places and by the end of this period over 120 communication satellites provided instant 
images to some 1.2 billion TV viewers (Bowdish 1998, 32).
In late 1980s, some predicted that the free flow of information will have “profound foreign 
policy implications” (Wriston 1988, 69-70).  The photographs of the Chernobyl  nuclear 
accident – taken by a private satellite – had forced the Soviet superpower to admit the scale 
of the disaster as the pictures had been published on the front pages all over the world. As a 
result of developments in communications technology, the Soviet bloc also lost the ability 
to control information available for its own citizens contributing to the fall of the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern European satellites (Wriston 1988; Barber 1992, Blinken 2002, 104-
105; Hiebert 2005, 2; Hachten & Scotton 2007, 181). In the words of Lech Walesa, trade 
unionist who became the President of Poland in 1990, “[w]hen it came to radio waves the 
iron curtain  was helpless.  Nothing could stop the news from coming through—neither 
sputniks nor minefields, high walls, nor barbed wire. The frontiers could be closed, words 
could not” (quoted in Hachten & Scotton 2007, p. 163). Similarly, by mid 1990s, 60 per 
cent of educated Chinese received their news primarily from the Voice of America (VOA) 
– i.e. US Information Agency (USIA) (Nye & Owens 1996). The international information 
flows became increasingly impossible to regulate (Wriston 1997, 174).
26 Some use the concept of information revolution to “refer to rapid technological 
advances in computers, communications, and software that have lead to dramatic 
decreases in the cost of processing and transmitting information” (Keohane & Nye 
2002, 164). For instance, the computerization of word treatment immediately 
significantly increased the volume of news produced and transmitted (Moisy 1996, 6).
27 Israeli forces attacked Lebanon in order to end PLO presence in its Northern border.
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A number of scholars argue that international news channels such as CNN and BBC World 
have  gained  a  position  where  they are  used  as  messengers  between foreign  ministries 
(Rosenstiel 1994; Stech 1994; Hoge 1994; Louw 2003, 219; Wriston 1997, 174; Gilboa 
2002b, 18-19; Larson 1986). Rosenstiel (1994) describes several incidents where real-time 
television replaced traditional diplomatic channels. For instance, CNN gave voice to the 
outcasts of the world diplomacy such as Ferdinand Marcos, the President of Philippines, 
and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi while it also broadcast Soviet protest for the US invasion 
of Panama in 1989. By the late 1980s, CNN had provided the means to communicate “to 
the entire diplomatic community – if not the public – simultaneously” (Gilboa 2002a, 737). 
However, some have argued that the trend toward real-time reporting was accompanied by 
the decline of professional standards of journalism (Rosenstiel 1994; Gowing 1994a; Hoge 
1994; Gilboa 2002a, 738; Gilboa 2002b, 22-24; Seib 2000, 2001). 
2.5.1 The Gulf War
The Gulf  War of  1991 was the first  true ‘CNN war’ in  which live coverage played a 
significant part. The war proved to be a success for the format of 24/7 news channel. Yet, 
according to Lawrence Grossman, former President of NBC News, the real-time coverage, 
rather  than helping the viewer to  understand what  was  going on,  “served to  mask the 
reality” (quoted in Seib 2001, 61). This was partly due to the fact that most journalists were 
far from the battlefields in their hotels in Saudi Arabia (Keeble 2000, 92). Only CNN’s 
Peter Arnett was in Baghdad reporting via satellite phone (Reese 2004, 261). 
Following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the US government and a public 
relations  firm  working  for  a  Kuwaiti  government  group  conducted  highly  skilful 
information campaigns to mobilize support for military action against Iraq. The priority of 
the US-led coalition was to win the war on the home front before the actual combat phase 
(Mallet 1997, 280). In the lead-up to the war, the CIA estimated that it would take at least 
two years before Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear bomb but the official estimates 
dropped  to  as  less  as  two  months  when  the  war  became  evident  (Keeble  2000,  93). 
Moreover, on the same day as President Bush announced that he would send troops to the 
Gulf,  the  Washington  Post ran  a  story which  claimed  that  Saddam Hussein  had  been 
uncooperative and aggressive in the negotiations with the US threatening to invade Saudi 
Arabia. Yet, the transcript of the meeting between Saddam and the US representative later 
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showed that the Iraqi President had been open to a diplomatic solution and he had assured 
that he did not intend to invade Saudi Arabia (Kellner 2004a, 138). 
Similarly to the First World War Bryce report, false atrocity stories were circulated. This 
time these stories were professionally manufactured with the expertise of Hill & Knowlton, 
a public relations firm with links to the Republican Party representing Citizens for Free 
Kuwait.  The most notorious atrocity story, which was widely reported and used by the 
Bush administration to justify war,  alleged that  Iraqi soldiers had taken 312 premature 
babies out of incubators leaving them to die on the floors of a Kuwaiti hospital. Despite the 
fact  that  the story was fabricated it  played an important role in mobilizing support  for 
military  action  against  Iraq  (MacArthur  1993;  Kellner  2004a,  142).  In  fact,  Hill  & 
Knowlton had conducted a focus group survey to find out that this incubator story was 
highly effective in angering people. In addition, the firm organised a photograph exhibition 
portraying  Iraqi  atrocities  and  provided  both  print  and  video  material  for  the  media 
(Kellner 2004a, 142). 
After  the  Falklands  War,  Robert  Harris  (1983,  150)  had  predicted  that  due  to  the 
development of new technologies the military would not be able to control information to 
the extent it did in the Falklands. Yet, once again, the journalists felt that their access to 
information had been severely and unduly limited (Hachten & Scotton 2007, 151; Fialka 
1992; cf. MacArthur 1993, 199-200, Sharkey 2001, 23). In fact, it has been argued that the 
restrictions for the Gulf War reporting were more substantial  than in any previous war 
(Jacobs 1992b, 675; Kellner 2004a, 137). The so-called pool system allowed only some 
journalists,  often  selected  by  the  army,  to  access  locations  which  the  military  saw 
appropriate.  War  reporting  was  organized  in  a  way  that  reporters’  ability  to  obtain 
information and interpret events independently was limited. Access to official information 
was conditioned to good behaviour while the military provided material such as footage, 
concepts, slogans and frames of reference for journalistic use (Luostarinen 1991, 101). The 
aim of the military was sanitized and bloodless war reporting (Newsom 1996, 87) and it 
was  largely successful  in  achieving  this  (Winter  1992).28 The  war  was  portrayed  as  a 
videogame with ‘surgical’ strikes and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was demonized and 
equated  with  Hitler  (Philo  &  McLaughlin  1995).  This  analogy  “offered  the  military-
industrial complex and the Department of Defense a demon to replace the Soviet menace 
28  For instance, an Associated Press photo editor noted that there were no photographs of 
dead Iraqi soldiers (Fialka 1992, 5).
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in the post-Cold War period” (Yetiv 2004, 85).29 According to Dorman and Livingstone 
(1994, 74), “the press merely replayed the highly personalized Saddam-as-Hitler analogy 
that was so thoroughly tested and refined by Hill and Knowlton research”. 
The  beginning  of  the  ground  war  provides  an  illustrative  example  of  the  military’s 
approach to the media. Shortly before the beginning of the ground war, US Marines were 
exercising amphibious assault in the Gulf area. While reporters were hardly allowed to the 
other fronts, news media was invited to follow the exercise making it a major news story. 
Apparently  this  news  media  transmitted  information  played  a  role  in  the  Iraqi  High 
Command decision to move six divisions to the coast from inland as they assumed that the 
US forces might  attempt to land on the Kuwaiti  shore.  However,  the US troops never 
intended to land on the shore but attack from the west (Neuman 1996, 209; Luostarinen & 
Ottosen 2000, 42). General Norman Schwartzkopf seemed to be aware of the possibilities 
real time news media offered. He said that “an estimated hundred million people world-
wide  (including  the  Iraqi  High  Command)  watches  the  broadcast  live,  as  well  as  six 
hundred million who see the highlights on the evening news” (Taylor 1998, 145).  The 
media supplemented – if  not  replaced – Iraqi intelligence gathering and captured Iraqi 
soldiers even acknowledged that they used radio as a source of information when they 
reported to their commanders.
As a result  of  manipulation and disinformation,  not only the Iraqis  but  also the world 
audience was deceived. For instance, the media portrayed the American Patriot missiles as 
highly successful in intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles which were intended to hit  Israeli 
targets. While President Bush claimed that 41 out of 42 Patriots had hit the target (Stech 
1994), in reality, Patriots rather contributed to civilian suffering and destruction of property 
than prevented it (Winter 1992, 23). However, the illusion of effective cover was important 
for the morale, cohesion of the Coalition and demoralization of the Iraqis (Stech 1994). 
While the US controlled the information to a considerable extent in the Gulf War and the 
effective media management strategies ensured that the coverage favoured the Coalition, a 
more radical notion of media’s power and independence emerged from the post-Cold War 
experiences. This notion claimed that “in international crisis situations global television 
has become the dominating actor in the conduct of foreign policy, replacing elected and 
29 For a more detailed discussion on the analogy see Dorman and Livingstone 1994 and 
especially in relation to the British press see Keeble 1997, 59-76. On Hill and Knowlton 
see Manheim 1994.
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appointed policy makers” (Gilboa 2002a, 732). The debate on growing media power in the 
international  arena  was  particularly  driven  by advances  in  real  time  news  technology, 
proliferation  of  24/7  news  channels  and  a  popular  perception  that  some  of  the 
‘humanitarian interventions’ of 1990s resulted from the so-called CNN effect which can be 
summed up as follows: Media coverage of human suffering and atrocities force Western 
governments to “do something” after public pressure has become unbearable (Jakobsen 
2000,  132). Often cited examples  include Operation Restore  Hope in  Somalia  in  1992 
(Cohen 1994, 9-10; Hachten & Scotton 2007, 182; cf. Mermin 1999; Robinson 2001a) and 
Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 (Robinson 2001c; 2002, 80-82). The CNN 
effect debate was further fuelled by policymakers' remarks such as UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s reference to CNN as “the sixteenth member of the UN Security 
Council” (cited in Gilboa 2002a, 734). 
While the jury is still out on whether the media influence actual policy outcomes, it seems 
that  real-time media  has  put  pressure  on  policy-makers  to  react  faster  to  international 
events.  If  policy-makers refrain from instant  reaction in  order to wait  for the complex 
intelligence gathering, evaluation and, finally, reporting they may come out as weak and 
hesitant (Gilboa 2002b, 19-20; Livingston 1997; Strobel 1997, 34; Seib 2000).
2.5.2 The Balkan Wars
The  Gulf  War  was  soon  followed  by  a  civil  war  in  Yugoslavia.  In  general,  Western 
audiences knew very little about Yugoslavia and its people prior to the dissolution. In this 
sense, news media played a pivotal role in identifying and depicting the warring parties of 
the conflict which eventually escalated into a tripartite civil war between the Serbs, Croats 
and Bosnian Muslims.
The war broke out in Croatia in August 1991 and western journalists entered the country 
adopting the Croat perspective on the events simply because the fighting took place there. 
At this point, local Serbian and – especially – Croatian television stations provided footage 
for  international  distribution.  Consequently,  Swedish  television  news,  for  example, 
depended  for  the  most  part  on  Croatian  footage.  At  the  same  time,  the  Serbs  were 
identified as aggressors and the Croats  as victims (Sommelius 1996, 78).  Furthermore, 
very  few  correspondents  knew  Serbo-Croatian  making  them  dependent  on  local 
interpreters or ‘stringers’ who may have had other loyalties as well. 
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The  Croatian  information  ministry  quickly  hired  English-speaking  publicists  (Brock30 
1993). The reception of international journalists in Belgrade was somewhat different. The 
Yugoslav federal information ministry had very few publicists and the regime was rather 
reserved  with  Western  journalists.  This  attitude  was  reinforced  by  the  coverage  they 
received. Reporters moved to Zagreb and Sarajevo after the UN imposed sanctions against 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 30 May 1992 – in the aftermath of the so-called 
Breadline Massacre31. As a result, the Serbs lacked resources to hire a western PR firm to 
present its case internationally.  At this point,  Serb failure to get its message across via 
international  media  was  evident  and  it  derived  from “official  negligence,  international 
sanctions, and a lack of media professionalism” (Brock 1993).
One of the peculiarities of media coverage on the dissolution of Yugoslavia is that Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman was often seen “as a spiritual cousin of the German Christian 
Democrats” and the Croat regime as a democracy. The western media depicted the conflict 
as  a  struggle between democratic  ideals  and totalitarian Communism of  the Milosevic 
30  It should be noted that Sabrina Ramet has referred to Peter Brock (under the heading 
‘Belgrade’s Friends in the West’) by stating that “[o]ther writers accused U.S. media of 
bias and one-sided reporting because the media devoted more time to reporting Serbian 
atrocities against non-Serbs than vice versa. No doubt there were those who, in World 
War II, considered it ‘biased’ that the American media devoted so little attention to 
discussing the ‘atrocities’ perpetrated by the Polish resistance against Nazi occupation 
forces.” (Ramet 2002, 220.) The point to note is that the information warfare over the 
story of Bosnia continues. Ramet equates the Serbs with the Nazis which is exactly 
what Ruder Finn – a public relations firm working for the Bosnian government – was 
trying to do. Ramet’s analogy is rather inappropriate to be presented in a scholarly study 
and – perhaps more importantly – she misses Brock’s point.
31  An explosion took place in a breadline in Vase Miskina Street in Sarajevo on 27 May 
1992. Bosnian government blamed the Serbs and used the incident to put pressure on 
the UN Security Council, which was preparing to vote for sanctions against Serbia. 
Horrific footage of the incident had been shown on CNN and other news channels 
(Gjelten 2002). The UN set sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (UN Security 
Council resolution 757) on 30 May in spite of the fact that UN sources later 
acknowledged that Bosnian Muslims had themselves “set off explosives that killed 22 
civilians outside a Sarajevo Bakery” (Brock 1993). Some eyewitnesses claimed that the 
street had been blocked off before the explosion while TV crews waited at a safe 
distance enabling them to be instantly on the spot (Thomas 1998, 134-135). However, 
Tom Gjelten (2002), a correspondent and the author of Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its  
Newspaper Under Siege, argues that the Sarajevo TV crew happened to be making an 
interview in an office building nearby and was alarmed by the explosion. The 
controversy remains because the UN did not do any investigation, interviewed 
eyewitnesses nor analysed the craters. Nevertheless, Generals Lewis MacKenzie and 
Satish Nambier of the UN peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, were convinced that 
Muslims had staged the event.
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regime even though neither of them was democratic but rather nationalistic and totalitarian 
(Sommelius 1996, 79-80; Hammond 2000a, 25; Hammond 2004, 184).32 
Wolfsfeld (1997, 23) argues that stories from Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital under siege, 
were “the only way for the Muslims to mobilize external support” they desperately needed 
against  a  more  powerful  enemy who would  have  preferred  to  keep  the  conflict  as  an 
internal affair. The Bosnian government strategy was to ensure Western military support by 
manipulating the international media (Badsey 2000, 5). The Bosnian government had hired 
Ruder  Finn,  a  Washington-based  public  relations  firm,  to  run a  successful  information 
campaign to mobilize Western support (Brock 1994; Binder 1994, 1995; Binder & Roberts 
1998; Seaton 1999, 267; Sommelius 1996; Thomas 1997; Thomas 1998). The strategy of 
this public relations campaign was to portray the civil war as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and equate 
the Serbs with Nazis.  In  an interview with Jacques Merlino in  April  1993, director  of 
Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs, James Harff, stated that 
“At  the beginning of  August  1992,  New York Newsday came out with the affair  of  [Serb] 
concentration  camps.  We jumped  at  the  opportunity  immediately.  We outwitted  three  big 
Jewish organizations - B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, 
and the American Jewish Congress. We suggested to them to publish an advertisement in the 
"New York Times" and to organize demonstrations outside the United Nations.
That was a tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of 
the [Muslim] Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. 
Nobody understood what was happening in Yugoslavia. The great majority of Americans were 
probably asking themselves in which African country Bosnia was situated. But by a single 
move we  were  able  to  present  a  simple  story  of  good  guys  and  bad  guys,  which  would 
hereafter play itself. We won by targeting Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a 
clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content, such 
as "ethnic cleansing", "concentration camps", etc., which evoked images of Nazi Germany and 
the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional charge was so powerful that nobody could go 
against it.” (Quoted in SourceWatch 2004)
John Simpson of the BBC seems to support Harff's analysis: “a climate was created in 
which it was very hard to understand what was really going on, because everything came 
to be seen through the filter of the Holocaust” (quoted in Hammond 2004, 183). Ruder 
Finn was awarded a silver medal in crisis communication for their work in Bosnia by the 
Public Relations Society of America (Kempf 2002b, 228).
Hundreds of journalists  were trapped in the besieged Sarajevo – where satellite  dishes 
enabled transmissions (Gowing 1994b, 43) – not knowing what was going on in the rest of 
32  In 1993, Council of Europe had criticized the Tudjman government for taking over the 
media enterprises and enforcing conformity in media views. According to Ramet (2000, 
166), “Tudjman’s treatment of media contributed to the impression that he was an old-
fashioned authoritarian without much tolerance for diversity.”
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the  country  (Binder  &  Roberts  1998,  40).  The  Bosnian  government  spokesmen  were 
always ready to present  their  views via satellite links  to international audience but the 
journalists  were unable to check the ‘facts’ Bosnian officials provided them (Binder & 
Roberts 1998, 44). On occasion, some tried to reach places like Mostar, a town in Western 
Bosnia, which was under siege by the Croats, but not all survived (Gowing 1994a). For 
example, an Italian TV crew lost three of its members in an attempt to cover the Mostar 
story in February 1994. The plight of this western Bosnian city went “virtually unreported” 
(Gowing 1994b, 26).
Because it was too dangerous to move in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reporting was heavily 
concentrated  on  Sarajevo  resulting  in  rather  one-sided  coverage  and  dissemination  of 
unverified  information.  For  instance,  the  numbers  of  killed  and  raped  were  highly 
exaggerated in news media because the estimates were based on Bosnian and Croatian 
government propaganda (Brock 1993; Thomas 1998, 135-36; Binder & Roberts 1998, 42-
43). Significant media organizations used the numbers given by the Bosnian government 
estimates  of  200,000-250,000  killed  in  the  conflict  while  Stockholm  Peace  Research 
Institute  estimated  in  1996 that  30,000-50,000 had been  killed  by the end of  the war. 
Similarly,  there  were  allegations  of  60,000  rapes  but  organizations  such  as  Amnesty 
International and the Red Cross agreed on 20,000 (Thomas 1998, 136-37). Bosnian Serbs 
provided information for the European Parliament and the UN that contained accusations 
of raping and killing Serb women but the media showed only minimal interest to alleged 
atrocities against Serbs while many of the stories of Serb aggression were based on similar 
unverified information (Brock 1993).
The journalism norms worked in the favour of the Bosnian government: the more negative 
information you give, the more newsworthy it is. Also the fact that the news industry is a 
highly competitive market influences the way far-away conflicts are covered – if they are 
covered at all (Seaton 1999, 257). This may have resulted in biased coverage as editors 
found the realities of the conflict too confusing and preferred a simple narrative of Good 
and Evil (Seaton 1999, 266-67). Correspondents complained that their reports had been 
revised by editors while a UN official said that “[t]he American press has become very 
partisan and anti-Serbian. They are very selective and manipulative with the information 
they use.” Furthermore, even respected news organisations such as Time, New York Times, 
BBC, Newsweek and CNN made blatant mistakes. A common error was the identification 
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of the victims of atrocities in pictures or footage as Muslims even when they were Serbs 
(Brock 1993).
Some journalists voluntarily gave up objectivity as a journalistic ideal and replaced it with 
“journalism of attachment” which insists that journalists cannot remain neutral in violent 
conflicts.  Instead,  reporters  “have  to  take  the  side  of  the  victims  and  demand  that 
something must be done” (Kempf 2002a, 59). Martin Bell (1997), who coined the phrase, 
argued that 
“In place of the dispassionate practices of the past I now believe in what I call the journalism 
of attachment. By this I mean a journalism that cares as well as knows; that is aware of its re-
sponsibilities; and will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim 
and the oppressor. This is not to back one side or faction or people against another; it is to 
make the point that we in the press, and especially in television which is its most powerful divi-
sion, do not stand apart from the world. We are a part of it. The influence may be for better or 
for worse, and we have to know that too.” 
According to Stephen Badsey (2000, 4), “journalists more than once told senior officers in 
confidence that they had chosen their side, and their personal objective was to promote 
even greater and more violent Western military intervention.” According to BBC’s Nik 
Gowing,  journalists  “empathized  with  the  Bosnian  government  because  of  personal 
outrage at  Serb aggression” and that “this  partiality distorted the reporting” (quoted in 
Binder & Roberts 1998, 45). In September 1992, Roy Gutman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist, chose not to report about the massacre of 17 Serbs in the vicinity of Banja Luka 
later acknowledging this abandonment of objectivity in favour of the attempt to pressure 
Western governments to take action (Brock 1993).33
Kempf (2002a, 59) argues that journalism of attachment lacks analysis and vision as it 
merely depicts the conflict as a struggle between Good and Evil while reporters take the 
role  of  judges  deciding  on  what  is  right  and  wrong.  Put  in  practice,  journalism  of 
attachment led to situation where
 “[j]ournalists faked empirical evidence by producing television images that did not show what 
they were claimed to show, but which put on show clichés and stereotypes which propaganda 
had already implemented in the minds of the audiences. And – which is perhaps even more 
symptomatic  –  journalists  openly justified  such  forgery by claiming that  it  did  not  matter 
whether the pictures were faked since they served the goal of opening the eyes of the public” 
(Kempf 2002a, 60).
33  Yet, Gutman has warned about the danger of choosing sides: “Our job is to supply the facts so other 
people can make the judgments. The worst thing is to step across the line and recommend what should be 
done” (Gjelten 2001, 73).
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However, Christiane Amanpour, an award-winning senior international correspondent for 
CNN, seems to reject this notion. She sees that the clear identification of “aggressor (Serb) 
and victims (Muslims)” by the international media was justified and that accusations of 
partisanship resulted from the nuisance and pressure journalists caused for Western leaders 
who were reluctant to get involved in the Balkan conflict.
“Bosnia was a just cause. The victims, the Bosnian Muslims, after all were upholding all the 
ideals we who belong to democracies consider sacred: multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, toler-
ance. If Bosnia lost, we all would lose” (Amanpour 1996).
It has also been argued that the journalists were incompetent to understand what was going 
on in Bosnia because there were very few permanent correspondents in the area prior to the 
war (Binder & Roberts 1998, 35-36).
The presence of journalists seems to have influenced how the war was fought. According 
to Brock (1993, 154-155), several  credible sources have confirmed that Bosnian forces 
“frequently fired on their own positions and people in Sarajevo and manipulated artillery 
attacks  elsewhere in  Bosnia  for public  relations and other  purposes.” Canadian Major-
General MacKenzie said at a press conference that he was unable to guarantee ceasefire 
“because I can’t keep the two sides from firing their own positions for the benefit of CNN” 
(Badsey 1997).
These public relations stunts were part of the media coverage which also served as source 
of information for world leaders. Based on interviews with policymakers, Gowing (1994b, 
36)  argues  that  the  creation  of  UN safe  areas  was  heavily  influenced  by news  media 
because the non-aligned countries of the UN Security Council acted upon the information 
they received from television coverage. Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria acknowledges 
that  “[i]t  was  the  knowledge  [from TV images]  that  drove  me  because  they gave  me 
information”  Furthermore,  a  senior  UN  official  has  stated  that  “TV  images  were 
fundamental.  The  non-aligned  relied  on  television  rather  than  the  UN.  If  TV had  not 
existed then the non-aligned would not have had the basis to pressure.” These are only few 
examples of how deeply the media, and public relations firms, became involved in the 
Bosnian War.
When  the  NATO  intervened  in  the  Balkans  to  stop  the  alleged  ‘ethnic  cleansing’ of 
Albanian  Kosovars  in  1999,  NATO  conducted  an  astonishing  information  campaign. 
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea has told that
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“One thing we did well during the Kosovo crisis was to occupy the media space… We created 
a situation in which nobody in the world who was a regular TV watcher could escape the 
NATO message. It was essential to keep the media permanently occupied and supplied with 
fresh information to report on. That way, they [were] less inclined to go in search of critical 
stories.” (quoted in Kitfield 2001, 39).
In the absence of UN Security Council mandate, Serbian refusal to sign the Rambouillet 
accord was used as a justification for war. What went unreported is that the Rambouillet 
Accord’s  Appendix  B  (United  Nations  1999)  on  the  “status  of  multi-national  military 
implementation  force”  stated  that  “NATO  personnel  shall  enjoy,  together  with  their 
vehicles, vessels, aircraft,  and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded 
access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters” and that 
“NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal”. 
These are terms that NATO hardly could have expected any sovereign state to agree with. 
Only a year later, the BBC reported that the Rambouillet talks had been “designed to fail” 
(Hammond 2000a, 22). 
The  NATO  information  strategy  was  to  portray  the  war  as  moral  imperative  and  a 
humanitarian intervention (Hammond 2000a, Thussu 2000a). For instance, Blair stated that 
the war was between “Good and Evil; between civilisation and barbarity; democracy and 
dictatorship”  (quoted  in  Hammond 2000a,  20).  Milosevic  was  demonized  in  a  similar 
fashion as the Iraqi leader Saddam  Hussein in the Gulf War. On 19 April,  a picture of 
Milosevic  was on  Newsweek’s  cover  accompanied with a  headline “The Face of  Evil” 
(Lansner 2006, 7). As PM Blair’s public relations aide Alastair Campbell (1999, 36) noted, 
NATO was hardly in the risk of being defeated in military terms, but losing the “battle for 
hearts  and  minds”  was  still  a  possibility.  In  order  to  avoid  this,  Blair  and  Campbell 
campaigned for  the  Kosovo War  using political  marketing  techniques  more commonly 
used  in  domestic  political  communications  and  election  campaigning  (Vickers  2000). 
Meanwhile, geopolitical realities often went unreported because Western television news 
channels  “tended  to  repeat  uncritically  the  Western  position”  and  provide  moral 
justification  of  ‘humanitarian  intervention’ rather  than  report  on  Western  strategic  and 
economic interests in the Balkan region (Thussu 2002, 205). 
It has been argued that “most journalists covering the war were highly critical” (Hachten & 
Scottin  2007,  153)  but  empirical  research  does  not  seem  to  support  this  view  (cf. 
McLaughlin 2002). For instance, the legality of the war was a marginal issue in editorial 
commentary on the Kosovo War in the German press (Eilders & Lüter 2000). The Flemish 
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press, in turn, heavily favoured NATO’s point of view and the coverage was dominated by 
“black-and-white reporting devoid of any critical reflection and without any knowledge of 
the complex context of the Balkan” (De Bens et al 2002, 255). Nelles (2004, 73) argues 
that the 
“Western media offered little serious investigative journalism, largely reporting and reinforcing 
American and NATO propaganda efforts  without questioning ‘facts’ presented.  The United 
States and NATO immediately and effectively became judge, jury and executioner, demonizing 
Milosevic and the Serbs, even ignoring its own earlier allegations of Albanian ‘terrorism’, as 
well as OSCE mechanisms in place to prevent or de-escalate violent conflict or outright war. 
This  is  a  complicated  story,  which  became  a  simplified  American-led  NATO  show  and 
Pentagon-choreographed media event simply,  and inaccurately,  depicted the fight  as one of 
‘good’ prevailing over ‘evil’.”
NATO strategy was to prevent news and pictures coming out of Serbia and also to control 
information  within  the  country  (Hammond  2000b).  In  line  with  this  strategy,  NATO 
considered Serbian Television station as a legitimate target. The subsequent bombing, in 
which 16 media workers were killed, was a sign of a change in Western news management 
strategies (Paterson 2006). In the following Western military engagements in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, war reporting became increasingly dangerous and US forces were involved on a 
number of occasions in which media workers lost their lives.
2.6 THE WAR ON TERROR
In 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. laid the ground for a 
greater government control of the frames of reference in the American media (Zelizer & 
Allen 2002). For instance, Michael Ryan's (2004) study shows that not a single editorial of 
ten largest US newspapers challenged the war in Afghanistan in the time period between 
9/11 2001 and the start of the war on 7 October. Some have even argued that the global 
War on Terror has marked the “revival of the propaganda state” (Snow & Taylor 2006; 
Rutherford 2004).
Soon after the military operation in Afghanistan was launched, Condoleezza Rice, National 
Security Advisor to President Bush, publicly asked the US media not to carry terrorist 
‘propaganda’. The media complied with the request and engaged in self-censorship (Louw 
2003,  225;  Hoffman 2002).  CNN specifically instructed its  workers  to  remind the TV 
viewers that the murdering of American civilians in New York and Washington was the 
reason for the war in Afghanistan (Luostarinen 2001, 29).  In fact,  CNN staff was also 
instructed  that  “showing  the  misery  of  Afghans  ran  the  risk  of  promoting  enemy 
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propaganda” (Louw 2003, 225). For example, as Voice of America (VOA) broadcast an 
interview with a Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar the “acting chief was quickly 
replaced”  (Hoffman  2002).  Meanwhile,  Donald  Rumsfeld,  US  Secretary  of  Defense, 
accused correspondents of being the enemy’s advocates in Afghanistan promoting Taliban 
and al-Qaeda propaganda. He claimed that the Taliban “would lie and drag people out of 
hospital over to a neighbouring building and claim we hit the hospital or killed innocent 
civilians, when we didn’t, and the press would carry it as though it were true” (quoted in 
Media Under Fire, 11).
It  has been even argued that “winning modern wars is as much dependent on carrying 
domestic and international public opinion as it is on defeating the enemy on the battlefield” 
(Payne 2005, 81). The global war on terror is a case in point since the objective is the will 
of the people rather then beating enemy forces in the field. Media has become a major 
factor for both the terrorists and the Pentagon in planning their strategies (Louw 2003, 
211). For instance, the events of 9/11 2001 were specifically designed for the news media 
(Sphiro 2002, 80; Louw 2003; see also Rampton & Stauber 2003, 132-133).
After 9/11 2001, it became evident that the US image problem in the Middle East could 
have serious repercussions. In an effort to tackle anti-American sentiments in the region, 
Charlotte  Beers,  who is  famous for  branding products  such as  American Express,  was 
appointed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to brand the 
US in October 2001 (van Ham 2002, 249). Moreover, in 26 February 2002, the Pentagon 
revealed  that  it  was  planning  a  new  propaganda  office  called  the  Office  of  Strategic 
Information, which would seek to feed news items to the foreign media in an effort to 
manipulate public opinion. The New York Times reported on these plans and the office was 
disbanded due to  a controversy that followed from the possibility that American media 
might pick up these false stories from foreign media (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 49). 
In  the aftermath  of  9/11,  the  US government  established  Arabic-language Radio Sawa 
(“Together”) to counter the predominant anti-Americanism in the Middle East region. The 
radio station, broadcasting a combination of pop music and news, was later followed by a 
satellite television station al-Hurra (“The Free One”) as a response to the emergence of 
pan-Arab news organisations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.  Despite  the first-year 
budget of $62 million, various experts doubted that the effort would pay off because it is 
the American policies that cause discontent and until the policies change there will be no 
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significant changes in opinions. In addition, Al-Hurra lacks credibility because Arabs may 
see it merely as a vessel promoting American interests and policies (Borchgrave 2004; el-
Nawawy 2006). 
The centrality of the news media in the war on terror is also reflected in the considerable 
efforts of the Bush administration to discredit Arabic television news channel Al-Jazeera 
during  the  Afghan  campaign  (2001)  and  the  War  on  Iraq  (2003)  (Figenschou  2006). 
According  to  a  10  Downing  Street  memo  that  was  leaked  to  the  Daily  Mirror (22 
November 2005),  President Bush even considered bombing Al-Jazeera Headquarters  in 
Doha, the capital of Qatar, in the spring of 2004 when the battle of Fallujah was raging in 
Iraq – despite the fact that Qatar is an important ally for the US in the Middle East.34 
President Bush’s (2001, 20 September) remark “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists” also sent a message to international news media. Kate Adie, BBC correspondent, 
has claimed that the Pentagon threatened to “bomb areas in which war correspondents are 
attempting to report from the Iraqi side” during the Iraq War (quoted in Media Under Fire:  
Reporting Conflict in Iraq, 3). In fact, the US has destroyed several news media bureaus in 
Afghanistan (both in  Kabul  and Kandahar)  and Iraq since the bombing of the Serbian 
television during the Kosovo campaign (Sreberny & Paterson 2004, 19-20; Seppälä 2002, 
60;  Gowing  2003;  Paterson  2006).  The  Pentagon  has  been  very  reluctant  to  even 
investigate  incidents  in  which  US forces  seem to  have  killed  media  workers  (Gowing 
2003). It seems that the US forces do not make any distinction between legitimate news 
media satellite uplinks and those belonging to the enemy in the war zone (Paterson 2006, 
25; Bell 2008).
34 Regular columnist with the New York Post Ralph Peters argued that “The [US] Marines 
in Fallujah weren’t beaten by the terrorists and insurgents, who were being eliminated 
effectively and accurately. They were beaten by al-Jazeera. . . . The media [are] often 
referred to off-handedly as a strategic factor. But we still don’t fully appreciate [their] 
fatal power. . . . In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and 
insurgents to escape us—despite promising that we would bring them to justice. We 
stopped because we were worried about what already hostile populations might think of 
us. The global media disrupted the US and Coalition chains of command. . . . We could 
have won militarily. Instead, we surrendered politically and called it a success. Our 




Ever since the global media system emerged, it  has provided an additional front in the 
struggle to extend one’s influence to both domestic and foreign mass media audiences. 
These  efforts  have  been  particularly  intense  in  the  lead-up  and  during  international 
conflicts.  Past  conflicts  have shown that  “[e]very single  nation,  whether  totalitarian  or 
democratic, uses different types of propaganda  before  the war (to prepare and mobilize), 
during  the  war  (to  confuse and  encourage)  and  after  the  war  (to  justify  and  ‘write 
history’)” (Nord & Strömbäck 2006, 86).35 As a logical consequence from the fact that the 
commercial news media infrastructure as well as its audiences are beyond comparison to 
information infrastructures that any government possesses (Bowdish 1998) global media 
continue to provide the battleground for the conceptual level  of international conflicts. 
Accordingly, media management strategies have become central in modern warfare (Louw 
2003,  218;  Badsey  2000,  2000b;  Seppälä  2002,  49).  “Knowledge  weapons”  and 
information  warfare  (IW)  manifest  the  fact  that  considerations  of  media  have  indeed 
influenced military strategies (Taylor 1997, 16). 
The rapid development  of information technology has contributed to  transformation of 
social, economic and political structures which have, at least to some extent, eroded the 
basis of the modern international system such as state sovereignty, national economies and 
military  power  (Wriston  1997).  It  has  been  argued  that  this  transformation  has  also 
reconfigured the sources of power and influence in the international system (Mowlana 
1993,  59;  Nye 1990a,  1990b) and that  the exercise  of  power rests  more and more on 
images and persuasion which are often linked with the so-called soft power (Keohane & 
Nye 2002; Metzl 1999, 17; van Ham 2002; Nye 1990, 2004; Gilboa 2002a, 731; Nye & 
Owens 1996). Metzl (1999, 13) argues that
“[m]ilitary action alone will not be effective without a sustained information campaign targeted 
at foreign populations explaining and justifying anti-terrorist activities in ways local popula-
tions will understand and appreciate. [...] [T]he essential engagement is not just physical but 
also conceptual. Success in specific geographic areas will only be successful if it is parlayed 
into success in conceptual spheres. Achieving this will require a fundamental change in the 
way governments behave in carrying out their foreign affairs” 
35  On the same tone, Luostarinen & Ottosen (2002, 44) divide war propaganda in four 
stages. ‘Preliminary stage’ introduces the “target country to the news agenda”. At 
‘justification stage’, this country becomes major news theme allegedly requiring urgent 
action. During the ‘implementation stage’ different methods are used in order to control 
war reporting. And finally, at the ‘aftermath justification phase’ sees the target country 
gradually fading from the news agenda. 
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The changing nature of conflicts themselves has contributed to the growing importance of 
the media. Sir General Rupert Smith (2006), who has served in the Gulf War, Bosnia and 
Northern  Ireland,  argues  that,  after  the  Second  World  War,  industrial  wars  have  been 
replaced by ‘wars amongst people’ which cannot be solved merely by applying military 
force. Since the objective in these wars is the will of the people, they extend to people’s 
living rooms via media. Smith (2006, 284-285) characterizes the role of the media in these 
new wars in the following way:
“Television and the internet in particular have brought conflict into the homes of the worlds – 
the homes of both leaders and electorates. Leaders are influenced by what they see and by their 
understanding of the mood of the audience, their electorate. And they act on these perceptions, 
often for reason to do with their own political purpose rather than the one at issue in the fight 
itself. Indeed, confrontations may end up crossing into conflicts, or escalating in levels of fight-
ing, or indeed crossing the other way and de-escalating owing to perceptions formed from the 
media. Whoever coined the phrase ‘the theatre of operations’ was very prescient. We are con-
ducting operations now as through we were on a stage, in an amphitheatre or Roman arena. 
There are two or more seats of players – both with a producer, the commander, each of whom 
has his own idea of the script. On the ground, in the actual theatre, they are all on the stage and 
mixed up with people trying to get to their seats, the stage hands, the ticket collectors and the 
ice-cream vendors. At the same time they are being viewed by a partial and factional audience, 
comfortably seated, its attention focused on that part of the auditorium where it  is noisiest, 
watching the events by peering down the drinking straws of their soft drink packs – for that is 
the extent of the vision of a camera.” 
The recent developments in military-media relationship have led Martin Bell (2008, 202) 
to argue that “We live in a new and more dangerous world, in which the journalists are no 
longer peripheral observers but influential players in the theatre of war”. Bell argues that 
while the nature of the war has changed, ”war reporting as we have known it no longer 
exists” (2008, 203):
 ”It is hard to escape the conclusion that in the absence of the independent journalism that has 
been  driven  from  the  field,  embedded  reporting  is  by  its  nature  deeply  and  dangerously 
misleading.... I would hazard a guess that readers of The Times in 1854 were better informed 
about the Crimean war than the readers of any newspaper, or the viewers of any TV network, 
about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2008.”
At the same time, the concentration of media ownership has left a few huge companies 
responsible  for  a  large  bulk  of  media  content  and  distribution  –  many of  which  have 
economic  interests  in  a  wide  range  of  industries.  For  example,  the  American  NBC 
television network is owned by General Electric which is also heavily involved in arms 
industry and bids for Pentagon contracts in places like Afghanistan.36  Some observers hold 
the  view  that  these  links  are  so  extensive  that  it  is  justified  to  talk  about  “Military-
Industrial-Media Complex” in reference to Eisenhower's warning of growing influence of 
36  ”By 2002, ten gigantic multinational corporations, including AOL Time Warner, 
Disney-ABC, General Electric-NBC, Viacom-CBS, News Corporation, Viviendi, Sony, 
Bertelsmann, AT&T, and Liberty Media controlled most of the production of 
information and entertainment throughout the globe” (Kellner 2004b, 6).
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arms industry at  the height  of the Cold War in 1961 (Solomon 2005, Reel 2004).  For 
instance, Danny Schechter (2004, 30) argues that the media complacency is partly due to 
”the avid cooperation of the corporate sector, which owns and controls most media outlets. 
Some of those companies, such as NBC parent General Electric, have long been a core com-
ponent of that nexus of shared interests that President Eisenhower called the 'military-industrial 
complex.' Now the media is part of the complex.”
Moreover, global  news  flows  are  essentially  dominated  by  Anglo-American  news 
organizations to such a degree that some have claimed that there is, in effect, a “world 
news  duopoly”  (Tunstall  &  Machin  1999,  77).  Especially  important  elements  of  this 
dominance are the two largest news agencies: the American Associated Press (AP) and the 
British  Reuters.  Hamid  Mowlana  (1993,  69)  argues  that  “[t]ransnationalization  of 
information distribution through media conglomerates is a particularly disturbing trend, for 
it  allows  one  cultural  and/or  national  perspective  –  mostly  American  –  to  expand  its 
influence  over  the  global  cultural  industries  and  the  distribution  of  information.”  This 
hegemonic  position  in  the  global  news  industry  gives  the  US  “a  permanent  strategic 
advantage” (Luostarinen & Ottosen 2002, 56) and this is reinforced by the fact that media 
has become an increasingly important element in modern warfare. 
Armed  conflicts  pose  the  ultimate  challenge  for  journalism.  Governments  have  grown 
increasingly  sophisticated  and  ruthless  in  their  information  campaigns  and  news 
management  while,  after  the  Cold  War,  the  number  of  foreign  correspondents  has 
decreased  especially  in  American  media  organizations  and  the  pressures  of  real-time 
coverage may have lowered journalistic standards. New portable technology which allows 
reporters to transmit via satellite links has not freed journalists from their dependence on 
official sources (Livingston & Bennett 2003). 
Tony Blair’s (2007) speech “Defence of the United Kingdom and Its Interests” indicates 
that the fears about the implications of “a completely new world of modern communication 
and media” for foreign policy have become a constant concern for policy-makers. While 
Nixon raised concern about television – a relatively new medium at that time – Blair was 
also  concerned about  an Internet  website  where military personnel  can send gruesome 
images from the battlefields. Yet, post-Vietnam conflicts showed that the media could still 
be  used  as  an  instrument  in  manufacturing  consent  by  democratic  governments.  Des 
Freedman (2004, 68) argues that 
“while there have been many moments of tension between media and government in the report-
ing of war, their interests are not fundamentally opposed. Governments need sympathetic me-
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dia coverage to legitimise and sustain war while, with very few honourable exceptions, editors 
and journalists share many of their government's ideological assumptions about war and are 
anxious not to undermine the 'national interest'.”37
Indeed,  McLane (2004, 78) argues that there is  “a trend toward greater  media-military 
cooperation” while surveys suggest there is public support for taking measures to limit the 
freedom of the press in foreign policy crisis situations in the US (Media Under Fire, 6; 
McLane  2004,  80).  At  the  same  time, it  has  been  argued  that  warfare  has  become 
increasingly  secretive  and  the  media,  while  providing  the  illusion  of  “openness  and 
transparency”, are complicit in keeping the public in the dark of what is really happening. 
For  instance,  the  US/UK bombing of  Iraq  throughout  1990s  went  virtually unreported 
(Keeble 2000, 93). 
The role that propaganda, well-organised and systematic persuasive communication, plays 
in democracies is often dismissed with three different arguments: Western democracies are 
open and there is a multiplicity of voices, journalism is guided by a set of norms that 
should  guarantee  independent  reporting  and that  eventually  audiences  make  their  own 
interpretations of the contents that they consume. Yet, journalism norms, news criteria and 
practical conventions of news production make journalism predictable and enable skilful 
actors to influence the attitudes and actions of their target audiences (Luostarinen 2002, 19-
21). 
37  Not all agree. Some argue that “the press wants freedom, and the military wants 




THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MEDIA AND 
FOREIGN POLICY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the years, a considerable amount of predominantly American academic research has 
addressed the relationship between media and foreign policy (e.g. Cohen 1967, Entman 
2004, Nacos et al. 2000, Gilboa 2002d) especially during international crises (e.g. Hallin 
1986, Bennett & Paletz 1994, Mermin 1999, Thussu & Freedman 2003).38 Some scholars 
have  explored  military-media  relationship  in  conflicts  (Aukofer  &  Lawrence  1995, 
Carruthers 2000, Martin 2006) while others have looked more specifically at some other 
aspects  of  the  wartime reporting  such  as  the  coverage  of  anti-war  demonstrations  and 
dissent (Hackett & Zhao 1994, Reese & Buckalew 1995, Reese 2004, Such et al 2005, 
Dardis 2006, Bishop 2006)39. The role of the media in peace negotiations and international 
diplomacy has also been explored (Ramaprasad 1983; Seib 1997; Wolfsfeld 2001; Shinar 
2000; Gilboa 1998, 2000, 2002c, 2005) and especially the literature on public diplomacy 
has been growing fast since 9/11 2001 (Nelles 2004, Zaharna 2004, Hoffman 2002, Ross 
2002, van Ham 2003, Price 2003, Wang 2007).  Moreover,  there  is  a growing body of 
literature on the so-called peace journalism which seeks to explore how the media could 
take up a more constructive role in conflicts (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Hackett 2006, 
2007; Kempf 2007; Tehranian 2002; Peleg 2006). Finally, Philip Taylor (1994, 1997) has 
38  In fact, there is a growing body of literature which has addressed the role of the media 
in conflicts such as the Boer War (Morgan 2002), Vietnam War (Hallin 1986; Russo 
1971; Culbert 1988, 1998; Bishop 1978; Hammond 1989), Northern Ireland (Curtis 
1984, Miller 1994), the Falklands/Malvinas War (Harris 1983), Grenada (Servaes 1991), 
Panama (Soderlund et al 1994), the Gulf War (e.g. Bennett & Paletz 1994, Kellner 1992, 
Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000a, Iyengar & Simon 1993, Taylor 1998, Philo & McLaughlin 
1995, Page 1996), the Bosnian War (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon 2005), Operation Restore 
Hope in Somalia (Mermin 1997, Graybill 2004), Kosovo (Höijer et al 2002, 
McLaughlin 2002, Grundmann et al 2000, Savarese 2000), War on Terror (Snow & 
Taylor 2006), Afghanistan (Ottosen 2005b) and the Iraq War (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 
2005, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Ravi 2004).
39  Reese and Buckalew (1995) argue that dissent with regard to the Gulf War was 
portrayed as an opposite to patriotic which reflected the general level of approval of the 
military operation in the media. 
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put  forward  a  view  in  which  the  media  are  an  integral  part  of  the  history  of  the 
international relations.
Yet, Hanson (1998) argues that few efforts have been made to develop generalisations or 
theories about the role of news media in foreign policy-making and that the literature has 
consisted mainly of single case studies and has, therefore, remained rather fragmented (see 
also  Malek  &  Wiegand  1997).  While  there  is  cumulative  and  theoretically  informed 
research on media—foreign policy relationship in the field of political communication with 
a  heavy focus  on  the  US,  the  research  agendas  of  International  Relations  theory  and 
Foreign Policy Analysis have expressed rather marginal interest in the role of news media 
and information technology in the conduct of foreign policy.40 Less than 2 per cent of the 
articles published in six leading Anglo-American international relations journals dealt with 
some aspect of media which lead Martin Shaw (2000, 29) to conclude that “no systematic, 
general  rethinking  of  the  media  has  appeared  in  the  critical  debates  over  international 
relations.”41 Consequently,  Abbas  Malek  (1997a,  xii)  points  out  that  the  media-foreign 
policy nexus “is one of the least systematically explored areas in the field of international 
relations  and  international  communication”  and  the  foreign  policy—public  opinion—
media conundrum remains, what Seaver (1997, 79) has called, “the most overlooked area 
in the current foreign policy literature”. However, it should be noted that there are also 
some studies that have specifically focused on the triangle of foreign policy, media and 
public opinion (Nacos et al 2000, Seaver 1997, Soroka 2003, Bloch-Elkon 2007).42
40  For example, a text book (Neack et al 1995) about the so-called ‘second generation of 
foreign policy analysis’ pays no attention to phenomena such as the ‘CNN effect’ and 
‘media diplomacy’ or any other media-related issue. Welcome exceptions are Naveh’s 
study (2002) integrating foreign policy analysis and media management theories, 
LaFeber’s study (2000) on technology and US foreign policy, Anthonsen’s (2003) study 
on Danish and Swedish policies with regard to UN operations and the media as well as 
Mor’s (2006) study on Public Diplomacy in the new communications environment. 
According to Mette Anthonsen (2003, 300), “[r]esearch on the relation between media 
and foreign policy suffers from lack of synthesis between communication studies and 
Foreign Policy Analysis.” Very few studies on the subject are genuinely 
interdisciplinary in their approach even though several scholars acknowledge the 
importance of interdisciplinary research (see e.g. Badsey 1997; Robinson 2000b, esp. 
227, 230; Gilboa 2002b, 8; Naveh 2002). For a discussion of lack of interdisciplinary 
approach see Gilboa 2002a, 732; Robinson 2000b.
41 Yet, Peter van Ham (2002) claims that the shift from Industrial Age to Information Age 
poses a major challenge for IR theory which, therefore, should be reconsidered.
42  This negligence is all the more surprising if one considers the fact that during the Cold 
War period it was widely recognised that that “coercive facilities are one among a 
number of foreign policy instrumentalities. Diplomatic negotiation is another, economic 
means are another, and mass communication is a fourth. These four means—military, 
diplomatic, economic, and symbolic—are the major instruments of foreign policy” 
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Many  closely-related  studies  have  focused  on  topics  such  as  foreign  policy  rhetoric 
(Bostdorff  1994;  Bostdorff  &  Goldzwig  1994;  Kuusisto  1998a,  1998b,  1999;  Shimko 
1995; Wander 1984) and there is also considerable amount of literature on public opinion 
and foreign policy in the  United States (see e.g. Almond 1956, Gamson & Modigliani 
1966, Caspary 1970, Jentleson 1992, Jentleson & Britton 1998, Powlick & Katz 1998, 
Holsti 1999, Baum 2004b, Knopf 1998, Oneal et al 1996).43 Existing research indicates that 
public opinion matters in foreign policy formulation (Powlick & Katz 1998, 30; Baum 
2004b; Foyle 2004) but much of the literature on foreign policy opinions fails to address 
seriously the question of the role of the media in opinion formation and some studies have 
deemed media coverage rather irrelevant. For instance, Mueller (1971, 373-374) argues 
that  television’s  impact  on  the  level  of  public  support  for  the  war  in  Vietnam  was 
insignificant in comparison to other factors. Meanwhile, other studies indicate that media 
influence on public opinion in foreign policy issues is significant (Iyengar & Simon 1993, 
381;  Jordan  &  Page  1992;  Oneal  &  Bryan  1995)  and  public  opinion  only  becomes 
activated when a foreign policy issue is widely covered by the media (Powlick &Katz 
1998, 39-40). 
However, there is no agreement on how significantly the media influence the formation of 
public opinion. Some argue that the control of the media makes it possible “to limit what 
people know” (Hague, Harrop & Breslin 1992, 173) while other scholars suggest that news 
media is  also able  to affect  how to think and,  consequently,  what  to  think (Kellow & 
Steeves 1998, 110; Entman 1989). Bernard Cohen (1967, 13) is a bit more cautious in his 
seminal  study  The  Press  and  Foreign  Policy in  which  he  argues  that  “the  press  is 
significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
(Almond 1956, 371).
43 After the Second World War, American research suggested that the public opinion is 
volatile, incoherent and has little influence on foreign policy (Almond 1956). However, 
many studies have challenged these notions after the Vietnam War and there is a 
growing body of research indicating that public opinion in foreign policy issues is rather 
stable and rational in the US (Shapiro & Page 1988, Jordan & Page 1992, Jentleson 
1992, Nincic 1992, Jentleson & Britton 1998, Drezner 2006, Oneal et al 1996, Page & 
Boutton 2006). Moreover, research emerging from other countries also indicates that 
public opinion on foreign policy issues is not as erratic as the early studies in the US 
have suggested (Forsberg et al 2001, Risse-Kappen 1991). For instance, Isernia et al 
(2002) tested the thesis of rational public in Italy, Germany and France and concluded 
that public opinion is not significantly more volatile in these European countries than in 
the US. 
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readers what to think about” (his emphasis). After all, it is through media that people learn 
about the foreign policy and the wider world (Soroka 2003, 42-43; Malek & Wiegand 
1997, 18).44 Consequently, public opinion studies, like studies in foreign policy rhetoric, 
remain rather shallow insofar as they do not consider the media as the potential source of 
public opinion and as the conveyor of foreign policy messages.
This chapter reviews theories of media-state relations which have emerged from American 
political communication literature and constitute the most advanced and empirically tested 
body of literature on media-foreign policy relationship in a democracy. This chapter first 
reviews the theoretical and empirical findings of theories of media-state relations in the US 
and then moves on to consider the prospect of this literature providing a theory of media-
foreign policy relationship in democracies in more general terms while also identifying 
potential problems for this approach. The presumptions of theories of media-state relations 
come into conflict with some of the findings in the field of international communication. 
This chapter concludes that comparative research is crucial in order to investigate whether 
theories  of  media-state  relations  predict  with  greater  accuracy  how  media  covers 
international politics than the international communication literature on the coverage of 
international politics. 
3.2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT OR DRIVING FOREIGN POLICY? 
THEORIES OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS ASSESSED
“The media of mass communication have the primary function of communicating the foreign 
policy and security issues as formulated by the Executive, and as reformulated by the Congress 
to  different  parts  of  the  public.  But  this  function  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  neutral 
communication.  It  involves  selection,  interpretation,  in  other  words  decisions  about  the 
salience of issues, and the importance of information” (Almond 1956, 373-374).
Albeit Almond might consider the press as a necessary evil between the executive and the 
citizenry,  this  extract  touches  upon an  issue  which  has  been  paramount  in  subsequent 
academic debates on the relationship between media and foreign policy: the level of press 
independence from the government frames of reference in covering foreign and security 
policy issues. From a normative point of view, the functions of the media far exceed the 
mere communicating of elite opinion in democratic decision-making. After all, “[t]he job 
of an independent press is not just to report the words and deeds of official actors, but to 
44  In a UK study, Yoel Cohen (1986, 66) argues that the “media create a climate of 
opinion on international matters” and “this climate limits the opinions available to 
policy-makers”.
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offer a perspective based 'outside the government'” (Mermin 1999, 144; see also Mermin 
2004).  This  is  essential  if  the  media  intends  to  fulfil  its  responsibilities  in  informing 
citizenry, encouraging policy debate and holding governments to account.45 Yet, decades of 
political communication literature shows that there is a discrepancy between the normative 
assumptions  about  democratic  decision-making  and  actual  media  performance  in  the 
foreign policy area. Bennett and Manheim (1993) argue that “[a]s a practical matter, news 
organizations  routinely  leave  policy  framing  and  issue  emphasis  to  political  elites”. 
According  to  this  view,  the  media  “manufactures  consent”  for  official  policy  line  by 
relying heavily on official sources in their reporting. However, a competing view can be 
distinguished from the debate on media’s role in foreign policy. The notion of the so-called 
CNN effect encapsulates the notion that the news media may play an independent role 
driving policy.46 
However, as Bennett and Livingston (2003, 359) point out, the media performance should 
rather be seen on a continuum between compliance and autonomy: 
“rather than advocate one extreme or the other regarding press-government autonomy or de-
pendence, it makes sense to think of journalists as semi-independent players in the news game. 
There is no inherent contradiction in the idea that press-government relations are characterized 
by potentially extreme variations from independence to dependence. Rather than continuing to 
debate the extremes of autonomy or dependence, it makes more sense to explore the uneasy 
and often disjointed combinations of the two.”
3.2.1 CNN Effect Thesis
The notion of growing media influence on foreign policy emerged from the debate on the 
role of real-time news media in the humanitarian interventions of 1990s. This so-called 
CNN effect – sometimes referred to as the CNN factor or the CNN curve – claims that 
real-time news media have started to drive foreign policy. While no conclusive evidence 
has emerged to support the thesis (Gowing 1994b, Jakobsen 1996, Strobel 1997, Mermin 
45  Schudson (2002, 263) points out with regard to informing citizens that “it is not a very 
good approximation of the role that the news media have historically played—
anywhere”. Indeed, audience research on knowledge about the Israeli-Palestine conflict, 
for instance, indicates that the media do not perform very well in educating people 
about the wider world (Philo & Berry 2004). Similarly, Kull et al (2003) argue that 
misperceptions among the American people were common with regard to Iraq War at 
least partly because many major media organisations did not question the Bush 
administration claims.
46 Piers Robinson (2002) has developed a policy-media interaction model to explain the 
dynamics of media influence/non-influence. His model is quite impressively build on 
existing research integrating these apparently contradicting theses of the CNN effect 
and manufacturing consent paradigms.
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1997, cf.  Robinson 2002), several policy-makers have given support to the CNN effect 
thesis. For instance, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater commented US policy formation on 
the  violent  suppression  of  student  demonstrations  in  Tiananmen  Square  in  Chicago 
Tribune in 1991: 
“We were the first government to respond, labeling it an outrage and so forth, and it was based 
almost entirely on what we were seeing on television. We were getting reporting cables from 
Beijing,  but  they  did  not  have  the  sting,  the  demand  for  a  government  response  that  the 
television pictures had” (quoted in Hoge 1994).
George Bush senior has also said that “I learn more from CNN than I do from the CIA” 
(quoted  in  Moorcraft  &  Taylor  2007,  40).  Moreover,  UN  Secretary-General  Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali  has  said  that  “CNN is  the  sixteenth  member  of  UN Security  Council” 
(quoted in Gilboa 2002a, 734) and continued: 
“The member states never take action on a problem unless the media take up the case. When 
the media gets involved, public opinion is aroused. Public emotion is so intense that United 
Nations work is undermined and constructive statesmanship is almost impossible” (quoted in 
Cate 2002, 5).
Despite policy-makers’ numerous testimonies, the findings of academic research on the 
subject remain controversial to say the least. One problem has been the fact that the CNN 
effect  has remained ill-defined.47 In one of the few attempts to dissect the CNN effect 
thesis,  Livingston  (1997)  distinguishes  three  media  effects  on  policy-making:  agenda-
setting,  impediment  and  accelerant.  Table  3.1  summarizes  the  content  of  these  media 
effects.
However, Livingston’s definition of the CNN effect is problematic. Anthonsen (2003, 30) 
points  out  that  agenda-setting  is  a  prerequisite  of  impediment  and  accelerant  effects: 
“Putting an issue on the agenda is a prerequisite for affecting policy outcome” However, it 
is  noteworthy  that  the  existence  of  free  media  may affect  decision-making  as  policy-
makers adapt to this media environment. Hence, it should be possible that some policy 
47 Even the definition of the CNN effect is still a subject of debate even though, in general, 
the definitions are rather similar albeit vague. Margaret H. Belknap (2002) defines the 
CNN effect as “the collective impact of all real-time news coverage.” According to 
Eytan Gilboa (2002a, 732), CNN effect theory “claims that in international crisis 
situations global television has become the dominating actor in the conduct of foreign 
policy, replacing elected and appointed policy makers.” Piers Robinson (1999, 301) 
argues that “CNN effect encapsulated the idea that real-time communications 
technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites 
to global events.” According to Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2000, 132) the causal mechanism 
of CNN effect is usually conceived in the following way: “Media coverage (printed and 
televised) of suffering and atrocities → journalists and opinion leaders demand that 
Western governments ‘do something’ → the public pressure becomes unbearable → 
Western governments do something.”
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alternatives are rejected in the fear of negative media coverage whether or not the issue is 
on the news agenda. What matters is the policy-maker’s belief that some actions are likely 
to lead in negative media coverage. They may also consider the possibility that reporters 
might  jeopardize  the  successful  implementation  of  the  policy by publicizing  pieces  of 
strategic information.48
Table 3.1. Conceptual variations of CNN effect (Livingston 1997, 2).
Accelerant Media  shortens  decision-making  response  time.  Television  diplomacy  evident. 
During time of war, live, global television offer potential security-intelligence risks. 
But media may also be a force multiplier, method of sending signals. Evident in most 
foreign policy issues to receive media attention.
Impediment Two  types:  1.  Emotional,  grisly  coverage  may  undermine  morale.  Government 
attempts to sanitize war (emphasis on video game war), limit access to the battlefield. 
2. Global, real-time media constitute a threat to operational security.
Agenda  Setting 
Agency 
Emotional, compelling coverage of atrocities or humanitarian crises reorder  foreign 
policy priorities. Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti said to be examples.
Moorcraft and Taylor (2007, 40) also question the motives of the policy-makers to promote 
the notion of growing media power. They argue that, in order to “shift responsibility away 
from themselves, politicians often pretended that the media were all-conquering”. They 
claim that
“[t]o argue in the 1990s that graphic pictures prompted government reaction was implausible 
then; it is almost laughable now […] there is still little or no scientific evidence to prove that 
violence  on  television  –  factual  or  fictional  –  affects  the  behaviour  of  individuals  or 
governments.”
While  Somalia  is  often  used  as  an  example  of  the  CNN effect  (Cohen  1994,  9–10), 
Mermin’s (1999, 137) study concluded that it was rather a demonstration of “the power of 
governments  to  move  television”  than  vice  versa.  Other  studies  have  reached  similar 
conclusions (Robinson 2001a, Graybill 2004, Strobel 1997). Similarly, the claim that the 
media ‘lost’ the Vietnam War has been rather painstakingly rejected by arguing that the 
media coverage was a mere reflection of, rather than an active player in, the breakdown of 
consensus on Vietnam policy in Washington (Hallin 1986; cf. Culbert 1998)49. In fact, the 
48 However, Piers Robinson’s policy-media interaction model gives the concept a very 
specific use. He points out that CNN effect and accelerant effects should be kept 
“conceptually distinct” because accelerating policy-making does not per se result in 
media influencing policy outcomes (Robinson 2002, 39).
49 Culbert’s analysis of the dramatic Loan footage, showing an execution of a Vietcong 
suspect in Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive, takes a different position on the role of 
the media during the Vietnam War emphasizing television’s visual impact on policy-
making. He suggests that “[t]he Loan footage and photograph legitimized the moral 
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main bulk of studies suggest that the media tend to serve the interests of the government by 
‘manufacturing consent’ behind the official policy. For this reason Zaller and Chiu (1999) 
have even called the media ‘government’s little helper’.
3.2.2 Manufacturing Consent Paradigm
While only a few well-tested theories on the nature of this relationship between media and 
foreign policy have emerged, rather convincing amount of evidence suggests that the range 
of debate is set by the executive branch of the government (Herman and Chomsky 1988; 
Herman 1993; Entman 1991; Malek 1997b, 244) or wider elite (Hallin 1986, Bennett 1990, 
Mermin 1999) in the US. These notions are known as executive and elite versions of the 
manufacturing consent paradigm. The executive version “emphasizes the extent to which 
news media content conforms with the agendas and frames of reference of government 
officials,”  while  the  elite  version  “holds  that  news  media  coverage  conforms  to  the 
interests of political elites in general whether they are in the executive, legislative or any 
other politically powerful position in society” (Robinson 2001b, 525-526).
Herman  (1993,  45),  drawing  on  the  executive  version,  argues  that  “[b]oth  structural 
analysis  and  empirical  evidence  of  media  performance  support the  view  that  the 
mainstream media tend to follow a state agenda in reporting on foreign policy”. Herman 
and Chomsky (1988, 306) analysed media coverage of several international crises in their 
famous study Manufacturing Consent concluding that 
“the mass media of the United States are effective and powerful ideological institutions that 
carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized 
assumptions, and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propaganda sys-
tem has become even more efficient in recent decades with the rise of the national television 
networks, greater mass-media concentration, right-wing pressures on public radio and televi-
sion, and the growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news management.”50
In Herman and Chomsky's (1988) view, there are several 'filters' that limit the scope of 
news  content  such  as  media  ownership,  its  concentration  and  the  commercial  profit-
seeking  nature  of  news  organizations.  Moreover,  news  organizations'  reliance  on 
arguments of the anti-war movement” and “became a part of the foreign policy-making 
process for the average person, for the politician looking for dramatic images with 
which to clothe his election-year promises, and for policy-makers, both military and 
civilian” (Culbert 1998, 437).
50  It should be noted that Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model is often criticised 
for failing to take account that different elite groups may have different interests which, 
allegedly, would lead to less uniform journalistic output than Herman and Chomsky 
admit (Hallin 1994, 13; Klaehn 2002, 154; Lang & Lang 2004, 196-197).
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advertisers as the main source of income and dependence on powerful newsworthy sources 
jeopardize  the  prospect  of  independent  reporting.  Indeed,  there  is  an  abundance  of 
evidence to support the argument of media's heavy reliance on government sources in news 
production (Gans 1979, Sigal 1973). Luostarinen (2002, 274) argues that “journalism tends 
to prefer official, powerful sources which have arranged easy access to information and 
professional  personnel  to  serve  the  needs  of  the  journalists.”  This  results  in  “a 
systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged 
institutional  positions”  (Hall  et  al  1978,  57).  Hall  et  al  call  these  influential  sources 
‘primary definers’ who are able to set the tone of the news. For example, in the case of the 
Gulf War of 1991, it has been argued that the reliance on official sources “ensured that the 
public’s and the President’s understanding of this international crisis would be congruent” 
(Iyengar & Simon 1993, 382). It is noteworthy that not only textual content but also news 
photography tends to reinforce the official interpretation of a foreign policy issue (Griffin 
2004).
Bennett (1996, 376) argues that the first rule of political reporting is “the imperative to 
build  a  story  line—whenever  possible—upon  official  or  at  least  authoritative 
viewpoints”.51 As Sigal (1973, 69)  notes,  “[e]ven when the journalist is in a position to 
observe  an  event  directly,  he  remains  reluctant  to  offer  interpretations  of  his  own, 
preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, in short, most news is not 
what  has happened, but  what  someone says  has happened”.52 Reliance on authoritative 
sources  also  protects  reporters  from accusations  of  partisanship  and  possible  lawsuits 
(Tuchman 1972). According to BBC/freelance reporter Jake Lynch, 
”If say, for example, you cease to base your news agenda on the words and deeds of official 
sources,  of the Prime Minister,  of the  government and start to base it  instead on gathering 
alternative perspectives,  on gathering news from unconventional  sources.  Then you will  be 
somehow exposing yourself to the risk that you will be accused of being biased.” 53
In  addition,  governments  have  become increasingly skilled  in  manipulating  the  media 
employing their specialist spin doctors to handle the media. This trend is not limited to 
51  Bennett (1990, 103) lists three reasons why the news media mostly uses official sources 
when covering daily news: 1. supporting the status quo also maintains the economically 
favourable conditions in which news media operates, 2. symbiotic relationship between 
the government sources and journalists, and 3. by giving the elected actors voice serves 
democracy. 
52 For example, a Sky News reporter happened to witness a London bus exploding on 7/7 
but was told by the editors that they would not go live on the spot until the reporter had 
a statement from authorities (Allan 2008).
53 Quoted in Danny Schechter's documentary WMD: Weapons of Mass Deception (2004).
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foreign policy issues and the US. Barnett and Gaber (2001, 1) argue that “the vital function 
of independent and critical  reporting is being progressively undermined to the ultimate 
benefit of those in power” in the UK. They argue that the sophistication of political PR and 
pressures on reporters make it increasingly difficult for journalism to fulfil its roles in the 
service of the democracy.54 According to Manheim (1991, 5):
“[p]oliticians, governments, and others have become increasingly sophisticated in their ability 
to  anticipate how the  news media  will  report  their  words  and deeds,  and how public  will 
respond to those reports. They have developed increasingly effective strategies for managing or 
circumventing the news, shaping their images,  and channeling public perceptions. This has 
reduced the role of journalists and the so-called free press almost to the point of complicity, 
and it has deprived the public-never highly motivated toward politics to begin with-of the tools 
it  needs  to  make  informed  judgments  about  world  and  national  affairs.  The  result  is  a 
democracy of the uninformed,  one that  is  ever  more vulnerable to  the wispiest  breezes of 
political expediency.”
Manheim’s argument is supported by Lawrence Jacobs (1992a, 199) who argues that the 
sophistication of public opinion polling and public relations techniques have contributed to 
the fact that “[i]nstead of exerting outright administrative domination, liberal democratic 
governments have developed the capacity during the twentieth century to manipulate the 
public in order to create consent and even enthusiastic support for their actions.”55 This 
trend has also influenced the foreign policy making. Bennett (1994, 37) argues that “[w]hat 
is clear about the contemporary world of foreign policy is that policy process includes 
public information management as an integral political calculation.” Clearly, governments 
have expertise and access to information which allows them to interpret  reality for the 
public  and mould  attitudes  (Anthonsen  2003,  15).  After  the  Cold  War,  the  number  of 
foreign  correspondents  has  decreased  in  American  news  organisations  (Miller  2005c) 
which has increased the government's ability to set the agenda of foreign news.
“With low budgets for newsgathering, news corporations often interview government officials 
as a cheap alternative to actually travelling to the field. Using government officials as sources 
also adds perceived reliability of information, and protection against  inaccurate reports.  As 
such, a great deal of reporting on ‘foreign affairs’ is conducted from the domestic capitals. The 
54  Barnett and Gaber (2001) identify four different factors that change the balance 
between reporters and sources. First, sophistication and wide use of political PR have 
given an advantage to news sources. Second, they argue that there is a growing 
willingness of the owners to interfere with journalistic output and their closer 
connections with the political power. Third, there is increasingly tough competition due 
to multiplicity of news outlets. Finally, there are structural changes within news 
organization which challenge the ability to provide independent and critical political 
reporting.
55 According to Bennett and Manheim (2001, 282), the rise of  'strategic communication', 
“the scientific engineering and targeting of messages that subordinate the ideals of 
deliberation and transparency to the achievement of narrow political goals”, undermine 
democratic decision-making. 
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result is an increase in the power of the government in choosing what will or will not become 
news, and a dominance of the government spin on the news” (Hawkins 2002, 227).
However, several studies maintain that the government is able to control the news frames 
only under certain conditions, e.g. when the government has a clear policy line (Robinson 
2002),  when  elites  agree  on  the  policy  (Hallin  1986)  or  when  policy  is  successfully 
implemented (Mermin 1996). For instance, with regard to the Vietnam War, Daniel Hallin 
(1986, 213) concluded that “the behavior of media [...] is intimately related to the unity and 
clarity of the government itself, as well as to the degree of consensus in the society at 
large.”  Accordingly,  W.  Lance  Bennett’s  (1990,  108)  influential  ‘indexing  hypothesis’, 
which was formulated in a study on the  New York Times's coverage of the US policy on 
Nicaragua,  suggests  that  “mass  media  news  is  indexed  implicitly  to  the  dynamics  of 
governmental debate”. Bennett (1990, 106) argues that
“[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of 
voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in 
mainstream government debate about a given topic.” 
In effect, this rule implies that views that are not expressed in elite debate would not be 
found in  the news coverage  while  conflict  among the officials  “serves  as  a  signal  for 
journalists to expand a story to encompass the views of experts, social groups, opinion 
polls, and other sources that reflect the observed differences among powerful politicians” 
(Bennett, 1996, 376).
A number of case studies support the theory while they have also added further nuances to 
the theory (Bennett 1990; Hallin, 1986; Livingston and Eachus 1996; Mermin 1996, 1999; 
Zaller & Chiu 1999; Bennett et al. 2006). For example, in accordance with the indexing 
hypothesis, Lewis and Rose (2002, 569) argue that the discussion whether George Bush 
(senior) had the power to take the US to war with Iraq was largely absent from media 
coverage during the build-up to the war due to lack of conflict among the elites.56 
In  a  case  study on  the  Panama  invasion  and  the  Gulf  War,  Jonathan  Mermin  (1996) 
concluded that the contradiction between the indexing hypothesis and critical journalistic 
identity can be explained. Criticism of decision itself is transformed into criticism of the 
ability to execute the policy when there is elite consensus on a given policy. Consequently, 
there  are  no  critical  voices  when  policy  is  successfully  implemented  in  the  sphere  of 
consensus.  Mermin’s  argument  is  consistent  with  Hoge’s  perception  of  media-state 
56 According to Peer and Chestnut (1995) newspaper coverage was less supportive of the 
government than television news.
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relations during the Cold War: “[t]he press was often critical, but of the execution of the 
policy more than the aims” (Hoge 1994). 
Althaus (2003, 387) points out that some previous studies in the US, including Bennett’s 
(1990) and Mermin’s (1999) studies, have omitted international actors from the analysis. 
Meanwhile, Althaus et al. (1996, 418) argue that when elite consensus prevails, journalists 
turn to foreign news sources to provide the ‘other opinion’ in order “to satisfy the norms of 
conflict and balance” which implies that coverage is indexed to international elite opinion. 
Yet, Zaller and Chiu (1999, 24) suggest that journalists evaluate the newsworthiness of 
sources by their “capacity to foretell or affect future events”. Hence, Bennett (1996, 378) 
added a further  nuance to  indexing theory claiming that  “[t]he development  of a story 
beyond  normal  institutions  and  newsbeats  suggests  a  third  representation  rule  for 
journalists  pursuing  a  complex  developing  story:  follow  the  trail  of  power.” This 
‘mechanism’ which may give foreign sources greater access is sometimes referred to as 
‘power indexing’ (Zaller & Chiu, 1999; Billeaudeaux et al., 2003). 
It  has been argued that the level of independence of the American media from official 
frames of reference has increased after the end of Cold War (Entman & Page 1994, 83; 
Althaus  et  al.  1996;  Entman 2000;  Zaller  & Chiu  1999;  Rojecki  2002).  For  instance, 
Entman (2003, 416) sees that the changes in both media and the international system since 
the end of the Cold War have left the indexing hypothesis outdated – at  least  to some 
degree. However, some argue that  the post-Cold War press independence may have been 
eroded  after  9/11  2001  (Sreberny  and  Paterson  2004,  18–19).  Bennett  et  al  (2006) 
investigate the media frames of the Abu Ghraib scandal in the US arguing that “the arc of 
news framing and public  opinion during the Iraq war suggests  that  indexing still  cues 
opinion” (p. 469).
From a normative point of view, media should be more than just a propaganda arm of the 
government, elites or other already powerful domestic or foreign actors as suggested by the 
executive,  elite versions and power indexing respectively.  Circulation of views at  odds 
with the official foreign policy is crucial for democratic processes (Entman & Page 1994). 
To remedy the situation, Mermin (1999) has suggested that journalists should give more 
prominence to expert views as well as opinions of citizens who have genuine interest in 
foreign policy.
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However,  Cristina  Archetti  (2008a)  has  argued  that  the  indexing  hypothesis  is  rather 
problematic paradigm especially when applied outside the US. Firstly, she argues that there 
are other factors in play that explain why the journalists tend to “reproduce the official 
line”. Secondly,  she claims that there are problems with regard to operationalisation of 
“indexing”  and the  findings  might  result  from methodological  choices  rather  than  “an 
objective  reality”.  Thirdly,  due  to  various  operationalisations  of  indexing  in  different 
studies  the  literature  does  not  provide  as  cumulative  findings  as  is  often  assumed.57 
Fourthly, indexing cannot explain media-government relations outside the US context due 
to differing notions of journalism across countries. Fifthly, changes in the media system 
driven by technological innovations may have left the indexing hypothesis outdated.
3.2.3 Policy-media interaction model
Robinson (2002) integrates the CNN effect thesis with the elite version of manufacturing 
consent paradigm by building the policy-media interaction model on two main arguments 
in his policy-media interaction model: 
Ø Media influence occurs in the absence of a clear, well-articulated policy line. CNN 
effect research indicates that policy certainty decreases news media influence while 
policy uncertainty tends to increase this influence. This is consistent with policy 
studies literature which indicates that external efforts to influence policy are more 
likely to succeed during elite dissensus.58 Therefore, the degree of policy certainty 
57 Archetti (2007, 53-54) points out, “[t]he difficulty in understanding what being 'indexed' 
to the political debate actually means relates to several aspects. The first is defining 
what the nature of 'indexing' is: it could be either a correlation, a compatibility or a 
reproduction of contents. Depending on the definition of what indexing is, the data 
analysis could lean to different assessments of the levels of indexing within media 
coverage: 'reproduction' of political messages—i.e. Contents detected within coverage 
should be exactly the same as those in the political discourse—could be stricter criterion 
than 'compatibility'. In the latter case, the contents would not have to be the same. They 
could be just 'similar', although, in turn, a new definition would be needed about how 
similar contents should be in order to be coded as 'compatible'. And even when such 
clarification is made, what would the nature of such 'contents' be?”
58  This point is also supported by interview-based research. Nik Gowing (1994a, 1998) 
and Warren Strobel (1996, 1997), both prominent journalists, have conducted numerous 
interviews with policy-makers, officials and journalists in order to investigate policy-
media interplay during humanitarian crisis and armed conflicts. They are sceptical of 
the CNN effect thesis and conclude that the government may lose control of the media 
only if it lacks a clear policy line. However, it should be noted that interview-based 
research lacks a systematic treatment of the subject as well as a solid theoretical 
approach. In this regard, interview-based provides more of a collection of anecdotes 
than a theoretically informed framework for analysis. On the limitations of interview-
based research see Robinson 2002, 16-18.
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is an essential element in assessing potential news media influence on government 
policy line (Robinson 2002, 25).59 
Ø Another key factor in determining news media potential to influence policy is the 
way  news  coverage  is  framed.  Robinson  (2002,  25)  assumes  that,  during 
humanitarian crises, “news media influence is greatest when coverage is framed so 
as to criticise existing government policy and empathise with the plight of suffering 
people.” However, media coverage may also create emotional distance and support 
government policy of non-intervention.
Basically, the model is designed to detect when policy uncertainty and critical empathy-
framed  news  media  coverage  coincide  with  humanitarian  intervention.  If  they  do  not 
coincide he interprets the direction of influence from government to media and vice versa. 
The  policy-media  interaction  model  argues,  in  accordance  with  manufacturing  consent 
literature,  that  critical  coverage  is  unlikely when  elite  consensus  exists.  Hence,  media 
influence on policy requires policy uncertainty and elite dissensus that enables critical and 
empathy-framed media coverage. In this scenario policy-makers are forced to consider 1) 
how this  coverage influences public opinion,  2) how this  influence affects  government 
image and credibility and 3) how functional the existing policy line is.
Robinson (2002, 37) distinguishes two basic forms of influence: a “strong CNN effect” 
occurs when “media coverage is a significant influence on the policy process and might 
operate  as either  a  necessary or even sufficient  factor  in  producing a  particular  policy 
outcome.” The “weak CNN effect,” in turn, hypothesizes “that a media effect might occur 
when policy makers  are  personally  affected  by random media  reports  that  highlight  a 
particular crisis” (Robinson 2001a, 942).60 Furthermore, “media coverage is not so much 
creating  a  political  imperative for  policy-makers  to  act,  but  rather  serves  to  cause  a 
59  Governmental sub-systems such as the White House, the State Department, the 
National Security Council and Pentagon formulate policies after “a complex bargaining 
process.” Hence, Robinson (2002, 26) defines policy uncertainty as “a function of the 
degree of consensus and co-ordination between the sub-systems of the executive with 
respect to an issue”.
60  His emphasis.
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politician to be inclined to take a particular course of action.”61 Table 3.2 summarises the 
findings of US-originated theories of media-state relations.
Table 3.2. The policy-media interaction model and theories of media-state relations 
(Robinson 2002, 31).
Level of elite  
consensus
Media-state relationship Role of the media
Elite consensus The media operate within ‘sphere of 
consensus’ and coverage reflects  elite 
consensus on policy (Hallin 1986)
Executive manufacturing consent: the 
media remain uncritical and help 
build support for official policy
Elite dissensus The media operate within ‘sphere of 
legitimate controversy’ (Hallin  1986) 
but overall coverage does not favor 
any side of the elite debate
The media reflect elite dissensus as 
predicted by Hallin (1986) and 
Bennett (1990) but remain non-
influential
Elite dissensus but 
policy certainty within 
executive
The media operate within ‘sphere of 
legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1986) 
but coverage, overall, becomes 
critical of government policy
Although coverage pressures 
government to change policy, policy 
certainty within executive means that 
media influence is resisted
Elite dissensus plus 
policy uncertainty 
within government
The media take sides in political 
debate and coverage becomes critical 
of government.  The media are now 
active participants influencing elite 
debate
The 'CNN effect’: in condition of 
policy uncertainty, critical media 
coverage provides bargaining power 
for those seeking a change in policy 
or makes policy-makers feel 
pressured to respond with a policy or 
else face a public relations disaster. 
Here the media can influence policy 
outcomes
3.2.4 Cascading activation and political contest models
While  the  policy-media  interaction  focuses  on  the  influential  relations  between  actual 
policy decisions and media coverage, there are two models which have sought to explain 
how the government's framing of events might become under a challenge. 
Robert Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model provides further nuances to theoretical 
literature on foreign policy-media relationship. In his model there is a competition over 
media frames “along a continuum of total dominance by one frame to a completely even-
61  Robinson (2002, 4) encounters some rather awkward difficulties in explaining the 
meaning of ‘influence’: “In this study I occasionally use the term cause (without 
assuming the phenomenon is overly deterministic) and, more often influence. When I 
argue that ‘A’ influenced/caused ‘B’ to occur I am saying no more and no less than that 
if ‘A’ had not been present, ‘B’ would have been unlikely to occur. [...] Also, to say that 
the media influenced or caused intervention is not to claim that it was the only factor, 
only a necessary one” (my emphasis). Since Robinson gives two contrasting definitions, 
it remains unclear whether cause/influence refers to the necessity of ‘A’ on the 
occurrence of ‘B’ or merely to statistical (positive) correlation between phenomena.
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handed  standoff  between  competing  frames”  (Entman  2003,  418).  Ideally,  free  press 
provides diverse coverage with different interpretations even if these would challenge the 
government’s frame. Yet, Entman (2003, 418) argues that frame parity, in which the news 
provides a ‘counterframe’, “is the exception, not the rule”. For example, Entman argues 
that President Bush’s framing of the 9/11 terrorist attacks prevailed in the media coverage 
despite the fact that there was also a counterframe which emphasised the role of Saudi 
Arabia in international terrorism while the Bush administration was focusing on Taliban-
ruled Afghanistan. According to Entman (2003, 429), elite dissensus is essential for the 
emergence  of  counterframes  and  their  ability  to  challenge  government  frame. 
Consequently,  the  model  does  not  contradict  indexing  theory.  Rather  Entman  sees  his 
model supplementing indexing theory by explaining how contesting frames emerge.
Entman  (2008)  has  further  developed  his  cascading  activation  model  to  theorize  US 
government  public  diplomacy efforts  to  influence foreign media.  He defines  'mediated 
public diplomacy' as “mass communication (including the internet) to increase support for  
a  country's  specific  foreign  policies  among  audiences  beyond  that  country's  borders” 
(Entman 2008, 88).62 Entman argues that the success of this process depends largely on 
cultural congruency while other important factors include the stance of the political elite of 
the targeted country as well as their skills and power to influence the media coverage either 
to accept or reject the US framing of events. Entman (2008, 95) illustrates the significance 
of the cultural congruency by comparing European responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq 
War.  While  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  helped  to  identify  Iraq  as  the  aggressor  and 
therefore  a  threat  to  be  countered,  the  pre-emptive  war  by  the  US  met  considerable 
resentment. Cultural congruence also explains  Entman's (1991) findings on the KAL and 
Iran Air incidents, in which the Soviets and the Americans shot down commercial airliners, 
indicating that similar events are covered very differently.  However,  the success of the 
government to control the news coverage is due to the fact that their framing was culturally 
congruent.  He concludes  that  the  framing  “coincided  closely  with  the  administration's 
interests, and much of the congruence appears traceable to the rhetoric and media strategies 
employed  by  the  Reagan  administration”  (p.  25).  Moreover,  despite  some  similarities 
between the Chinese Tiananmen movement and Kwangju movement in South Korea, the 
US media covered them in drastically different terms as a result of differing government 
responses (Kim 2000). 
62 His emphasis. In more specific terms, Entman (2008, 89) defines 'mediated U.S. public diplomacy' as ”the 
organized attempts by a president and his foreign policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible 
over the framing of U.S. policy in foreign media.”
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Gadi Wolfsfeld’s Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East (1997) provides 
a ‘political contest model’ of media-state relations. In this study the competition of actors 
over the access to media and the media frames is viewed as a part of a larger political 
struggle.  Wolfsfeld (1997, 3) argues that  political  power can usually be translated into 
power over news media because political  culture has a major influence on how media 
cover conflicts, news media is rather reactive than initiative, political realities determine 
how actors use the media, and because political decisions regulate who owns the media 
and  how  it  operates.  However,  media  coverage  may  occasionally  conform  to  the 
perceptions of marginalised groups. Wolfsfeld identifies the conditions under which non-
elite groups can challenge government control of news media coverage. He argues that, 
during the 1987 Palestinian Intifada,  the news media frame of “injustice and defiance” 
served the interests of the Palestinians as the Israeli government had lost the control of 
media agenda. Robinson (2001b, 539-541) sees that political contest model is an important 
supplement to our understanding of policy-media interplay as it theorizes when non-elite 
groups can employ news media as a vehicle of influence
3.3 EXPORTING THEORIES OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS
The main bulk of research on media and foreign policy focuses on the United States while 
no extensive theoretical and cumulative literature exists on any other country with regard 
to the relationship between foreign policy and the media. At the same time, theories of 
media-state relations have tended to treat the media entirely as a domestic factor having 
little significance on the international level. Moreover, cross-national research on media-
state relations has remained rare (Stolle & Hooghe 2005) even though  ‘[r]ecent research 
has demonstrated the importance of the comparative method in testing media theory across 
national borders’ (Dardis 2006, 410). Daniel Hallin (1997) has also emphasised that the 
study of war and media would greatly benefit from comparative studies.  There are two 
main concerns when exporting American theories of media-state relations to Europe or 
other regions. The first has to do with states' differing positions in the international system 
and the second with national characteristics, such as the journalistic culture or political 
system, which may significantly differ from those of the US. 
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3.3.1 Hierarchical international system
States and news organisations are part of hierarchical international system. Hence, some 
studies emphasise the American influence on national media during international crises 
through  the  dominant  position  of  both  the  US government  and  news  organisations  as 
sources  of  information  (Mucunguzi  2005;  Nohrstedt  2005;  Nord and Strömbäck 2006; 
Ottosen 2005b; Thussu 2000a, 2000b). Daya  Thussu (2005, 271) has argued that “[t]he 
general pattern of media ownership indicates that the west, led by the US dominates the 
international  flow  of  information  and  entertainment  in  all  major  media  sectors”.  This 
dominance is particularly strong in the news sector leading Tunstall and Machin (1999) to 
argue that there is, in effect, a US/UK “world news duopoly” of which AP and Reuters are 
an essential part. The major news agencies tend to set the agenda also for smaller news 
agencies  and  nations,  which  have  insufficient  resources  to  cover  international  events 
independently, rely heavily on their wire copy (Rafeeq 2007, 152). This has led a number 
of  scholars  to  argue  that  there  has  been  globalisation  of  news  with  increasing 
harmonisation of news content across the world. It has been argued that the global media 
infrastructure is an essential part of globalisation (Rafeeq 2007, 6).
Several studies on the international coverage of international conflicts seem to support the 
notion of US/UK dominance in international news. For instance, Ali Rafeeq's (2007) study 
on the press coverage of the Iraq War in New Zealand emphasises the ability of the US 
government  and  military  sources  to  dominate  the  news  agenda  due  to  newspapers' 
dependence on few Anglo-American news agencies and media outlets. Similarly, Kupe and 
Hyde-Clarke’s (2005) study on South African media during the Iraq War points out that 
national  media  may  have  insufficient  resources  to  cover  international  conflicts 
independently.  Instead,  they rely on Western  news  agencies  which,  according  to  some 
scholars, conform to the interests of Western governments.63 Studies (Maslog et al 2006, 
Lee et al 2006) based on data from five South East Asian countries indicates that stories 
relying on news agencies were more supportive of the Iraq War than stories produced by 
newspapers' own correspondents.64 
63 For instance, Lee and Yang (1996) showed that AP’s coverage of the Tiananmen 
movement reflected US foreign policy concerns while Japanese Kyodo news agency 
was reluctant to challenge the Chinese government due to Japanese economic interests 
in China. Yet, even though the Anglo-American news media are well-positioned to 
influence national media, Skurnik’s (1981) study concluded that African newspapers 
tended to choose from the foreign media those that suited the national interests of their 
country. 
64 However, Horvit (2004) did not find support for the argument that, despite differing 
government policies, the French AFP would portray the US in more negative terms than 
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A cross-national study (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b) of media coverage of the Gulf War in 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the US concluded that the coverage overall tended 
to focus on the US and conveyed the US political agenda. However, variations remained 
between media outlets and  different national contexts (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 255-
256).65 Meanwhile, the Iraqi propaganda had very limited influence on media coverage for 
a simple reason: “all Iraqi information, whether it came directly from the authorities or via 
the media, was labelled and treated as propaganda by media in the West” (Nohrstedt & 
Ottosen 2000b, 259). Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2000b, 270) conclude that “[t]he same ethical 
principles and rules of balanced and independent journalism are not usually applied in 
international as in national conflicts.” 
Thussu  (2002,  205)  suggests  that,  in  the  case  of  Kosovo,  geopolitical  realities  went 
unreported because Western television news channels  “tended to repeat  uncritically the 
Western position” and provide moral justification of “humanitarian intervention” rather 
than report on Western strategic and economic interests in the Balkan region.66 Empirical 
research suggests that the NATO propaganda campaign was very effective (De Bens et al 
2002, Vickers 2000). These findings suggest that the media, rather than ‘manufacturing 
consent’ for the views of national foreign policy elites,  reflect  the viewpoints of major 
powers in the international system. This is also suggested by power indexing discussed 
earlier.
Soderlund et al. (1994) compared the TV news coverage of the Panama invasion in the US 
and Canada,  concluding that,  in both countries, sources favourable to the invasion had 
greater access to media and, consequently, the US point of view prevailed in the coverage. 
AP in the lead-up to the Iraq War.
65 For instance, Finnish and Swedish media put greater emphasis on the UN than the 
others – especially US media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 258). Similarly, Maeshima 
(2007) analysed the coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 in the New York Times and the 
Asahi, a Japanese newpaper, concluding that Japanese coverage focussed more on the 
UN while NYT's emphasised US decision-making. 
66 With regard to Kosovo, it has been argued that the Western objective was to secure a 
safe route for oil and natural gas transport from Caspian Sea area to Central Europe 
(Gokay 2002, 8). Similarly, Thussu (2004, 51) has argued that the media missed ”the 
real story” behind the invasion of Afghanistan whose central location in the midst of 
world’s energy resources makes it a potential route for oil and natural gas transit (for 
more detailed analysis of the region’s energy resources and Western policy see Gokay 
2002). 
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”set  of  common  news  sources,  which  tended  to  be  supportive  of  American  initiatives, 
dominated access to the news media in both the United States and Canada [...] this study has 
demonstrated the remarkable extent to which the American government, through a variety of 
news sources, can get its viewpoint expressed in the news.”
It has to be noted, though, that there was no significant Canadian opposition to the US 
invasion of Panama and other studies have found evidence of the independence of the 
Canadian media from the US. Kim et al. (2007) concluded that despite the traditionally 
strong influence of the US media on the Canadian news coverage,  the Canadian press 
coverage  of  the  Darfur  crisis  reflected  the  view  of  Canadian  foreign  policy  and  the 
influence of the US media was limited. In addition, Hibbard and Keenleyside (1995) draw 
a similar conclusion with respect to Canadian coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990–
91. They argued that
”The case of the Persian Gulf crisis thus seems to be a heartening example of the capacity of 
the Canadian  public,  aided  by its  media,  to  resist  the  powerful  attraction  of  attitudes  and 
perspectives from south of the border. The explanation for this independence of thought would 
seem to rest in differences in political culture between Canada and the United States. This 
country's less militaristic history; its penchant for compromise in contrast to America's seeking 
of unambiguous solutions, its greater patience (and hence readiness to give sanctions time to 
work), and its preference for peacekeeping over peace enforcement were doubtless all at work 
in shaping press and public attitudes in Canada distinctly different from those in the United 
States.”
Meanwhile, in the field of international communication, some argue that the media are 
operating  above  the  nation  states  providing  the  same  content  to  everyone  anywhere. 
According to this line of argument, national public spheres are replaced by a global public 
sphere. On the other side of the argument are those who claim that people learn about the 
world mainly from national news outlets and from national perspectives (Ruigrok & van 
Atteveldt  2007,  69).  They argue  that  the homogenization  of  global  news thesis  is  far-
fetched (Clausen 2003,  Ruigrok & van Atteveldt).  For  instance,  a  study conducted by 
Cohen et al (1996) on Eurovision news exchange indicated that news is ‘domesticated’ to 
suit the local audiences. 
In  addition,  a  comparative  study of  the  Gulf  War  coverage  on  seven  television  news 
channel  worldwide  concludes  that  “each  service's  overall  narrative  construction  of  the 
meaning of  the  war  and the  abilities  and  motivations  of  the  antagonists”  significantly 
differed across countries (Swanson & Smith 1993, 189). Hence, “media globalization did 
not produce a global narrative. On the contrary, the global television environment provided 
ample resources by which nationally relevant and distinctive narratives were produced. 
Viewers of each service saw a coherent narrative of the beginning of the Gulf War, what 
was happening, why and what it had to do with them” (Swanson & Smith 1993, 191). 
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These  findings  indicate  that  national  characteristics  might  play  a  significant  role  in 
explaining how national news organizations cover international events.
3.3.2 National media systems
It has been noted that American media theories may not work outside its borders because 
‘other  democracies  organize  press  coverage  on  the  basis  of  different  normative 
understandings  about  power,  citizen  information,  and  the  role  of  the  press  in  political 
communication’ (Bennett  1996,  376;  see  also  Cohen  1995,  Anthonsen  2003,  Archetti 
2008a, Corner 2003). For example, among the most noticeable differences between the US 
and European media systems is  the weight  placed on Public Service Broadcasting and 
higher  level  of  competition  between  newspapers  in  the  latter  (Sparks  2007a,  77). 
Moreover,  Gadi  Wolfsfeld  (2008,  199)  has  suggested  that  “in  multiparty  systems 
characterized by a wider range of political parties, one will find a much larger range of 
views  in  the  national  press.” Kazuhiro  Maeshima  (2007)  argues  that  national  media 
coverage of international events is influenced by several factors such as state's political 
culture, public opinion, government policy line and organizational characteristics such as 
newspaper's political orientation. Maeshima argues that national political communication 
cultures are heavily influenced by history.
Despite national differences, some studies suggest that the executive version (Lehmann 
2005, Glasgow University Media Group 1985) and elite version (Tumber & Palmer 2004, 
Eilders & Lüter, 2000) might have wider relevance across countries. Riegert (1998, 293) 
argues that “despite similarities between national media systems, an international media 
culture and heavy dependence on international news agencies, television news tends to 
'nationalise'  foreign conflicts to domestic frameworks of understanding about the world 
outside.”  Her analysis  of  British and Swedish media coverage of  foreign policy crises 
identifies government policy as an explaining factor (see also Vilanilam 1983). Stolle and 
Hooghe (2005) analysed television news coverage in nine countries and the pan-Arab Al-
Jazeera,  suggesting  that  government  policy  line  was  a  crucial  factor  in  determining 
coverage of the Iraq War. Dimitrova et al (2005) analysed 246 news sites concluding that a 
third  of  the  stories  on  the  Iraq  War  were  negative  in  countries  that  opposed  the  war 
compared to 15 per cent in countries that supported the war.  Lehmann's (2005) analysis of 
US and German media coverage of UN Weapons Inspections prior to the Iraq War suggests 
that government policy line is a major factor in determining the range of media coverage. 
Meanwhile,  Yang  (2003,  245)  drew  similar  conclusions  on  a  study on  American  and 
69
Chinese media coverage of the Kosovo War by arguing that “national interest would have a 
powerful role in framing the international media content because of its decisive role in 
making government policies and subsequent actions.” Finally, Dimitrova and Strömbäck's 
(2008, 216) study concludes that “the elite newspapers in Sweden and the USA framed the 
war in ways congruent with the national foreign policy and the positions of the political 
elites in each country”.  In sum, there is  a vast  amount  of empirical  research literature 
which  suggests  that  government  position  might  be  the  single  most  important  factor 
explaining media frames regardless of regime type (cf. Chan 1994).
Some studies lend support to the elite version of manufacturing consent thesis indicating 
that  the elite  opinion is  an important  factor  in explaining how international  events  are 
covered.  Tumber  and  Palmer  (2004,  164–65)  concluded  that  their  findings  on  British 
media-state relations during the Iraq Crisis are consistent with Hallin’s (1986) findings on 
Vietnam War  coverage  in  the  US.  Eilders  and  Lüter  (2000)  analyse  editorials  of  the 
German press  during  the Kosovo War arguing  that  there  was wide political  consensus 
supporting the use of military force across the political field. Only a small leftist party 
opposed which was reflected at the left  end of the spectrum of newspapers. The study 
shows that the breach of international law was not a significant issue in the debate. Only a 
fraction of editorials “fundamentally disapproved of the war” while most of the criticism 
focused on “procedural aspects of the war”. Eilders and Lüter conclude that the editorials 
failed to provide perspectives that were not already present in parliamentary debate.  This 
indicates  that  the  indexing  hypothesis  might  explain  media-state  relations  also  in  a 
multiparty system (cf. Otopalik and Schaefer 2006).  However, some studies suggest that 
the  press-government  relations  vary across  countries  due to  different  political  systems. 
Mikhail Alexseev and Lance Bennett (1995) investigated press-government relations in the 
US, the UK and Russia.  They argue that  there were three “different patterns of press-
government relations” although the debate was elite-driven in all  three countries.  With 
regard to the UK, they conclude that “the party in power is given considerable room to 
articulate its policy preferences” while the party debate is also cued (Alexseev & Bennett 
1995, 409). Timothy Cook (1994) compared US and French television news coverage of 
the Persian Gulf War concluding that while the American journalists relied on the White 
House, the Pentagon and the State Department, French journalists turned to political party 
leaders. 
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The most recent and serious challenge for the generality of theories of media-state relations 
is Archetti's (2007) 'Global News Model'. She conducted a cross-national research testing 
the  validity  of  theories  from  the  field  of  political  communication,  international 
communication and news sociology concluding that 
“[t]he news framing of  9/11,  as  the study of  its  coverage in eight  newspapers  across four 
different countries [US, France, Italy, Pakistan] suggests, can effectively be explained by the 
selection of newsworthy sources within the news. It is the range of sources, their variety of 
origin (foreign rather than national) and identity (politicians/intellectuals/social actors/religious 
leaders  etc.)  that  determines  the  scope  and  variety  of  the  news  discourse.  The  choice  by 
journalists  and  editors  of  which  sources  are  newsworthy  is  guided  by  national  interest, 
journalistic culture, and editorial policy. These variables act as multiple and progressive filters 
on the media professionals' judgements of newsworthiness: they shape their news values.” (p. 
12)
On the other hand, Liebes et  al  (2008) argue that nationalisation of news is  no longer 
possible with the domestic audience exposed to international media and that journalists act 
more independently regardless of public and/or government resentment.
3.4 CONCLUSION
To summarise, this chapter argues that the US-originated theories of media-state relations 
are the most sophisticated line of research on media-foreign policy relationship despite the 
shortcomings. Yet, they have not been widely tested outside the US. Some of the problems 
with exporting these theories to other areas were also identified.  For instance,  drawing 
from  international  communication  literature,  one  could  arrive  at  almost  opposite 
hypotheses of how media coverage of the Iraq War should differ across countries – if at all. 
On one side of the argument are those who argue that the US and American media play 
such an important role that they can, in effect, influence news coverage worldwide. On the 
other  side of the argument  are  those who argue that  international  news are  adapted to 
national setting and typically portray the views of the national government and/or national 
elites. 
It  is  fair  to  say that  it  is  still  unclear  to  what  degree  country  characteristics,  such  as 
differences in national media systems, political systems and position in the international 
system, affect the generality of the theories of media-state relations but, eventually, ‘[r]eal 
advances in  theoretical  development  with respect  to  the media and foreign policy will 




THE IRAQ CRISIS, 2002-2003
4.1 INTRODUCTION
There is already a vast literature examining various aspects of the Iraq crisis Some of the 
key protagonists have published their memoirs (Meyer 2005, Blix 2005, Campbell 2007, 
Clarke 2004, Bremer &McConnell 2006) while investigative journalists have brought into 
light many previously unknown details especially on Bush administration's inner processes 
(Ricks  2006;  Gordon  &  Trainor  2006;  Newhouse  2003;  Packer  2005;  Suskind  2006; 
Woodward 2004, 2007). There is also a growing body of scholarly literature emerging 
from the  fields  of  Politics,  International  Relations  and  Strategic  and  Defence  Studies 
(Hallenberg & Karlsson 2005, Kugler et al 2004, Pauly & Lansford 2005, Magstadt 2004). 
This line of research has addressed questions such as why this controversial conflict took 
place (Huisken 2006, Dowd 2003, Dunn 2003, Perezalonso 2006) and why the UK joined 
the US invasion (Bluth 2004, Coates  & Krieger  2004, Kennedy-Pipe & Vickers  2007, 
Hoggett 2005). The Iraq War has also been investigated in relation to transatlantic relations 
(Gordon & Shapiro 2004, Wither 2003, Forsberg 2005, Wall 2004, Styan 2004), global 
energy politics (Duffield 2005; Gokay 2002, 2005; Jhaveri 2004; Leverett & Bader 2005; 
Klare 2004; Rowell 2004) and world opinion (Goldsmith 2006, Willnatt et al 2006). In the 
field of International Law, the literature has addressed the question of the legality of the 
invasion  (Rigg 2003,  Schmitt  2004,  Simpson 2005,  Yoo 2003,  Verdirame 2004)  while 
other studies have focused on President Bush’s rhetoric or argumentation (Mral 2006) as 
well as Blair’s (McLean & Patterson 2006). 
As the Iraq War of 2003 became the “most covered war in history” (Katovsky & Carlson 
2003,  xi),  communication  scholars  have  added  to  this  growing  body  of  literature  by 
tackling different aspects of the media performance in covering the Iraq crisis and the war 
that  followed (e.g.  Artz & Kamalipour  2005, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Nohrstedt  & 
Ottosen 2005, Lewis 2004, Kull et al 2003, McChesney 2005, Rojecki 2008). Some studies 
have explored issues such as the role of the news agencies (Horvit 2006, Rantanen 2004), 
news photography (Männistö 2004, Tomanic 2004, Schwalbe 2006, Griffin 2004, Fahmy 
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& Kim 2008), and the Internet (Berenger 2006, Choi et al 2006, Schwalbe 2006, Hirji 
2006, Dimitrova et al 2005, Best et al 2005, Alexander 2004, Allan 2004, Cammaerts & 
Carpentier  2007). Embedding program and its  implications for war coverage have also 
been widely explored in the literature (Cortell et al 2009, Sylvester & Huffman 2005, Paul 
& Kim 2004, McLane 2003, Miracle 2003, Katovsky & Carlson 2003, Haigh et al 2006, 
Pfau et al 2004, Zeide 2005). To a lesser degree, comparative analysis of media coverage 
of the war has also emerged (Ravi 2004; Aday, Livingston & Hebert 2005; Lehmann 2005; 
Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2005, 2008;  Dorschneider  2007;  Lundsten & Stocchetti  2006; 
Collins et al 2004; Maeshima 2007). 
This chapter draws from this vast literature discussing the events leading up to the Iraq War 
with an emphasis on Bush administration and Blair government’s case for war and media 
management strategies in order to provide the context for the analysis of press coverage in 
the subsequent chapters. Other issues, such as the motives of the Bush administration and 
Blair government to invade Iraq, are not the subject of this study although the substance of 
their strategic communications and how the media covered these issues are relevant for this 
study.
4.2 THE RUN-UP TO THE US/UK INVASION OF IRAQ
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration took several measures to tackle America’s 
image  problem.  Charlotte  Beers,  better  known  for  branding  Uncle  Ben’s  rice,  was 
appointed as Under-secretary of State for Public Diplomacy to (re)brand America (Snow 
2003).  The  PR-minded  Bush  administration  established  ‘instant  response’  offices  in 
Washington, London and Islamabad in Pakistan to influence media coverage. In addition, 
the  Pentagon  set  up  Office  of  Strategic  Influence  (OSI)  for  overseas  propaganda  and 
worked  closely  with  Hollywood  producers  to  ensure  patriotic  television  programming 
(Paterson 2005, 53-54; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005). However, OSI had to be aborted after 
the  New York Times (Dao & Schmitt 2002) published a story in February 2002 that the 
office would plant false stories in foreign media that might be picked up by the American 
media. Despite the nominal disbanding of the OSI, its functions have still been carried out 
(Shanker & Schmitt 2004). In fact, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that, 
while “OSI” might be history, he is going to “keep doing every single thing that needs to 
be done and I have” (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting 2002).
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Unlike in the Gulf War of 1991, there were several Arabic real-time news channels such as 
Al-Jazeera which challenged the US narrative in Afghanistan which became the first target 
of the American “War on Terror”. According to one official, the US wanted “to combat 
hate media” in  the region (Snow 2004, 54).67  The US accelerated its public diplomacy 
efforts  in  the Middle East  by establishing radio al-Sawa,  which begun broadcasting in 
March 2002. It was followed by television channel al-Hurra which went on air in February 
2004. These efforts to communicate directly to Arab audiences could be seen in the context 
of Bush administration’s changing foreign policy objectives in the Middle East – or, in 
other words, its plans to invade Iraq.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq had gone from a Western ally against Iran in the 1980s to a villain 
after invading Kuwait in 1990. This aggression was met by President George Bush’s (sr.) 
decision to go to a war against Iraq. A wide international coalition drove Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait  but Saddam was allowed to stay in power.  However,  the UN Security Council 
imposed  economic  sanctions  and  weapons  inspections  on  Iraq.  Some  elements  of  the 
George H.W. Bush administration felt that the Iraqi regime should have been toppled in the 
Gulf  War.  When  they  re-entered  the  office  with  George  Bush  Jr.,  they  seized  the 
opportunity to push their policies in the favourable circumstances that the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks had created (Kramer & Michalowski 2005; Gilpin 2005, 11; Magstadt 2004, 204; 
Dueck  2006,  156).68 Several  key  positions  in  the  Bush  administration  were  held  by 
signatories of a letter that had demanded President Clinton to take a more forceful stance 
on Iraq in January 1998.69 
67  For Bush administration’s troubled relations with Al-Jazeera see Figenschou 2006.
68  According to William Kristol, editor of a conservative weekly magazine The Weekly 
Standard, before 9/11 it was not clear President Bush would adopt the neoconservative 
agenda in foreign policy (Magstadt 2004, 203). 
69  The letter (Project for the New American Century 1998) stated: “It hardly needs to be 
added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the 
safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the 
moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be 
put at hazard.” The signatories included US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, US 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security John Bolton, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
and Richard Perle (a member of Defense Policy Board which is an advisory board for 
the Secretary of Defense). PNAC also prepared a “blueprint for maintaining global US 
pre-eminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international 
security order in line with American principles and interests” (Project for the New 
American Century 2000, ii).
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There is evidence to suggest that the Bush administration considered invasion of Iraq as a 
viable  policy  option  soon  after  9/11  2001  even  though  the  US  decided  to  attack 
Afghanistan first (Woodward 2004,  Beaumont et al 2001).70 Consequently, soon after the 
Taliban  regime  was  toppled  in  Afghanistan  in  November-December  2001,  the  Bush 
administration turned its  focus  on Iraq.  According to  one administration official,  Bush 
decided to pursue regime change in Iraq in early 2002 (Dueck 2006, 157).71 The planning 
for invasion of Iraq was in full progress during the first half of 2002 (Woodward 2004) and 
General Tommy Franks presented operational war plans to Rumsfeld and Bush in as early 
as February 2002 (Doig et al 2007, 28). 
According to the British Ambassador to Washington, President Bush requested Britain’s 
support for ousting of Saddam only days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Phythian 2005, 
129). Leaked Downing Street memos indicate that Britain got involved in the planning of 
the  invasion  of  Iraq early on.  For  instance,  Blair’s  chief  foreign policy advisor  David 
Manning,  who  discussed  Iraq  with  National  Security  Advisor  to  President  Bush, 
Condoleezza Rice, wrote a memo to PM Blair on 14 March 2002. The memo states that 
“We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and 
has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for 
regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that very 
different than anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if 
we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result.” 
The memorandum also points out that President Bush had not yet figured out “how to 
persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified” 
(UK Government 2002a).
70  Suskind (2006, 22) argues that regime change in Iraq was discussed in the first National 
Security Council meeting of the Bush presidency already in January 2001 – several 
months before 9/11. According to a former Treasury Secretary O’Neill, "It was all about 
finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying ‘Go find me a way 
to do this,’" (CBS News 2004). Richard Clarke, former advisor to Bush, has also argued 
that the administration took the office “with Iraq on its agenda” (quoted in Doig et al 
2007, 27). According Packer (2005, 41), Bush said that “I believe Iraq was involved” 
within days after 9/11. In Britain, the Foreign Office also reviewed the policy options 
with regard to Iraq well before 9/11. In late 2000, Blair was informed that "Such a 
policy [regime overthrow] would command no useful international support. An overt 
attempt to be successful would require a massive military effort, probably including a 
land invasion: this would risk considerable casualties and, possibly, extreme last-ditch 
acts of deterrence or defiance by Saddam." Moreover, the document added that the 
policy would be ”illegal” (Savage 2010).
71 Yet, the leadership in Australia, Britain and the US kept insisting in public that no 
decisions had been made for another year (Doig et al 2007).
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In the absence of evidence to link Iraq to 9/11 or other signs of Iraqi aggression, it was 
clear that the removal of the Ba’ath regime posed more of public relations than military 
challenge (Calabrese 2005). Therefore, the US and its closest ally in the enterprise, the UK, 
put considerable effort  into selling the war to their  constituencies and the international 
community.  Political  marketing  played a  pivotal  role  in  Bush administration  efforts  to 
mobilize both domestic and international support  for the invasion (Rampton & Stauber 
2003; Rutherford 2004; Snow 2003; Jowett & O’Donnell 2006, 317).72 Dubious pieces of 
intelligence on Iraqi unconventional weapons programs and links to terrorism were often 
“cherry-picked” to suit the needs of the public relations effort (Pillar 2008).73 The evidence 
seems  to  suggests  that  the  Bush  administration  was  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
intelligence did not support  a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Kramer & Michalowski 
2005, 449), yet the chief counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke was asked three times to 
find a link between 9/11 and Iraq by President Bush (Doig et al 2007, 27-28).
On 29 January, President Bush (2002a) coined the term “Axis of Evil” in his State of the 
Union Address in which Iraq was especially targeted. Bush also implied that the US might 
take preventive action against countries it considered to be her enemies.  
“Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime 
has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade.74 This is 
a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the 
bodies  of  mothers  huddled  over  their  dead  children.  This  is  a  regime  that  agreed  to 
international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something 
to hide from the civilized world. 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match 
72  Danny Schechter (2004, 25-26) argues that “[w]hat was new in the 2003 Iraq War was 
the sophisticated way in which corporate public relations techniques were adapted by 
the Bush administration to create the rationale for the war, orchestrate support for it, 
bring media on board, and then sell it to politicians and then the public.”
73  A study by Cirincione et al (2004, 8) concludes that the Bush administration “officials 
systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile 
programs.” An online database recording and analyzing the Bush administration claims 
can be found at www.publicintegrity.org. Another study that focuses on the the issue is 
Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administrations Public Statements on Iraq by Special 
Investigations Division of the United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Government Reform (US House of Representatives 2004).
74  Of course, Iraq had been developing WMD much longer than a decade but in the 1980s 
this was done with secret US assistance (Magstadt 2004, 207). According to US Senate 
Committee reports in 1994, the US had provided Iraq with materials and agents for 
chemical weapons until 1989 (Blum 2002, 122). In 1996, Scott Inquiry revealed that 
Britain had also played a role in the build-up of the Iraqi weapons arsenal (Phythian 
2005). 
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their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of 
these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. […]
We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I 
will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit 
the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. 
(Applause.)”
In effect, the war on terror had been extended to the so-called rogue states. A memorandum 
prepared by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on 25 March 2002, which provides a 
rather detailed account on how these problems were seen inside the British government 
and how they were to be solved, argued that it was difficult to make a convincing case why 
Iraq should be attacked and not Iran or North Korea which kept making threats while the 
US prepared to go to war with Iraq (Straw 2002). Straw saw that the concept of Axis of 
Evil only added to this problem. According to a close adviser to Blair, even the PM was 
first and foremost concerned about North Korea followed by Iran. Iraq was third on Blair’s 
list of dangerous rogue states (Woodward 2004, 177).75 The apparent contradiction of the 
Bush  doctrine,  pre-emptive  use  of  force,  with  international  law  only  added  to  the 
difficulties in mobilizing international support for military action against Iraq.76 
The difficulties of selling the war were acknowledged in discussions between the UK and 
US.  On 17 March  2002,  the British Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  Sir  Christopher 
Meyer,  discussed  the  main  selling  points  with  US  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  Paul 
Wolfowitz over a “Sunday lunch” in Washington.  On the following day,  Meyer (2002) 
wrote  a memo addressed to  Sir  David Manning,  PM Tony Blair's  chief  foreign policy 
advisor:
“On  Iraq  I  opened  by  sticking  very  closely  to  the  script  that  you  used  with  Condi 
[Condoleezza] Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and 
failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically and probably elsewhere 
in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there 
had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went on 
75 Coates and Krieger (2004, 94) also point out that, in terms of unconventional weapons 
capability, North Korea was the most advanced of the “Axis of Evil” followed by Iran 
while “Iraq was the least developed”.
76  According to Hakanen and Nikolaev (2005, 1): “For the first time since 1945, the 
doctrine of preemptive war was not only openly proclaimed by the United States but 
actually put to practical use, encountering stiff political resistance even from its 
traditional allies and neighbors—France, Germany, Canada, Mexico, and others. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that the entire security system was tested by this event. The 
future and the relevance of the United Nations—as a cornerstone of this system—were 
challenged by this war. Therefore, this event is being and will be thoroughly studied by 
scholars from different fields to assess the effects and future political consequences of 
this war.”
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through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspections and the UN SCRs [Security Council 
Resolutions]  and  the  critical  importance  of  the  MEPP [Middle  East  Peace  Process]  as  an 
integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully, we were 
fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.”77
The memo also notes that “[t]he WMD danger was of course crucial to the public case 
against Saddam, particularly the potential linkage to terrorism.” In effect, the main themes 
for a public relations campaign had been laid out. Meanwhile, the CIA held the view that 
“Saddam is not a threat to the United States right now, but that the easiest way for him to 
become an immediate threat is to give him no options. Bush could well provoke the use of 
the very weapons he is trying to prevent” (quoted in Hakanen & Nikolaev 2006, 2; see also 
Pillar 2008, 237).
Leaked British documents reveal that Blair had promised Bush that “the UK would support 
military action to bring about a regime change” during his visit to Crawford, President’s 
Texas  ranch, in April 2002 (Smith 2005). Apparently Blair’s decision was based on his 
analysis  that  the  war  was inevitable  and that,  in  his  own words,  “[i]t  would  be  more 
damaging to long-term world peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam 
Hussein than if they had international support to do so” (quoted in Coates & Krieger 2004, 
96). According to Bluth (2004, 871), the British decision was based not on the imminence 
of the Iraqi threat but on the prospect that Iraq might develop missiles with wider range or 
cooperate  with terrorists.  Bluth (2004, 890) argues that  Blair  “consistently” referred to 
three reasons for war: threat posed by Iraqi WMD, containment had not worked and merely 
affected the Iraqi people, and the cruelty of the Iraqi regime.78 
In a meeting on July 23, in which Blair and his senior ministers and advisers devised a plan 
to justify the invasion, the British Attorney-General pointed out that “regime change was 
not a legal base for military action” (Smith 2005). While pointing out that the case against 
Iraq was “thin”, Foreign Minister Jack Straw suggested that Britain should work towards 
reinvigorating the weapons inspections in which case either Saddam’s refusal to let the 
77  In February 2006, Channel Four News (2006) reported on another attempt to 
‘wrongfoot’ Iraq’s relations with the UN. Bush and Blair discussed disguising a US 
plane in UN colours and using it to lure Iraq to take a shot at it creating a pretext for 
war. This discussion, which also set March 10th as the start of the invasion regardless of 
UN Security Council position, took place in January 2003.
78  Yet, it should be mentioned that in December 1998, Blair told the House of Commons 
that “we reject claims that the Iraqi people are suffering because of the sanctions” 
(quoted in Williams 2005, 191). In Williams’s (2005, 193) view, the reasons for UK’s 
endorsement of the use of military force were Blair’s atlanticism, the post-9/11 security 
environment and Saddam’s intransigence.
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inspectors in Iraq or evidence of WMD programmes would provide the justification and a 
legal pretext for military action (Smith 2005). In August 2002, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell managed to convince President Bush to take the Iraq issue to the UN rather than act 
unilaterally (Dueck 2006, 157).
The  six-month-long  campaign  to  mobilize  an  international  coalition  against  Iraq  was 
launched in September 2002 to coincide with the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist 
attack in an effort to create an association between 9/11 and the Iraqi regime in the public 
mind.79 From the beginning,  information was used very selectively to conceal the lack of 
hard evidence. Hastedt (2005, 430) provides an illuminating example of the techniques of 
the US/UK propaganda campaign: 
“President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at Camp David on 7 September and 
each made public pronouncements regarding the seriousness of the threat. Blair cited a report 
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) showing ‘what’s been going on at the 
former  weapons  sites’ and  Bush  said  an  IAEA report  placed  Iraq  ‘six  months  away from 
developing a [nuclear] weapon. I don’t know what more evidence we need’. Neither reference 
was to a contemporary IAEA report. In Blair’s case he was referencing news reports. President 
Bush was citing an IAEA report written in 1996 and updated in 1998 and 1999. It stated that 
‘based on all credible information to date, the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having 
achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical 
capacity for the production of weapon usable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained 
such material.’ The report did say that before the Gulf War Iraq was six months to a year away 
from having a nuclear capacity.”80
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002, President 
Bush  (2002b)  presented  the  case  against  Iraq  which  was  repeatedly  invoked  in  the 
following months. In addition, Bush implied that if the UN does not act according to his 
will, the US would go-it-alone if necessary:81
“We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do 
nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights 
and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make 
that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as 
well.”82
79 August was also considered to be bad time to introduce any new policies. White House 
Chief of Staff said that “[f]rom a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new 
products in August” (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 37). 
80  On this meeting, on 7 September 2002, PM Blair also told President Bush that Britain 
would follow the US even if force was needed (Woodward 2004, 178).
81  As Knudsen (2004, 52) notes, “Bush's address looked more like an ultimatum to the UN 
than an invitation to negotiation and diplomacy, the message being that earlier 
resolutions of the Security Council would now be enforced with or without the UN 
which could either take action against Iraq or become irrelevant.” 
82  According to Bob Woodward (2004, 161), Bush instructed his speechwriter Mike 
Gerson on the preparation of his UN speech in the following way: “We’re going to tell 
the U.N. that it’s going to confront this problem or condemn itself to irrelevance, okay?” 
Condoleezza Rice’s proposition to issue an ultimatum demanding disarmament within 
79
According  to  Bush,  Iraq  was  not  only  in  breach  of  several  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction but also harbouring 
terrorists. However, it was the combination of these two that posed the greatest threat: “the 
greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw 
regime supplies them with technologies to kill on a massive scale.” In effect, the argument 
about terrorism was based on preventing the  “smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” as 
Condoleezza  Rice  put  it  in  September  2002  (quoted  in  Mral  2006,  51).83 Moreover, 
Saddam's history of aggression against his own people and neighbouring countries called 
for immediate action from the UN. Bush saw in Iraq a “grave and gathering danger” and 
“exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.” 
President Bush's address was coordinated with Blair government's campaign which was 
launched with the release of an intelligence document  called “Iraq's  Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Assessment of the British Government” on 24 September (Sharp 2004, 63). 
John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), worked closely with the 
No  10  Downing  Street  aides  who  suggested  plenty  of  amendments  and  wanted  to 
“heighten  the  sense  of  threat  beyond  the  level  supported  by the  original  intelligence” 
(Phythian 2005, 130). Downing Street  Chief of Staff,  Jonathan Powell,  warned Alistair 
Campbell that the original JIC draft did not suggest Iraq posed a threat to its neighbours or 
the  international  community  (Sharp  2004,  63).  Yet,  this  so-called  ‘Iraq  dossier’, 
‘September dossier’ or ‘British dossier’ (UK Government 2002b, 5) argued that 
“[a]s a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: continued to produce chemical and 
biological  agents; military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,  including 
against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of 
an order to use them.”84 
The dossier also claimed that Iraq had obtained uranium from Niger – an allegation which 
was later dismissed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Phythian 2005, 
30 days or face military conflict had been ruled out and Bush had agreed to attempt to 
get UN authorization (Woodward 2004, 181). 
83  This expression was also used by President Bush in Cincinnati on 6 October 2002 
(Payne 2005, 4; Rid 2006, 14). This argument played an important part in marketing 
campaign but could not provide the legal basis for the war as the 'pre-emptive strike' is 
in breach with international law. Yet, pre-emption, also known as the 'Bush doctrine', is 
part of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which was released in 
September 2002.
84  In December, it was accompanied by another dossier focusing on Iraq's human rights 
record (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2002) and in February by perhaps the most 
controversial Iraq dossier which was based on a dated post-graduate study rather than 
new intelligence (UK Government 2003).
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133). The following week, the Bush administration released its National Security Strategy 
which included the doctrine of pre-emptive use of force and, on 28 September 2002, Bush 
used the British dossier as an evidence of Iraqi unconventional weapons capability: 
"The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to 
make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical 
attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and 
continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. This regime is 
seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year."
As  a  consequence  of  this  US/UK  initiative,  UN  weapons  inspections  were  soon 
reinvigorated and, on 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 
1441 granting Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations”. Yet, 
the Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspections could be characterized more passive than 
active. For instance, only when the inspectors found missiles which exceeded to range-
limit set by the Security Council, Iraq destroyed the missiles (Wall 2004). 
As diplomats and weapons inspectors worked to avoid war, the military build-up of US, 
UK and Australian forces took place in the Gulf region.85 In early 2003, the UN Chief 
Weapons Inspector Hans Blix briefed the UN Security Council  on three occasions (27 
January, 14 February and 7 March). In January, he argued that “the results to date have 
been  consistent  with  Iraq's  declarations”.  Blix  restated  UN weapons  inspection  team's 
position on 14 February:
“In my 27 January update to the council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had 
decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all 
sites and assistance to UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission] in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and 
we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never 
been declared or  inspected,  as  well  as  to  Presidential  sites  and private residences.”(United 
Nations 2003)
Yet,  the US determination to  employ military force grew despite  the fact  that  the UN 
weapons inspectors had not been able to find evidence of active weapons programs. By 
early 2003,  the  war  seemed inevitable  regardless  of  the positions  of  the UN Weapons 
Inspectors, the Security Council or hostile world opinion. Many European governments 
were torn between their loyalties to the US and the UN (Mouritzen 2006, 138). Moreover, 
the crisis had mobilized their domestic constituencies. While there was public support for 
the Afghan campaign to oust the Taliban regime – which was allegedly harbouring Osama 
bin  Laden  and  al-Qaeda  –  in  the  aftermath  of  9/11,  the  global  public  opinion  was 
85 Australian forces never amounted to more than 2,100 which is only a fraction of the 
Coalition military build-up in the area (Bromley 2004, 225).
81
vehemently  against  the  use  of  military  force  against  Iraq  (Gallup  International  2003, 
Kritzinger  2003).  According  to  some  estimates,  one  million  people  in  London  alone 
protested against the looming war on a worldwide anti-war rally on 15 February (Pickerell 
& Webster 2006, 407).86 
France was hoping for successful inspections and an end to sanctions while the US was 
hoping for a clear sign of Iraqi non-compliance which would lead the UN Security Council 
to  authorize  the  use  of  military  force.  According  to  French  foreign  ministry  sources, 
President Jacques Chirac worried that the war would destabilize the region even further, 
incite terrorist attacks and cause considerable harm to Western relations with the Muslim 
world. In addition, the doctrine of pre-emption could open a Pandora’s Box (Wall 2004, 
131).87 President  Chirac said it  was an “extraordinarily dangerous  doctrine” (quoted in 
Miller  2005b,  166).  As  the  US  determination  intensified,  European  Parliament  took  a 
strong stance against pre-emptive use of force declaring such action would be in breach of 
international law (Miller 2005b, 168).
By  early  January,  French  diplomats  became  increasingly  convinced  that  the  war  was 
inevitable and, on 13 January 2003, Condoleezza Rice told a French special envoy that the 
decision has been already made in December. However, French Foreign Minister Dominic 
de Villepin decided to do everything in his power to avert the war (Wall 2004, 132). Pauly 
and Lansford (2005, 55) argue that the most important reasons for French opposition to the 
use of force were diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq,88 large Muslim minority in 
France and an opportunity to challenge US hegemony. 
In Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had promised during the election campaign that 
he would not support a war against Iraq (Wall 2004) while the German position could also 
be seen as a protest against increasingly unilateral US policies which excluded Germany 
from the  decision-making  process  (Forsberg  2005).  Meanwhile,  Russia  was  concerned 
about her economic interests in Iraq and potential destabilization of her southern borders as 
a consequence of war (Golan 2004, 430). These three countries formed the core of the 
international opposition to the use of force against Iraq.
86 Estimations vary as Couldry and Downey (2004, 267) refer to 1.5 million.
87  Ever since France re-established its relations with Iraq in mid-1990s, the French 
position with regard to Iraq has differed from that of the US and the UK (Styan 2004, 
372).
88  However, Styan (2004) argues that they played only a minor role in French decision-
making in the run-up to the war.
82
On 31 January, President Bush and PM Blair met in Washington. Bush told Blair that the 
war was inevitable even without a second UN Security Council resolution. The war would 
begin on 10 March. According to a leaked memo of the meeting, Blair pushed for a second 
resolution because it would give them “international cover” if anything went wrong. The 
leaders discussed the invasion and its  aftermath in some detail  while Bush also talked 
about ways to provoke a confrontation with Iraq to justify the invasion or assassinating 
Saddam Hussein ('Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says', New York Times, 27 
March 2006). 
Meanwhile, the US “apparently co-orchestrated” two declarations  which were signed by, 
what the press called, Gang of Eight, and Vilnius Ten (Mouritzen 2006, 140). The first 
declaration was published on 30 January and it was signed by the UK, Italy, Spain, Czech, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Denmark. It argued that the UN Security Council resolution 
1441 recognised Iraq as a threat and insisted that they “would rid the world of the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction”. Failing to do so would rid the 
Security Council of its credibility and “world peace will suffer as a result” (Gang of Eight 
2003). The Vilnius Ten statement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, followed 
on  5  February  and  was  accompanied  with  Powell’s  presentation  at  the  UN  Security 
Council the same day. The statement called “upon the U.N. Security Council to take the 
necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq’s continuing threat to international 
peace and security” (Vilnius Ten 2003).89
On 5 February 2003, only some days before Blix's second briefing for the UN Security 
Council, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell addressed the Security Council arguing that 
Iraq had failed to disarm. Powell’s speech has been described as “a pivotal moment in the 
run-up to the war” which resulted in 30 per cent rise in American public’s belief that there 
was a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq (Dorman 2006, 16). It was also “covered live by 
much of the world’s media” (Dadge 2006, 56). The timing was specifically designed to 
undermine the UN weapons inspector's report which was due the following week (Mral 
89 According to Mouritzen (2006, 158, n7), ”[t]he Statement of the Vilnius Group 
Countries had actually been written by Bruce Jackson, a former military intelligence 
officer and a ‘freelance US envoy’ to Central and Eastern Europe. It was non-
negotiable: ‘Take it or (do not) leave it’, according to his e-mail to the Lithuanian 
embassy in Washington, which coordinated the operation.”
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2006). It became clear that even the failure to “wrongfoot” the UNMOVIC and Iraq did not 
stop the Bush administration from executing the invasion as planned. On the same day, the 
British intelligence agency, MI6, leaked a report which denounced the link between Iraq 
and al-Qaeda (Calabrese 2005, 155-156). 
Colin Powell failed to convince the members of the UN Security Council as only the UK 
gave its unconditional support while the others preferred giving more time to diplomacy 
and UN weapons inspections. This left the Blair government in a difficult position as the 
attempts to secure a UN Security Council  authorization grew desperate.  Public opinion 
surveys,  which  were conducted  in  February 2003,  showed that  91 per  cent  of  Britons 
considered UN authorization crucial for the justification of the use of force while 45 per 
cent opposed the war in any case (Kritzinger 2003).  The Blair government was fighting 
this  sentiment  and  published  its  second  Iraq  dossier  on  January  30,  which  become 
commonly known as the ‘dodgy dossier’ when it was revealed that the ‘intelligence’ was 
based on previously published academic material.90 Despite the difficulties, Blair was fully 
committed to the use of force and had promised President Bush on January 31, that he was 
“solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam” (Norton-
Taylor 2006).91 According to the Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook (25 Feb 
2003), “Tony’s attempt to wrap himself in the UN flag is fatally hobbled by his inability to 
say that the UN will have the last word” (quoted in Dumbrell, 212). 
On March 7, Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith still held the view that second UN Security 
Council resolution would be needed to legalise military action. However, he seems to have 
changed his mind few days later (O’Malley 2007, 14). Similarly to the Operation Desert 
Fox in 1998, the legal case rested on UN Security Council resolutions dating back to early 
1990s and proved controversial. For instance, experts on International Law from Oxford 
and Cambridge Universities along with 13 UN Security Council members denounced the 
legal argument for the use of force (Williams 2005, 198-200).   
On March 10, President Chirac told that France would veto the proposal for second UN 
Security Council Resolution. The Bush administration and the Blair government put the 
90  The dossier was partly based on Ibrahim al-Marashi’s (2002) article ‘Iraq's Security and 
Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis published in Middle East Review of  
International Affairs in September 2002.
91  It is often taken for granted that the invasion of Iraq was a US-led policy to which the 
Blair government “merely adapted” (Hallenberg 2005, 21).
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blame on  France  for  the  failure  of  diplomacy by deliberately misinterpreting  Chirac’s 
reference “whatever the circumstances”. By this reference, Chirac meant that France would 
vote ‘no’ to the proposal endorsed by Spain, the UK and the US regardless of how other 
countries voted in the next meeting but he did not mean that France would never under any 
circumstances authorise the use of force against Iraq (Vaïsse 2003, 8).92 Although the US 
and the UK preferred to make France the scapegoat, in reality, they were nowhere near 
securing  sufficient  support  in  the  Security  Council  for  the  authorisation  of  the  war 
(Williams 2005, 193). As the US/UK failed to secure a second UNSC resolution giving a 
UN mandate for the use of force, former Foreign Secretary and the leader of the House of 
Commons, Robin Cook (2003) resigned as a protest to “a war that has neither international 
agreement nor domestic support” on 17 March. While Labour Party was divided on the 
issue and Liberal Democrats against the war, Blair took the country into the war with the 
support of the Conservative Party.
4.3 THE INVASION
Exactly a year after Meyer—Wolfowitz meeting in Washington, the Iraq crisis culminated 
in President George W. Bush's ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein to flee Iraq within 
48 hours or find himself “in a military conflict” (Bush 2003a). In the absence of the second 
UN Security Council  resolution,  less  than  50 governments  supported  American-British 
military action against Iraq (White House Press Release 27 March 2003). Clearly, the kind 
of support America had for ousting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the 9/11 2001 
terrorist attack was missing as both the UN  Security Council and Nato were divided on 
Iraq.93 99 per cent of the invading forces consisted of US and UK troops and out of all 
other  European  states  only  Denmark  and  Poland  participated  in  the  war  with  modest 
contributions  (Mouritzen  2006,  141).  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  (2007,  158-159),  former 
national security adviser to the Carter administration, points out that 
“the military campaign in 2003 was largely a solitary and unilateral undertaking. Except for the 
British, other national  forces’ participation in combat was minimal,  even though the White 
House  misleadingly  claimed  in  a  March  2003  press  release  that  forty-nine  states  were 
committed  to  a  coalition  ‘that  has  already begun military operations  to  disarm Iraq  of  its 
weapons of mass destruction’ The facts on the ground were quite otherwise and stood in sharp 
contrast to the Gulf War of 1991.” 
92 The draft resolution has been published in Sifry & Cerf (2003), pp. 499-500.  
93  Many countries in the Iraq Coalition were insignificant small states and in some cases 
their support was bought (see White House 2003). 
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The war began on 20 March 2003. 17 states either participated or gave strong or moderate 
support  for  the  US-led  intervention.  Ireland  was  among  Croatia,  Czech  Republic  and 
Slovenia  whose  position  on  Iraq  could  be  characterised  either  vague  or  contradictory 
(Mouritzen 2006,  142).  Eleven European states  were against  the war  and Sweden,  for 
instance, declared the war illegal. Finland stated that the use of force was “unacceptable”. 
In the absence of the UN authorisation,  the public opinion in Ireland and Finland was 
equally opposed to  the war  at  77 and 78 per cent  respectively.  Opposition to  national 
governments' participation in the operation was over 80 per cent in both countries. Even in 
Britain 68 per cent opposed the use of force against Iraq and the same percentage opposed 
Britain's involvement in the invasion (Mouritzen 2006, 141-142).
The Coalition forces reached Baghdad by early April. The Iraqi army was outdated and 
demoralised  in  the  face  of  superior  military power.  Even the  much feared  Republican 
Guard, Saddam's elite forces, evaporated and it began to seem as if there was not going to 
be ”another Stalingrad” – fierce and bloody street-by-street fighting – promised by Tariq 
Aziz close to the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad in February (Roberts 2003). 
Baghdad fell on 9 April as only Saddam Fedayeen and foreign volunteers put up fierce 
resistance (Bowen 2004, 164).
The toppling of the Saddam Statue provided the most iconic images of the Iraq War, at 
least until the pictures of torture in Abu Ghraib were published a year later, but some argue 
that the event was especially stage-managed for international journalists residing in the 
near-by Palestine Hotel. David D. Perlmutter (2005, 120) points out that what happened on 
Firdos Square ”was in essence a photo-op by the U.S. military, with participants invited in 
and the area closed off.” Among approximately hundred Iraqis there were about a dozen of 
journalists and US army personnel were also present closing the square from outsiders and 
helping to bring down the statue. According to a Daily Mirror journalist “there were very 
few people in that square when it happened. There were 30 or 40 people in the beginning” 
(quoted  in  Baines  &  Worcester  2005,  8).  Some  have  alleged  that  the  Iraqis  were 
specifically transported to the site by the Americans. In another media stunt, US forces 
‘rescued’ young female soldier Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital where she was being 
treated. Reporters widely reproduced the official story according to which she had killed 
several  Iraqis  before she ran out  of  ammunition and had been shot  and stabbed.  BBC 
documentary  challenged  the  official  narrative  and  eventually  Washington  Post,  for 
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example,  acknowledged  that  it  may  have  seriously  misreported  the  events  leading  to 
Lynch's capture and rescue (Rafeeq 2007, 96-97).
Meanwhile, the real Saddam had disappeared and would only be found several months 
later. The death toll of American soldiers continued to rise despite Bush had declared the 
“mission accomplished” and an end to “major combat operations” on May 1. The Pentagon 
had only begun planning for the post-invasion phase in late January 2003 and was ill-
prepared for the aftermath (Williams 2005, 201). Essentially, the Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was merely designed to topple the Iraqi regime and lacked elements that would have been 
crucial for the political reconstruction of the country in the immediate aftermath of the 
invasion  (Ricks  2006,  115-116).  Consequently,  the  US failed  to  establish  security  and 
restore  essential  infrastructure that  had suffered  from years  of  sanctions,  bombing and 
widespread looting that followed the fall of the Ba’ath regime. Consequently, the US was 
slowly  but  surely  losing  the  good  will  the  Iraqi  people  might  have  had  towards  the 
Americans (Magstadt 2004, 210). According to al-Marashi and al-Khalili (2006), incidents 
in which American forces killed innocent civilians only added to the hostility towards the 
occupier. The Iraqi people did not welcome the occupation and the country descended into 
a  spiral  of  violence  with  increasing  sectarian  violence  and  roadside  bombs  targeting 
Coalition forces.94 On August 19, the UN headquarters  in Baghdad was bombed and a 
suicide attack at Red Cross headquarters followed in October. In the spring of 2004, there 
was  a  Shia  uprising  and four  US contractors  were  killed  in  Fallujah  leading  to  a  US 
crackdown on the city.  To make matters  worse for  the  occupier,  images  of  abuse and 
torture at Abu Ghraib emerged to the public domain. As Rutherford (2004, 198) put it
“Washington had hoped, if not promised, that its 'war of liberation' would deliver a grateful 
country, similar in spirit to a newly freed France in the aftermath of the Second World War... 
the invasion had produced yet another quagmire, all too reminiscent of Vietnam, an unstable 
Iraq where American soldiers were bogged down in constant combat”.
Moreover,  a survey report  by Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2004) 
indicates that a year after Iraq War mistrust of America has increased and discontent with 
its policies has intensified in European and Muslim countries.
94  According to a Special Forces veteran in Iraq, “[w]e are without allies amongst the 
Iraqi populace, including those who have benefited from the ouster of Saddam....Across 
Baghdad, Latifiyah, Mahmudiyah, Salman Pak, Baqubah, Balad, Taji, Baiji, Ramadi, 
and just about everywhere else you can name, the people absolutely hate us.... The Iraqi 
people have not bought into what the Americans are selling, and no amount of military 
activity is going to change this fact” (quoted in Ford 2005, 51).
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4.4 THE FALLOUT
The publicly announced rationale for war evaporated soon after the invasion as the US-led 
Coalition failed to produce the “smoking gun” to substantiate their allegations about Iraqi 
weapons  of  mass  destruction.  While  the  US/UK  had  provided  a  barrage  of  moral 
justifications in the run-up to the war, in legal terms, the case for war rested on weapons of 
mass  destruction.  Possession of  WMD would  have put  Iraq in  breach  of  UN Security 
Council  resolutions  which  would  have  given  the  legal  pretext  for  the  use  of  force 
(Humphreys 2005, 157).
In the lead-up to the war, the Bush administration had been able to exaggerate the Iraqi 
threat because the access to the intelligence data was strictly limited and critics working for 
CIA, FBI or NSA did not want to go on record with journalists even though anonymity 
undermined the credibility of their arguments (Dadge 2006, 21). However, as the security 
situation worsened in Iraq, US intelligence and State Department officials started to point 
out  that  it  was  clear  to  them that  the  case  for  war  was  weak  all  along  and  that  the 
occupation  would  face  severe  difficulties  (Stacks  2003,  20).95 Bush  and  Blair  “found 
themselves under heavy and regular pressure to justify the war they had won” and faced 
“repeated calls to explain why they had taken their countries to war” (Coates & Krieger 
2004, 1).96 The US sent its own weapons inspectors to Iraq but, eventually, the Iraq Survey 
Group (ISG) had to conclude that there was “no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to 
restart the [nuclear] program” (Iraq Survey Group 2004, Key Findings, 11). Nor did they 
find  evidence  of  operational  chemical  and  biological  weapons  programs.97 In  2004, 
95  On 17 August 2003, a terrorist attack on UN Headquarters in Baghdad was a clear 
indication that the shift to democracy would not be easy and the subsequently attacks on 
religious landmarks have fuelled a sectarian conflict. Many of the difficulties of the 
occupation had been predicted in the so-called Crane-Terrill report in February 2003.
96  For instance, former defense minister Peter Kilfoyle said that “[i]t seems to me that, at 
very least, evidence was used selectively from intelligence reports to fit the case” 
(quoted in Lyall 2003). 
97  In a press conference on talks with visiting British PM Tony Blair at the end of April 
2003, Putin seemed to suspect that the desperate search for WMD would drive the 
Coalition to fabricate their evidence which, in the light of the run-up to the war, might 
have been a valid concern. He said that “if something is found, there's no need to just 
show empty barrels on television. UN inspectors could be immediately summoned to 
draw their professional conclusions.” Putin also said scornfully that “Where is Saddam? 
Where is this arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, if it ever existed? Maybe Saddam 
is sitting somewhere in a secret bunker with weapons of mass destruction, preparing to 
explode all this stuff and threaten thousands of human lives. Or maybe he transfer it, or 
plans to transfer it, to terrorist organizations. We need answers to these questions.” 
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Saddam acknowledged  that  Iraq  let  the  world  to  believe  that  it  could  possess  WMD 
because it did not want to appear weak to its neighbours, least of all Iran. Consequently, it 
did not allow the UN inspectors to observe the destruction of its non-conventional weapons 
arsenal after the Gulf War in 1991, something he later regretted (The Times, 2 July 2009).
Similarly, even though the Bush administration frequently implied a link between Iraq and 
al-Qaeda and Rumsfeld even described the evidence “bulletproof” (Pfiffner 2004, 26), the 
argument was never fully substantiated. On 7 October 2002, President Bush said that “[w]e 
know that  Iraq  and al-Qaeda  have  had  high-level  contacts  that  go back  a  decade”.  In 
addition, the Bush administration frequently implied a link with 9/11 and Iraq but when 
asked directly in a press conference on 31 January 2003, Bush and Blair acknowledged 
that  they  had  no  evidence  to  directly  link  Saddam  Hussein  to  9/11.  Despite  the 
shortcomings  of  evidence,  in  his  “Mission  Accomplished”  speech  on  1  May  2003, 
President Bush still insisted that there was a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda: “We've 
removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding”. Justin Lewis (2004, 
297)  argues  that,  very much  like  in  advertising,  association  was  an  important  tool  in 
legitimizing the Iraq War and the Bush administration frequently associated Iraq crisis with 
the War on Terror with vague accusations (see also Robinson & Livingston 2006, 26).
Eventually, the Pentagon admitted that there was no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Schor 
2008) while US Senate Intelligence Select Committee had reached the same conclusion in 
2006 and 9/11 Commission had denounced any Iraqi involvement in 9/11. Before being 
transferred to Iraqi custody and hanged in December 2006, Saddam Hussein told the FBI 
that he did not share “the same belief or vision” with bin Laden and had never met him 
(The Times, 2 July 2009). A source at the heart of the CIA points out that the “intelligence 
community never offered any analysis that supported the notion of an alliance between 
Saddam and al-Qaeda” (Pillar  2008, 239).98 Paul L.  Pillar  (2008, 235),  CIA’s National 
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, argues that 
“it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the 
most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify 
decisions  already  made,  that  damaging  ill  will  developed  between  policymakers  and 
intelligence officers, and that the intelligence community’s own work was politicized.”
98  The publicly available information on al-Qaeda—Iraq relationship has even convinced 
some scholars to believe that connection existed ignoring all the information to the 
contrary (see e.g. Pauly & Lansford 2005, 31). 
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According to the  Center for Public Integrity (2008) study, the key Bush administration 
figures  made  935  false  statements  in  the  lead-up  to  the  war.  While  it  remains  highly 
controversial  who  knew  what  and  when,  it  is  likely  that  historians  and  International 
Relations  scholars  will  argue  for  years  to  come  what  exactly  motivated  the  Bush 
administration and the British government to invade Iraq. In addition to publicly declared 
motives for the invasion, reasons, which are more in line with realistic tradition, include 
setting  a  warning  to  other  ‘rogue  states’,  securing  Western  access  to  Iraqi  oil  and 
reinforcement of US-led world order (Doig 2005, 111). In “Petrodollar Warfare”, William 
R. Clark (2005, 3) makes the case for yet another explanation. He argues that the Iraq war 
“was a war to gain control over Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves and, in doing so, maintain the US 
dollar as the monopoly currency for the critical international oil market. It was, and is, about 
retaining the dollar as a mechanism for effortless US credit expansion and global supremacy. It 
is also about the installation of numerous US military bases in Iraq to gain strategic dominance 
of the region with the largest remaining hydrocarbon reserves on the planet.”99
There are two factors that make it rather difficult to single out the motive. First, the Bush 
administration provided all kinds of reasons and emphasised them differently at different 
stages of the conflict (Hakanen & Nikolaev 2006, 1).100 For instance, more emphasis was 
put on the cruelty of the Saddam regime and on the moral obligation to free the Iraqi 
people from his rule as the weapons inspections did not produce the much needed evidence 
of Iraqi WMD programs (Lewis 2004, 298-299; Baines & Worcester 2005, 5). Second, the 
publicly announced rationale is part of strategic communications which is motivated by the 
need  to  mobilize  support  or  at  minimum demobilize  resistance.  Consequently,  the  real 
motives for war may not be found in public statements (Hallenberg 2005, 22-23).101 In fact, 
99 Not all agree on oil as an explanatory factor. For instance, Russell (2005, 290-291) 
argues that considerations of oil played an insignificant role in Bush administration's 
decision to invade Iraq.
100 “The year leading up to the Iraq war witnessed a barrage of reasons to go to war given 
by the U.S. Administration, some reasonable, some unreasonable, some valid, some 
invalid, some factual, and some fictional. Reasons given for war changed almost daily. 
Americans and people around the world were undoubtedly confused. And the media 
clearly contributed to the confusion.” Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, 1. Kerton-Johnson's 
(2008) analysis of President Bush's statements between August 2002 and May 2003 
shows that the justifications were a bit more consistent than Nikolaev and Hakanen 
suggest. Yet, it is true that there were several lines of arguments to justify the use of 
force with WMD accounting only 24%, terrorism 9%, national interest/security/pre-
emption 23%, egoist morality/freedom/democratic peace civilization 34%, human rights 
6% and international law/norms/international peace and security 3%.
101 Hallenberg (2005, 22-23) notes that “for the decision-makers speaking publicly on the 
subject it has presumably been more important to receive political support for the 
decision already taken to invade than to give completely truthful account of what the 
real goals were that led to the decision in the first place. It is reasonable to assume that 
the striving to get support has influenced both what goals have been presented and how 
these goals have been characterized.” 
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in  May  2003,  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  Paul  Wolfowitz  acknowledged  that  the 
emphasis on WMD was merely a tactical choice which guaranteed wider political support 
for  the  use of  force:  “The truth is  that  for  reasons  that  have a  lot  to  do with the US 
government bureaucracy, we settled on one issue that everyone could agree on – which was 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  –  as  the  core  reason”  (quoted  in  Tannenhaus  2003). 
Accordingly, a former British government official, Carne Ross (2006b), has argued that the 
Blair government never considered Iraq’s unconventional weapons capability to be a threat 
to the British interests. 
By summer 2003, Blair was facing charges of hampering intelligence while MI5 and MI6 
demanded that the government should never again publish an intelligence document that 
was not cleared by them (Norton-Taylor & White 2003).  On 8 June 2003,  The Sunday 
Times revealed that the government had shelved a six-page intelligence document prepared 
by the Ministry of Defence and MI6 in March 2002. The dossier is believed to have argued 
that Iraq was not a growing threat and, consequently, it was shelved by the Downing Street 
despite the fact that Alistair Campbell had told reporters earlier that a document on Iraq 
would be published shortly. It is also known now that Blair ignored the MI5 stance which 
argued that Iraq was not a serious threat but that invading Iraq would fuel terrorism in the 
UK (Siddique 2010).
There  were  three  official  inquiries  into  government’s  use  of  intelligence  –  the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Security Committee 
and the Butler  Report  on Intelligence and Iraq.  In addition,  the death of WMD expert 
David  Kelly,  who  was  found  dead  after  he  had  been  revealed  to  be  the  source  to  a 
controversial  Today programme report by Andrew Gilligan, launched the Hutton Inquiry. 
Relying on Kelly’s remarks, Gilligan’s report made the allegation that the Downing Street 
had “sexed up” intelligence for the September dossier. While these inquiries have cleared 
the government of deliberate deceit, inquiry chairman Lord Robin Butler said in July 2004 
that "[l]anguage in the [September] dossier and used by the prime minister may have left 
readers with the impression that there was fuller and firmer intelligence than was the case. 
It was a serious weakness" (quoted in Oakley 2005).102 
102 O’Malley (2007) argues that this withholding and releasing of information very 
selectively enabled Blair to mobilize support within the political system. 
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Yet, a few leaked British government memos suggest that the Bush administration and the 
Blair  government knowingly deceived the public.  The so-called Downing Street  memo 
dated 23 July 2002, which was leaked to the Sunday Times on May 1 2005, states that “it 
seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing 
was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, 
and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.” The document 
reveals  that  the  head  of  the  MI6  Sir  Richard  Dearlove  warned  the  government  that 
“intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” in the US. Some argue that 
rather  than  cynically  misleading  the  public,  Blair  was  “self-deceiving”  (Hoggett  2005, 
418). Unfortunately,  the limited nature of the inquiries did not enable them to produce 
definite answers. 
Meanwhile,  some  have  even  argued  that  not  only  the  press  but  also  decision-makers 
themselves  fell  victim to the propaganda campaign against  Iraq.  Rampton and Stauber 
(2006, 208) see a connection between the propaganda and the failure to address some of 
the challenges of post-invasion Iraq: 
“Repeatedly, when faced with predictions of problems, White House officials dismissed the 
warnings of Iraq experts and adopted plans that were unrealistic because of their optimism—
too few troops on the ground to maintain security; failure to anticipate insurgency; oblivious 
disregard, even disdain, for those who attempted to assess the human and economic costs of 
war. These warnings went unheeded because giving them credence would have undermined the 
public relations effort to sell the war to the American people.”
Yet,  it  was  not  only  the  political  leadership  and  intelligence  community  that  faced 
criticism; the media was also held culpable. A leading article in the  Independent  ('Iraq: 
Doomed from the start', 16 March 2008), while pointing out that their editorial policy has 
consistently opposed the war from the beginning, read that 
“among the guilty people that we would name as responsible for the disaster of Iraq, we would 
include journalists collectively, in Britain and America. In our assessment of the winners and 
losers from the war we include the media among the latter. Partly, this was because journalists 
and opponents of the war focused too much on the distraction and legal device of weapons of 
mass destruction, on which, before the war, little could be proved. 
Instead, we should have been asking much more searching questions about what would happen 
after the invasion.”
4.5 COALITION PRESS POLICY IN THE IRAQ WAR
“We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”
-Bush administration official103
103Quoted in Bennett et al 2007, 131.
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Journalists were losers also in another sense. They were ten times more likely to get killed 
than the Coalition soldiers during the invasion phase (Katovsky 2003, xi).104 Kate Adie, a 
former BBC reporter, has claimed that the US military threatened to target any satellite 
uplinks transmitting from Baghdad (Paterson 2005, 55). In fact, the US has targeted news 
media bureaus in Afghanistan (both in Kabul and Kandahar) and Iraq since the bombing of 
the Serbian television during the Kosovo campaign (Sreberny & Paterson 2004, 19-20; 
Seppälä 2002, 60). The treatment of journalists, particularly those working for Al-Jazeera, 
has  been  brutal  and  some have  seriously  started  to  discuss  whether  there  has  been  a 
significant  shift  toward  much  more  aggressive  media  management  strategy by the  US 
(Gowing 2003;  Paterson 2005, 2006; Gopsill  2004;  Herman 2005; Sparks 2007b, 228; 
Knightley 2003).105 “[D]oes a journalist  and camera operator’s presence now constitute 
‘military significance’ and therefore a possible military threat or danger which military 
commanders can remove with impunity?”, Nik Gowing (2003, 189), the main presenter on 
BBC World, asks and says that the answer may well be “a deeply worrying ‘yes’”.
While independent, or “unilateral”, reporting from Iraq was very dangerous, reporters were 
offered access to the battlefield with Coalition forces.106 The so-called embedded reporters, 
who were attached to military units, relied on the military for protection, transportation and 
maintenance (Pfau et al 2004). While journalists had been embedded in earlier conflicts, 
the scale was unprecedented in the Iraq War with some 700 journalists experiencing the 
conflict with servicemen (Tatham 2006, 97). Embedded reporters had to sign a contract 
agreeing on Pentagon guidelines (see US Department of Defense 2003) or comply with the 
regulations  of  so-called  Green  Guide  in  the  British  case.  In  addition,  the  Pentagon 
programme  involved  a  boot  camp  in  which  the  Department  of  Defense  prepared  the 
reporters  to  combat  conditions  (Miracle  2003).This  change  in  the  Pentagon  media 
management strategy marks a major shift in the US press policy. In the Gulf War of 1991 
104 Katovsky (2003, xv) also points out that while four journalists died in the Gulf War, 13 
were dead by the end of the first three weeks of the Iraq War. 
105 Investigative journalist Ron Suskind (2006, 138), who conducted interviews with 
senior officials, states that,“[i]nside the CIA, and White House, there was satisfaction 
that a message had been sent to Al Jazeera” after the bombing of Al Jazeera’s Kabul 
office on 13 November 2001. This suggests that the US targeted media deliberately 
(Sparks 2007b, 228).
106Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman warned the media that “We are going to control 
the media space. Reporters that are not embedded are going to be treated like any other 
civilian, appraoched with a certain amount of caution. For many journalists, proving 
their identity can sometimes be problematic” (quoted in Seib 2004, 53). 
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and Afghanistan in 2001 access to the front line was very limited.107 Basically, “the news 
organizations had two main options: either to stick with the Alliance, or to have no footage 
on any significant events” (Lundsten & Stocchetti 2005, 28).
A British  Ministry of  Defence  spokesman  said  that  the  embedding  program has  three 
benefits. Firstly, the public is better informed on the developments, secondly, the media get 
images from the war zone and, thirdly, the government gets good PR (Baines & Worcester 
2005, 8). Meanwhile, the Pentagon publicly declared that the embedding was designed to 
counter possible Saddam Hussein propaganda stunts that the independent observers would 
be able to prove wrong (Aday, Livingston & Hebert 2005, 7). Another reason was “putting 
a human face on the American effort” (Aday Livingston & Hebert 2005, 15). Indeed, US 
Army Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle (2003, 45) argues that “embedding journalists 
into  Army units  provides  an  opportunity  for  the  world  to  see  the  American  soldier’s 
capability and dedication to the mission.” 
In the military circles embedding was deemed a success and a formula for future wars. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Collins (2003) sees that embedding worked because the boot-
camp,  that  the  participating  reporters  had  to  go  through,  gave  them  an  idea  and 
appreciation for what is required from a soldier. Furthermore, embedded reporters were 
almost bound to bond with the military unit they lived with.108 And finally he argues that 
the system provided the news networks with unforeseen war coverage without risking the 
lives of the reporters unnecessarily.
Many journalists have also welcomed embedding as a model for the future of war reporting 
because  it  gives  greater  access  to  the  battlefield  in  comparison  to  pooling  which  was 
preferred by the Pentagon in the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, embedded reporters secure a 
constant  supply of  footage for 24/7 news channels.  While  acknowledging some of the 
limitations of embedded reporting,  one journalist  noted that “[t]here is  no going back” 
(Smith 2003).
107 For instance, John McWethy from ABC News, has said about Afghanistan that the 
“war was over by the time the press got close enough to actually cover it” (Hess & Kalb 
2003, 286).
108However, Maeshima (2007) argues that Japanese embeds did not identify with the 
soldiers to the same degree as US reporters.
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Nevertheless, David Miller (2004b, 90) argues that “[t]he PR genius of the embed system 
was  that  it  allowed  unprecedented  access  to  the  fighting  and,  also,  unprecedented 
identification by the reporters with the military.” Some argue that this, together with the 
dependence on the military, compromised reporters’ ability to provide objective coverage 
(Haigh  et  al  2006).  One  research  (Haigh  et  al  2006)  analysed  the  print  coverage  of 
Washington Post,  New York Times,  Los Angeles Times and  Chicago Tribune in order to 
compare the reports of embedded and non-embedded reporters. This study indicated that 
embedded reporters portrayed the army in more positive terms and “convey greater trust 
toward military personnel”. 
The  Independent's Patrick Cockburn says that “it's a great mistake to go with American 
units and report on any Iraqi city because I think it's in the nature of things that you're not 
actually meeting local people, and if you are, you aren't meeting them in circumstances in 
which they can actually speak” (quoted in Hoyt et al 2005, 98). Justin Lewis (2004, 308), 
in turn, argues that while embedded journalists may not have been “cheerleaders for the 
USA”, embedding shifted the parameters of debate. Instead of focusing on a bigger picture 
British television coverage was reduced to tactical level. Lewis et al (2006, 193) maintain 
that 
“[w]hat embed system did do, however, was to help bind the journalists in to a focus on the 
progress of the war, at the expense of broader contextual issues. The fact that there were no 
embeds with Iraqi forces (for obvious reasons) combined with traditions of taste and decency 
to humanize the U.S.-led forces and dehumanize the Iraqis. This war narrative, then, created its 
own momentum, making 'liberated' Iraqis more newsworthy than the many who had, at best, 
mixed feelings about the war.”
To the same effect, Rid (2007, 150) argues that 
“[m]ost reporters only had the very limited view from a unit's perspective, the soda-straw view, 
rich in human and tactical detail but poor in abstract and strategic oversight. And the embedded 
journalists  often  lacked  the  military  knowledge  to  put  their  eye-witness  accounts  into 
perspective: only 19 percent had served in the military.” 
However, embedding was only one part of Pentagon's media operations which began well 
before the invasion. It has been argued that Western audiences, especially the Americans, 
were subjected to psychological operations (PSYOPS) which have usually been reserved 
for demoralizing the enemy (Schechter 2004, 27-28).109 For instance, favourable coverage 
was assured by secretly briefing ‘military analysts’ used by network television channels. 
According to the New York Times (20 April 2008),
109The psychological operations such as dropping leaflets over Iraq attempted to 
“dissuade and deter adversial groups, for instance officers within the Iraqi Army, from 
taking up arms against the coalition” (Rid 2007, 155).
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“In the fall and winter leading up to the invasion, the Pentagon armed its analysts with talking 
points  portraying  Iraq  as  an  urgent  threat.  The  basic  case  became a  familiar  mantra:  Iraq 
possessed chemical and biological weapons, was developing nuclear weapons, and might one 
day slip some to Al Qaeda; an invasion would be a relatively quick and inexpensive ‘war of 
liberation’.”110
In  fact,  CNN was  so  keen  on  conforming  to  the  official  frames  of  reference  that  its 
executive Eason Jordan had their military analysts  cleared by the Pentagon on its  own 
initiative (Solomon 2005).
The scale  of  the  event  posed a  challenge to  Coalition media  management.  Over  3000 
journalists  were  sent  the  region  (Tumber  &  Palmer  2004,  1-2).  The  Pentagon  media 
strategy was planned to provide a constant supply of news 24 hours a day in order to 
secure control over news frames. A multi-million dollar briefing centre was set up in Doha, 
Qatar, and two others in Kuwait and Bahrain (Tatham 2006, 99). Every morning, President 
Bush's spokesman Ari Fleischer coordinated the day's message with Alastair Campbell and 
a few communications directors at relevant branches of the Bush administration (Tumber 
& Palmer 2004, 64). Tatham (2006, 99), who headed one of the Press Information Centres 
(PIC) in Bahrain, argues that the British considered the PICs to be much more important 
than  the  Americans  whose  view was  that  the  embeds  provide  the  coverage  and Press 
Centres  only  supplement  it.  This  US  press  policy  frustrated  some  journalists  such  as 
Michael  Wolff  of  New  York  Magazine who  asked  US  military  spokesman  some 
inconvenient questions in a press conference: “Why are we here? Why should we stay? 
What's the value of what we are learning at this multi-million dollar press centre?” (quoted 
in Tatham 2006, 111). Meanwhile,  Washington Post's Alan Sipress pointed out that “[a]t 
daily news conferences and private briefings, senior Central Command officials have been 
more determined to paint Iraqi forces in the darkest light possible than to shed light on the 
embattled progress of the military campaign” (quoted in Tumber and Palmer 2004, 68).
According to Rid (2007, 151-152), 
“[i]nformation to the public was principally provided through three channels: a strategic, an 
operational,  and  a  tactical  channel.  The  strategic  picture  of  the  war  was  presented  to  the 
international press corps in briefings in Washington, mostly in the Pentagon's press room and 
sometimes in  the White  House;  the operational  briefings  were held at  Central  Command's 
headquarters in Doha, Qatar; and the tactical view from the ground was provided by reporters 
110This may not be very surprising if one considers the fact that in the 1970s Senate and 
House investigations revealed that CIA had penetrated the media and even “owned 
dozens of newspapers and magazines worldwide” (Boyd-Barrett 2004, 38). Moreover, 
almost “every major US news organization had been penetrated, usually with the 
cooperation of top management” (Boyd-Barrett 2004, 38).
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embedded with troops. On all three levels communication and media were – just as planned – 
deliberately used as a channel to address an entire bundle of audiences at the same time: the US 
public,  the enemy leadership,  the Iraqi  population,  the coalition troops,  allied publics,  and 
potential future adversaries. On each level, the media cooperation was motivated by specific 
operational intentions. The communication, in short, was tied to strategy.” 
The Coalition media operations focused heavily on securing the domestic support for the 
invasion in the US. Similarly, the head of the British Ministry of Defence Communications 
Planning Unit, David Howard, was focused on the UK media which was far less compliant 
than American journalists (Tatham 2006, 101). In total, 55 journalists were embedded with 
the UK forces (Rafeeq 2007, 74). The British military prioritised UK media in allocation of 
embed slots and, for instance, no Arab journalists were embedded with the British forces 
(Tatham 2006, 98). According to Steve Tatham (2006, 10-11), the Coalition media strategy 
with regard to Arab media could hardly be described as a success. Indeed, Arab press, such 
as pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat, was very critical of the US/UK policy and their motives 
(El-Bendary  2005).  Meanwhile,  Iraq  tried  to  challenge  the  US  frame  by  “issuing 
statements, providing images of civilian deaths, and conducting foreign media to places 
where civilians were killed in the American and British military action” (Ravi 2005, 61). 
Iraq also changed the times of their  press briefings to counter the Central  Command's 
version of events presented in Doha (Rid 2007, 158). It is noteworthy that there were 200-
300 foreign journalists in Baghdad when the war begun (Rafeeq 2007, 74).
4.6 THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ CRISIS
According  to  John  Rendon,  a  Pentagon  adviser  and  a  public  relations  specialist,  the 
Coalition success in influencing media frames varied across regions:
”There were five wars in Iraq. There really was the reality of combat operations from the air, 
on the ground and from the sea. The second war was the war the United States saw, the third 
war was the war that Europe saw. The fourth war was the war that Arab audiences saw. And the 
fifth war was the war the rest of the world saw. And as we monitored that in real time, we 
found that none of them were ever in alignment.”111
Comparative research on worldwide media coverage lends support to the notion that there 
were notable differences in how the war was covered (Gladney 2004, Tajima et al 2006). 
Yet,  the  European  political  elite  were  divided  on  Iraq  which  presumably  would  have 
contributed to varying media coverage within Europe.




 “It is almost commonplace that the determination to go to war is perhaps the most critical 
decision a nation can make. The news media should play a vital role in the decision-making 
process. As a nation prepares for war, the news media should offer sites in which rationales for 
war are identified and verified; official claims are solicited and evaluated; alternate views are 
sought and assessed; costs, both human and material, are weighed; legalities are established; 
possible  outcomes  and  aftermaths  are  considered,  and  wide-ranging  debates  given  voice” 
(Lule, 2004: 180).
9/11 had laid the ground for a greater government control of the frames of reference in the 
American  media  (Zelizer  & Allan  2002)  and no  such  deliberation  took  place  as  Lule 
describes above.112 Moreover, Entman (2004, 2) argues that 9/11 
“may have 'changed everything,' as a cliché of the time had it, but at least on first impression, 
one thing it  did not  change was the news media's  traditional  promotion of patriotic rallies 
around presidents when America appears under attack. Reflecting the surge of outrage and 
nationalistic  fervor,  the news  made little  room for  any but  official,  government-sanctioned 
interpretations. Even the mildest dissent was immediately condemned.”
CNN’s  President  Walter  Isaacson  instructed  journalists  working  for  CNN’s  American 
edition that when critical views of the war in Afghanistan were expressed, the audience 
should be reminded that the war on terror is a worthy war. CNN International was allowed 
more  latitude  as  foreign  audiences  might  have  deserted  the  channel  if  it  appeared  too 
biased (McChesney 2002, 94).
With  regard  to  the  Iraq  War,  Lance  Bennett  (2003)  argues  that  “[t]he  capacity  of  the 
administration to so successfully push deceptions and mispresentations through a docile 
press  to  an  emotionally  volatile  public  may  stand  as  the  most  ruthless  press  control 
operation in history.” In addition, some news editors were apprehensive about expressing 
critical views in the post-9/11 opinion climate. Some journalists, who refused to play along 
with their editors’ emphasis on patriotic coverage, were either fired, moved to other tasks 
within  the  organizations  or  they resigned  as  a  protest  to  their  editors’ decision  not  to 
publish critical articles that might alienate the readership (Dadge 2006, 64-65; Rampton & 
Stauber 2003, 169). Other news outlets such as Fox News Channel also played a role in 
silencing  critical  debate  by attacking  journalists  who expressed  dissent  (Miller  2005c, 
Rampton & Stauber 2003, 161-173). Images of casualties were also absent from American 
television news which conveyed a sanitized picture of the war (Aday 2004). In fact, the 
112 Some have even argued that the global War on Terror has marked the “revival of the 
propaganda state” (Snow & Taylor 2006, Rutherford 2004). According to Paul 
Rutherford (2004, 184), “[a] propaganda state refers to a regime in which the governors, 
whether official or unofficial, employ a constant stream of messages to propel the 
population toward some desired condition of right thinking and right acting.”
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Pentagon had asked the US media not to carry images of American casualties or prisoners 
of war (POW) (Tumber & Palmer 2004, 70).
Empirical  studies  indicate  that  the  American  media  coverage  seems  to  have  failed  to 
challenge Bush administrations allegations to a significant extent. David Dadge (2006, 19) 
argues that 
“Although it is difficult to say with absolute authority that the American public reached the 
conclusion that the war in Iraq was justified on the basis of news reports in the media, it can be 
said that the Bush administration’s most coercive arguments—WMD including the threat of a 
nuclear bomb—were communicated directly to the public with little or no assessment of the 
worth of these statements.” 
Other  studies  have  drawn  similar  conclusions.  For  instance,  David  Domke’s  (2004) 
analysis of US media coverage concludes that 
“the mainstream press consistently echoed the administration’s communications from Septem-
ber 11 to Saddam and Iraq—thereby disseminating, reinforcing, and embedding the administra-
tion’s fundamentalist worldview and helping keep at bay Congress and any serious questioning 
among much of the public. Even in press criticisms of the administration, which were present 
during this period, the administration’s communication emphases resounded.” 
With regard to television news coverage, Aday, Livingston and Hebert (2005) analysed the 
nightly  news  on  ABS,  CBS,  NBC,  CNN,  Fox News and Al-Jazeera  during  the  major 
combat operations in the spring of 2003 in order to investigate whether there were bias and 
how they might be explained if they existed. While these news networks claim to operate 
in  the  objective  Western  fashion,  the  study  indicates  “that  the  administration  had  a 
privileged  role—and  dissent  was  largely  absent—across  virtually  all  American  news 
programs” (Aday, Livingston & Hebert 2005, 7). As a consequence, misperceptions were 
common in the audience's mind clearly indicating that the media had failed to provide 
accurate information (Kull et al 2003). Especially widespread were misperceptions with 
regard to Iraq’s links to 9/11 and al-Qaeda as well  as Iraqi WMD capability.  Poll data 
indicates that these misconceptions remained common before, during and after the invasion 
(Dadge 2006, 2).
Terence Smith (2003), senior producer for PBS’s The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, points 
out that several mistakes were also made during the war: 
“The strategic southern city of Basra was reported taken on March 23, when in fact it took 
British troops another two weeks to subdue the resistance there. Scud missiles were said to be 
striking in Kuwait that same day, when in fact they were not. An entire Iraqi  division was 
reported to have laid down its arms and surrendered, when in fact it had not. A fast-moving 
convoy of Republican Guards in 1,000 armored vehicles was repeatedly reported to be moving 
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south from Baghdad on March 26 to confront U.S. forces, when in fact it was busy scattering 
under relentless U.S. air strikes.”
After the invasion, the two most prominent US quality newspapers have acknowledged 
that  they  failed  to  subject  many Bush  administration  and  Blair  government  claims  to 
scrutiny in the lead-up to the war. On 26 May 2004,  The New York Times published an 
editorial ('The Times and Iraq') acknowledging that 
“we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have 
been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was 
insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been 
more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged — or failed to emerge.”
According to Executive Editor of  The Washington Post Leonard Downie Jr.  (quoted in 
Kurtz 2004), 
"we were so focused on trying to figure out what the administration was doing that we were not 
giving the same play to people who said it wouldn't be a good idea to go to war and were 
questioning the administration's rationale. Not enough of those stories were put on the front 
page. That was a mistake on my part." 113
However,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  there  were  critical  responses  to  the  Bush 
administration’s case against Iraq even in the US. For instance, Chicago Daily Tribune ran 
a news story headlined “Bush uses fears, not evidence, to justify Iraq War” in September 
2002 (Dadge 2006,  14).  According  to  Ravi  (2005,  60),  the  New York Times remained 
critical of the use of military use until the war began. Meanwhile, the  Washington Post 
adopted a pro-war stance (Lehmann 2005, 84). 
4.6.2 The UK
While part  of the British press was clearly more sympathetic towards the use of force 
against Iraq with the Daily Telegraph running a headlines such as “Saddam is months away 
from a nuclear bomb” (Dadge 2006, 15), a study by Goddard et al (2008) argues that there 
was a wide range of views expressed in the British press coverage of the war and the 
coverage did not merely reflect government’s point of view. For instance,  Daily Mirror 
adopted a vehemently antiwar position while conservative Daily Telegraph expressed more 
support for the war (Palmer 2004). Similarly, Ravi (2005) observes a polarization in the 
UK press as the Guardian was against the war while the Times was more likely to express 
views in  support  of  military action.  Couldry and Downey's  (2004) analysis  of  opinion 
113 However, he continues: "People who were opposed to the war from the beginning and 
have been critical of the media's coverage in the period before the war have this belief 
that somehow the media should have crusaded against the war” adding that “[t]hey have 
the mistaken impression that somehow if the media's coverage had been different, there 
wouldn't have been a war" (quoted in Kurtz 2004).
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items in the British press at the end of January 2003 supports the notion of polarized press. 
Research has also detected that the UK press did not marginalise dissent to the same extent 
as the US press coverage in their coverage of antiwar protests (Dardis 2006). 
Palmer (2004, 3) argues that “the overall pattern of coverage to be found in the UK press 
gives approximately equal emphasis  to positive and negative presentation of Anglo-US 
policy.” Yet, Robertson's (2004) analysis of Scottish broadsheets indicates that Iraqis were 
rarely used as a source in reporting and that the humanitarian cost of the war attracted only 
minor attention in the coverage which was predominantly focused on military tactics and 
troop movements.
The  Daily Mirror's coverage of the Iraq Crisis was quite extraordinary. The  Mirror  had 
opposed the Suez invasion in 1956 and the Falklands War in 1982 but it had supported 
Gulf War in 1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999. It had never opposed war plans of a labour 
government  until  Piers  Morgan,  the  Mirror's  editor,  begun  to  emphasise  international 
coverage at  the expense of celebrity gossip in the aftermath of 9/11 2001. The  Mirror 
adopted a rather critical position to the bombing of Afghanistan and particularly to the 
US/UK plans to invade Iraq. The new emphasis was largely due to declining circulation 
while  its  main competitor,  the  Sun,  had managed to increase its  circulation.  Moreover, 
feedback from the readers encouraged the Mirror to criticise the US/UK war plans. Indeed, 
the Mirror campaigned fiercely against the looming war on Iraq and, on 21 January, it even 
launched  a  petition  which  collected  220,000  signatures  opposing  Blair's  Iraq  policy. 
Therefore, the Mirror not only publicly questioned the government policy but also played 
an active part in mobilising the anti-war movement (Freedman 2009).
However, when the war began, Mirror's coverage became more moderate and the emphasis 
shifted from the opposition to the war on the heroism of the British troops.  On 11 April, it 
was revealed that the Mirror's circulation had continued to decline and had dropped below 
two million copies a day. The next day, the war was dropped from the front page for the 
first  time  since  the  beginning  of  March.  The  extraordinary  circumstances,  significant 
public scepticism of the government policy and elite dissensus, during the run-up to the 
Iraq War enabled the  Mirror's radical coverage but, eventually,  the newspapers exist to 
make profit. (Freedman 2009) 
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With  regard  to  television  coverage,  Lewis  (2004,  302)  argues  that  “while  British 
broadcasters were generally committed to maintaining impartiality in their coverage of the 
war, in certain key areas they tended to favour assumptions that were central to the pro-war 
case.” For instance, they “were eight times more likely to make references indicating the 
presence of chemical and biological weapons then to suggest their absence” (Lewis 2004, 
303). According to Tumber and Palmer (2004, 91-92) this was not true with regard to press 
coverage of Iraq's alleged links to al-Qaeda which were widely denounced in the UK press. 
Moreover, Kodrich and Law's (2004) analysis concludes that the  Guardian and to a bit 
lesser degree the Times questioned the WMD claim of the British government during the 
war.
Nick Couldry and John Dowey (2004, 269) single out the Murdoch's Times for “[t]he most 
unambiguous support for the UK/USA position” among the British press as it “supported 
both policy and rhetoric”. Hafez (2003, 4) argues that the  Times “published many heroic 
images  of  British  and  US soldiers:  soldiers  in  action,  soldiers  receiving  flowers  from 
Iraqis, soldiers handing food to children and the like” on its front page. Rupert Murdoch's 
global media empire seemed to have reflected his support for the invasion of Iraq with the 
Fox News Channel (FNC) being the most obvious example (Thussu 2004). For instance, 
The  Australian,  the  only  daily  with  national  circulation,  endorsed  Australian  military 
participation  in  the  invasion  (Hirst  & Schütze  2004).  In  fact,  all  175 Murdoch-owned 
Australian newspapers adopted an editorial  policy which was in line with his  personal 
stance on the war (Bromley 2004, 227). However, the concentration of media ownership 
has  been  counterbalanced  by  the  Internet  and  audiences  could  find  an  abundance  of 
alternative views and eye witness accounts online (Allan 2004).114
114It is worth noting, however, that several factors protect the hegemony of the traditional 
media. Herman and Chomsky argue that  ”(1) the traditional media themselves have 
occupied the internet and are dominant news providers there; (2) they have the 
resources and pre-existing audiences to give them a huge advantage over alternative 
media potential rivals; (3) the alternative operators on the internet seek advertising 
revenue to fund their operations, compromising their alternative character, and the 
biggest, like Google and Yahoo, are heavily dependent on advertising revenue (and they 
are not inclined to put resources into original news origination); (4) much of the new 
media on the internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics 
secondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources and 




While  the  American-British  public  relations  campaign  posed  a  challenge  to  media 
organizations world wide, European media were rather critical of the invasion in countries 
such  as  Germany  (Lehmann  2005,  Ates  et  al  2005),  France  (Palmer  2004),  Sweden 
(Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2005), and Turkey (Ates et al 2005). However, it should be noted 
that,  in many countries,  the media were divided by the Iraq War with different outlets 
expressing varying degrees of support  to the Anglo-American policy. This seems to have 
been the case in  many European countries  such as  Norway (Ottosen 2005b),  Slovenia 
(Erjavec 2005), Spain (Gunnarson 2005), Ireland (Phelan 2005) and Austria (Carfora et al 
2005). Hafez (2003, 8-9) argues that
“in militarily non-involved countries all three sectors – government, media and public opinion 
– mainly develop according to their own specific dynamics: governments have a political target 
that they follow; the media work according to their own, inborn ideological and professional or 
commercial orientation; and the public decides on matters of war and peace according to their 
own values and attitudes that  are rooted in the political culture and history of the relevant 
country. This, of course, does not mean that governments do not influence the media and public 
opinion  or  that  the  media  and  public  opinion  are  not  influenced  by  information  and 
disinformation strategies of the governments at war. But it shows that there is no mechanism 
'manufacturing consent' about the facts – whether they are right or wrong – that are debated.”
Yet, Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) cross national analysis of television news coverage of the 
Iraq  War  indicates  a  strong correlation  between  government  policy and media  output. 
French press coverage was supportive of the French government view which maintained 
that  only  explicit  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  could  authorise  use  of  force  and 
condemned the subsequent invasion (Palmer 2004, 3-4). Lehmann (2005) investigates how 
American and German media covered the weapons inspections in the lead-up to the war 
and concludes that, generally speaking, the German coverage reflects strong antiwar public 
sentiment  even  though  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung also  carried  articles  that  were 
critical of the German Iraq policy. The US motives were challenged and, for instance, Der 
Spiegel (No 3, 2003) carried a front page with a headline ”Blood For Oil: What Iraq Is 
Really  About”.  In  Denmark,  which  was  part  of  the  Coalition,  the  media  were  rather 
supportive of the war even though there were also some critical tones (Kristensen & Ørsten 
2007).
4.6.4 Arab World
Al-Jazeera provided much more critical coverage than its Western counterparts by putting 
more emphasis  on civilian casualties  and destruction of Iraqi  infrastructure.  Unlike the 
Western news channels, Al-Jazeera did not rely on embedded journalists for footage but 
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had  several  'unilaterals'  in  Iraq  (Iskandar  & el-Nawawy 2004,  323).  Ahmed el-Gody's 
(2005) analysis of the major Arab broadcasters, indicates that Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Arabiya 
and  Al-Jazeera  indeed  provided  an  alternative  to  Western  coverage  of  the  war.  The 
credibility of Western news in the region suffered when Arab audiences contrasted CNN 
and BBC's coverage with what they could see on Arab channels. A study by Lars Lundsten 
and Matteo Stocchetti (2005) indicates that both the CNN and the BBC World presented 
the conflict as a zero-sum game and failed to ”formulate alternative narrative patterns for 
the description of the war against Iraq as a war against 'evil'” to resist the view on the 
conflict that the Pentagon was promoting. Despite the fact that the USA and the UK were 
allies in this conflict and they share the language and some basic values, the coverage of 
BBC World and CNN differed to some extent.115 
4.6.5 The Rest of the World
With regard to the rest of the world, existing research indicates that the media coverage of 
the war expressed some degree of criticism of the invasion in  many African countries 
(Alozie 2006, Mucunguzi 2005, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005) and even in Australia which 
was part of the Coalition (Jacubowics & Jacka 2006). Analysis of press coverage in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the lead-up to the war indicates that the Bush administration was not able 
to dominate the frames of reference and, instead, the press adopted a rather critical stance 
towards the use of force and raised concerns of destabilization of the Middle East and its 
implications  for  African  countries  (Alozie  2006).  Meanwhile,  Indian  and  Pakistani 
newspapers  paid  more  attention  to  Iraqi  perspectives  and  casualties  than  US and  UK 
newspapers reflecting the antiwar stance of the elites in each country (Ravi 2005). 
Ali  Rafeeq's  (2007)  study  on  the  press  coverage  of  the  Iraq  War  in  New  Zealand 
emphasises the ability of the US government and military sources to dominate the news 
agenda due to newspapers' dependence on few Anglo-American news agencies and media 
115They argue that they were ”able to identify conceptual patterns according to which 
scattered reports from the war were understood and presented by these agencies, and we 
chose to call these two patterns 'crusade' and 'soccer game'” (Lundsten & Stocchetti 
2005, 2). CNN International portrayed the conflict as a crusade while the BBC World 
approach was that of a soccer match. These patterns are similar in significant ways: they 
are both adversary situations where two factions meet in a zero-sum game while soccer 
game ”does not imply ideological or religious superiority”. Crusade pattern, in turn, 
implies stronger polarization and success is ”a sign of moral superiority” while soccer 
game merely implies better trained, coached etc. Lundsten and Stocchetti (2005, 2) 
argue that ”the communicative point of a significant part of the television news reports 
could be identified only within the logical framework of either of these metaphors”.
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outlets. Similarly, Kupe and Hyde-Clarke’s (2005) study on South African media during 
the  Iraq  War  points  out  that  national  media  may have  insufficient  resources  to  cover 
international conflicts independently. Instead, they rely on Western news agencies which, 
according to some scholars, conform to the interests of Western  governments.116 Studies 
based on data from five South East Asian countries indicates that stories relying on news 
agencies were more supportive of the Iraq War than stories produced by newspapers' own 
correspondents (Maslog et al 2006, Lee et al 2006).117
Existing research suggests that some East Asian media organisations adopted rather critical 
position  to  the  war.  Japanese  newspaper  Asahi portrayed  the  US  as  the  ”evil  doer” 
(Maeshima 2007) and the Chinese government even saw fit to censor Hong Kong media 
“so as not to offend Washington and London” (Shimatsu 2004, 212). Overall, the existing 
literature provides a somewhat mixed picture of the media performance in the Iraq War.
 
4.7 CONCLUSION
To sum up,  selling the war  to the domestic  and international  audiences by controlling 
media content was a crucial part of the preparations for the invasion from the beginning. 
The  Bush  administration  and  the  Labour  government  in  the  UK went  into  lengths  in 
securing favourable coverage and communicating their point of view mainly to domestic 
constituencies but also to foreign audiences. The Coalition media strategy was carefully 
planned to control media frames and to limit prospects for critical topics. To that effect, 
messages were carefully coordinated at different levels of political and military leadership 
and embedding programme was launched to ensure supportive media coverage.
National media coverage of the war seems to have varied considerably across countries 
and regions as well  as outlets.  The global information system had gone through major 
changes since the first Gulf War. Alternative information was now readily available online 
116For instance, Lee and Yang (1996) showed that AP’s coverage of the Tiananmen 
movement reflected US foreign policy concerns while Japanese Kyodo news agency 
was reluctant to challenge the Chinese government due to Japanese economic interests 
in China. Yet, even though the Anglo-American news media are well-positioned to 
influence national media, Skurnik’s (1981) study concluded that African newspapers 
tended to choose from the foreign media those that suited the national interests of their 
country. 
117Horvit (2004) did not find support for the argument that, despite differing government 
policies, the French AFP would portray the US in more negative terms than AP in the 
lead-up to Iraq War.
105
and several Arabic and other non-Western news channels such as China's English language 
news  channel  CCTV9 had emerged to  challenge  the  Coalition  framing.  It  seems  very 
plausible  that  the  Coalition  deliberately  targeted  news  organisations  that  operated 
unilaterally in Iraq and focused on the plight of the civilian population. 
Several years later, the future of Iraq is still in doubt despite the fact that the focus of the 
media has shifted back to Afghanistan. Yet, the Iraq War has not completely disappeared 
from the news agenda, thanks to continuing violence on the ground and inquiries which 
have been set up in the Netherlands and the UK. In the Netherlands, an inquiry looking 
into the government's decision-making process on the political support for the invasion 
concluded,  among other  things,  that  “the  military action  had no sound mandate  under 
international law” (Dutch inquiry 2009, 530). Now that the British troops have withdrawn 
from Iraq, yet another inquiry has been launched to investigate the run-up to the war as 
well as its conduct in 2003-2009. The so-called Chilcot inquiry has held public hearings of 
people who were directly involved in policy-making and implementation including former 
Foreign Minister Jack Straw and Tony Blair. The hearings have provided new insights. For 
instance,  former  security  and  intelligence  coordinator,  Sir  David  Omand,  has  told  the 
inquiry  that  the  Joint  Intelligence  Committee  (JIC)  repeatedly  warned  the  Blair 
government  that  invasion  of  Iraq  would  radicalise  British  Muslims  and Britain  would 
become a priority target for al-Qaeda (Guardian, 20 January 2010). JIC's concerns proved 
legitimate on 7 July 2005 when home-grown terrorist hit London. The Blair government 




RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the years, a considerable amount of predominantly American academic research has 
addressed the relationship between media and foreign policy (e.g. Cohen, 1967; Entman, 
2004; Nacos et al., 2000), especially during international crises (e.g. Hallin, 1986; Bennett 
and Paletz, 1994; Mermin, 1999, Baum & Groeling 2010), but cross-national research on 
the subject has remained relatively rare (Stolle & Hooghe 2005). Consequently, it is still 
unclear  to  what  degree  country  characteristics,  such  as  differences  in  national  media 
systems, political systems and position in the international system, affect the generality of 
the US-originated theories of media-state relations. In order to avoid developing as many 
theories as there are states in the international system, it is necessary to test whether the 
American literature could provide the basis for a theory of press-state relations in foreign 
policy  domain  in  more  general  terms. Accordingly,  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  to 
contribute to widening our understanding of media-foreign policy nexus across countries 
and to  investigate  whether  these  US-originated  theories  have  explanatory  power  in 
European democracies. 
First, this chapter discusses the comparative research design and the Iraq crisis as a case 
study.  Second,  this  chapter  describes  the  foreign  policy  traditions  of  the  three  states 
involved in this study in order to put their Iraq policies in a historical context. Moreover, it 
deals with the controversies that surrounded Iraq policies in Finland, Ireland and Britain. 
Third, this chapter explains the rationale of data selection: the choice of press coverage as 
the object of this study, the choice of newspapers, the choice of periods of analysis and 
how the data was retrieved (together with the limitations of using electronic databases in 
retrieving of the data).  Fourth, this chapter presents the hypotheses tested in this study 
while also referring to previous research from which they are derived. Fifth, this chapter 
explains in great detail how the data was analysed: why content analysis was determined to 
be the appropriate method for the purposes of this study, how the categories were created, 
and – more generally – how the content analysis procedure was executed.
107
5.2 THE IRAQ CRISIS AS A CASE FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY
The  international  debate  was  very  much  reactive  to  US  initiatives  and  claims. 
Consequently, the debate focused on WMD and, to a lesser extent in Europe, terrorism. 
Few governments publicly questioned the existence of these weapons while many insisted 
– especially France, Germany and Russia – that Iraq could have been disarmed by peaceful 
means.  Unlike in the Persian Gulf War (1991) or Kosovo War (1999), the international 
community was divided on Iraq creating a more fruitful research setting (Mouritzen 2006). 
Stolle and Hooghe (2005, 2) argue that the Iraq War of 2003 “offers us a unique test, not 
just to examine the mass media's role in the war but also to understand whether national 
media indeed tend to follow their governmental arguments and positions in framing the 
Iraq question.” In order to test this assumption, three states with different policies were 
chosen. It was necessary to produce comparable data on national media coverage in each 
country to  be able  to draw conclusions about  how government  policy line might  have 
affected  media  coverage.  Due  to  the  various  different  research  methods  adopted  in 
previous  research,  it  was  determined  that  they  rarely  produced  directly  comparable 
findings.
If government policy line is the single most important factor explaining media frames, the 
coverage of Iraq crisis  should have differed significantly in Finland (anti-war),  Ireland 
(neutral) and the UK (pro-war). In Britain, PM Blair had committed himself to the US-led 
invasion of Iraq early on (Woodward 2004, 178; cf. Meyer 2005, 238). In line with British 
post-WWII foreign policy tradition, Tony Blair said in the Parliament on 24 September 
2002 that “it is an article of faith with me that the American relationship and our ability to 
partner [with] America in these difficult issues is of fundamental importance, not just to 
this country but to the wider world” (cited in Jervis 2003, 385). Meanwhile, Finland put 
greater  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  UN Security  Council  in  the  disarmament  of  Iraq 
(Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b) and,  on 31 March,  Foreign Minister  Erkki 
Tuomioja (2003b) stated that “to wage war without a UN mandate was not acceptable nor 
justified”. It is worth noting that, even though Finland's position was “anti-war”, Finland 
was not among the harshest critics of the US/UK invasion. The Irish government, in turn, 
tried  to  balance  very  carefully  between  the  US  and  anti-war  sentiments  within  its 
constituency. As the war began, Foreign Minister Cowen (Dáil Éireann 2003b) stated that a 
second resolution should have been adopted and the US and UK are acting on the belief 
that previous resolutions have already given them UN mandate even though there is not 
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general consensus on the issue. Consequently, the position of the Irish government could 
be characterised as neutral. 
The executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm suggests that a) the British 
press was largely supportive of the war, b) the Finnish press adopted a critical stance on the 
US case for war while c) the Irish press provided a more balanced view. In addition to the 
government  policy  line,  the  elite  version  of  the  manufacturing  consent  paradigm  is 
concerned with elite opinions. Consequently, it is important to consider the level of elite 
consensus on Iraq policies in each of these three countries.
5.3  FOREIGN  POLICY  CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  UK,  IRELAND  AND 
FINLAND
Like in many European countries, the national policies in the UK, Finland and Ireland were 
as controversial as the US Iraq policy. These national policies are discussed below in the 
context  of  national  foreign policy traditions.  In the case of Britain,  the Iraq issue was 
already covered in some length in the previous chapter and, hence, only a short reminder is 
included here.
5.3.1 Britain: Blair's unpopular commitment to military operation against Iraq
Britain has a long tradition of a “special bilateral relationship” with the US on “multiple 
levels” (Nibblett 2007, 627; see also e.g. Wallace 1992).118 Despite the argument over Suez 
in 1956, which resulted from Franco-British military venture to capture the Suez Canal 
following its nationalisation by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the transatlantic 
relationship has been the “bedrock of British security policy” after the Second World War. 
For instance, President Reagan supported PM Margaret Thatcher in the 1982 Falklands 
War and Thatcher returned the favour when the US bombed Libya in 1986 (Kennedy-Pipe 
& Vickers 2007, 209).  In 1991, the US and the British forces drove Iraqi troops out of 
Kuwait as a part of a larger coalition.
Part of the modernisation of the Labour Party in late 1980s and early 1990s was to rethink 
its foreign and security policy because the Conservatives had successfully labelled them 
weak in  this  area.  Blair's  “New Labour”  put  greater  emphasis  on the Anglo-American 
relationship. He also established close relationships with US Presidents and he readily took 
118It is worth noting that some consider this special relationship ”dead” (Wallace 2005).
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credit for convincing President Bill Clinton to take military action in Kosovo in 1999. He 
gave a speech on the 'Doctrine of the International Community' in Chicago in April 1999 
which redefined New Labour's foreign and security policy. Blair (1999) argued that “the 
principle  of non-interference must be qualified in some respects.  Acts of genocide can 
never be a purely internal matter.” This argument was used to justify the Kosovo War 
which was unlawful under international law. It is often assumed that Blair's experience of 
the Kosovo War encouraged him take military action in dealing with Iraq later (Kennedy-
Pipe & Vickers 2007, 210). To some, “it seems clear that rather than being a reluctant 
partner in the invasion of Iraq, Blair was determined that Britain would be engaged and 
involved in a central way in the military action to overthrow Saddam Hussein” (Kennedy-
Pipe & Vickers 2007, 208). This view is supported by Blair's own testimony to the Chilcot 
inquiry in January 2010. The inquiry was announced by PM Gordon Brown on 15 June 
2009 to identify the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict.119
Blair thought that Britain could act as a bridge between the US and continental Europe 
(Kennedy-Pipe & Vickers 2007, 209; Wallace 2005, 55).120 However, this task had become 
increasingly difficult after the republican Bush administration took office in 2001. At the 
latest, this became evident when Iraq entered the agenda and the EU member states could 
not agree on a common position. PM Blair's emphasis on the relationship with the US and 
especially his alliance with George W. Bush outraged not only some Labour MPs but also 
the British electorate. Blair government's Iraq policy proved unpopular with the public and 
the  government's  public  relations  campaign  ran  into  further  difficulties  when  it  was 
revealed  that  parts  of  a  government  dossier  on  Iraqi  threat  was  plagiarised  from  a 
postgraduate study. However, the most severe blow to Blair was the failure to secure a 
second UN Security Council resolution giving a UN mandate for the use of force which 
left the legality of the war dubious. Lawyers in the Foreign Office held the view that a war 
without the second resolution would be “unlawful” (Guardian, 25 January 2010).
According to a Gallup International poll conducted in mid-January 2003, 39% of British 
respondents were ready to support military action against Iraq only if sanctioned by the UN 
while 41% were against military action under all circumstances. On 15 February, global 
119More detailed information on the inquiry can be found on its website 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk.
120Like his predecessor John Major, Blair left Britain in the margins of European politics 
despite entering the office promising to put Britain 'at the heart of Europe' (Wallace 
2005, 54).
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anti-war rally mobilised 1.5 million people to march against  the US/UK Iraq policy in 
London alone – at least according to the organisers. The London protest was organised by 
the  Stop  the  War  Coalition,  the  Campaign  for  Nuclear  Disarmament  (CND)  and  the 
Muslim Association of Great Britain but over 450 other organisations affiliated themselves 
with the protest – including the Liberal Democratic Party and the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) (Guardian, 15 February 2003). Shortly before the war, former Foreign Minister and 
the leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook (2003) resigned as a protest to “a war 
that has neither international agreement nor domestic support.” Eventually, Britain went to 
war with the support of the Blair loyalists within the Labour party and the Conservatives – 
the main opposition party. In the absence of a UN sanction Liberal Democrats unanimously 
opposed the war in the crucial House of Commons vote on 18 March. The government 
motion was passed with a majority of 263 but more than 140 MPs voted against the war – 
including a fifth of the Parliamentary Labour Party (House of Commons 2003a). While 
Blair had pushed President Bush to give the UN a 'vital' role in Iraq after the invasion as 
well  as  move  the  Middle  East  peace  process  forward,  the  UN  was  sidelined  in  the 
aftermath of the invasion and the Bush administration made no significant effort to settle 
the Israeli/Palestine conflict (Hoggett 2005, 421).
5.3.2 Ireland: Controversy over the stop-over policy
Although the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy has been neutral status, Irish neutrality in 
the  Second  World  War  is  debatable  and  in  the  post-war  period  Ireland  joined  several 
Western  European  organizations  (Rees  2006,  174).  According  to  Robert  McNamara 
(2003), ”idealistic and radical elements” of the Irish foreign policy in the late 1950s were 
replaced with ”conservative and cautious” approach by Fianna Fáil governments of Seán 
Lemass and Jack Lynch in 1960s. This change was clearly visible in the Irish stance on the 
Vietnam War. In this regard, Irish policy was closer to those of America's NATO allies such 
as the UK and West Germany than neutral countries such as Sweden. 
In 1990s, Ireland clung on to the neutrality while also committed itself to the development 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EU (Rees 2006, 175). Both 
Finland  and  Ireland  have  engaged  in  deepening  cooperation  with  NATO  through  the 
Partnership  for  Peace  (PfP)  program (Rees  2006,  175).  In  1999,  Kosovo put  the Irish 
neutrality to yet another test. Support for the Kosovo War was not very strong in Ireland 
with  only  46%  supporting  and  42%  opposing  while  there  was  also  some  degree  of 
mobilization in anti-war protests. Initially, the government neither supported or condemned 
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the NATO intervention but later, after a meeting with other EU leaders, Taoiseach (the Irish 
Prime  Minister)  Bertie Ahern gave his support for the continuation of bombing (Rees 
2006, 182). Editorial in the Irish Times argued that “Ireland has stepped off the neutrality 
fence” (quoted in Rees 2006, 182).
Table 5.1. Public opinion on Iraq (Gallup International 2003)121
Finland Ireland UK
Are you in favour 
of military action 
in Iraq?
1 Under no circumstances 44% 39% 41%
2 Only if sanctioned by the UN 37% 50% 39%
3 Unilaterally by America and 
its allies
6% 8% 10%
4 Don't know/no opinion 12% 3% 10%
If military action 




1 Should support 5% 26% 44%
2 Should not support 79% 69% 41%
3 Don't know/no opinion 15% 5% 15%
The Irish government offered assistance to the US shortly after the events of 9/11 2001 and 
within a fortnight over 2,000 US troops had travelled through the Shannon airport (Newby 
& Titley 2003, 485). As Iraq returned to the top of the international agenda shortly after the 
toppling  of  the  Taliban  government  in  Afghanistan,  the  Fianna  Fáil  and  Progressive 
Democrat coalition government tried to remain neutral in the issue. However, the stop-over 
policy  begun  to  fuel  considerable  domestic  resentment  towards  the  end  of  2002.  In 
September,  the  Green  Party  criticised  government's  stop-over  policy  for  eroding  Irish 
neutrality  and,  in  October,  ten  anti-war  activists  were  arrested  after  over  50  people 
attempted to breach the security at Shannon (Miller 2005b, 167).  By January 2003, anti-
war protests in Shannon became more frequent and the political opposition to the stop-over 
policy also intensified. The anti-war movement established “a peace camp” at Shannon as 
a site for permanent protest and to enable constant monitoring of the activity at the airport 
(Newby & Titley 2003, 486). Opposition parties requested a Dáil debate on Shannon which 
took  place  on  29  January.  The  debate  did  not  go  without  drama  as  the  Green  Party 
protested by raising a banner “No to War” and marched out in protest to the stop-over 
policy (Miller 2005b, 169). 
121 Poll conducted in mid-January 2003 by Gallup International. UK data excludes 
Northern Ireland.
112
In a Gallup International survey (mid-January 2003), 69% of Irish respondents said that 
Ireland  should  not  support  military  action  against  Iraq.  According  to  some  estimates, 
100,000 people attended the anti-war rally in Dublin on 15 February. Commonly expressed 
view within the anti-war movement was that the government was willing to compromise 
Irish neutrality and put moral issues aside to secure economic ties with the US. The Irish 
economy was largely dependent on US investments122 and the government feared that a 
changing its policy on stop-over flights could harm economic relations (Miller 2005b, 170-
171). Another concern with regard to the stop-over policy was that it could make Ireland a 
target for terrorists.123  
On  13  March,  Taoiseach  Ahern  met  President  Bush  in  the  White  House  where  he 
emphasised  the  importance  of  UN  sanction  for  the  legality  of  war.  Yet,  the  Irish 
government avoided taking a stance on whether it would allow the use of Shannon if the 
US  commenced  military  action  against  Iraq.124 Eventually,  the  government  decided  to 
continue  the  stop-over  policy  which  granted  the  US  “access  to  Shannon  for  troop, 
equipment  and  maintenance  stop-overs  following  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  Iraq” 
(Miller 2005b, 173). The Irish government insisted that this did not constitute participation 
in the war and did not give statements which could have harmed Irish-US relations. In fact, 
on 20 March, Ahern wrote an article ('Saddam, not Bush or Blair, is responsible for the 
crisis') for the Irish Independent which blamed Saddam for the war emphasising Ireland's 
“deep bonds of democratic values and of political as well as historic ties” with the US and 
the UK. 
The stop-over policy led to a challenge in the High Court. The plaintiff argued that the 
stopover policy constituted “participation” in the war and was, in effect, unconstitutional. 
Finally,  on  April  28,  High Court  ruled  that  the  government  policy did  not  violate  the 
Constitution but also questioned whether the government policy was “compatible with the 
status of neutrality in international law” (High Court of Ireland 2003).
122Rory Miller (2005b, 171) notes that, in February 2003, ”it was estimated that foreign 
direct investment by US firms was worth US$34 billion and accounted for 90,000 jobs 
in Ireland.”
123For instance, Robert Fisk speculated on this prospect in the Irish Independent  on 14 
October 2002.
124It is worth noting that both Germany and France granted the US over-flight rights 
despite their anti-war stance (Miller 2005b, 172).
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5.3.3 Finland: Foreign policy takes centre-stage ahead of general elections
As discussed in chapter 2, Finland found herself in a difficult position at the end of the 
Second World War and especially at  the beginning of the Cold War.  Although Finland 
aspired a neutral status during the Cold War, it was contested due to Finland's Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union. Despite 
military clauses in the treaty, Finland “was prepared to fight against all possible foreign 
troops on Finland's soil” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 70). 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Finland's EU membership (1995) have meant that 
Finland feels less threatened by its Eastern neighbour (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 70). 
Finland  and  Sweden  pushed  towards  adopting  the  so-called  Petersberg  tasks  into  the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. There has also been increasingly close 
relationship  with  NATO.  For  instance,  Finland  joined  NATO's  Partnership  for  Peace 
Program  in  1994  and  has  later  participated  in  NATO-led  peacekeeping  operations  in 
Bosnia  and  Kosovo  (Vaahtoranta  & Forsberg  2001,  74-75).  In  fact,  Defence  Minister 
Anneli  Taina  (1995-1999)  even  commented  on  Finland's  relationship  with  NATO  by 
arguing that “Finland is engaged to NATO but the wedding day has not been decided yet” 
(quoted  in  Vaahtoranta  & Forsberg  2001,  75).  At  the  same  time,  'neutrality'  has  been 
replaced in political speeches. Instead, it is argued that Finland is 'militarily non-aligned' 
(Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 77).
Traditionally, the UN Charter has provided the cornerstone of the Finnish foreign policy. 
According to Luostarinen and Suikkanen (2004, 4), “Finland has had various reasons to 
emphasize  the  role  of  the  UN;  multilateral  international  co-operation  has  been  seen 
important as a counter-force for super power domination, as well as Finland's visibility in 
the struggle for  its  neutral  and sovereign status.”  Commitment  to  UN-led international 
system has also been reflected in the media. An analysis of press coverage during the Cold 
War era shows that the coverage of the UN was very positive (Luostarinen & Suikkanen 
2004). Some argue that the experiences of the Cold War era still influence foreign policy-
making.  According to Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2001, 80) there is an “old tendency in 
Finland to have respect for authority in foreign and security policy” which may hinder 
substantial public debate on foreign and security policy issues. They argue that, with the 
exception of EU membership, “major foreign policy decisions” have been made “without 
much public debate” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 84). 
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The Kosovo War had posed a somewhat similar challenge to Finland as Iraq Crisis of 
2002-2003.  In  the  case  of  Kosovo,  Finland  supported  NATO  military  action  against 
Yugoslavia despite the lack of UN Security Council authorization (Forsberg 2000). Both 
Finland  and  Sweden  felt  rather  uneasy  about  supporting  the  bombing  without  a  UN 
mandate  but  eventually supported the statement  by the EU according to  which the air 
strikes were “necessary and warranted” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 77). 
The Finnish public opinion was very much against the US policy on Iraq. In January 2003, 
only 5% of respondents in the Gallup International study held the view that Finland should 
support military action against Iraq. None of the political parties endorsed military action. 
As an indication of the consensus on the Iraq issue, one could refer to a survey among the 
Finnish elite (politicians, cultural elite, soldiers, researchers and public servants) conducted 
by the biggest tabloid newspaper  Ilta-Sanomat in mid-February 2003. Only four out of 
fifty  respondents  approved  of  the  looming  invasion  (Hämäläinen  2003).  Despite  this 
apparent consensus within the political elite and the public, Finland's Iraq policy became 
the most prominent issue in the run-up to the parliamentary election which took place in 
March 2003. 
In November 2002, the Bush administration made inquiries with 50 countries whether they 
would be willing to participate in the rebuilding and re-stabilizing Iraq after the potential 
war. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA) formulated response 
to the US request on 4 December 2002 which put emphasis on the authority of the UN 
Security Council and its resolution 1441 (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). In 
other words, Finland would participate in such activities only as a part of UN authorised 
operations. Five days after the UTVA meeting, Social Democratic Prime Minister Paavo 
Lipponen held meetings with President Bush and Vice President Cheney in Washington. A 
memo drafted on these meetings states that PM Lipponen thanked President Bush for his 
leadership in the war on terror. Bush, in turn, praised Finland's cooperation and thanked the 
Finnish government for its statements on Iraq and for joining the Coalition.
PM Lipponen's  discussions  in  Washington  raised  questions  already in  December  when 
three MPs (Anni Sinnemäki of the Green Party, Mikko Elo of the Social Democratic Party 
and Jaakko Laakso of the Left Alliance) posted a public question on Lipponen statements. 
They expressed concern that Finland could appear to be giving green light to the invasion 
(Kaleva,  19  December  2002).  On  7  January,  a  national  daily  newspaper,  Helsingin 
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Sanomat, reported that Yrjö Hakanen, the chairman of the marginal Communist Party of 
Finland, criticized the government for not taking a firmer stance against the war. Moreover, 
he argued that the government had in praxis given its support for the war by promising the 
US to take part in the rebuilding process. On 10 January, Lipponen gave his response to the 
public question at the Parliament (Eduskunta) emphasising that the policy adopted by the 
UTVA  has  been  communicated  to  the  US.  Nevertheless,  opposition  leader,  Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki of the Centre Party, launched her offensive in a regional newspaper, Kaleva, 
on  the  following  day.  Jäätteenmäki  argued  that  Lipponen  had  prematurely  promised 
assistance in reconstruction noting that Finland had never before decided on such matter 
prior  to  the  UN request  for  assistance  (Kaleva,  27  January  2007).  Social  Democratic 
Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (2003a) responded to Jäätteenmäki by arguing that “the 
fact  that  the  Finnish  government  is  prepared  to  discuss  humanitarian  assistance  and 
reconstruction in a post-war Iraq does not imply Finnish support for military action.”
Jäätteenmäki  intended  to  replicate  what  Gerhard  Schröder  had  done  in  the  German 
elections  – exploit  the  electorate's  opposition  toward a  war  in  Iraq.  Consequently,  she 
hammered  down her  points  in  the  televised  electoral  debate  on  29  January 2003:  she 
criticised Finland's stance on Iraq, the disagreements within the social democratic foreign 
policy  leadership  and,  finally,  she  emphasised  that  the  Iraq  crisis  should  be  solved 
peacefully through the United Nations (Ervasti 2004, 63). Her strategy also sidelined the 
conservative National Coalition Party dropping their leader Ville Itälä from the race to the 
Office of Prime Minister (Anttila 2006, 176).
Two days  later,  the  UTVA held  another  meeting  and released  the  following statement 
(Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003a):
“On  Friday 31  January 2003,  the  meeting  between the  President  of  the  Republic  and  the 
Cabinet  Committee on Foreign and Security Policy discussed the current  situation in  Iraq. 
Finland supports, in a coherent manner, the UN's efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on the matter. 
Finland considers it important that the resolution be implemented in a manner consistent with 
the Security Council's intention.
Finland has already previously expressed its readiness to reply to inquiries by the UN and its 
special bodies concerning humanitarian and other assistance after a possible conflict.”
On 14 February,  the UTVA met again.  This  time the statement  included expression of 
support  to  the  “Greek  Presidency  in  its  endeavours  to  secure  the  broadest  possible 
understanding” on Iraq. More importantly, however, the statement stressed that “[a]ny use 
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of  military  force  will  require  authorization  from  the  UN  Security  Council”  (Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b). 
On 28 February 2003, the US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman held a 
briefing for ”countries that had promised cooperation and assistance to the US with regard 
to Iraq”.  Finland was invited to the 'coalition briefing'  among some 30 other countries 
while other European non-aligned countries Sweden and Austria were not invited. Ervasti 
(2004, 38) explains the invitation to the briefing by Bush administration's need to present 
the US policy as popular as possible.
Between  the  end  of  January  and  early  March,  Jäätteenmäki  received  24  classified 
documents on Iraq from President Tarja Halonen's advisor Martti Manninen (Ervasti 2004, 
64).  Among  them was  a  memorandum on  the  Grossman  briefing  which  Jäätteenmäki 
exploited  in  another  election  debate  on March 6 – only ten  days  before the  elections. 
Quoting the documents almost word to word at times, she argued that the “US sees that 
Finland is  part  of  their  Coalition.  And PM Lipponen has  generated  this  perception by 
promising  President  Bush  that  Finland  will  participate  in  peacekeeping  activities, 
reconstruction  and humanitarian  aid  on 9 December  2002” (quoted  in  Salminen 2006, 
201).125 Journalists asked about the source of her information in the election debate and 
Jäätteenmäki simply replied that she is entitled to see some documents as an opposition 
leader.  She had broken with a decades long tradition by turning foreign policy into an 
election  theme.  The  social  democrats  now  knew  that  someone  had  leaked  classified 
documents to the Centre Party leader (Salminen 2006, 201).
When UTVA met to discuss Iraq the following day, the new statement gave Jäätteenmäki 
an opportunity to say that the confusion is finally over now that Finland has clarified its 
position by regarding military action “unacceptable”: 
“The crisis can be brought to a peaceful conclusion provided that Iraq fulfils its obligations re-
garding  disarmament  and  fully  collaborates  with  the  UN weapons  inspectors  and  that  all 
countries commit themselves not to act without UN authorization. The time, as well as the 
human and technical resources used for the arms inspections, can be increased in consultation 
with the inspection leadership and in accordance with the Security Council's decisions. The 
inspections  cannot,  however,  be  continued  endlessly  if  Iraq  fails  to  fully  cooperate  and, 
consequently, the possibility of using military force cannot be ruled out entirely.
125Meanwhile, Centre Party MPs Juha Korkeaoja and Mauri Pekkarinen did not see a real 
difference between the Social Democrat and Centre Party stance on Iraq (Ervasti 2004, 
74).
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Any use of military force will require the authorization of the UN Security Council and all 
unauthorized use of military force is unacceptable.”
Again,  mixed messages from the social democratic foreign policy leadership lent some 
credibility to Jäätteenmäki's argument. Foreign Minister Tuomioja said that the US had 
misinterpreted the Finnish position and that Finland is not a part of the coalition (Ervasti 
2004, 88).
On March 10, both national tabloids  Ilta-Sanomat and  Iltalehti received two documents. 
They were Ministry of Foreign Affairs secret documents on PM Lipponen's Washington 
visit and the Grossman briefing (Ervasti 2004, 92). According to Pekka Ervasti, a political 
reporter with Ilta-Sanomat, they decided to check the authenticity of the documents and get 
an  expert  view on them as  soon as  possible.  Ilta-Sanomat relied on Max Jakobson,  a 
former ambassador, who confirmed the authenticity of the documents but did not agree 
with Jäätteenmäki's analysis (Ervasti 2004, 94). President Halonen also gave a statement 
arguing that Finland's Iraq policy has been clear all along and tied to the UN (Ervasti 2004, 
98).  The Finnish government insisted that “coalition” referred to coalition against terror. 
Although this explanation seemed to satisfy many, the fact that coalition is mentioned in 
the context of Iraq (under the heading “Iraq” and in the same sentence) in the classified 
memo contradicts with this argument.126 The memorandum on the Bush-Lipponen meeting 
was written by Matti Anttonen from the Finnish Embassy in Washington (Ervasti 2004, 
32). According to Ervasti (2004, 34), the Finnish delegation present in the meeting held the 
view that Bush had thanked Finland for the position that UTVA adopted with regard to Iraq 
just prior to Lipponen's visit to Washington on 4 December 2002. As for the “coalition”, 
Ervasti (2004, 34) argues that it referred to the “Coalition Against Terror”.
On 16 March, the parliamentary elections were held and the Centre Party secured a narrow 
victory with 55 seats against  53 seats of the Social Democrats. The Social Democratic 
Party gained two seats but the Centre Party gained seven new seats. Having been sidelined 
by the Iraq debate in the run-up to the elections, the National Coalition Party lost six seats 
and  had  to  settle  for  40  seats  in  the  parliament.  In  April,  Jäätteenmäki's  coalition 
government took office. The government consisted of eight Centre Party ministers, eight 
Social Democratic Party ministers and two National Swedish Party (RKP) ministers.
126The document can be found as an appendix in Pekka Ervasti's book ”Irakgate” (2004).
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Whether or not  PM Lipponen exceeded his  authority by promising more than UTVA's 
guidance allowed, or whether there was an innocent (or deliberate127) misinterpretation of 
the Finnish policy by President Bush is not the object of this study. What is relevant here, 
is that Jäätteenmäki's accusations – together with the classified memos which were also 
leaked to tabloid newspapers in early March – provided legitimate grounds for journalists 
to investigate what exactly PM Lipponen had promised to Bush. 
Jäätteenmäki, who had received the classified Ministry of Foreign Affairs memos, had to 
resign in late June having served only a couple of months as a Prime Minister. Centre 
Party's coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, adopted a position that Jäätteenmäki 
could not continue in PM's office after it was revealed that she had received the classified 
documents from President's advisor Martti Manninen. Her credibility was also damaged by 
her  evasive  answers  to  questions  regarding  her  source  of  information.  Some  of  her 
statements on the matter became famous. Among them was “Puhun niin totta kuin osaan” 
which roughly translates to “I am speaking as truthfully as I can.” Both Jäätteenmäki and 
Manninen faced trial in 2004. Eventually, Jäätteenmäki was acquitted and she was elected 
to the European Parliament.
5.3.4 In sum
It is safe to conclude that the national Iraq policies created considerable controversy in 
each of the three countries.  In Britain,  the political  elite  were divided on the issue of 
whether UK troops should join the US invasion of Iraq. In Ireland, the Fianna Fáil and 
Progressive  Democrat  coalition  government  was  harshly  criticised  by  the  opposition 
parties for the stop-over policy. In Finland, the political elite seemed to agree on anti-war 
stance. However, opposition leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki argued that PM Paavo Lipponen 
had exceeded his mandate in promising Finnish assistance in the aftermath of the invasion 
to President Bush before the UN had made a request of assistance. Eventually, she received 
very little support for her view from the rest of the political elite albeit she might have 
secured the victory in the general elections by challenging PM Lipponen in the field of 
foreign policy.
127The US was keen on interpreting as many states as possible to be supportive of its Iraq 
policy to give international legitimacy to its attack. For instance, Croatia protested 
against being attached to the list of states supportive of invasion merely because it had 
opened its airspace to US planes.
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National  foreign  policy  formulation  with  regard  to  Iraq  attracted  considerable  media 
interest  in these countries  allowing the investigation of  whether the coverage favoured 
government or reflected wider elite opinion – and to what degree the public was allowed to 
participate in the foreign policy debate. Interestingly, the press had grounds to investigate 
the legality of government policies in all three countries that are subject of this study. 
5.4 SELECTING THE SAMPLE
Newspapers were chosen not only because of the relative ease in accessing the material in 
comparison to television coverage but also because national quality press is often expected 
to have higher standards than other media and to act as the critical ‘watchdog’ scrutinizing 
the  power  (Robertson  2004).  Moreover,  newspapers  are  still  widely  read  in  Ireland, 
Finland and the UK which are among the top newspaper reading nations. In fact, 50% of 
the British said that they read a newspaper every day, 10% at least 4 times a week and 14% 
at least twice a week. Only 16% said they hardly ever read a newspaper (Sancho & Glover 
2003,  20).  On average,  the  British  spent  about  38  minutes  a  day reading  newspapers 
(Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008, 432).128 According to the National Newspapers of Ireland 
(2004), “more than a 3 million adults” read a newspaper in a typical week between July 
2003 and June 2004.129 The level of daily newspaper reading by adults was 59% in Ireland 
in  2003/2004 and,  in  the  case  of  Sunday newspapers,  notably higher  78% (McPartlin 
2009).  A study  suggests  that  the  Irish  spent  approximately  53  minutes  on  reading  a 
newspaper on an average day (Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008). The Finns, in turn, are among 
the leading newspaper readers in the world (Sauri 2007) and only Japan and Norway have 
higher newspaper circulation per 1,000 persons (Moring 2008, 52). The share of the whole 
Finnish  population  reading  a  daily  newspaper  on  an  average  day  was  86%  in  2000 
(Moring, 2008, 55). According to a 2003 poll, nearly 90% of respondents said they trusted 
the  newspaper  of  their  choice  either  very  much  or  quite  a  lot  (Finnish  Newspapers' 
Association 2008). Only 4% of Finns read newspapers online in 2002 (Sauri 2007).
5.4.1 Selecting the newspapers
Selecting two quality dailies from different ends of the political spectrum has two major 
benefits:  they are likely to cover the most extreme views present in mainstream news, 
while also, given the situation that both dailies seem to have adopted a similar stance with 
128Elvestad and Blekesaune use the data from European Social Survey 2004.
129The population of Ireland was little less than 4 million in 2003.
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regard to some issues, one would assume that this reflects what was common to journalism 
rather than just the political stance of the daily (see Aday, Cluverius & Livingston 2005, 
319).
In the case of the UK, which has a number of national quality dailies, the conservative 
Daily Telegraph and the liberal Independent were chosen for these purposes. The decision 
between the  Independent and the  Guardian was based on the  Independent's  supposedly 
more critical approach to the Iraq War and on the fact that previous research has often 
neglected the Independent while the Guardian’s war coverage has been analysed in several 
studies (e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Ravi 2004, Fahmy & Kim 2008, Dardis 2006). In 
January 2003, the circulation of the Daily Telegraph was 947,000 (including bulks) and the 
Independent had the smallest circulation of the national quality dailies with a circulation of 
222,000 (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2003a). Their Sunday editions were also included in 
the study. Independent on Sunday had a circulation of 220,000 and the Sunday Telegraph 
considerably higher  751,000 (Audit  Bureau of Circulations 2003b).  In 2003, the  Daily  
Telegraph was controlled by a Canadian businessman Conrad Black but was sold to the 
Barclays brothers the following year.
Britain's  newspaper  market  is  very competitive.  The  two above-mentioned newspapers 
compete with the  Guardian/Observer,  The Times and the  Financial  Times.  In  addition, 
there is the middle-market Daily Mail and Daily Express and tabloid newspapers such as 
the  Sun and the  Daily Mirror.   According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 208) the British 
press “has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely” despite having a 
commercial  press  (Hallin  &  Mancini  2004,  208).  Consequently,  “within  the  limits  of 
British political spectrum, strong, distinct political orientations are clearly manifested in 
news content” (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 211). However,  in the post-war period, British 
newspapers' support for particular political parties has become less consistent than it was in 
the past (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 210) and despite a degree of partisanship in the British 
press,  the  newspapers  remain  largely independent  of  political  parties  (Hampton 2003). 
Nevertheless, the British dailies have quite different readerships. According to a MORI 
poll in 2004, 39% of Independent readers were Liberal Democrat voters and 36% Labour 
Party supporters. The  Guardian, which competes for the same readers, had more Labour 
Party voters than Liberal  Democrat supporters in its  readership. According to the 2004 
MORI poll, nearly two thirds of  Telegraph readers were supporters of the Conservative 
Party (Duffy & Rowden 2005).
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Ireland’s two biggest  national quality dailies have different political  orientations which 
made  the  selection  rather  easy.  The  Irish  Times,  which  is  popular  among  urban 
professionals, is “liberal and progressive in character” (Phelan 2004, 178) while the Irish 
Independent,  which is  read by conservative rural  population, could be characterized as 
centre-right.  The  Irish  Independent supported  Fine  Gael  party  until  1979  (Hallin  & 
Mancini 2004, 209-210) and openly supported Fianna Fáil party in 1997 elections (Horgan 
2000, 258). The Irish Times is often considered to be Ireland's most influential newspaper, 
'newspaper of the record', although the Irish Independent is the sales leader. According to 
Joint  National  Readership  Survey (2003),  the  readership  of  the  Irish  Independent was 
532,000 in 2003 while the Irish Times' readership was 319,000. The Irish Independent had 
17% share  of  the  market  while  the  Irish  Times had  little  over  10% share.  The  Irish 
Independent's  Sunday edition,  the  Sunday Independent had a readership of 1,064,000 – 
more than a  third of  the Sunday newspaper  market.  The second most  popular  Sunday 
broadsheet is the Sunday Tribune with less than a third of the Sunday Independent's sales 
(Ferre 2003). Irish newspapers compete with British newspapers in their domestic media 
market as a result of geographical proximity and a shared language.130 Consequently, some 
British newspapers publish an Irish edition. For example, the popular tabloid the Star is an 
Irish edition of the British Daily Star (Ferre 2003).
The Irish newspaper market is highly concentrated. The Independent News and Media PLC 
sells 80% of newspapers in the country. The company owns the Irish Independent together 
with  its  Sunday  edition,  national  Evening  Herald and  eleven  regional  newspapers. 
Independent News and Media also owned London's  Independent in 2003 (which is the 
focus of this study) and operates, for example, in the Australian and South African media 
markets (Ferre 2003). Since 1974, the  Irish Times has been run by the  Irish Times Trust 
with an objective to  secure it  as  ”an independent  newspaper  primarily concerned with 
serious issues for the benefit of the community throughout the whole of Ireland, free from 
any form of personal or party political, commercial, religious or other sectional control” 
(Irishtimes.com 2010). In addition to the Irish Independent, the Irish Times and the Sunday 
Independent,  the  Sunday Tribune was  included for  the  sample  but  only for  qualitative 
analysis. O'Regan (2007, 13) has argued that these newspapers play ”opinion leader” roles 
”in  Irish  public  and  political  life  and  are  well-positioned  in  the  Irish  media  market”. 
130Most newspaper readers prefer Irish titles and very few settle for reading only a British 
title (Ferre 2003).
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Moreover,  she argues, that  it  is often assumed that they are widely read by both other 
media and the elites.
Unlike  the  other  newspapers  mentioned  above,  the  Sunday  Tribune adopted  a  harshly 
critical position on the Iraq War. Meanwhile, Phelan (2004, 185-186) argues that the Irish 
Times was largely approving of the US operation in Afghanistan and also took the view 
that Ireland cannot remain neutral in the war on terror. An editorial (25 Sept 2001) argued 
that the stopover policy, which allows US military aircraft to refuel at Shannon airport, 
“deserves  the  support  of  the  Irish  people”  only  regretting  that  the  decision  was  not 
subjected  to  parliamentary  approval  (quoted  in  Phelan  2004,  184).  On the  whole,  the 
editorial policy of the  Irish Times was in line with the government position at the time 
(Phelan 2004, 187).
The selection of the Finnish newspapers was less clear-cut for three main reasons. First of 
all,  Finland  has  only one  national  quality  daily  newspaper  Helsingin  Sanomat131 (HS) 
which was, consequently,  included in the sample. In 2003, the circulation of  Helsingin 
Sanomat was nearly 440,000132  making it the biggest newspaper in Scandinavia and it 
could be characterised as “liberal quality daily” (Rahkonen 2007, 86). 
Secondly, the heyday of the political  press was from 1910 to early 1930s (Salokangas 
1999) when Finnish newspapers were closely affiliated to political parties. However, party 
affiliated press has been in the decline for decades and “the party press is almost totally 
marginalized” today (Moring 2008, 54)133. Nieminen et al (2005, 38) argue that the demise 
of the political press led to a situation in which alternative and conflictual voices have 
diminished access to the public domain.
Thirdly,  the Finnish press seems to hold quite uniform views on foreign policy issues. 
Since  independence,  Finnish  geopolitical  thinking  among the  governing  elite  has  been 
dominated by two schools of thought: nationalist-realists who emphasise neutrality and 
131Salokangas (1999, 103) notes that Helsingin Sanomat is first and foremost regional 
newspaper of the Helsinki area and only secondarily national.
132 All circulation figures for Finnish newspapers are based on the Finnish Audit Bureau 
of Circulations data from www.levikintarkastus.fi.
133By 1997, out of 214 Finnish newspapers only 18 had a “formal party affiliation” 
(Salokangas 1999, 97). By early 2001, the party press had a combined circulation of 
145,000 or little more than 4% of the total newspaper circulation (Jyrkiäinen & 
Savisaari 2003, 70).
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non-alignment and western-liberalists who emphasise “cultural difference and the threat 
posed  by  Russia/Soviet  Union”  (Moisio  2008).  The  latter  are  well-presented  in  the 
mainstream media. With regard to Finland's decision to become a member of the European 
Union in 1990s, Sami Moisio (2008) argues that 
“The national media clearly supported the westernisers [western-liberalists], while some of the 
provincial media with their base in the agricultural regions wholeheartedly campaigned against 
the membership. The leading daily newspapers published in major cities,  Helsingin Sanomat 
(Helsinki),  Aamulehti (Tampere) and  Turun Sanomat (Turku), were all in favour and became 
important  players  in  the  EU  debate,  along  with  some  influential  weekly  magazines  (e.g. 
Suomen Kuvalehti), as they added publicity to the westernisers' attempts to persuade the people 
to support their 'new foreign policy' aimed at relocating Finland on the mental map of Europe.”
According  to  Rahkonen's  analysis  of  editorials  in  36  major  newspapers  and  weekly 
magazines published in 2003, the Finnish print media would seem to be largely supportive 
of Finland's membership in NATO. Both national tabloids, HS, and the largest regional 
newspapers were in favour of military alignment through NATO. Apart from the marginal 
Green Party and Communist Party weekly newspapers (Vihreä Lanka and  Tiedonantaja 
respectively),  only  three  regional  newspapers  (Jyväskylä-based  Keskisuomalainen, 
Seinäjoki-based Ilkka and Helsinki- and Oulu-based Suomenmaa) close to the Centre Party 
did not want to  see Finland ally herself  with NATO (Rahkonen 2007, 88;  2006, 221). 
However, these small and medium-size regional newspapers have limited resources and 
rely heavily on Finnish news agency STT even in their national coverage (Rahkonen 2006, 
239). Moreover, they have little influence beyond their region. These factors limited the 
choice to the largest regional newspapers which are Tampere-based Aamulehti and Turku-
based  Turun Sanomat.  The  second largest  regional  newspaper  Turun Sanomat had  the 
circulation of nearly 112,000 and reached approximately 70% of Turku residents.  Turun 
Sanomat was  chosen  over  Tampere-based  Aamulehti (circulation  136,000)  because 
Aamulehti's  Iraq  coverage  has  already  been  studied  by  Männistö  (2004)  while  the 
candidate is not aware of any research done on Turun Sanomat's Iraq coverage even at a 
graduate level. 
Turun Sanomat, which was established in 1905, is part of the family-owned TS-Group. 
Helsingin  Sanomat,  in  turn,  is  owned by Finland's  largest  multimedia  house  Sanoma-
WSOY which also owns the biggest national tabloid Ilta-Sanomat (IS), with a circulation 
of nearly 199,000.  Ilta-Sanomat,  which was founded in 1932, was also included in the 
sample because it played a significant role in the controversy regarding Finnish Iraq policy 
in the lead-up to the general election (Virkkunen 2004). Finland also has another national 
tabloid, Iltalehti, but its circulation was (121,000) well behind Ilta-Sanomat. It also lacks a 
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proper online archive and it played a less prominent role in the controversy regarding the 
national foreign policy on Iraq. Another reason for selecting a third newspaper is that the 
Finnish sample would have remained rather small without it.
Helsingin  Sanomat declared  free  from  party  political  alignments  in  1932  and  Turun 
Sanomat followed in early 1960s  (Rand & Savisaari  1995, 53). Both newspapers have 
ideological  background  in  the  Young  Finnish  Party  which  was  based  on  international 
liberalism (Rahkonen 2006, 118).134 According to Olli Kivinen, who worked for Helsingin 
Sanomat for  44  years,  the  HS always  maintained  the  view  that  Finland  is  a  Western 
democracy and shares the values with Western Europe rather than its Eastern neighbour 
which has different ideals  (Rahkonen 2006, 117).  The orientation towards west is  also 
reflected in the fact that, during the Cold War era, the Finnish press did not rely on the 
Soviet  news  agency TASS which  had  only marginal  role  in  most  Finnish  newspapers 
(Rahkonen 2006, 116). While in 1950 70% of foreign news stories published in Helsingin 
Sanomat originated from news agencies and newspapers in NATO countries, in 2000, this 
percentage had dropped to less than 10%. During the same time period the output of the 
newspaper's own reporters and correspondents increased from little over 10% to over 70% 
(Rahkonen 2006, 115).
The fact that  Helsingin Sanomat has not had a party political alignment since 1932 does 
not mean that it would not press its own political agenda. During the recent years it has 
openly campaigned for NATO membership and the newspaper sees that Finland should be 
part  of  every  organisation  in  which  other  Western  liberal  democracies  participate 
(Rahkonen 2007, 86). Helsingin Sanomat also supported the NATO bombing campaign in 
Kosovo  in  its  editorials  in  1999  (Forsberg  2000,  45).  Despite  its  stance  on  NATO, 
Rahkonen  (2007,  86)  argues  that  Helsingin  Sanomat did  “not  fully  support”  Bush 
administration's foreign policy and “Republican ideology” as they contradicted with some 
of the principles of liberal tradition with regard to religion for example.
According to critics, Helsingin Sanomat's partisanship is also illustrated by its treatment of 
some Centre Party politicians. Especially in the run-up to the Presidential election in 2000, 
Helsingin Sanomat made significant efforts to discredit  the Centre Party nominee Esko 
134However, from 1951 to 1961, Turun Sanomat was affiliated to a liberal party, Finnish 
People's Party (Suomen Kansanpuolue), at least nominally. It differed from its 
predecessor party (National Progressive Party/Edistyspuolue) by prioritising middle 
class interests  (Steinby 1963, 114; Mickelsson 2007, 151, 179).
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Aho (Salminen 2006, 180-183). In the 1994 Presidential  election,  the Social  Democrat 
nominee Martti Ahtisaari was the preferred candidate with the HS journalists (Salminen 
2006, 182). Both Helsingin Sanomat and Turun Sanomat supported Finnish membership in 
the European Union (Moisio 2008)
The Irish Times articles were retrieved from Factiva database while the British newspapers 
were  retrieved  from  Lexis/Nexis.  The  Finnish  newspapers  together  with  the  Irish 
Independent and the  Sunday Tribune were retrieved from their own online archives. All 
databases and archives were simply searched with specific dates (see below) and a search 
word  “Iraq”  or  “Irak”  in  the  case  of  Finnish  newspapers.  Items  that  had  only  minor 
references to the Iraq crisis were excluded from the sample as well as duplicates. Based on 
a preliminary analysis, business sections dealt mainly with the war's impact on oil prices, 
stock markets, effects on tourism industry and other issues which were deemed somewhat 
irrelevant to the political aspects of the war. As a result, business news were excluded from 
the sample together with sports, TV/radio programming, culture and obituaries. Hence, the 
sample  consists  of  news  articles  (both  national  and  international  sections),  editorials, 
commentaries and letters-to-the-editor.
As opposed to using hard copies, the electronic databases have some disadvantages. As 
Philip Hammond (2007) has noted the “problem with electronic versions of newspapers is 
that  they do not include layout,  photographs or other illustrations.” Electronic archives 
“can be unreliable and incomplete, and discrepancies can arise when different newspapers' 
data are recorded differently” (Hammond 2007). This was a challenge particularly in this 
research project because there were multiple sources of content. For instance, Lexis/Nexis 
database records the page number where the item appeared. However, this information was 
not  available  for  all  newspapers  analysed  in  this  study  and,  consequently,  it  was 
determined that page numbers will not be recorded for any of the items. The point of the 
research was to produce comparable data and because this information was lacking in too 
many cases (including all Finnish newspapers) recording page numbers was deemed futile.
Electronic databases often include different versions of the same article. However, this is 
also true of the actual newspapers. Different versions of the articles may go to print at 
different times. For example, in Finland, where distances are very long, the first copies 
have to be shipped to the northern parts of the country. Meanwhile, Helsinki residents get 
the latest version of the newspaper. In other words, a researcher might get slightly different 
126
results depending on where he or she retrieves the newspapers. In cases where duplicates – 
different versions of the same article – were found in the databases, the longer one (or the 
longest one in some cases) was chosen for analysis while the rest were disregarded as 
duplicates. 
With  regard  to  news  photographs,  they  were  excluded  from this  study  because  news 
photography is  not  readily  available  via  electronic  databases.   As mentioned  above,  a 
further limitation imposed by the use of electronic databases is that they do not allow the 
analysis of the manner in which the stories were positioned in the pages of the newspapers. 
While  all  of  these  factors  are  clear  drawbacks  in  comparison  to  analysing  actual 
newspapers, it was determined that retrieving copies of seven newspapers in three different 
countries  would  have  been  too  costly  and  time-consuming  in  relation  to  the  potential 
benefits of such effort. Consequently, such endeavour will be left to future research.
5.4.2 Selecting the periods of analysis
In order to make the sample manageable, it was necessary to reduce the number of days 
subjected to analysis. Hence, four key events were identified at different stages of the crisis 
which  supposedly were  followed by particular  intense  framing contests  –  which occur 
when  “political  actors  compete  by  sponsoring  their  preferred  definitions  of  issues” 
(Carragee & Roefs 2004, 216) – on both international and national levels: 
• Colin Powell's presentation at the UN on 5 Feb, 
• Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on 17 March, 
• the fall of Baghdad on 9 April,
• the end of "major combat operations" on 1 May. 
 
Analysis periods cover a week after each event. This was considered to be sufficiently long 
period  for  other  actors  to  put  forward  competing  interpretation  of  events/issues  and 
journalists to investigate the implications of the initial events and statements.135 Indeed, the 
policy debate was particularly intense during the chosen weeks and many relevant events 
in  foreign policy formulation in  each country coincided with these periods as  national 
governments  reacted to  these stimuli.  For example,  during the first  period of  analysis, 
135Due to the delay in newspaper reporting, the periods of analysis begin only the next 
day after the major event. Hence, for example, the third period of analysis following the 
fall of Baghdad on 9 April covers the newspaper coverage of the period from 10 to 16 
April. 
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parliamentary debates on Iraq took place in all  three countries and an EU summit  put 
pressure especially on Ireland to  adopt  a  clear  policy instead of  continuing the fence-
sitting.  Another possibility for a pre-war period of analysis was the week following the 
February 15 global anti-war demonstration. However, the fact that Powell's presentation, 
unlike the global protests, seemed to have pushed the policy formulation forward in all 
three countries tipped the scale in favour of early February. Moreover, the global anti-war 
movement made another effort to influence events or at least public perception of them by 
organising  the  second  round  of  global  demonstrations  as  the  war  began.  These 
demonstrations coincided with the second period of analysis (18–24 March). As in the pre-
war situation, it was the US statements and actions that drove things forward – including 
foreign policy formulation in Europe. Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on 17 March 
was  a  clear  sign  that  the  war  would  be  not  only  inevitable  but  also  imminent. 
Consequently, in Britain, the Blair government faced a vote in the House of Commons on 
the war. The Leader of the House, Robin Cook, resigned as a protest to Blair's policy on 
Iraq which divided the Labour Party in the vote. Similarly, Bush's ultimatum forced the 
Finnish  and  Irish  governments  to  formulate  their  positions  on  the  war.  The  Irish 
government found itself in especially difficult circumstances due to the opposition toward 
the stop-over policy which allowed US planes access to Shannon airport. Clearly, President 
Bush's ultimatum launched a chain of events and the few days that followed his statements 
witnessed a particularly intense period in the Iraq debate. This period also covers the first 
days of actual combat operations from the attempt to “capitulate” the Iraqi President on 20 
March to the killing of ITV reporter Terry Lloyd near Basra on 23 March (which made the 
newspapers on 24 March).
The third period of analysis covers the period from the fall of Baghdad on April 9 to the 
meeting of US officials and Iraqi opposition in Southern Iraq on 15 April. The picture of a 
falling statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on April 9 became perhaps the most iconic 
image of the invasion.  However,  the fighting continued and Saddam's hometown Tikrit 
only fell a few days later. At this point of the invasion, it was still unclear who would be in 
charge  of  reconstruction.  Russia,  France  and  Germany,  which  held  a  summit  in  St. 
Petersburg on 11–12 April, demanded that the UN should be given the task of organising 
reconstruction and the political transition in Iraq. At the end of this period of analysis, 
however, it became clear that the US did not intend to include the UN in the negotiations 
with Iraqi opposition and religious groups on an interim government. The week following 
128
the  fall  of  Baghdad  was,  therefore,  a  crucial  period  in  determining  which  course  the 
political reconstruction would take.
On 1 May, President Bush gave his “Mission Accomplished” speech on the deck of USS 
Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier, in a carefully staged media event which was widely 
covered in the world media.  In his  speech,  Bush justified the military action with the 
removal of a brutal dictator, bringing freedom to the Iraqi people and ensuring that “no 
terrorist network” would “gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime”. Yet, 
there still was no evidence of active unconventional weapons programmes in Iraq which 
had begun to raise suspicions about potential undeclared motives for the invasion. Another 
important event also took place during the fourth and last period of analysis. EU foreign 
ministers  met in Rhodes on 2 May to discuss EU's role in reconstruction of Iraq.  The 
debate over UN's role in the reconstruction also continued with the US and UK drafting a 
UN Security Council Resolution which would give the US authority over Iraqi economy 
for a year.
While the latter two events (the fall of Baghdad and Bush's declaration of end of combat 
operations) chosen for analysis  did not create  similar urgency of policy formulation in 
European capitals as the first two events, they were the two most prominent events in the 
aftermath of the invasion in terms of fuelling debate on Iraq. They also implied an end to 
the initial invasion albeit views on the future of Iraq may have significantly differed among 
supporters and critics of the invasion. In any case, these two events fuelled debate on the 
meaning  of  the  invasion  and  especially  its  justifications  since  the  invaders  failed  to 
produce  evidence  of  Iraqi  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  Moreover,  the  major  powers 
continued to fight over who would determine the political and economic future of Iraq 
during these latter two periods of analysis.
To appropriate comparison, time periods had to be identical for all the countries but this 
created some problems especially when important national debates did not coincide with 
the  four  periods  of  analysis  which  were  discussed  above.  Consequently,  an  additional 
period  on  national  foreign  policy  debate  was  included  when  the  events  were  deemed 
critical  for foreign policy debate  in  a  country. In the Finnish case,  early March was a 
critical  period  when  the  opposition  leader  challenged  government's  Iraq  policy  in  a 
televised  election  debate.  Qualitative  analysis  was  applied  to  this  additional  content. 
Unfortunately,  covering  the  whole  period  from  mid-February  to  early  May  was  not 
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possible as the sample would have grown way too large to be handled in this study due to 
the exhaustive and time-consuming process of qualitative content analysis.












Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat 84 200 116 46 446
 Turun Sanomat 23 65 23 16 127
 Ilta-Sanomat 37 98 64 25 224
FINLAND 144 363 203 87 797
 The Independent 120 303 245 77 745
 The Daily Telegraph 98 240 216 59 613
UK 218 543 461 139 1358
 The Irish Independent 85 202 107 36 430
 The Irish Times 71 186 94 24 375
IRELAND 156 388 201 60 805
Total 518 1294 865 283 2960
To summarise, the time span for this study covers 28 days of coverage between 6 February 
and 8 May 2003. This period covers the first clear sign of the inevitability of the war (that 
is, Colin Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council meeting), the final ultimatum to 
Saddam and the beginning of the invasion, the fall of Baghdad and the conclusion of the 
first  phase of the conflict  culminating in  President  Bush's  declaration of end of  major 
combat operations. With hindsight, however, it was only the beginning of a bloody conflict 
in  Iraq and the  later  stages  of  the  occupation and/or  civil  war  should  be an object  of 
another study. Nevertheless, selecting four different periods of analysis enables comparison 
of how the press covered the crisis before, during and after the actual invasion stage of the 
Iraq crisis. It is worth noting that different types of communication strategies are employed 
at different stages of the conflict. In the lead-up to a conflict, the participating governments 
seek to prepare the nation to the war and mobilize support whereas governments attempt to 
confuse the enemy and encourage its domestic audience. After the war, the emphasis is on 
justifying the taken course of action and writing history (Nord & Strömbäck 2006). The 
time span for this study should cover both the immediate and more reasoned reactions to 
events and statements through the phases of mobilisation, confusion and justification.
Clearly, the validity of the findings would have been enhanced by including more days and 
media  outlets.  Nevertheless,  it  was  necessary  to  strike  a  balance  between  what  is 
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practically feasible and a sufficiently large sample. A sample of nearly 3,000 items was 
deemed sufficient enough to produce valid findings. As can be seen in table 5.2, the sample 
consisted of about 800 items from both Finnish and Irish newspapers and considerably 
more from the UK press (over 1,350).136
5.5 HYPOTHESES
As  discussed  in  chapter  3,  previous  research  has  produced  somewhat  contradictory 
assumptions about how the media in different countries cover international events. The 
executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm argues that the government sets 
the range of views present in the national media. While the manufacturing consent thesis 
emerges from the US context, other studies have produced similar result in other locales. 
There  is  a  bulk  of  literature  that  has  found  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  news  about 
international  events  are  'domesticated',  'nationalised'  or  'localised'  (depending  on  one's 
choice of word) to reflect the national foreign policy line (Cohen et al 1996, Riegert 1998, 
Yang  2003,  Dimitrova  &  Strömbäck  2008,  Stolle  &  Hooghe  2005).  The  following 
hypotheses can be drawn from this line of research:
H1. The media in countries with pro-war governments (i.e. the UK) 
a) prefer sources that share this position, 
b) avoid topics that deal with human suffering while focusing on tactical aspects 
of the invasion (i.e. troop movements), 
c) cover the pro-war arguments extensively without much criticism while 
d ) underpresenting and/or heavily criticising the arguments used to discredit the 
war.
H2. The media in countries with anti-war governments (i.e. Finland) 
a) prefer sources that share this position, 
b) focus on topics that deal with human suffering, 
136Since the Sunday editions (the Sunday Telegraph, the Independent on Sunday and the 
Sunday Independent) seemed to adopt similar editorial positions as their daily editions 
(the Daily Telegraph, the Independent and the Irish Independent) they were treated in 
the tables as one outlet. In other words, the Daily Telegraph figures, for example, 
include the findings of the Sunday Telegraph. Of the Finnish newspapers, Helsingin 
Sanomat and Turun Sanomat are published seven days a week Ilta-Sanomat being the 
only Finnish newspaper included in this sample which is not published on Sundays. The 
Irish Times is also published six times per week and lacks a Sunday edition.
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c) cover the anti-war arguments extensively without much criticism while 
d) underpresenting and/or heavily criticising the arguments used to credit the 
war.
There are also studies (elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm) that suggest 
that domestic elite opinion is a crucial factor in determining the nature of media coverage. 
The elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm argues that the media comform 
”to the interests of political elites in general whether they are in the executive, legislative 
or any other politically powerful position in society” (Robinson 2001a, 525-526). When 
there  is  no  disagreement  within  the  elite,  the  media  operate  within  the  ”sphere  of 
consensus” and media coverage remains uncritical  helping to build support  for official 
policy. When there is elite dissensus, the media coverage reflects the divisions and may 
become critical of the government policy (Robinson 2002, 31). 
H3. In Finland, the elite and the public shared the anti-war position. Therefore, the 
coverage  should  have  been  uniformly  and  unambiguously  anti-war  and  also 
reflect the opposition's criticism of the government.
H4.  If  media  coverage  reflects  ”the  range  of  views  expressed  in  mainstream 
government debate” in accordance with Bennett's indexing hypothesis (Bennett 
1990, 106), the Irish and British press coverage should convey a wide range of 
opinion on the US/UK invasion and Ireland's stop-over policy.
Another line of research emphasises the ability of the US government to get its message 
across  in  the  global  media  especially  in  countries  which  lack  resources  to  cover 
international events independently and, therefore, mainly rely on Anglo-American media 
as sources of information (e.g. Soderlund et al 1994, Rafeeq 2007, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 
2005). The following hypotheses can be drawn from these studies:
H5.  US  government  and  military  sources  are  the  main  sources  of  information 
regardless of national foreign policy line.
H6.  US  views  are  widely  reproduced  in  media  coverage  regardless  of  national 
foreign policies.
H7. Finnish and Irish newspapers that depended on Anglo-American news agencies 
or organisations for original material for their articles are more favourable to US 
views than newspapers that relied on their own foreign correspondents.
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5.6 METHODOLOGY
The  presumption,  on  which  the  analysis  is  based  on,  is  that  there  are  competing 
interpretations of reality which “are linked to interests and these competing interests will 
seek to explain the world in ways which justify their own position” (Philo & Berry 2004, 
95). Some of these interpretations gain greater visibility in media coverage while others are 
marginalised. Walter Lippmann (2004, 192) has noted that 
“[e]very newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of a whole series of selections as to 
what items shall be printed, in what position they shall be printed, how much space each shall 
occupy,  what  emphasis  each  shall  have.  There  are  no  objective  standards  here.  There  are 
conventions.” 
Bennett (1994) suggests that these conventions translate into patterns in media coverage. 
These,  in  turn,  can be best  studied with the method of content  analysis  (Wilkinson & 
Birmingham 2003, 68) which is  “a research technique for making replicable  and valid 
inferences  from  data  to  their  context”  (Krippendorff  1980,  21).  It  is  a  “systematic, 
objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002, 1). 
5.6.1 Content analysis as a method
Content analysis is perhaps the most widely used research method in the field of political 
communication and there is a large number of studies on war coverage that have employed 
content analysis as the main method of investigation. The scope of these studies on media 
coverage of international conflicts range from the American Civil War to the Korean War, 
the Algerian Civil War and the 2003 Iraq War (Rafeeq 2007, 206). For instance, Daniel 
Hallin employed content analysis in his famous study of the Vietnam War coverage. Hallin 
(1986, 112-113) pointed out some of the strengths and weaknesses of the method:
“Content  analysis  lends  an  aura  of  scientific  authority  to  media  research.  And  in  fact 
quantification does, if  done properly,  impose a useful measure of discipline. It  requires the 
analyst to define clearly the criteria for assigning stories or other units of content to fit the 
different categories of the analysis. And it requires dealing with all the content sampled, not 
just those parts of it that fit the story line the analyst starts out with. Nevertheless, at the risk of 
undermining scientific authority, it is important to point out that the data produced by content 
analysis are always a result of many choices and sometimes conceal a good deal of ambiguity 
or subjectivity in coding procedures.”
Other notable studies that have employed content analysis to investigate media coverage of 
foreign policy issues include Mermin (1999), who investigated television news' breadth of 
information and foreign policy debate on several US military interventions in the post-
Vietnam era, and Zaller and Chiu (1996) who covered a longer period (1945-1991) in their 
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analysis  of news magazines (Time and  Newsweek)  of US military interventions.  Media 
coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 has also been studied by the means of content analysis 
(see  e.g.  Rafeeq  2007  and  Maeshima  2007).137 These  above  mentioned  examples  are 
sufficient to highlight some of the major advantages of the method. Content analysis is a 
flexible method in a sense that it can be applied to radio and television programmes and 
both textual and visual content of newspapers (Bryman 2001, 179). It  also enables the 
analysis  of very large samples. Content analysis  provides the required tools when “the 
ambition is to analyse thousands of communication units in a meaningful way” (Anthonsen 
2003,  189).  Meanwhile,  “other types  of  communication analysis  are  neither  practically 
applicable, nor consistent” with such ambition (Anthonsen 2003, 189). 
Quantitative content analysis is an especially helpful tool in revealing patterns in media 
coverage  and  displaying  these  patterns  in  numbers  (Maeshima  2007,  16).  Another 
advantage of quantitative content analysis is that it is a very transparent research method 
enabling replication and follow-up studies. Content analysis is carried out by developing 
content categories through a set of explicit rules of coding. The categories are created to 
produce relevant information vis-à-vis the research questions at hand. The rules of coding 
are then systematically applied to the material being analysed. It is due to this transparency 
in  procedures  that  content  analysis  is  often described as  an  objective  research method 
(Bryman 2001, 189). The purpose of the transparent and systematic research method is to 
disable any personal biases from influencing the findings (Bryman 2001, 178). 
Quantitative content analysis as a research method suffers from some limitations. One has 
to do with the fact that it is nearly impossible to devise a codebook which does not entail 
some degree of interpretation by the coders. Coders rely on their own knowledge of the 
culture in making interpretations of the meanings of the material being coded (Bryman 
2001, 191). In this regard, the notion of objectivity should be taken with little caution. 
Another limitation of content analysis is that while it may reveal certain patterns in media 
coverage, it rarely answers the question of why such patterns occur (Bryman 2001, 191). 
Consequently, other methods are often required to explain the actual news-making process 
(Rafeeq  2007,  207)  which  can  be  studied  more  thoroughly in  ethnographic  newsroom 
studies. Moreover, analysis of the content does not in itself allow conclusions about the 
effects  of the messages on an audience.  Making statements about  media effects  would 
137Frankly, the use of content analysis is so commonly employed in this particular field of 
research that there is an abundance of examples in the bibliography of this thesis.
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require audience studies which could be supplemented by content analysis (Rafeeq 2007, 
207).
Another problem associated with quantitative content analysis is that it typically reduces 
rich and complex content into quantifiable categories risking to miss the real meanings of 
the data.  Traditional quantitative content analysis aims to ”quantify content in terms of 
predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (Bryman 2001, 177). 
It has also been seen as “a strictly quantitative technique, which aims to give an objective 
description of the manifest content of communication” (Anthonsen 2003, 189). Traditional 
quantitative content analysis has focused on counting words, sentences, measurement of 
column inches or other such easily quantifiable matter. In other words, there has been an 
attempt to avoid engaging in any kind of interpretative readings of text. While such method 
produces highly reliable and replicable results, the critics have argued that the method fails 
to  deal  with the nuances and meanings of the text.  Critics of this  approach argue that 
”counting numbers so dilutes the quality of information collected as to make it of little 
use” arguing instead that ”themes and issues can be determined more readily through a 
qualitative,  more  holistic,  approach  rather  than  employing  advanced  statistical  and 
analytical techniques” (Wilkinson & Birmingham 2003, 76). Nowadays, however, the lines 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches have blurred and counting and interpreting are 
not seen as mutually exclusive methods (Anthonsen 2003, 189-190). The type of content 
analysis carried out in this study combines both quantitative and qualitative elements. In 
other words, it involves systematic registration of easily quantifiable manifest content as 
well as interpretations of various elements in the press coverage of the Iraq crisis. A clearly 
qualitative approach – without the intention to quantify – was well-suited especially for the 
analysis of editorials and commentary pieces which often discussed issues in much greater 
depth than news stories. Therefore, qualitative content analysis supplemented the analysis 
of opinion content.
Both  quantitative  and  qualitative  content  analyses  are  empirical  methods  of  analysing 
recorded  human  communication  –  be  it  television  programmes,  newspaper  articles, 
photographs or transcripts of interviews. According to one definition, the main difference 
between these approaches is that quantitative content analysis ”decomposes text material 
into different parts and assigns numeric codes to these elements or parts” which ”are not 
just words, but rather issues, statements, arguments, or bundles of meaning” (Scheufele 
2008).  Qualitative  content  analysis,  in  turn,  ”works  inductively  by  summarizing  and 
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classifying elements  or  parts  of  the  text  material  and  assigning labels  or  categories  to 
them”  (Scheufele  2008).  Maeshima  (2007,  68)  defines  qualitative  content  analysis  in 
slightly different terms by arguing that it does not attempt to quantify anything. In practice, 
the line between quantitative and qualitative content analysis is often blurred.
5.6.2 The coding procedure
While content analysis has been a widely used method in a large number of the studies 
cited in this thesis, many previous studies have indeed reduced complicated foreign policy 
debates  in  mainstream media  into  very simple categories.  For  instance,  US studies on 
media-state  relations  have  often  adopted  rather  simplistic  coding  protocols  such  as 
hawkish/dovish  (Zaller  & Chiu  1996,  2000)  and  critical/uncritical  (Mermin  1999,  43) 
which often fail to reveal the actual substance of foreign policy debates (cf. Althaus 2003). 
Althaus  (2003, 386-387) argues that many studies in the field  have failed to take into 
account subtle ways of criticism (for instance, procedural rather than fundamental criticism 
of government policy),  have used proxy data  instead of full-text news articles or have 
simply omitted foreign voices from the analysis of coverage (see e.g. Bennett 1990 and 
Mermin 1999).138 These methodological choices have contributed to the notion of “lapdog 
press” which argues that newspaper coverage fails to provide criticism of the government. 
Studies which have analysed full-text news articles and considered also subtle forms of 
oppositional  argumentation  have  typically  found more  evidence  of  press  independence 
from the government positions (Althaus 2003, 387). These were all issues that had to be 
addressed in making the methodological choices for this research project.
Two of the problems that  have affected previous research,  were easily eliminated: this 
study analysed full-text news articles and recorded also foreign actors from the content. 
However, capturing the substance of the foreign policy debate was a more difficult task. 
The complexity of the Iraq crisis posed a challenge for developing a coding protocol which 
would take into account also subtle criticism while also providing numerical information 
about the substance of the Iraq debate in the press coverage. It was evident that a simple 
pro-war/anti-war coding of the sample would have provided only a very limited picture of 
how the press covered the Iraq crisis in the three countries. 
138Mermin (1996, 1999) has excluded foreign actors from his analysis because they are 
unlikely to have an influence on an American audience. 
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As discussed above in the previous chapter, the Iraq debate had many dimensions ranging 
from  security  to  humanitarian  concerns.  At  least  in  part,  this  is  explained  by  the 
multiplicity of justifications given by the Bush administration and the Blair government. 
Ian Taylor (2008) argues that the Iraq debate was mainly concerned with issues pertaining 
to  legality,  morality,  strategy  and  security.  He  identifies  both  pro-war  and  anti-war 
arguments on all of these levels. For instance, the pro-war arguments from the security 
point of view included Iraqi WMD and potential links to al-Qaeda as too great a risk for 
Western security. Security concerns were also used to oppose the invasion by arguing that 
the war would only incite more terrorism and potentially further destabilise the Middle 
East. From this point of view, the respect for international law and the multilateral UN-led 
international system were seen as the best guarantee of peace and stability in the world. 
Hence,  a “pre-emptive strike” could create a dangerous  precedent which could lead to 
international anarchy. Similarly, the arguments considering the legality of the war ranged 
from seeing the war as an attempt to uphold the UN authority to rather seeing the war 
eroding the UN.139 
How to analyse such a complex foreign policy debate? In order to produce nuanced data on 
how the press  coverage might  have differed between countries and outlets,  the coding 
protocol was developed to cover a wide range of issues.140 While it was neither practical 
nor possible to capture all  the aspects of the Iraq debate,  a number of categories were 
created reducing the debate into fewer and manageable categories which were identified as 
the key elements of the debate. The categories were developed after a preliminary review 
of part of the sample and analysis of a few key statements of political leaders at different 
sides of the argument on Iraq.141 This stage included going through a few dozen randomly 
selected articles from the total sample of nearly 3000 articles. Although Neuendorf (2002, 
139 Taylor (2008) identifies six school of thoughts which employed different combinations 
of arguments. 'Neoconservatism', the 'official line' and 'liberal hawks'  supported the war 
for different reasons while 'Antiwar Realists', 'Liberal Doves' and 'Antiwar Radicals' 
opposed the invasion.
140With regard to the creation of categories, the substance of the debate was of more 
interest than what some might call ”frames”. As Archetti (2007, 348-349) notes, news 
rarely employ systematic, logical and consistent frames. So, instead of trying to impose 
”frames” on something that is often little more than a collection of quotes from different 
actors – processed and put  together by journalists – this study focuses on the 
occurrence of certain themes and arguments pertinent to the crisis at hand. Nevertheless, 
the codebook includes many of the elements of frames as defined by Robert Entman 
(1993): problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment 
recommendation.  
141In other words, the effort to quantify the characteristics of the analysed content also had 
some qualitative elements.
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11) argues that “an a priori (i.e. 'before the fact') design is actually a part of the task of 
meeting the requirement of objectivity-intersubjectivity” and that the “inductive approach 
violates the guidelines of scientific endeavor”,  this exercise was helpful in determining 
some specific issues which were discussed during the analysed weeks. For instance, the 
Franco-German peace initiative had little significance in retrospect and very little is written 
about  it  afterwards.  In  such  cases,  the  pre-analysis  of  the  sample  was  helpful  in  the 
identification of issues that could be developed into coding categories for the measurement 
of the newspapers coverage of the Iraq crisis.142 Arguably, subjecting part of the data to 
pre-analysis to establish key issues, themes or arguments in the content leads to a more 
accurate and thorough analysis than imposing predefined categories on the data (Wilkinson 
& Birmingham 2003, 76). 
In the second phase, a pilot study was conducted to put the codebook to a test. About 350 
items (nearly 12% of the sample) were coded to assess the coding protocol. As a result, the 
codebook was further modified to produce relevant and reliable results before proceeding 
to the coding of the entire sample (and re-coding of the 350 items used in the pilot study). 
For instance, it was discovered at this stage that press coverage often included references 
to 'casualties of war' without specifying whether they are military or civilian – let alone 
their nationality. Consequently, a category for 'unspecified casualties' was created and used 
in  cases  where  it  was  impossible  to  determine  whether  the  item  referred  to  civilian, 
military or journalist casualties. 
The codebook was build on the premise that the newspapers' coverage of the Iraq crisis 
could  differ  in  terms  of  news  sources,  salience  of  certain  issues/themes  (that  is,  the 
selection of topics) or the direction of arguments. The last one requires some clarification 
and will be discussed later in greater detail.  Coding unit was an item (news, editorials, 
commentaries and letters-to-the-editor). SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) 
142As a result of the pre-analysis two categories were created to measure how the Franco-
German peace initiative was covered in the respective newspapers. Positive/neutral 
references to the initiative were counted together with negative references. The 
following was recorded as positive/neutral reference: 
“ The Franco-German plan would effectively turn Iraq into a protectorate of the UN, and 
sideline President Saddam Hussein.” 
The following was recorded as negative reference: 
“Reflecting Britain's forward march to decision-time for the UN, the Foreign Secretary, Mr 
Jack Straw, warned that Franco/German proposals for the deployment of more weapons in-
spectors in Iraq were simply 'a recipe for procrastination and delay'.”
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was used to assist in the analysis of the findings. The complete codebook can be found as 
an appendix.
5.6.3 Creating the categories
The aim of the preliminary analysis  was  to  identify a  number of  arguments  that  were 
contested. There were competing perspectives in the area of policy options (primarily the 
dividing  line  was  between  the  continuation  or  re-enforcement  of  the  UN  weapons 
inspections  and  the  employment  of  military  force),  rationale  for  military  action (e.g. 
disarmament of Iraq or expansion of the US sphere of influence), and implications of the 
invasion (e.g. fuels more terrorism or brings democracy to Iraq). 
While  some  of  the  categories  were  rather  straight-forward  and  did  not  require  much 
interpretation from the coder, other categories were more challenging in this respect. The 
simpler categories included such as the day of publication and the name of the newspaper 
in which the item appeared. In addition, the type of the text was recorded. Each item was 
labelled either news story, editorial, commentary, letter-to-the-editor, 'quotes of the day' or 
'other'. News story was applied to all items that did not violate the rule of objectivity (or 
any other characteristics of a news story) in news reporting. Editorials/leading articles were 
explicitly stated as such in vast majority of cases and, when in doubt, the type of text was 
often an easy matter to verify – thanks to the newspapers' online databases. All items that 
departed from objectivity were recorded as 'commentaries'.  For instance,  all  items that 
declared themselves columns fell into this category. Letters to the editor were also quite 
easy to identify and, usually, they were also clearly labelled such in the databases. Finally, 
many of the newspapers that were analysed for this study regularly published ”quotes of 
the day” or ”quotes of the week” sections. It was determined that if they dealt with the Iraq 
crisis, they should be coded just like other types of items. After all, it was interesting to see 
who got to present their views in their own terms in these types of items. Finally, category 
'other' was applied when the item did not fit any of the text type categories discussed above 
or when it was impossible to determine its type with satisfactory certainty.
Recording the origin of the text was a little bit more challenging task. There were eight 
options in this category. All items that were filed from Iraq by a reporter, whose name was 
not  on the UK Ministry of  Defence (2004)  list  of  embedded reporters,  were coded as 
'unilateral  correspondent in Iraq'.  'Embedded correspondent'  was applied when the item 
was written by a reporter who, in turn, was on the above-mentioned list. These items were 
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often quite easily identifiable. However, it  is worth noting that naturally there were no 
embedded reporters in Iraq during the first week of analysis and that embedded reporters 
started to leave their units after Baghdad fell.  The origin of items that were filed from 
abroad (excluding  Iraq)  was  recorded as  'other  foreign  correspondent'.  Items  that  only 
acknowledged  Associated  Press,  Reuters  or  some  other  Anglo-American  news 
agency/outlet as their origin, were recorded as such. Similarly, items that acknowledged 
only  non-Anglo-American  news  agencies  such  as  Finnish  STT or  French  AFP were 
recorded.  An additional  category was created for items that  acknowledged both of the 
above. Mainly due to the Irish Independent, which heavily relied on British quality dailies 
in its international news coverage, a separate category was applied to items that explicitly 
originated  from  another  newspaper.  Finally,  items  that  did  not  fit  any  of  the  above-
mentioned categories, or it was impossible to determine with satisfactory certainty which 
code to apply, were recorded as 'other'.
It  was impossible  to analyse  the actual  substance of the Iraq debate  by restricting the 
analysis merely to easily quantifiable categories and, hence, it has to be noted that all the 
following categories involved more interpretation. The main challenge was to capture not 
only how often certain themes or arguments appeared in the press coverage but also the 
manner  in  which  they  were  presented  ('tone  of  the  coverage'  or  the  'direction  of  the 
argument'). For instance, the overall tone of the coverage could be reflected in issues such 
as the coverage of the nature of the Iraqi regime,  anti-war movement  and the Franco-
German peace initiative. For instance, discussing how the West supported Saddam Hussein 
in 1980s puts the events of 2003 in a completely different context than choosing to run an 
article  on  the  atrocities  of  the  Iraqi  government  since  the  beginning  of  Saddam's 
presidency. What follows is not an exhaustive explanation of the codebook. The aim here is 
to  explain  the  coding  procedure  and  provide  a  few  examples  of  not  only  how  the 
quantitative analysis was conducted but also of various categories that were recorded in the 
process. The reader who is interested in the full list of categories should see the appendix at 
the end of this thesis.
What is meant by the 'direction of argument' then? For instance, the US/UK arguments 
about  the  Iraqi  threat,  its  possession  of  WMD and links  to  terrorism were  among the 
contested arguments at  the heart of the debate. Rather than coding 'WMD theme'  on a 
presence/absence basis, it was important to record the direction of argument in the press 
coverage: i.e. whether the item invoked the argument that Iraq has WMD or questioned the 
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argument in some way. For instance,  the following sentence merely invokes the WMD 
argument: 
"The  urgency comes  with  the  reality  that  every week  and  month  that  goes  by,  Saddam's 
chemical  and biological weapons  programmes are more advanced and the risk of their use 
becomes greater."
Meanwhile, the following extract was coded “questioned”:  “Mr Blix told BBC Radio 4's 
Today that he was not sure Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.” Arguments concerning 
other contested areas were coded in a similar invoked/questioned basis. For instance, the 
argument  about  Iraqi  links  to  terrorists  was  included  in  the  codebook.  The  following 
sentence was coded ”invoked”: ”Mr Powell completed his presentation by claiming, 'Iraq 
harbours  a  deadly  terrorist  network  headed  by Abu Musab Zarqawi,  an  associate  and 
collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenant'.” Meanwhile, the following 
was coded “questioned”: “I don't believe any assertion that is made without the evidence 
being provided that there are linkages between him [Saddam] and al-Qa'ida.” Previously, 
Althaus (2003) has employed a similar device in his study on the media coverage of the 
Persian Gulf War (1991) producing reliable results despite the apparent complexity of this 
method (p. 389).
The case for or against rested on several arguments many of which were recorded in the 
content  analysis.  The  following  arguments  for  and  against  the  war  were  recorded  on 
invoked/questioned basis:
01 Iraq has links to terrorism,
02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction,
03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change,
04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit,
05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community,
06 War against Iraq is/would be legal,
07 War against Iraq is/would be justified (morally)
08 Iraq is cooperating with the weapons inspections,
09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient.
10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN.
Similarly,  the  views  on  the  rationale  for  military  action  were  polarised  and  recorded 
accordingly in the same way (invoked/questioned):
01 Disarmament of Iraq (preventing Iraq from developing and employing WMDs),
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02 Hurt terrorists (deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support),
03 Exporting democracy (the objective is to introduce democracy in Iraq/the Middle East)
04 Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions and/or setting a warning example of 
non-compliance of UN Security Council Resolutions,
05 Oil-related objectives,
06 Expansion of the US sphere of influence,
07 Supporting Israel,
08 Regime change (removal of Saddam Hussein from power),
09 Free Iraqi's from Saddam's rule
In  addition,  there  was  a  range  of  arguments  about  the  possible  consequences  of  the 
invasion. Critics of the invasion emphasised, for example, that military action against Iraq 
would incite terrorism and/or could destabilise the fragile Middle Eastern. Supporters of 
the military action argued, among other things, that the end result of the US/UK invasion 
of Iraq would be a democratic Iraq. The full list of recorded implications of the use of force 
can be found in codebook at the end of this thesis.
It was also important to consider the salience and/or absence of certain issues in reporting. 
To this effect, references to certain themes were recorded not on the 'invoked'/'questioned' 
basis  but  on  'presence'/'absence'  basis.  For  instance,  references  to  casualties, 
looting/anarchy, humanitarian aid, military advancement and the US/UK use of depleted 
uranium (DU) ammunition were recorded.
As Gadi Wolfsfeld (1997) has noted, the struggle over media coverage is twofold: on the 
one hand it is structural struggle over access to the media and, on the other hand, it is a 
cultural struggle over meaning. So, this study also investigated sourcing patterns in order 
to determine what level of access the government, opposition, foreign governments, the 
UN and non-elite  actors  had to  the news media,  and whether  the selection  of  sources 
differed across countries  and newspapers. Only sources that  were directly quoted were 
recorded.  There  were  two  reasons  for  this.  First,  this  made  coding  simpler  and  more 
reliable. Second, it was deemed important to investigate which sources were able to define 
the situation in their own choice of words. There was one minor drawback related to this 
choice. The Finnish newspapers did not seem to use direct quotations to the same extent as 
British and Irish newspapers. This may have been due to the language barrier. In other 
words, Finnish journalists may have preferred to paraphrase English language statements 
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rather than attempting to accurately translate them to enable the use of quotation marks. 
However, there may be other factors in play that may have to do with journalistic cultures. 
This possibility is indicated by the fact that the Irish newspapers were more likely to use 
direct quotations than the British newspapers.
5.6.4 Qualitative analysis
Being  aware  of  the  hazards  of  quantitative  approach,  this  study  analysed  especially 
commentaries and editorials in greater detail. It became clear in the process that opinion 
content presented more complicated argumentation than news articles and, consequently, 
they lost  more of their  meaning in an attempt to simply quantifying the occurrence of 
certain themes and arguments that were chosen for the codebook. The findings chapters 
attempt to – within reasonable limits – to present extracts from opinion pieces in order to 
convey the nuance and richness of their content to the readers. It has to be noted, however, 
that this qualitative analysis of commentaries is not rigidly systematic or comprehensive as 
its purpose was first and foremost to give the reader a sense of what the public debate on 
Iraq was like in the three countries and also to address some of the issues that could not be 
taken  into  account  in  the  codebook  (i.e.  quantitative  analysis).  Typically,  qualitative 
content  analysis  explores  the  tone  and  impressions  of  the  text  without  attempting  to 
quantify them. Maeshima (2007, 69) argues that it ”is common with qualitative content 
analysis to examine themes, main ideas and major storylines of a text”. Comparing the 
leading articles of the newspapers in this  manner was especially helpful  in  identifying 
similarities and differences in their editorial positions.
5.6.5 Intercoder reliability
The whole sample was coded by the candidate himself which arguably leads to higher 
coding consistency (Rafeeq 2007, 212). Nevertheless, an inter-coder reliability test was 
required  “to  establish  whether  data  obtained  in  the  course  of  research  can  provide  a 
trustworthy basis for drawing inferences” (Krippendorff 1980, 146). For this purpose, Mr. 
Luigi  Rodriguez  Rocha coded 100 items  which included 25 items  from each English-
language newspaper selected for this study. Unfortunately, Finnish newspapers could not 
be  included  in  this  process  due  to  a  language  barrier.  The  double-coder  had  previous 
experience in content analysis as he is the Founder/Director of the Centre for Social and 
Media  Research  (CISC)  in  Puno  and  holds  a  MA degree  in  Communications  from 
University of Westminster,  London. He was not aware of the hypotheses related to the 
research  project.  The  coder  was  provided  specific  examples  of  each  category  during 
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training. After the training, the coder was able to independently apply the codebook to the 
newspaper articles with satisfactory reliability as measured with Holsti's formula143 with 
each category included in the analysis reaching at least .71.
5.7 CONCLUSION
This study focuses on the press coverage of the Iraq crisis in three European states which 
adopted different policies with regard to Iraq and in which the national Iraq policy created 
controversy. The purpose of the study is to test whether the press coverage reflects the 
national foreign policy line and/or elite opinion in the newspapers' host country. The study 
employs both qualitative and quantitative content analysis in order to determine the range 
of sources, topic selection and tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and national Iraq 
policy. The analysed content consists of two daily quality newspapers from each country 
from different ends of the political spectrum in Ireland and the UK. The Finnish sample 
includes the only national  quality daily,  the second largest  regional newspaper  and the 
biggest tabloid, Ilta-Sanomat, which played a significant role in the controversial debate on 
national Iraq policy. Four week-long periods (28 days) were chosen for analysis at critical 
phases of the crisis between February and May 2003.
The content analysis was designed to produce nuanced data on the characteristics of the 
press coverage. The codebook was built on analysis of key political statements and a pre-
analysis of a small part of the sample. The codebook was also influenced by the way Scott 
Althaus (2003) devised his content analysis in an earlier study. The aim was to take into 
account  subtle  ways  of  criticism in  the press  coverage  while  also capturing  the actual 
substance of the foreign policy debate which is something that many earlier studies have 
failed to do due their simplistic coding categories.
The empirical  contribution of  the study shows not only how the invasion of Iraq was 
covered  by  selected  European  press  and  but  also  how  the  coverage  differed  across 
countries and dailies. Existing research on Finnish and Irish media coverage of the Iraq 
War  of  2003  is  very  limited  for  the  time  being.144 However,  the  literature  on  British 
143Holsti’s intercoder reliability (IR) formula was used as follows: IR = 2M/(N1 + N2), 
where M equals the number of agreements between the coders, N1 is the total number of 
coding decisions made by coder 1, andN2 is the total number of coding decisions made 
by coder 2.
144Phelan's (2005) article on Irish media coverage and Männistö's (2004) analysis of news 
photography in Helsingin Sanomat and Aamulehti are exceptions in this regard.
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coverage  is  much  more  extensive  including  both  print  and  electronic  media  but  the 
Independent has often been excluded from the analysis (see e.g. Ravi 2005, Tumber & 
Palmer 2004, Robertson 2004). 
With regard to the theoretical contribution, the study addresses the issue of the generality 
of the theories of media-state relations by investigating whether the US-originated theories 
of media-state  relations have explanatory power in European context and whether they 
could  serve  as  a  basis  for  providing  accurate  predictions  on  how  the  media  covers 
international events across countries.  Characteristically many previous studies on conflict 
coverage  have  remained  rather  descriptive  outside  the  US  as  the  studies  have  not  set 
themselves an explicit objective to theorize the media-foreign policy relations and to make 
predictions of media behavior in covering future conflicts and foreign and security policy 
issues in general (e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Nohrstedt & 
Ottosen 2005, cf. Riegert 1998, Stolle & Hooghe 2005). 
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Chapter 6
THE CASE FOR WAR IN THE PRESS, 6-12 
FEBRUARY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the press coverage of the Iraq crisis during the following Colin 
Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council on 5 February, 2003. Before presenting 
the findings based on both qualitative and quantitative content analysis, it is worth shortly 
reviewing  the  major  developments  in  the  crisis  during  the  analysed  week  as  well  as 
national policy responses to the events. 
The United Nations' replica of Picasso's Guernica, which is among the most famous anti-
war statements in modern art, was covered in a blue cloth when US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. His task was to 
convince the Council, wider international community and the American public that Iraq 
was  in  ‘material  breach’ of  UN Security  Council  resolutions  and  it  was  necessary  to 
impose ‘serious consequences’ – a diplomatic code for military action – on Iraq. According 
to Powell  (2003), Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction – biological, 
chemical and nuclear – while also experimenting on new missiles whose range exceeded 
the UN-imposed limit of 150 km. In effect, Powell insisted that Iraq had failed to disarm 
and continued to deceive the UN weapons inspectors. In addition, he argued that Iraq had 
links to al-Qaeda and might provide the terrorists weapons of mass destruction. 
While even Powell himself acknowledged that there was no ‘smoking gun’, i.e. conclusive 
evidence, he provided satellite pictures and recordings of Iraqi communications allegedly 
depicting secret WMD facilities and deception of UN weapons inspectors.145 UN Security 
145It is noteworthy that Powell misrepresented the content of intercepted Iraqi 
communications and intelligence information was used selectively and without caveats 
(Hanley 2003; Woodward 2004, esp. 310). None of the seven newspapers analysed in 
this study questioned Powell’s translation from Arabic when he referred to the secretly 
recorded conversations between Iraqi officials. The British public was divided on the 
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Council members greeted his presentation with great scepticism and only Britain backed 
the US. Meanwhile, Iraq dismissed the ‘evidence’ as “pure fantasy”. Whatever the merits 
of  the  presentation,  it  received  considerable  media  coverage  world  wide  varying  from 
appraisals to scorn. ‘In the end, all the evidence Mr Powell presented was circumstantial’, 
declared the Irish Times (6 February 2003).
In effect, Powell made the case for war. From that point on, it was almost certain that the 
US would go to war regardless of the world opinion.146 Shortly after Powell’s presentation, 
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor to President Bush, said that ‘we clearly don’t 
believe a second resolution is necessary’ (Cornwell 2003). Couple of days later, the US 
pulled out its diplomats from the region and sent further reinforcements, a fifth carrier 
group, to the Gulf which were further signs that non-military options were now off the 
table. This forced European governments to react and formulate their Iraq policies under 
the pressure from their constituencies, the US and loyalty to the UN (Mouritzen 2006). The 
Finnish Parliament and the British House of Commons debated Iraq on 6 February and the 
Irish  Dáil  followed on  11  February.  Some European  states  joined  the  bandwagon and 
expressed their support for the US. Following a joint declaration by the so-called gang of 
8, ten Eastern European states – known as the Vilnius Ten – gave their support to the US 
position  in  a  joint  declaration  shortly  after  Powell’s  presentation.147 In  fact,  these 
declarations were drafted by the US (Wall 2004, 173). 
Meanwhile, the ‘Old Europe’ wanted to express its strong resentment to American policy if 
not try to reverse it. France and Germany, chairman of the UN Security Council in the 
spring of 2003, made a proposal which would have enforced the UN weapons inspections 
in  an attempt to  avert  the war.  The US dismissed the Franco-German peace plan as a 
‘distraction’.  The  row  over  Iraq  escalated  into  rather  nasty  sabre-rattling  especially 
between  Germany  and  the  US.  US  Secretary  of  Defence  Donald  Rumsfeld  said  that 
Powell’s case; YouGov (2003) poll showed that 45 % of Brits thought Powell was 
telling the truth while 39% thought he was distorting the evidence.
146 For example, a Kuwaiti daily al-Watan wrote that “[t]he decision for war has been 
taken and the speech was merely a memorandum of explanation” (cited in the Daily  
Telegraph 7 February 2003).
147 On 30 January, the ”Gang of Eight” (2003) had already expressed their support for the 
US in another joint declaration signed by Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. The Vilnius Ten countries are Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. 
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Germany is in the same group with Libya and Cuba which, according to Rumsfeld, ‘did 
not want to help in any way’ in tackling Iraq. 148
The transatlantic rift spilled into NATO as the US tried to pressure NATO to re-enforce 
Turkey’s  defence  in  case  of  war.  Germany,  France  and Belgium maintained  that  such 
decision  should  only be  taken  in  the  case  the  UN Security  Council  has  come  to  the 
conclusion that disarming Iraq requires military force. Accordingly, they vetoed the action 
arguing that it would have signalled that the war was inevitable while asserting that they 
would assist Turkey if it came under any threat. The unity, which had prevailed after 9/11 
leading to the invocation of the article 5 to oust Taliban from Afghanistan, was gone.
This  crisis  in  NATO  probably  suited  Russia  which  decided  to  back  Franco-German 
position  declaring  that  it  would  veto  any  UN  Security  Council  resolution  that  would 
authorize what President Putin called ‘unreasonable use of force’ in Paris on 11 February. 
France, Germany and Russia agreed on a joint declaration which called for continuation of 
the weapons inspections (Golan 2004, 437). On 11 February, China joined Russia, France 
and Germany in their demands to give the weapons inspections more time. Moreover, the 
Arab  League joined  the  opposition  by issuing  demands  to  the  US and  pleading  for  a 
peaceful  solution  and  a  wide  range  of  non-governmental  organizations  with  various 
interests worked on a coordinated campaign against the war. The date for a global anti-war 
rally was set for 15 February 2003 and it began to receive media coverage several days in 
advance especially in Britain where the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, 
announced that he would join the anti-war march. 
148Differences between German and US approach to the Middle East remain. On 31 July 
2007, the US announced a new arms deals with sunni-Arab states in order to 
counterbalance Iranian and Syrian influence who had benefited from the power vacuum 
created by the removal of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime. Meanwhile military support for Israel 
had to be significantly increased in order to counterbalance growth of military power of 
its sunni-Arab neighbours. Germany, even under the leadership of the Christian 
Democrat Angela Merkel, who as an opposition leader had questioned Chancellor 
Schröder's Iraq policy in 2003 and argued that ”[i]f it is impossible to solve the situation 
peacefully then Germany has to take part in a military operation” (Daily Telegraph, 9 
February 2003), criticized this plan saying that the region does not need more weapons 
but more stability. 
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6.2 GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
Both Ireland and Finland emphasised the role of the UN Security Council and weapons 
inspections team in dealing with the Iraq issue. On 31 January,  Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (UTVA)  stated  that  (Finnish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
2003a):
“Finland supports, in a coherent manner, the UN’s efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on the matter. 
Finland considers it important that the resolution be implemented in a manner consistent with 
the Security Council’s intention.”
On 14 February, UTVA confirmed that Finland maintained that “[a]ny use of force will 
require authorization from the UN Security Council” (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2003b).
On 29 January, Ireland’s Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (2003) harshly criticised Iraq for 
its non-compliance with regard to UN Security Council Resolutions and continued:
‘The result is that we now stand on the brink of a third Gulf War. The consequences of this war, 
if it takes place against all our wishes, could be very grave. Quite apart from the horrific human 
suffering likely accompany the outbreak of war, there is, of course, the risk of destabilising an 
already volatile region., support for terrorism could grow, and economies could suffer.
The Irish Government does not want to see the war take place. We have raised our voice and 
used our influence in every forum available to us to urge the need for a peaceful solution. We 
are determined to discharge our international obligations, both in trying to avert conflict and in 
carrying out the decisions of the Security Council. 
Ireland’s approach to this crisis is  based on our long-standing commitment to international 
peace, justice, security and stability upheld by the rule of law, peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and respect for human rights. These are the principles which have informed Irish foreign policy 
under successive Governments ever since the foundation of the State.’149
After  the  9/11  2001  terrorist  attacks,  Taoiseach  Bertie  Ahern  had  announced  that  US 
aircraft would be allowed to use the facilities of the Shannon airport in the pursuit of UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  1368  which  defined  the  terrorist  attacks  as  a  threat  to 
international  peace  and security.  Consequently,  US aircraft  continued  to  exercise  their 
overflight and landing rights although some conditions, such as being unarmed and carried 
no ammunition or explosives, applied. The Irish government was hoping that the war could 
149Foreign Minister Cowen (2003) also emphasised the role of the UN: “Ireland is a 
strong supporter of the system of collective international security set forth in the United 
Nations Charter. We regard the United Nations as the centre of this system of collective 
security. We attach particular importance to the role of the Security Council as having 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Council is acting on behalf of the 
entire membership of the United Nations. Under Article 25 all Members agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Council. This is a clear obligation on all States.”
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be avoided and, consequently, Cowen (2003) settled to stating that ”in the event of military 
action  being  initiated  against  Iraq,  either  with  or  without  further  UN  sanction,  the 
Government, having reviewed the situation, will initiate a debate in this House [Lower 
House of the Parliament, Dáil Éireann] on the position to be adopted by Ireland.” On 11 
February, Cowen gave a further statement to Dáil Éireann (2003a) which did not address 
the stop-over per se but, instead, argued that 
”Ireland has repeatedly stated the view that if Iraq continues in its non-compliance, a second 
Security Council resolution should be adopted. The arguments to whether a second resolution 
is a legal necessity are a distraction from the real point. The compelling political reality is that 
a second resolution would signal the unity and resolve of the international community, and the 
clear legitimacy of any subsequent military action.”  
Arguably,  Cowen tried to  downplay the significance of the second resolution although 
resolution 1368 had been the cover for the stop-over policy with regard to the Afghan 
operation. However, Powell’s presentation had failed to convince opposition parties. Fine 
Gael’s (the main opposition party) foreign affairs spokesman, Gay Mitchell, argued that 
unilateral  military action  by the  US would  not  comply with  international  law and the 
Labour Party and Green Party regarded Powell’s evidence insufficient to justify war.
Meanwhile, Britain backed the US position. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2003) stated in 
the UN Security Council meeting on 5 February that 
“we have just heard a most powerful and authoritative case against the Iraqi regime set out by 
Secretary Powell. The international community owes him its thanks for laying bare the deceit 
practised by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and worse, the great danger it represents… This is 
a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for 
this institution, the United Nations. The UN’s pre-war predecessor, the League of Nations, had 
the same fine ideals as the UN. But the League failed because it could not create actions from 
its words; it could not back diplomacy with the credible threat and where necessary the use of 
force;  so small  evils  went unchecked,  tyrants  became emboldened,  then greater  evils  were 
unleashed. At each stage good men said wait; the evil is not big enough to challenge: then 
before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We had slipped slowly down a slope, 
never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late. We owe it to our history as well as to 
our future not to make the same mistake again.”
However, the British public was reluctant to support a military campaign without a second 
resolution which would give explicit UN Security Council authorisation to the use of force. 
Eventually, efforts to get that second resolution became desperate as France and Russia 
kept  on  insisting  on  weapons  inspections  as  a  peaceful  means  to  disarm Iraq.  Prime 
Minister Tony Blair had committed himself into an unpopular campaign and agreed to be 
interviewed by Jeremy Paxman on Newsnight and a quite hostile audience in an effort to 
mobilize support for his policy on 6 February. He told that Britain would bypass the UN 
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Security Council decision if it considered a veto from one of the permanent members to be 
‘unreasonable’ (Newsnight 2003).
Blair’s campaign ran into further difficulties when the government document on the Iraqi 
threat, which soon became famous as the ’dodgy dossier’, was revealed to be based on 
outdated publicly available information rather than intelligence (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 
96-99). Moreover, while the dossier (UK Government 2003, 1) promised to provide ’up to 
date’ information  on Iraqi  intelligence  organisations,  large  chunks were  lifted  from an 
academic research focusing on pre-Gulf War situation. In a YouGov (2003) survey, 65% of 
the British people said this weakens the case while 28% said it made no difference. In 
addition,  MI6 leaked  a  document  rejecting  any prospect  of  Iraqi  cooperation  with  al-
Qaeda. YouGov (2003) poll also indicated that four out of ten believed that Powell had 
distorted the evidence against Iraq in his presentation at the UN.
6.3 ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE
A total of 518 items – published between 6–12 February – were included in the sample. 
The  Independent published 120 items on the Iraq crisis during the week followed by the 
Daily Telegraph with 98 items. The Irish newspapers published between 71–85 items while 
the  variation  between  the  Finnish  newspapers  was  much  greater.  Helsingin  Sanomat 
published  84  items  while  the  tabloid  Ilta-Sanomat published  37  and  the  regional 
newspaper, Turun Sanomat, only 23 items.
If  the media reflects  governmental  positions as suggested by a number of studies (e.g. 
Stolle & Hooghe 2005, Herman & Chomsky 1988, Riegert  1998, Lehmann 2005),  the 
coverage of Iraq crisis should differ across the three countries chosen for the study. This 
chapter attempts to answer the following questions based on content analysis of Finnish, 
Irish and British press 6-12 February 2003: 
Ø Does the coverage reflect the policy line of the newspapers’ host governments? 
Ø Are there notable differences in the use of foreign sources?
Ø Do the Finnish and Irish newspapers question the sincerity of the US/UK motives 
to a greater degree than their British counterparts? 
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6.3.1 Sourcing
Two different hypotheses have emerged from the literature with regard to the selection of 
foreign sources. One study argues that foreign sources gain access to the US media if they 
are in a position to influence the course of events.  This is  known as ‘power indexing’ 
(Zaller & Chiu 1999, Billeaudeaux et al 2003). Yet, another study looking at television 
news in  nine  countries  and the  pan-Arab Al-Jazeera news network suggests  that  news 
organizations prefer foreign sources that are supportive of their government’s position. For 
instance, French television news preferred foreign sources that shared the French anti-war 
position over countries that supported the US stance on Iraq (Stolle and Hooghe 2005, 18). 
In order to test these hypotheses, the analysis of sources focused on the access of the UN, 
the most vocal anti-war states (France, Germany and Russia), the US and Iraq to the press 
coverage.150 
Table 6.1. Number of items quoting different sources, 6-12 February 2003 (percentage in 
brackets).151
US govt UN Iraqi govt
Anti-war states
France Germany Russia
Helsingin Sanomat 19 (22.6) 7 (8.3) 4 (4.8) 4 (4.8) 3 (3.6) 3 (3.6)
Turun Sanomat 5 (21.7) 4 (17.4) 3 (13.0) 3 (13.0) 2 (8.7) 1 (4.3)
Ilta-Sanomat 7 (18.9) 2 (5.4) 3 (8.1) 1 (2.7) - -
FINLAND 31 (21.5) 13 (9.0) 10 (6.9) 8 (5.6) 5 (3.5) 4 (2.8)
Independent 29 (24.2) 10 (8.3) 6 (5.0) 9 (7.5) 6 (5.0) 3 (2.5)
Daily Telegraph 29 (29.6) 5 (5.1) 3 (3.1) 10 (10.2) 5 (5.1) 3 (3.1)
UK 58 (26.7) 15 (6.9) 9 (4.1) 19 (8.7) 11 (5.0) 6 (2.8)
Irish Independent 33 (38.8) 9 (10.6) 7 (8.2) 6 (7.1) 7 (8.2) 3 (3.5)
Irish Times 26 (36.7) 8 (11.3) 6 (8.5) 8 (11.3) 3 (4.2) 6 (8.5)
IRELAND 59 (37.8) 17 (10.9) 13 (8.3) 14 (9.0) 10 (6.4) 9 (5.8)
Total 148 (28.6) 45 (8.7) 32 (6.2) 41 (7.9) 26 (5.0) 19 (3.7)
Table 6.1 shows the how the newspapers sourced their items, or to be more precise, the 
number of items quoting each source (and the percentage of items quoting each source of 
the total in brackets). The analysis here with regard to the use of foreign sources does not 
give clear support to Stolle and Hooghe’s (2005) suggestion that the media would select 
150Only governmental sources, were included in the analysis since, for example, a British 
journalists might look for members of the public and opposition sources in Germany 
that conform to the position of the UK government rather than to that of the German 
government.
151France, Germany and Russia adopted a joint statement on 11 February and, it was read 
out by the French President, Jacques Chirac, in the press conference. Consequently, 
quotations of the joint statement were recorded as French governmental source.
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foreign  sources  that  support  their  government’s  policy.  If  this  was  the  case,  the  UK 
newspapers should have quoted US government sources more often than the Finnish and 
Irish newspapers while the Finnish newspapers should have quoted other anti-war states 
the  most.  It  is  true  that  the  UK newspapers,  especially  the Daily  Telegraph, used  US 
sources more often than the Finnish newspapers. However, while 30 per cent of Telegraph 
items quoted US sources, nearly 38 per cent of items in the Irish newspapers quoted US 
government sources. The corresponding percentages for Finnish and British newspapers 
were 22 and 27 respectively. It should be noted that the Irish newspapers also quoted UN, 
Iraqi, French, German and Russian government sources more often than the Finnish and 
the British press. 
The Finnish press quoted French and German governmental sources the least although they 
shared an anti-war stance with both the Finnish government and the Finnish newspapers. 
This finding directly contradicts with the argument that the media choose sources that hold 
similar views to those of the media’s host country (see Stolle and Hooghe 2005).   
The high number of items quoting US government sources (nearly 29 per cent of the total 
sample) could be explained by power indexing. The US government was on the driving 
seat and ultimately it was the Bush administration policy which mattered – especially since 
it had declared that it would act with or without the UN. Even though Iraq was the centre 
of the international crisis, all newspapers quoted US and UN sources more often than Iraqi 
government  sources.  Only  4  per  cent  of  British  news  and  opinion  items  quoted  Iraqi 
government  sources.  The  Finnish  and  Irish  newspapers  did  so  in  8–9  per  cent  of  the 
analysed items. At the same time, the latter also quoted UN sources more often than the 
UK newspapers. The proportion of items citing UN sources in the British newspapers was 
7 per cent while the figure was 11 and 9 per cent for Irish and Finnish press respectively. 
Interestingly, there were differences within the countries which raises the question whether 
editorial  policy  might  influence  the  selection  of  foreign  sources.  For  instance,  the 
Independent quoted the UN, Iraqi government and anti-war countries more often than the 
Telegraph. 
Overall,  the  data  indicates  that  the  government  policy line  alone  may not  explain  the 
selection of foreign sources. If a larger sample turns out similar results it would seem that 
the most important factor in manufacturing consent literature – government policy line – 
might  not  have  a  clear  connection  with  the  selection  of  foreign  sources.  Instead,  this 
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selection of sources would seem to be influenced by the perceived power of the sources 
while  notable  differences  within  countries  would  suggest  that  editorial  position  of  the 
newspaper might also be a factor.
6.3.2 Responses to Powell’s presentation and the case for war
The  assumption  here  is  that  the  editorial  responses  to  Powell’s  presentation  reflect 
newspapers’ attitudes  towards  the  use  of  force  against  Iraq  in  general  and  that  these 
attitudes would reflect elite opinion in the respective states if not the government position. 
In addition, other commentary is discussed where appropriate.
An editorial in Turun Sanomat (7 February) basically restated the position of the Finnish 
government by arguing for more time for weapons inspections and warning about the use 
of  force  without  specific  UN  authorization  (see  Finnish  Parliament  2003).  Helsingin 
Sanomat (7  February)  stated that  “if  the UN Security Council  sticks  to  its  unanimous 
decision [resolution 1441] and interprets ‘serious consequences’ as war, there is a legal 
justification for war”. However, the editorial argues that Powell failed to make the moral 
and political case for war. Both TS and HS were unconvinced of Iraqi links to terrorism 
and similar views had been expressed by the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja the 
previous day (Finnish Parliament 2003). With regard to possible continuation of weapons 
inspections, HS called for a final deadline since the US was getting impatient. In general, 
both editorials conformed to the views expressed by the government with HS more in line 
with PM Lipponen’s view which tended to place the burden of proof on Iraq. Meanwhile, 
TS reflected the slightly softer tone expressed by Foreign Minister Tuomioja. During the 
analysed period IS did not publish an editorial which would have revealed its position on 
the use of force but summarised Powell’s presentation in six short articles and ran a story 
on Iraqi response to Powell on February 6. 
Editorial  in  the  Irish  Independent (6  February)  argued  for  continuation  of  weapons 
inspections if the UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix was to request for it while also 
commenting on the Iraqi  President  by arguing that  “Saddam Hussein ranks among the 
worst tyrants. He is a mass murderer and a destroyer. He oppresses his own people and 
threatens his neighbours. It is easy to believe him capable of any evil deed.”
The  Irish Times (6 February) was sceptical of the US case for war and raised questions 
about the Bush administration’s cooperation with the UN weapons inspections since the 
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intelligence, presented by Powell, apparently had not been made available to them earlier. 
The editorial called for reinforcement of inspections and insisted that “the US must fully 
respect  the  UN’s  role  in  coming  weeks”.  The  Irish  Times also  ran  stories  on  Arab 
perspectives  on  the  US war  plans  (e.g.  ‘Arab  commentators  accuse  US of  fabricating 
evidence’, 7 February, and 'Kuwait welcomes decision to send Gulf Force', 10 February).152 
Ireland’s second biggest Sunday newspaper, the Sunday Tribune, adopted a similar position 
to that of the Irish Independent's. On 9 February, its editorial (‘Military neutrality does not 
mean political neutrality’) argued that 
“In the coming weeks, the members of the UN security council will have to balance the evils of 
war against the evils of allowing Saddam to continue to out its authority. The UN has allowed 
him to make a mockery of its resolutions on weapons of mass destruction since 1991. It is only 
in the shadow of war that he has made even a token effort to allow Hans Blix and his inspect-
ors back in to Iraq to carry out the UN mandate. War will only be avoided if Saddam finally 
complies, even at this late hour, and fully cooperates with the inspectors.” 
In the UK, there was a higher degree of disagreement on the use of force against Iraq since 
the Liberal Democrats and a faction of Labour Party were not persuaded by the case for 
war.  While  the  Independent (7  February)  called  Powell’s  presentation  a  “bravura 
performance”, it preferred the old policy of sanctions in containing the threat posed by the 
“tyrant”. A war “would virtually guarantee an upsurge in global terrorism”. In effect, the 
editorial  denounced  the  position  held  by the  government  and  the  Conservatives  –  the 
largest opposition party. 
Leading  article  in  the  Daily  Telegraph,  in  turn,  adopted  a  clearly  pro-war  position: 
“Saddam is a madman who is equipped with weapons of mass destruction. We cannot rely 
on rational judgment preventing him from using them. If we continue with this current 
combination of deterrence and containment, he will not disarm, and he may use them.” 
As  suggested  by  the  manufacturing  consent  literature,  the  editorial  positions  of  the 
newspapers  were  in  line  with  their  government  policies  with  the  exception  of  the 
Independent which  adopted  a  clearly  anti-war  position.  This  can  be  explained  with 
manufacturing  consent  literature  (elite  version)  by  arguing  that  the  Independent was 
152 Strangely, the Irish Times and the Irish Independent reported quite differently on 
Hillary Clinton's views on the Iraq Crisis. The former headlined ”Hillary Clinton tells 
Irish TV she is against war with Iraq” (8 February) while a headline in the latter read 
”Back US against Iraq, says Hillary” (9 February). The Irish Times emphasised that 
Hillary Clinton ”would prefer to see more time given to the UN weapons inspections” 
but the Irish Indepedent argued that she ”calls on Ireland's support for military action to 
disarm Saddam Hussein in 'a war that involves all of us'”.
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reflecting the dissensus among elites. It is worth noting that while the Irish newspapers had 
slightly different emphasis, they did not contradict the largely vague government policy.
In other commentaries, journalists made an effort to find historical parallels. Most common 
was Adlai Stevenson’s presentation at the UN during the Cuban missile crisis though often 
this incident was mentioned in order to make the point that Powell’s presentation did not 
have an ‘Adlai  Stevenson moment’ and that he was not Stevenson (Robert  Fisk in the 
Independent 6 February). Similarly, an editorial in the Irish Independent (6.2.) rejected the 
comparison by arguing that “[a]cross the world, comparisons have been made with the 
famous occasion in 1962 when Ambassador Adlai Stevenson showed the United Nations 
incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It was very different 
yesterday”. Yet,  many of the correspondents were clearly impressed with Colin Powell’s 
performance. Conor O’Cleary, correspondent to the Irish Times, wrote that 
“Colin Powell did not disappoint. With the atmosphere in the chamber like that of a courtroom, 
he gave a compelling presentation of the US case against Iraq… When Powell, immaculate in 
dark power suit and pink tie, sat down at  10.30 a.m. to begin his delivery,  the atmosphere 
changed abruptly to that of a courtroom about to hear a capital case. It was as if Mr Powell had 
been sent to state the case for the prosecution and to call for the death sentence, and to warn 
that if he did not get the verdict he wanted, then the court of world opinion might itself have no 
future.”
The Irish Independent (6 February), in turn, ran a short story with a headline ‘Ghosts of 
Cuban Missile  Crisis  Hang over UN’ arguing that  “Colin Powell  evoked an inevitable 
historical comparison when he went public with classified satellite photos and intercepts to 
make  the  US  case.”  The  Daily  Telegraph had  found  a  little  more  modest  point  of 
comparison – the UN Security Council meeting on the KLA incident in which the Soviet 
Union  shot  down  a  commercial  airliner  in  early  1980s.  Instead,  Daily  Telegraph's 
diplomatic editor Anton La Guardia (‘Powell lands some heavy blows on the “nexus” of 
terror’, 6.2.) argued that “[t]here was no 'Adlai Stevenson’ moment - no single picture of 
an Iraqi nuclear missile or nuclear facility to compare to America’s photographs in 1962 
clearly showing Soviet missiles being transported to Cuba.” The same story referred to 
Colin Powell as the teacher and another story portrayed him as a prosecutor lending him 
the  authority  that  goes  with  these  occupations.  Although  some  of  the  evidence  was 
“hearsay”,  “given  the  weight  and  variety  of  information,  any  reasonable  jury  would 
condemn Saddam – at least for consistently lying to the court – rather than assume that the 
US prosecution was fixing the evidence”, La Guardia argued.153
153In Finland, Aamulehti also made a reference to Stevenson’s performance in the Cuban 
crisis ('Cuban missile crisis sprang to mind', 6 February),
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The Daily Telegraph's reaction to Powell's presentation was quite extraordinary. In addition 
to  the  news  stories,  it  published  six  long  edited  extracts  of  the  speech  focusing  on 
biological  and  chemical  weapons,  nuclear  weapons,  Iraqi  deception  of  UN  weapons 
inspectors  by  hiding  scientists  and  weapons,  links  to  terrorism  and  missile  capacity. 
Considering the fact that Powell’s presentation lasted for 76 minutes the extracts accounted 
for more than half of the entire presentation. Telegraph's Washington correspondent Toby 
Harnden (11 February) wrote that Colin Powell had received “almost universal praise for 
his UN speech last week” and Ambrose Evans-Pritchard added that “[v]irtually the whole 
eastern and central Europe, much of the Balkans, the Mediterranean belt of Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, as well as Britain and Denmark, are now firmly in the American camp.” 
However,  other dailies expressed reservations about the success of Powell’s presentation 
and the Finnish and Irish quality dailies did not publish any extracts of the presentation. 
The Independent published one extract of Powell’s presentation but expressed criticism of 
the US policy. For instance, on 10 February, the  Independent noted that ‘[w]hat the US 
Defence  Secretary’s  finger-wagging in  Munich made clear  was  that  Secretary of  State 
Powell's slideshow at the UN was a failure. It  did not change many hearts and minds, 
except possibly in America.’ Meanwhile, Ireland's Sunday Tribune reported from Baghdad 
(‘Calmly waiting for the wail of war sirens’, 9 April):
“The real  fear of many people here was that the US would have unveiled some genuinely 
damaging evidence that  would have made the case for  war inconvertible.  They manifestly 
failed to do this in the view of Baghdad's public with the idea of mobile biological weapons 
laboratories being a touch too Ian Fleming even for them.”
The  reporter  also  interviewed  Ali  Jassem who  ran  one  of  the  facilities  which  Powell 
accused of illegitimate activities. Jassem explained that the weapons inspectors had been to 
the site several times already and had not found anything suspicious. On the same day 
Turun  Sanomat reported  on  Powell’s  speech  at  the  UN  Security  Council  meeting,  it 
published an article  (6 February)  on expert  views on Powell's  evidence casting doubts 
about  the  case  for  war.  Similarly,  Helsingin  Sanomat (6  February)  ran  a  story with  a 
headline ‘Researchers: Iraq is not cooperating with al-Qaeda’ in which two international 
experts stressed that there is no common ideology that would allow them to cooperate.154
154Powell's evidence was closely scrutinized by an AP journalist Charles J. Hanley some 
six months later exposing the half-truths (Hanley 2003; Rampton & Stauber 2006, 70).
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In fact, there were notable differences in terms of portraying the justifications for war (see 
table 2 below). For instance, the  Daily Telegraph had 13 news and opinion items with a 
reference to Iraq being a threat either to its neighbours or wider international community in 
a  total  of  98 analysed  items.  Only once  the  threat  posed  by Iraq was questioned in  a 
reference to PM Blair’s acknowledgement that Iraq is not a direct threat to the UK when he 
faced a hostile public in the BBC’s Newsnight special on 6 February. The Independent, in 
turn, portrayed Iraq as a threat in ten items but this was balanced with ten instances in 
which the Iraqi threat was questioned in some way.
The Finnish newspapers expressed more doubt about the seriousness of the Iraqi threat. 
HS, TS and IS, put together, had six references to Iraq as a threat while this threat was 
questioned on five occasions.  The figures for the Irish newspapers  were seven against 
eleven items questioning the claim.
Table 6.2. Coverage of the US/UK case for war, 6-12 2003.
 
Argument that Iraq is a 
threat
Argument that Iraq has 
WMD capability
Argument that Iraq has links 
to terrorism
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat 6 3 13 12 5 4
Turun Sanomat 0 2 4 4 3 5
Ilta-Sanomat 0 0 7 3 5 4
FINLAND (n=144) 6 (4.3%) 5 (3.6%) 24 (17.9%) 19 (13.2%) 13 (9.1%) 13 (9.0%)
The Independent 10 10 26 10 14 16
The Daily Telegraph 13 1 29 4 13 6
UK (n=218) 23 (11.0%) 11 (5.1%) 55 (26.2%) 14 (6.5%) 27 (12.6%) 22 (10.2%)
The Irish Independent 3 4 14 5 8 7
The Irish Times 4 7 12 7 8 3
IRELAND (n=156) 7 (4.7%) 11 (7.1%) 26 (17.0%) 12 (7.8%) 16 (10.3%) 10 (6.5%)
Total (n=518) 36 (7.2%) 27 (5.3%) 105 (21.1%) 45 (8.8%) 56 (10.9%) 34 (6.6%)
The Daily Telegraph’s pro-war stance was also reflected in its coverage on Iraqi WMD. 29 
news and opinion items out of a sample of 98 implied that Iraq has WMD. In contrast, only 
four items raised doubts about their existence or employability. The Independent was more 
sceptical with 26 items implying the existence of Iraqi WMD against ten items questioning 
this  assumption.  With regard to Iraqi links to terrorism, the  Daily Telegraph was more 
cautious  than  with  the  WMD  issue.  Yet,  again  there  were  twice  as  many  references 
implying a link than questioning it. The Independent was much more critical about the 
links  to terrorism.  In sum, the  Daily Telegraph strikes as clearly the most enthusiastic 
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advocate of the pro-war claims and rarely questioned US/UK case for war and, similarly to 
sourcing,  there  were  clear  differences  between  the  Telegraph and  the  Independent 
reflecting the elite dissensus within the UK.
There  was a  slight  difference  between the  Irish  Independent  and the  Irish  Times with 
regard to the WMD claim. The Irish Times was rather critical in this respect whereas the 
Irish Independent had 14 items implying Iraq has WMD and only five raising doubts of 
their existence or employability. The Finnish press was slightly more sceptical and had 24 
items  supporting  US/UK  claims  about  Iraqi  WMD  while  19  items  questioned  the 
allegation.155
The Finnish newspapers were much more sceptical about the terrorism link. TS, clearly the 
most critical of the US/UK case of war, rejected the terrorism claim in five items against 
three. Even the tabloid,  Ilta-Sanomat, provided criticism of the alleged link. In Ireland, 
especially the  Irish Independent challenged the alleged terrorism link raising doubts in 
nearly as many items as the link was implied.
President Bush decided to raise the terror alert level on 7 February. The possibility of the 
Anglo-American  Iraq  policy inciting  terrorism was  hardly implied  in  the  Independent: 
‘There is also concern about terrorists trying to take advantage of America’s preparation 
for a military operation against Iraq’. At the end of the period of analysis, PM Blair sent 
tanks to Heathrow allegedly to counter a terrorist threat. Similarly, this incident was not 
really discussed in the context of the Iraq Crisis and journalists especially avoided any 
causal arguments which might have suggested that the looming war might increase the risk 
of terrorist attacks against the UK and the US. This is how close The Daily Telegraph came 
to  acknowledge a  possible  connection  between the  terrorist  threat  and  the  British Iraq 
policy: “Police and security sources gave few details of the specific intelligence that led to 
the operations at a time when preparations for war in Iraq are at an advanced stage.” The 
British press quite readily accepted Scotland Yard’s analysis that the increased threat had to 
do with a Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha. Similarly,  Helsingin Sanomat wrote that sending 
soldiers  to  Heathrow  was  just  another  “sign  that  the  war  against  Iraq  is  close.”156 
155Quite often news articles and commentaries presented both the US view while later 
referring to sources that doubted the allegation.
156The original Finnish wording as follows: ”Asepukuisten sotilaiden lähettäminen 
vilkkaalle lentoasemalle oli tiistaisten arvioiden mukaan myös yksi merkki siitä, että 
Irakin vastainen sota on lähellä. “ HS 12.2.2003.
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Meanwhile, the Irish Independent (12.2.) ran an article from the Times (of London) which 
stated that the PM Blair’s spokesperson ‘denied that the Government was happy to see the 
country in a state of alert at a time when it was trying to convince the public of the need to 
go to war against Iraq’.
Chart 6.1. Number of items presenting pro-war case (Iraqi threat, WMD and links to 
terrorism) by country.
Chart 1 shows that the Finnish press expressed most doubt about the claims about Iraqi 
threat  followed by Ireland.  Meanwhile,  the UK presented the pro-war arguments  more 
frequently without questioning their validity. There seems to be some correlation with the 
government policy line and the way the case for war was covered. However, it has to be 
noted  that,  overall,  the  US/UK  information  campaign  seems  to  have  been  rather 
successful157 – especially in retrospect when the weakness of the evidence has been well-
documented (Hanley 2003). 
Analysis of press coverage on issues that challenged the rationale for war suggests that 
while  the  newspapers  frequently  reproduced  many  US/UK  arguments  for  war,  the 
157 YouGov (2003) survey for the Mail On Sunday showed that 44% believed that 
Saddam Hussein was helping al-Qaeda while 31% said they didn’t know. Only 26% of 












credibility of the evidence against  Iraq was often assessed to be unconvincing for one 
reason  or  the  other.  References  to  the  evidence  were  predominantly  negative  in  all 
countries and newspapers although the Telegraph stands out as the least critical of the war 
once again (see table 3 below). These negative references to the evidence can be partly 
explained with the criticism of Powell’s presentation but also by the coverage of ‘dodgy 
dossier’. For instance, a leader in the  Daily Telegraph (8 February) argued that “[o]nce 
again, the Number 10 culture of spin is undermining a perfectly good case.” In a YouGov 
Survey, 65 per cent of the British people said this weakens the case while 28 per cent said 
it made no difference.
Another argument against the war, in addition to insufficient evidence, claimed that the 
weapons inspections are working or could work if the inspectors were given more time 
and/or resources for successful disarmament of Iraq. The Franco-German peace plan was 
based on the idea that the inspections provided an alternative to the war.  Rumours of a 
Franco-German peace plan started to circulate couple of days after Powell’s presentation. 
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw rejected Franco-German peace plan and argued that 
“[t]he descent into war in the 1930s is a searing reminder of the dangers of turning a blind 
eye whilst international law is subverted by the law of the jungle.” Accordingly, in the 
British newspapers critical references to the peace plan outnumbered positive/neutral ones. 
The Telegraph was particularly hostile towards the plan. The peace plan was described as 
the “Franco-German rescue package for Saddam Hussein” or “apparent Franco-German 
ambush” on the US (10 February). Janet Daley (Daily Telegraph, 12 February) dismissed 
the  Franco-German  peace  plan  as  “attention-seeking  behavior”.  On  10  February,  the 
Telegraph argued that ‘Hans Blix resisted American demands for more monitors over many 
months and eventually held them down to a total of 300. If a few inspectors were so hard 
to deploy, imagine the problems with inserting soldiers’ ('Practical Putin'). While the Daily  
Telegraph used  this  argument  to  reject  the  Franco-German  peace  plan,  it  did  not 
acknowledge the difficulties of employing well over 100,000 soldiers for a significantly 
harder task – not to look for WMD but to occupy the country until a democracy has been 
established.
While  the  Finnish  and  Irish  governments  did  not  actively support  the  Franco-German 
peace plan especially Finnish coverage of the initiative was supportive. Unlike the  Irish 
Independent, the Irish Times covered the issue with greater criticism. 
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Table 6.3. Coverage of issues questioning the rationale for war (percentage in brackets).
 
Argument that the 








neutral Negative Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat 2 13 9 2 20 4
Turun Sanomat 1 5 2 2 10 0
Ilta-Sanomat 3 7 1 0 1 0
FINLAND (n=144) 6 (4.2%) 25 (17.5%) 12 (8.3%) 4 (2.8%) 31 (21.6%) 4 (2.8%)
The Independent 8 24 6 9 22 12
The Daily Telegraph 14 20 8 8 15 7
UK (n=218) 22 (10.1%) 44 (20.7%) 14 (6.4%) 17 (7.9%) 37 (17.1%) 19 (8.9%)
The Irish Independent 6 15 4 1 21 7
The Irish Times 3 11 4 5 25 4
IRELAND (n=156) 9 (5.8%) 26 (17.0%) 8 (5.1%) 6 (3.9%) 46 (29.9%) 11 (7.1%)
Total (n=518) 37 (7.3%) 95 (18.7%) 34 (6.6%) 27 (5.3%) 114 (22.1%) 34 (6.6%)
The  Independent expressed  more  scepticism  of  the  prospect  of  weapons  inspections 
working than the  Daily Telegraph but also covered them more extensively. The British 
newspapers clearly differed from Irish and Finnish newspapers with regard to the coverage 
of the UN weapons inspections as the latter covered the issue in clearly favourable terms.158 
Ireland’s  Sunday Tribune (‘US knows how easy it  will  be to buy its  way into war’,  9 
February) argued that ‘Powell’s presentation at the United Nations on Wednesday was as 
devastating an indictment of the effectiveness of weapons inspectors as it was of Saddam 
Hussein.’  Again,  IS  differed  notably  from  the  quality  newspapers  having  only  one 
reference to the Franco-German peace plan and to the weapons inspections.
Chart 6.1 shows that the Finnish press was the most sceptical of the case for war (Iraq is a 
threat which is manifested in its possession of WMD and links to terrorism) followed by 
Ireland. Meanwhile, the UK sample expressed doubts of these three claims less frequently 
when covering the issues. Similar pattern can be observed in the salience and framing of 
the anti-war case (see table 6.3): the Finnish press was largely supportive of the weapons 
inspections and the peace initiative while framing negatively the evidence against Iraq. The 
Irish newspapers, in turn, were slightly more critical of the anti-war case than their Finnish 
counterparts while the UK was by far the most critical of the three.
Especially,  the  Daily  Telegraph frequently  expressed  its  disgust  with  the  anti-war 
movement whose members it called ‘sandal-wearing peaceniks’ (11 February). A leading 
158 Calls for reinforcement or continuation of the weapons inspections were counted as 
positive references as well as comments implying that the inspections are working.
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article in the Daily Telegraph (9 February) argued that ‘[m]any of the most vocal groups 
organising protests against forcing Saddam to comply with UN Resolution 1441 are the 
remnants of communist and socialist political parties, united by nothing except a common 
detestation of the leading economy in the capitalist world.’ The article concluded that:
”Hundreds of thousands of people will be on the march next Saturday because they are repelled 
by the awful horrors that any war must bring. They will ignore the much worse terrors that will 
follow if the decision to disarm him is not taken now. The plausibility of the anti-war stance 
depends on the deluded but comforting hope that if we don't confront evil, we'll manage to 
escape being overwhelmed by it. That is a profound mistake, as the history of the last century 
has taught us. We know that Saddam has, over many years, been in touch with terrorist groups, 
and that such groups are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They will use them 
on our cities if they get them. When that happens, children will die on a far, far greater scale 
than in the course of a war to topple the Butcher of Baghdad.”
6.3.3 Possible oil-related motives
John S. Duffield (2005) has argued that any debate on possible oil-related motives was 
absent and the Bush administration hardly mentioned oil. When it did, it bluntly denied 
that oil had anything to do with the administration's policy on Iraq. He continues 
“This silence on the question of oil is puzzling in view of what is arguably most distinct about 
Iraq’s circumstances. Other rogue states have been much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons 
than was Iraq in early 2003, and others have had more extensive ties to anti-American terror-
ists. Likewise, a number of other states around the world have fallen equally short of adhering 
to democratic principles or have engaged in massive human rights abuses. But of all the states 
where the United States has considered regime change, Iraq is one of only a few to possess 
substantial amounts of oil, and it sits squarely in the middle of nearly two-thirds of the world's 
proven oil reserves.”159
Alan  Greenspan,  former  US Federal  Reserve  Chairman,  said  more  recently  that  he  is 
“saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq 
War is largely about oil” (Paterson 2007). Many Europeans had suspected this from the 
beginning with 44 per cent of the British public agreeing with the argument that US policy 
can be better explained with Iraq’s oil resources than Iraqi threat (Pew, 2002).160 It is not 
159This argument was put to PM Blair on a Newsnight (2003) special by a member of the 
audience: “The difference between Korea and Iraq is it purely based on oil, because 
Iraq’s an oil-producing country and Korea isn’t.” Tony Blair replied: “No, let me just 
deal with the oil thing because this is one of the … we may be right or we may be 
wrong, I mean people have their different views about why we’re doing this thing. But 
the oil conspiracy theory is honestly one of the most absurd when you analyse it. The 
fact is that, if the oil that Iraq has were our concern I mean we could probably cut a deal 
with Saddam tomorrow in relation to the oil. It’s not the oil that is the issue, it is the 
weapons, which is why the UN Resolutions have gone over 12 years in relation to the 
weapons and why we’ve actually allowed Iraq to export oil but we’ve had to try to keep 
it in an account used for food and medicine because of our worry that otherwise it 
would be used to buy arms.”
160“Large percentages in each country polled think that the U.S. desire to control Iraqi oil 
163
relevant  for  this  study whether  oil  played  a  role  in  the  US  and  UK decision-making 
process. What is relevant here is that it would have been reasonable to assume that this 
vital energy resource might be a factor in the crisis and that this view was widely held by 
the public.  However,  during the analysed period,  oil  as  a  possible motive for invasion 
attracted only few references which were often confined to one sentence or a citation.
Since  the  Finnish  foreign  policy  elite  emphasised peaceful  solution  through  the  UN, 
investigation  of  possible  oil-related  motives  for  invasion  would  not  have  brought 
journalists into a direct conflict with the government policy line. In fact, such views were 
expressed in the Parliament. While Cabinet ministers avoided discussion on oil, that might 
have harmed relations with the US, two Left Alliance MPs, Jaakko Laakso and Outi Ojala, 
suggested in a parliamentary debate on 6 February that the “control of Iraqi oil resources” 
is  among  the  US  objectives  and  that  the  war  might  be  about  “redistribution  of  oil 
resources” (The Finnish Parliament, 2003). However, this did not seem to have encouraged 
the press to investigate possible undeclared motives for the invasion. The above mentioned 
quote from Jaakko Laakso was the only reference to the issue in HS during the whole 
week. The only reference to Iraq’s oil resources in IS during the week examined was a 
comment  by  a  reader:  “The  USA wants  oil  and  that  is  why  they  will  attack.”161 All 
references to possible oil-related motives in the Finnish newspapers were confined to one 
sentence.
Some Irish politicians also expressed views on the significance of the Iraqi oil when the 
Dail,  the Irish Parliament,  debated Iraq on 11 February. Mr. Connolly expressed views 
which put the question of oil at the heart of the matter:
‘Iraq is one of the world’s biggest oil producers. The Saudi tycoons made billions of dollars a 
year while Iraq’s oil was blocked and President Bush made his millions as an oil magnate. The 
politics of the region are the politics of oil; billions are there to be made and lost by winners or 
losers. The US and the British wished the embargo to continue while the Russians and French, 
who wished  to  profit  from buying  and  selling  oil,  wanted  it  lifted.  In  the  late  1990s  the 
international front against Iraq crumbled; each country in the coalition adopted positions to 
gain the greatest oil profits. Iraq and the US constantly claimed the other was lying, with Iraq 
periodically blocking inspection teams from certain sites, declaring them to be fake excuses to 
is the principal reason that Washington is considering a war against Iraq. In Russia 76% 
subscribe to a war-for-oil view; so too do 75% of the French, 54% of Germans, and 
44% of the British. In sharp contrast, just 22% of Americans see U.S. policy toward Iraq 
driven by oil interests. Two-thirds think the United States is motivated by a concern 
about the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein.”
161 Ilta-Sanomat does a poll every day on some question and invites people to vote by 
sending SMSs and raise their opinions – selection of which are printed the following 
day. 
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continue sanctions. The US periodically threatened to restart the war if teams were not allowed 
widespread access, declaring some weapons were still hidden in the country.’
At times the tone was quite different from the debates in the House of Commons and the 
Finnish Parliament on 6 February. For instance, Joe Higgins (Labour Party TD) argued that 
“The ordinary people of Europe know that a war would not be to institute democratic rights in 
Iraq since the United States and Britain, the primary belligerents, continue to support and arm 
with weapons of mass destruction some of the most vile regimes that still besmirch the face of 
our globe, more than George Bush could possibly count up to. They know that the imminent 
war is to corral the second largest oil reserves for the future of US capitalism and to send a 
message to the huddled masses on our globe, particularly the poor of the Third World, that the 
21st century will be the century of the United States empire and that it will set the terms in 
trade, military might and international politics.”
Moreover,  Irish Minister for Defense Willie O'Dea was exceptionally frank in a televised 
debate on RTE on Monday 27 January 2003:
“I think it is a bit disingenuous to say that oil has nothing to do with it. I mean oil has a lot to 
do with it. Oil has quite a lot to do with it because as has been said, by 2025 America will be 
importing 70%... 70% of American imports will consist of oil. Now the reality... this is vital... a 
vital  strategic  interest  and  America  shouldn't  be  ashamed  or  afraid...  and  the  Bush 
administration shouldn't be ashamed or afraid to admit that. But the mistake I think a lot of 
people are making is that when you say that it's all about oil people conjure up an image of a 
few cigar chomping Texans sitting around in Dallas-style ranch houses who support George 
Bush and that they're going to be the only beneficiaries. The price of oil and the control of the 
oil supply has a vital impact on the economies of all the western world. It has a vital impact on 
your  jobs...  on  my  job.  [...]  There  are  supplementary  reasons,  of  course,  for  a  military 
adventure in Iraq.”
Bennett  (1996,  376)  suggests  that  an elite  debate  “serves as a  signal  for journalists  to 
expand a story to encompass the views of experts, social groups, opinion polls, and other 
sources that reflect the observed differences among powerful politicians”. It was perhaps 
for  this  reason that  the  Irish  Times provided  the  most  comprehensive  coverage  of  the 
possible  oil-related  motives. For  instance,  Irish  Times (10  Feb) published  an  article 
discussing in detail the significance of Iraqi oil reserves though the by-line of the article 
said that  “control of Iraq’s oil” would be “a by-product” of the war rather than a real 
motive for invasion. The newspaper also quoted Belgium’s Foreign Minister Louis Michel 
in two articles (10 and 11 February): “They did not succeed in catching bin Laden and now 
they have to find an enemy they can beat. I think it has to do with power, probably also 
very likely with oil and the humiliation they suffered.”162 However, the Irish Independent, 
which was more sympathetic to the US views and dependent on British newspapers for 
international coverage, made only one reference to possible oil-related motives. 
Table 6.4. References to possible oil-related motives for invasion. 
162This quote also appeared in the Daily Telegraph where it was characterized as the one 
of the most anti-American statements from Western leaders.
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The argument that the invasion has possible 
oil-related motives
 Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=84) 3 (3.6%) -
Turun Sanomat (n=23) 2 (8.7%) -
Ilta-Sanomat (n=37) 1 (2.7%) -
FINLAND (n=144) 6 (4.2%) -
The Independent (n=120) 2 (1.7%) 2 (1.7%)
The Daily Telegraph (n=98) 3 (3.1%) 1 (1.0%)
UK (n=218) 5 (2.3%) 3 (1.4%)
The Irish Independent (n=85) 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%)
The Irish Times (n=71) 6 (8.5%) 1 (1.4%)
IRELAND (n=156) 7 (4.5%) 2 (1.3%)
Total (n=518) 18 (3.5%) 5 (1.0%)
In the British newspapers, references to oil-related motives were countered almost as often 
as invoked by raising the argument that the coming war is not about oil or questioning the 
evidence to the contrary. Some of the few references on the issue were so cryptic that they 
posed a particular challenge for coding.163 This is how close The  Independent’s Johann 
Hari came in acknowledging that oil might be among, what he called, the “wrong reasons” 
for war: “Of course, the US is morally compromised. I wish there were a pristine, perfect 
state with no oil interests and the military power to help the people of Iraq, but there isn't 
one.”
For anti-war movement oil seemed to have been an obvious motive for the invasion. Their 
slogans included ‘No war for oil’, ‘Oil is the fuel for war’ etc. Quite often citations of their 
banners  in  demonstrations were the only references to  alternative motives  in the press 
coverage.
In sum, serious debate on the strategic significance of Iraq’s oil resources and the role they 
might have played in the current crisis was lacking in all three countries. In this regard, the 
media hardly fulfilled two of its roles in society: scrutinizing the power and reflecting the 
public  opinion  (Curran  and  Seaton  2003,  346).  This  finding  supports  the  notion  of 
alternative motives of Western interventions going unreported (Thussu 2000a). McChesney 
(2005, 119) provides one explanation why journalists might avoid certain topics: “If people 
in  power  agree  on  an  issue,  presuppose  it,  or  do  not  seriously debate  it,  it  is  almost 
impossible for a journalist to raise it without being accused of partisanship and pushing an 
163Code 99, ”Not possible to determine”, was used in these cases.
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ideological  agenda.  So  it  is  rarely  done,  and  when  it  is  done  it  is  dismissed  as  bad 
journalism.”  Clearly, official sources were reluctant to discuss Iraqi oil (Duffield 2005) 
and, for example, in the House of Commons Iraq debate on February 6, oil was mentioned 
only once by an anti-war Labour MP Jeremy Corbin.
Another  explanation  is  that  newspapers  have  separate  sections  for  financial  and 
international news – as well as domestic politics. Arguably this format prevents journalists 
from properly  tackling  complicated  issues  in  which  economics  and  both  national  and 
international  politics  are  intertwined.  Finance  sections  typically  approach the  economy 
from a corporate point of view rather than adopting a social or political perspective on the 
economy.  Similarly,  both  domestic  and  international  politics  are  treated  in  their  own 
sections often without an economic perspective (Kivimäki 2005, 106).
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The editorial policy of the Independent seems to suggest that the press in Britain does not 
simply  follow  the  government  policy  line  as  the  executive  version  of  manufacturing 
consent literature would suggest. Elite version, however, suggests that the Independent was 
only able to assume the anti-war position due to the conflict among the elite. In the absence 
of substantial disagreement among the Finnish elite, the editorials of the Finnish quality 
dailies reflected the government view and, in this regard, the findings are in accordance 
with the manufacturing consent literature.
The three most prominent anti-war countries and the UN were outnumbered by the US 
sources in all three countries. Analysis of sourcing supported the power indexing thesis. 
Further analysis is needed in order to investigate whether the selection of foreign sources is 
influenced by the editorial policy of the newspaper. 
While there were differences between newspapers within countries, there was a pattern 
indicating that the Finnish press as a whole was the most critical of the invasion and the 
least critical of the weapons inspections as an alternative to a war. The UK press, in turn, 
was least critical of the invasion and the most critical of the weapons inspections leaving 
the  Irish  newspapers  somewhere  in  the  middle.  To  some  extent,  the  press  coverage 
correlated with the policy line of their host government in the run-up to the war. 
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Meanwhile, possible oil-related motives for the invasion and the geopolitical significance 
of the second largest oil reserves in the world received only few references as journalists 
hardly pursued this topic independently in the absence of real governmental debate. This 
negligence did not seem to directly relate to government policy line and the  Irish Times 
and Turun Sanomat differed from their national competitors with more extensive coverage 
of the issue. 
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Chapter 7
THE WAR BEGINS,  18 – 24 MARCH
7.1 INTRODUCTION
After a brief review of how the Iraq crisis evolved into a war and national governments 
adapted  to  the  events  during  this  period  of  analysis  (18-24  March),  this  chapter  will 
provide analysis of press coverage using both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. 
The  analysis  will  focus  on how the newspapers  reacted to  the military action in  their 
leading  articles  and  other  opinion  material  and  whether  the  newspapers  had  differing 
sourcing  patterns  in  their  coverage.  Finally,  the  chapter  will  discuss  whether  the 
newspapers differed in their presentation of some of the most common arguments about the 
war – e.g. with regard to the legality of the military action, the objectives of war or the 
consequences of the war. 
On 7 March, the UN Security Council met to discuss Iraq once again. According to Chief 
Weapons Inspector Hans Blix, the British ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 
tried to rally the UN Security Council members behind a resolution which would have 
required Saddam Hussein to give a televised speech pronouncing a strategic decision to 
give up all WMD. Moreover, there would have been requirements to provide evidence that 
the decision was “real and genuine”. Blix discussed this plan on 10 March with Tony Blair 
but eventually, by 14 March, it became clear that the Security Council members could not 
agree on another resolution. Six of the elected members insisted that it is the task of the 
Security Council to assess whether Iraq has met the benchmarks while the US position was 
that it had the right to act unilaterally if necessary  (Blix 2005, 244-50).164 The US, Britain 
164According to Blix (2005, 253), the statement was “less of an ultimatum to Saddam than 
one to the members of the Security Council—to support the resolution or be bypassed.” 
The draft resolution proposed by the US, UK and Spain read that the UN Security 
Council “[d]ecides that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by 
resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that 
Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in 
accordance with its disarmament obligations under 1441 (2002) and previous relevant 
resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC prohibited by resolution 687 
(1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior 
destruction of such items”. Had the draft resolution been accepted, avoiding the war 
would have required the US and Britain to abstain from using their veto in a vote on 
Iraqi compliance.
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and Spain held a meeting at Azores on 16 March and issued Azore's Summit Statement 
(2003) which read:  
“For 12 years, the international community has tried to persuade him [Saddam Hussein] to 
disarm and thereby avoid military conflict, most recently through the unanimous adoption of 
UNSCR  [United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution]  1441.  The  responsibility  is  his.  If 
Saddam refuses even now to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the 
serious consequences foreseen in UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions.” 
The  next  day  (17  March),  President  Bush  (2003a)  issued  an  ultimatum  to  President 
Saddam Hussein to flee Iraq within 48 hours: 
“All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons 
must  leave  Iraq  within  48  hours.  Their  refusal  to  do  so  will  result  in  military  conflict, 
commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals - including 
journalists and inspectors - should leave Iraq immediately.”
Once again, Bush took the opportunity to repeat his arguments for war: 
“The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly 
defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon 
inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically 
deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we 
are not dealing with peaceful men. 
Intelligence  gathered  by this  and  other  governments  leaves  no  doubt  that  the  Iraq  regime 
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime 
has  already  used  weapons  of  mass  destruction  against  Iraq's  neighbors  and  against  Iraq's 
people. 
The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of 
America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives 
of al Qaeda. 
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the 
help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.”165 
Meanwhile, the Iraqi leadership was meeting in Baghdad. Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Al-
Sabri gave Iraq's defiant response to President Bush's ultimatum saying that the war could 
be avoided ”if Mr Bush went into exile” (quoted in the  Irish Times, 19 March). On 15 
March,  Germany,  France  and  Russia  had  requested  UNMOVIC  (United  Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) to present its work program on 18 
March and, eventually, Blix presented it on 19 March – a day after the UN staff had been 
pulled out from Iraq (Blix 2005, 249-250). While Russian and French foreign ministers 
attended  the  meeting  in  New  York,  US  Secretary  of  State  Colin  Powell  stayed  in 
Washington as the US had already made its decision.166
165The ultimatum made the Finnish newspapers on 19 March while due to time difference 
the Irish press reported the statement on 18th. 
166 Hence, the Irish Times headlined its story “A final report from Blix falls on deaf ears”.
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On the night of March 19, the war began with an attempt to “decapitate” President Saddam 
Hussein with an air  strike after  the Coalition had received information on his possible 
whereabouts.167 Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee 
to  the  US  Department  of  Defense,  later  acknowledged  to  the  House  Armed  Service 
Committee that Iraqi intelligence had outwitted the US government by using double agents 
to provide false information on Saddam's whereabouts (Ricks 2006, 117). The press had 
already been informally told that the bombardment would not begin on that night but the 
perceived opportunity to kill Iraqi leadership changed the original war plans. The main 
attacks begun on 20 March and US/UK forces advanced deep into Iraq in the following 
few days. However, some military analysts became concerned about Iraq's creative use of 
asymmetric  warfare,  the  reserved  response  of  the  population  in  Southern  Iraq  to  the 
'liberation'  while major water-crossings and urban areas posed further challenges to the 
invading forces (Cordesman 2003, 59-62). The start of the military hostilities ignited yet 
another global wave of demonstrations against the war.
7.2 GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
The European Commission broke with tradition and criticised the position the UK and 
Spain had adopted in the Iraq crisis. As the war became imminent, Ireland and Finland also 
had to decide on the final formulation of their policies while the UK government faced a 
House of Commons vote on British participation in military action against Iraq. 
The Finnish government (2003a) formulated its  position in  the following way in early 
March:
”The crisis can be brought to a peaceful conclusion provided that Iraq fulfils its obligations 
regarding disarmament  and fully collaborates with the UN weapons inspectors  and that  all 
countries commit themselves not to act without UN authorization. The time, as well as the 
human and technical resources used for the arms inspections, can be increased in consultation 
with the inspection leadership and in accordance with the Security Council's decisions. The 
inspections  cannot,  however,  be  continued  endlessly  if  Iraq  fails  to  fully  cooperate  and, 
consequently, the possibility of using military force cannot be ruled out entirely.
Any use of military force will require the authorization of the UN Security Council and all 
unauthorized use of military force is unacceptable.”
As the war  begun,  the Finnish government  (2003b)  emphasised the role  of  the UN in 
international relations and adopted the following statement on 20 March 2003:
167It should be noted, however, that US/UK air forces had consistently attacked Iraqi air 
defences since late 2002 (Cordesman 2003, 58).
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“Finland laments that the US and its allies have begun military action against Iraq.
Use  of  military  force  without  the  UN  Security  Council's  specific  authorisation  is  not 
acceptable.  
The ongoing war must not result in the marginalisation of the UN. It is obligatory that the role 
and  responsibility  of  the  UN  and  its  organisations  remain  central  in  the  drafting  and 
implementation of the forthcoming decisions and measures.”
While disapproving of the use of force, the Finnish response was cautious in comparison to 
its  neighbour Sweden which regarded the attack as a violation of the international law 
(Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2005, 405; Vogt 2004).168 
The Irish government had avoided taking sides in the run-up to the war. On 20 March, Irish 
Foreign Minister Brian Cowen continued on this path and gave the following statement to 
the Dáil Éireann (2003b):
“Ireland has repeatedly stated its view that if Iraq continued in its non-compliance, a second 
Security Council resolution should be adopted. We believe that this is what should have been 
done. The United States and Britain have long held the view that  earlier  Security Council 
Resolutions already mandate the use of force, and that no further authorisation is required. 
They are now acting on this belief. It is clear that there is no generally accepted view on the 
validity of the different interpretations and it is unlikely that agreement on this point can be 
reached.”
Like  his  Taoiseach  Bertie  Ahern,  Cowen  held  the  Iraqi  President  responsible  for  the 
situation.  With  regard  to  US  military  access  to  Ireland's  Shannon  airport,  Cowen 
announced that
“For us now to withdraw facilities at Shannon would not only be in direct contrast to what we 
have done in previous occasions, but would antagonize two of our most important friends and 
partners. The core of our neutrality,  as I have said, lies in independence of judgement – in 
being able to make up our minds about what is right for Ireland.”
After heavy criticism from the opposition parties including Fine Gael, Labour, Green party 
and Sinn Fein, the government motion for continued overflight and landing rights for the 
US military was carried by 77 votes against 60. 
On 18 March,  before the House of Commons voted on the British participation in the 
military action to disarm Iraq, Tony Blair appealed to the Members of Parliament arguing 
that (House of Commons 2003b, col. 761):
168It is worth noting that between these two statements, the Centre Party had secured a 
very narrow victory in the general elections and was preparing for negotiations to form 
a coalition government.
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“the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more 
than the fate of the Iraqi people who have been brutalised by Saddam for so long, important 
though these issues are. It will determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the 
central  security  threat  of  the  21st  century,  the  development  of  the  United  Nations,  the 
relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union 
and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly 
be  more  important.  It  will  determine  the  pattern  of  international  politics  for  the  next 
generation.”
With the help of the Conservative party, Blair won the support of the House of Commons 
although the Labour Party was split on the issue. The clearest sign of the divisions within 
the Labour  party was the resignation of the Leader of the House of Commons,  Robin 
Cook, a day earlier. In his resignation speech, Cook (2003) argued that Britain's interest is 
in  multilateral  agreement  rather  than  unilateral  action  which  could  break  the  coalition 
against terrorism. Cook also questioned the claim that Iraq posed a threat: “Iraq probably 
has  no weapons of  mass destruction in  the commonly understood sense of  the term – 
namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target.” He also 
raised the question of why Iraq's alleged weapons could not be stripped by giving more 
time  to  the  weapons  inspections.  The  government's  Iraq  policy  resulted  in  several 
resignations.  For  instance,  Tory  junior  whip  John  Randall  and  Andy  Reed,  a  labour 
ministerial aide, had resigned from their posts earlier over concerns about the Iraq war. 
Moreover,  International  Development  Secretary Clare  Short  had threatened to  resign if 
Britain  participated  in  the  war  without  a  second  UN  Security  Council  resolution  but 
eventually decided to stay in the office.169 
7.3 THE SAMPLE
During the week following Bush's ultimatum to the Iraqi president, 1293 opinion and news 
articles  on  Iraq  were  published  in  the  analysed  newspapers.  The  British  newspapers 
accounted  for  542  items,  the  Irish  newspapers  for  388  while  the  Finnish  newspapers 
published 363 items.
The  Irish  newspapers  had  very  different  strategies  in  how  to  provide  international 
coverage. The  Irish Independent relied heavily on British newspapers in its international 
coverage. 88 out of 112 items originated from the Times (27), Daily Telegraph (30) and the 
Independent/Independent News Service (31). Meanwhile, its main competition, the  Irish 
Times, relied on its extensive network of foreign correspondents. The Irish Times was well-
169This invited very harsh criticism in the press and very little sympathy apart from 
Johann Hari's column in the Independent on 19 March.
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equipped  to  cover  the  war  as  it  had  correspondents  in  Iran/Northern  Iraq  (Lynne 
O'Donnell), Jordan (Michael Jansen) and Baghdad (Lara Marlowe).170 Moreover, the Irish 
Times regularly ran reports from Jack Fairweather who was embedded with the British 
army. Consequently, on 18 March alone, the Irish Times ran reports from Baghdad, Tehran, 
Amman, Jerusalem, Moscow, New York, London, Brussels and Kuwait.
The Finnish newspapers depended on news agencies to supplement their own international 
coverage  or  to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  correspondents  abroad.  Turun  Sanomat had 
correspondents in many Western countries which allowed it to cover the diplomatic feud 
rather  independently.  However,  dependence  on  news  agencies  increased  when the  war 
started because the newspaper  lacked presence in  Iraq.  Helsingin Sanomat (20 March) 
declared that its goal was to provide ”comprehensive, fast and accurate picture of actions 
of all actors involved in the crisis, war and the situation that follows.” Helsingin Sanomat 
was better equipped to reach this target than any other Finnish newspaper as it had several 
correspondents in the region including Jordan (Tanja Vasama and Hannes Heikura), Israel 
(Susanna Niinivaara) and Turkey (Minna Nalbantoglu). Moreover, HS had Sami Sillanpää 
embedded with the American 101st Airborne division but it did not have a correspondent 
reporting  from the  Iraqi  side.  Ilta-Sanomat was  largely dependent  on  Anglo-American 
news agencies but also ran articles by a Norwegian unilateral reporter, Åsne Seierstad. She 
provided the perspective of ordinary civilians in Baghdad. Seierstad's four articles, which 
appeared in  Ilta-Sanomat, were the only reports from the Iraqi side in the three Finnish 
newspapers during the analysed week. 
Together with the Irish Times, the Independent provided the most extensive coverage from 
the Iraqi side.  The  Independent had Robert  Fisk in Baghdad and his  reports were also 
published  in  Ireland  by  the  Irish  Independent and  the  Sunday  Tribune.  While  the 
Independent only  had  Terri  Judd  embedded  with  the  British  troops,  Daily  
Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph had several embedded reporters who provided more than 30 
reports during the week. In addition to having several reporters with the UK forces,171 the 
Daily Telegraph's Oliver Poole was the only British daily newspaper journalist embedded 
with the US forces. 
170According to Lara Marlowe (2003), her reports were never censored by the Iraqis and 
the editors in Ireland only cut three of the most gruesome depictions from her reports.
171Martin Bentham (Sunday Telegraph), Tim Butcher (Daily Telegraph), Paul Grover 
(Daily Telegraph), David Harrison (Sunday Telegraph), Ian Jones (Daily Telegraph) and 
Stewart Payne (Daily Telegraph).
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7.4 ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE
As discussed in the previous chapters, previous research suggests that the media follow 
rather closely governmental positions on international issues. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
that the editorial positions of the newspapers would reflect the official policies of their host 
countries. Previous research suggests that the media select sources that hold similar views 
as their national government (Stolle & Hooghe 2005). Therefore, the Finnish newspapers 
are expected to quote other anti-war governments and UN sources more often than the 
British newspapers. Finally, the selection and/or avoidance of certain topics or arguments 
could reflect bias in favour of national foreign policy line. 
7.4.1 Editorial responses to the beginning of the war
An editorial  in  Turun Sanomat ('One has to avoid inciting unnecessary hysteria on the 
brink  of  war',  20  March)  refrained  from condemning  the  military  action.  Instead,  the 
editorial  focussed on calling for calm in the midst of the crisis.  However,  a day later, 
another editorial headlined 'USA has taken a dangerous path by attacking Iraq' (21 March). 
The article argued that
“In Bush's view, he is now applying the National Security Strategy which was adopted last 
year.  According  to  the  strategy,  pre-emptive  attack  is  justified  against  a  country which  is 
striking the US. The investigations of the UN weapons inspectors have made it clear that Iraq 
does not have this kind of capability. There is no evidence to suggest that Iraq has provided 
terrorists with weapons to strike the US. The fear now is that America's doctrine is applied in 
other conflict areas.”
In effect, the editorial questioned the existence of Iraqi threat, which was at the heart of 
US/UK case for war, and expressed concern about the possibility that the invasion would 
create  a  potentially  dangerous  precedent  for  pre-emptive  strikes.  Helsingin  Sanomat 
adopted a rather similar position. Its editorial ('Bush decided to go on war path regardless 
of the UN', 19 March) argued that 
“Ideology and strong conviction in its [US's] own superiority has fatally won the patience and 
sense of reality. Bush demanded much more than an approval for toppling Saddam Hussein 
from the international community. In his new strategic doctrine he effectively demanded the 
US to be exempt from international norms. His inner circle made it clear that Iraq will be made 
a precedent.  As other states now oppose the war,  they do not defend Saddam Hussein but 
institutionalised rules and their right to distinguish themselves from US dictation. Washington 
does not seem to get this simple fact.”
Ilta-Sanomat was  perhaps  a  little  more  understanding  of  US policy –  or  at  least  less 
condemning. Under the headline 'It is impossible to prevent the war any more' (19 March) 
it wrote:
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“There were no good options available. The anti-war countries would have needed to accept 
the war  because  otherwise  sufficient  consensus  would have  been  lacking.  The  US and  its 
closest allies would not have retreated from their position. On the contrary, the US had planned 
to solve the matter with military force in any case. In Washington's view, UN blessing would 
have been desirable but not necessary icing on the already decided policy line.
It is reasonable to ask whether the inflexible UN Security Council is the best forum to deal 
with questions of war and peace as it is coming out of this situation with a severe failure. Five 
countries have a veto in the Security Council. They are the winners of the Second World War. 
However, the world has been transformed several times over since 1945.”
In this editorial, IS implies that the US intentionally misinterprets the UNSC resolution 
1441 as de facto authorizing the use of force. However, the editorial does not take a clear 
position  either  for  or  against  the  use  of  force.  The  following  extract  illustrates  the 
ambiguity: 
“Hardly anyone will miss Saddam Hussein. He is a tyrant who seized the power in a coup and 
has hundreds of thousands of innocent lives on his conscience. In addition, there is a lot of oil 
in the land he rules which makes it very attractive for the Americans to intervene in the matters 
of this criminally run state.” 
However,  another  commentary  on  the  same  day  was  highly  sceptical  of  US  claims 
('Toward Liberation, But at What Cost?').172
The editorial policies of the Finnish newspapers varied from rather harsh criticism of the 
US to a slightly less condemning approach adopted by  Ilta-Sanomat. It is worth noting 
that, while  Ilta-Sanomat was perhaps less judgemental in its approach than TS and HS, 
some commentary pieces shared their scepticism of the US/UK case for war. For instance, 
Jouko Juonala argued that creating a democracy in 22-million clan society would be a 
difficult task and runs the risk that Iraq disintegrates ('Toward liberation but at what cost?', 
172Aamulehti discussed the views of the US and its critics on 18 and 19 March ('Last 
moments in Saddam Hussein's countdown' and 'USA put an end to the appeasement'). 
On the former date, it wrote that ”[v]ery few want Saddam to stay in power. However, 
most people settle for twisting arms and hope that the dictator of Iraq would mend his 
ways sometime.[...] His place is not in head of any country”. On the latter date, 
Aamulehti just repeated the views of the US and its critics but did not seem to choose 
sides. Although the newspaper's editor-in-chief Matti Apunen may have personally 
supported the invasion of Iraq and the editorials may have been more sympathetic to the 
US views than in other Finnish newspapers, this did not seem to translate into generally 
supportive coverage of the war. The news coverage seemed to emphasise humanitarian 
aspects of the war. In fact, Aamulehti ran a series of reports which approached the 
closing war from the perspective of an ordinary Iraqi family and, on 21 March alone, 
Aamulehti ran several news articles which focused on humanitarian concerns and anti-
war protests together with a column that warned about the potentially very difficult 
post-invasion situation due to tribal, ethnic and religious divisions within the Iraqi 
society ('The hardest challenge comes after the war'). This interpretation is further 
supported by an analysis of news photographs: Aamulehti emphasised the Iraqi civilian 
view on the war as half of all the photographs depicted civilians. In comparison, about 
40% of photographs in Helsingin Sanomat depicted civilians (Männistö 2004, 165).
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20 March). In sum, the opinion items in the Finnish newspapers largely reflected the anti-
war position of the government as well as the anti-war sentiment in the society at large.
Opinion  items in  the  Irish newspapers  presented  wider  range  of  views than  the  rather 
uniform Finnish press. The editorials and commentaries in the  Irish Independent/Sunday 
Independent included both quite passionate endorsements of the military action as well as, 
to  a  lesser  degree,  its  criticism.  For  instance,  Eoghan  Harris  defended  the  war  in  the 
Sunday Independent ('Comments of mass distraction buried in bodybags of bluster',  23 
March): “No war is a good war, but this necessary war comes close to being a noble war. It 
is a great thing to free a people from a tyrant. And it is a tragedy that the Irish republic is 
either standing sullenly on the sidelines, or,  even worse,  on the wrong side.”   Clearly, 
Harris would not have liked to see Shannon closed for the US military.  Other pro-war 
opinion items included, for instance, 'Move against Saddam not just a war but a just war' 
(Sunday  Independent,  23  March),  'The  bigger  the  crisis,  the  more  we  opt  to  duck  it' 
(Sunday Independent, 23 March) and 'Why it is time to stand by our friends'. Moreover, the 
Irish Independent ran Taoiseach Bertie Ahern's article which blamed the Iraqi President for 
the situation and defended the stop-over policy ('Saddam, not Bush or Blair, is responsible 
for this crisis', 20 March).
Simon Jenkins's commentary piece ('Bin Laden's laughter echoes across the battlefield', 19 
March), which was also published in the Times (of London), was among those few articles 
published  in  the  Irish  Independent that  were  unequivocally  critical  of  the  war.173 He 
dissected the US/UK case for war and argued that “[i]t is a poor comment on the civilised 
West in the 21st century that its chief means of retaliation against terrorism is a declaration 
of  war  on  whole  peoples.”  Jenkins  saw the  war  playing  into  the  hands  of  al-Qaeda: 
“Nothing can be giving bin Laden greater pleasure than the spectacle of the West going to 
war to topple his hated foe, the 'atheist Satan,' Saddam Hussein.”
In contrast to the Irish Independent, the Irish Times and the Sunday Tribune were largely 
critical of the US/UK invasion of Iraq as well as Ireland's stop-over policy. On 18 March, 
the Irish Times ('On the brink of an unacceptable war') argued that
“The aims of this war are changed by the circumstances of its pronouncement. Disarming Iraq 
is secondary now to overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime and reordering Middle East 
politics. Such objectives are emphatically not covered by existing UN resolutions, however 
173It should be noted, however, that outright condemnations of the US/UK invasion as 
well as Irish government's stop-over policy were common in letters-to-the-editor.
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abstractly desirable. The price paid in terms of legality and legitimacy is too high. We must 
hope for  a  short  war.  But  the subsequent peace remains  deeply problematic  and contested 
because of these unacceptable decisions by the United States, Britain and their allies.” 174 
The  Irish Times also took a critical stance on the government's continuation of the stop-
over policy ('Decision time on Shannon', 20 March):
“If military neutrality is to mean anything in these circumstances, it should involve refusing the 
movement of troops or munitions of war across our territory, as other European neutrals have 
done. The use of Shannon Airport should be refused. But if our political alignments are greater 
than the avowed principle of neutrality, perhaps this is the time to confront and implement a 
new foreign policy. We are politically aligned towards the US and UK, neutral in the cop-out 
sense, and demonstrably political passengers in the first march in international affairs of the 
21st century.” 
Irish Times's Fintan O'Toole harshly criticised the stop-over policy in his opinion piece 
'Throwing principle to the wind' (22 March): 
“The Government  contends,  of  course,  that  the use of  Shannon does  not  really amount to 
participation in the war. Even if this were true, it certainly amounts to something even more 
momentous: support for the replacement of the UN by US-led 'coalitions of the willing'. 
By choosing Boston rather than Berlin, we have tied ourselves to the agenda of a confident, 
aggressive right-wing faction in the US. Seldom in Irish history can so profound a choice have 
been made with such little thought, either for the sacrifices of the past or the dangers of the 
future.”
Nevertheless, the Irish Times also published Taoiseach Bertie Ahern's article, 'We stand by 
neutrality and support for UN'. While acknowledging that the legality of the use of military 
force against Iraq was disputed, he defended the stop-over policy: “We have been making 
such facilities  available for half  a  century,  throughout many wars and crises.  We have 
pursued  our  policy  of  military  neutrality  throughout  that  period.  Maintaining  these 
facilities does not mean we are participating in a war.” There were also a few other opinion 
pieces which could be characterised as pro-war.175
A leading article in the Sunday Tribune ('Victory would not make Bush's war legitimate', 
23 March) adopted a clear anti-war editorial stance:
“The removal of Saddam Hussein will not justify the death and destruction so far wreaked by 
the allies. It  will not justify our government's lapdog attitude to the Americans, an attitude 
174Typically to the Finnish and Irish newspapers included in this study, the article was also 
concerned with the role of the United Nations in the international system: “we are 
reduced to a United States led war against Iraq. It is a great failure of politics and 
diplomacy. It flies in the face of the majority on the United Nations Security Council. 
That majority does not accept a war is the only means available to ensure Iraq complies 
with UN demands that it disarm its weapons of mass destruction. This is, therefore, an 
unacceptable war of highly doubtful legality and legitimacy. It will endanger the 
international order which the United Nations was created to protect .”
175These included e.g. John Waters's 'Bush and Blair doing right thing' (24 March).
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clearly demonstrated when Ireland became the only country in Europe to hold a national day of 
mourning for the victims of the World Trade Centre attack. Will  we hold a similar day of 
mourning for the dead in Iraq?
[…] Some will say that opposing the war, that protesting for peace, is futile. It may well be. 
But it is also right, moral, decent, civilised and Christian.
We will continue to oppose it.” 
Sunday Tribune's Iraq coverage was quite consistently critical of the invasion. For instance, 
Special Correspondent Harry McGee wrote ('A wretched war, started on lies, reliant on 
lies', 23 March): 
“US president George Bush said that the war had been launched to protect the American people 
from the threat of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, to enforce the Security Council's 
long-standing demands. America and its allies, he said, had the 'resolve to meet this threat to 
peace'. Blair's justification focuses on so-called asymmetrical threats. 'This new world faces a 
new threat of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of 
mass destruction, or  extreme terrorist  groups.  Both hate our  way of  life,  our  freedom and 
democracy.  My fear,  deeply held,  based in part  on the intelligence that  I  see,  is  that these 
threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and world.' But did Iraq ever pose 
such a threat? Was it really capable of bringing the entire world to its knees so much so that it  
justified  an  attack  of  such  a  calamitous  nature?  What  happens  if  no  weapons  of  mass 
destruction are unearthed when the regime is eventually over-run? Where does the campaign 
against terrorism stop? How do you describe the extraordinary arsenal of uranium-enriched 
warheads, daisy cutters, cluster bombs, the new super-bomb that can zap everything within 
600m. As conventional weapons? 
He  continued  by  arguing  that  the  war  “has  a  dubious  legal  basis,  was  started  in 
contradiction of the will of the international community, and will give a legitimacy to a 
very dangerous and very scary doctrine, that of pre-emption.” 
The Irish newspapers reflected the divisions within the political elite on the Iraq War and 
Ireland's  decision on Shannon.  As suggested by the elite  version of  the manufacturing 
consent literature, elite dissensus brought the Shannon issue in the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. 
In Britain, the Independent took a somewhat conformist stance on the war on 19 March. 
While  retaining  reservations  about  the  Prime Minister's  Iraq  policy,  the  leading  article 
argued that  ”Mr Blair  has shown himself  in the past  few days  to be at  once the most 
formidable politician in the country and the right national leader for these deeply uncertain 
times” ('Whatever the anxieties over this conflict,  Mr Blair  has shown himself  to be a 
leader for troubled times').  However, on March 21, the leader of the  Independent argued 
that there had been “a marked shift in emphasis in the weeks leading up to this moment, 
from the need to confront the threat Saddam Hussein posed to the rest of the world to 
giving at least equal billing to the need to liberate the Iraqi people from a pitiless dictator” 
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('After all the doubts, only one aim can justify this war: freedom for the Iraqi people'). The 
leader  suggested  that  this  was  due  to  doubts  that  the  WMD  did  not  exist  after  all. 
Nevertheless, the editorial concluded that “[f]or all the spin, for all Mr Bush's disastrous 
diplomacy and his dubious motives, however, the restoration of freedom and democracy to 
the Iraqi people is a noble aim.”176
Another leading article in the Independent ('A war in the name of democracy must tolerate 
some dissent at home', 22 March), read:
“The Independent takes the view that the case for or against the war is no longer the issue. We 
accept that Parliament has decided that question for now. Anyway, it would make no sense to 
withdraw British forces from an operation that is going to continue regardless, and certainly 
not while there is hope that Saddam Hussein's regime will collapse and the Iraqi people be 
liberated with minimal casualties.”
The leading article also included a message to the anti-war movement:
“we urge rhetorical restraint on both sides. Equally, we would urge the peace marchers to avoid 
accusing  people  of  war  crimes.   Careless  use  of  such  words  cheapens  the  currency  and 
undermines  the anti-war argument.  For those reasons,  yesterday's  stunt  in a  Belgian court, 
where peace protesters lodged war crimes charges against George Bush and Dick Cheney, was 
foolish.”
In a similar fashion, a leading article in the Independent on Sunday ('This war is wrong, but 
unstoppable. So we must fight for the peace', 23 March) distanced itself from the anti-war 
movement:  “What  we cannot  do  is  share  the  wish  of  some protesters  that  the  war  is 
suddenly stopped without a resolution of any sort, an absurdly unrealistic and therefore 
meaningless  aspiration.”  It  seems safe  to  conclude  that  the  Independent abandoned its 
earlier  unambiguously anti-war editorial  policy and reconciled itself  to the government 
policy.
Nevertheless, in general, the opinion items published in the  Independent were critical of 
the  invasion.  For  instance,  Andrew  Lansley,  a  conservative  MP,  argues  that  the 
“justification  for  this  conflict  is  built  on  sand”  (19  March)  in  a  commentary  in  the 
Independent. He continued: 
“Of course, inspection without Iraqi co-operation would never produce the full disarmament 
required. But there is a perversity in the approach taken by Britain and the US, which has failed 
to recognise that the enhanced weapons inspection since last November has given substantial 
evidence  of  the  extent  of  Iraqi  non-compliance,  gone  a  considerable  way  to  destroying 
equipment, especially missile technology, and defined the disarmament tasks which remain.”
176 Philip Hammond (2003) argues the British press has been largely supportive of 
Western military interventions for humanitarian reasons and ”from Somalia in 1992 to 
Iraq in 2003, the loudest complaint voiced in the press has been that the West does not 
do enough to reorganise other societies” (Hammond 2008).
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However, the Independent's regular commentator on world affairs, Johann Hari, adopted a 
pro-war position. He believed in the prospect of “honourable, democratic and – at last – 
peaceful Iraq” ('Clare Short has given lead for all those who oppose the war', 19 March). 
Therefore, he argued 
“[i]f you are going to march, ditch the old, cheap slogans to 'stop the war'. Call instead for 
democracy in Iraq. The Bush administration and its allies are divided on this issue. There are 
big players calling for post-war democracy, like Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blair and Clare Short, 
and others like Dick Cheney and Colin Powell calling for another dictatorship, albeit a less 
horrific one.”
The  Daily  Telegraph's  editorial  supported  Blair's  military  adventure  wholeheartedly 
('Beyond debate', 18 March):
“From 1940 to the present day, we have continuously recognised that we must be strenuous for 
peace and freedom, and that this sometimes means fighting for them. In this, we have sustained 
with the United States the most important alliance of modern times. If we slink away now, we 
will suffer much more than the relatively minor catastrophe of losing a prime minister: we will 
be weak and friendless, and we ought to be ashamed.”
Moreover, on the following day, another editorial argued that “any fair-minded person who 
listened to yesterday's debate, having been genuinely unable to make up his mind about 
military action against Saddam, must surely have concluded that Mr Blair was right, and 
his  opponents  were  wrong” ('Master  of  the  House',  19 March).  The  editorial  provided 
further praise for Blair's speech at the House of Commons by arguing that he “made the 
speech that he should have made months ago, marshalling all his arguments for action - 
moral, legal, geopolitical and humanitarian - and putting them with such patent conviction 
and force that his performance deserves to be remembered as one of the finest in recent 
history.” The Daily Telegraph also published edited extracts of Blair's speech ('The world 
must unite against chaos', 19 March).
Yet, some of the opinion items published in the Daily Telegraph questioned the rationale 
for invasion. For instance, Robert Harris ('Despite everything, we must dare back Blair and 
this war', 18 March) argued (quoting his own article from previous year) that 
“[w]e are being whipped into a war psychosis about `weapons of mass destruction' which are, 
practically,  often no more destructive than high explosive,  and which can,  in any case,  be 
manufactured in the middle of a city or stolen from a laboratory. 
We are considering acting pre-emptively against a state which has not actually sponsored a 
terrorist threat against us. We are likely, in the process, to fracture the united international front 
against al-Qa'eda, split public opinion in this country, and make bio-terrorism more likely. All 
in all: a strange way to go about making the world a safer place."
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However, Harris suggested that “the dangers of stopping now exceed the risks of seeing the 
thing  through” and,  therefore,  he  backed the  government.  In  fact,  opinion  items  were 
largely  supportive  of  the  invasion  and  opinion  items  taking  an  unambiguous  anti-war 
stance  were  virtually  limited  to  few  letters-to-the-editor  and  David  Pryce-Jones's 
commentary which discussed the potential consequences of the war for the stability of Iraq, 
the Middle East and the wider world. He argued that there could be a civil war between the 
ethnic factions and that, if the US military does not manage to prevent this, the US runs the 
risk of turning Iraq “into a fanatically anti-American country generating terrorists faster 
than the West Bank” ('For Sunnis, Shias, Kurds and Turks, when war stops, the trouble 
starts', Sunday Telegraph, 23 March).
While their editorial positions on the war differed significantly, both British newspapers 
published both pro- and anti-war opinion items. However,  the  Independent was largely 
critical of the invasion apart from Johann Hari who, together with other “liberal hawks”, 
emphasised the prospect of democratic Iraq (Taylor 2008). Rally round the flag effect was 
also visible in the Independent's softened editorial position once the war begun. The Daily  
Telegraph,  in  turn,  ran  very  few  anti-war  opinion  items  and  its  leading  articles  and 
commentary pieces were largely supportive of the US/UK invasion of Iraq. Similarly to the 
situation in Ireland, the press reflected the range of elite opinion in the country.
7.4.2 Sourcing
Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) analysis of television coverage of the Iraq crisis found that in 
countries, which had anti-war governments, the television channels tended to choose anti-
war actors as on-screen actors. Data presented in table 7.1 indicates that the newspapers 
analysed for this study did not choose their sources in a similar fashion. The Finnish and 
the British press quoted US governmental and military sources to similar extent while the 
Irish press quoted US government sources slightly more frequently. However, the Finnish 
press  quoted  Iraqi  government/military  sources  less  frequently  than  the  Irish  and  UK 
newspapers.177 So,  the  anti-war  editorial  policies  of  the  Finnish  newspapers  did  not 
177There were two incidents in the early days of the war that were widely misreported. 
The first was the allegation that Iraq had fired Scud missiles to Kuwait and the second 
was the claim that an entire Iraqi division, the 51st infantry, had surrendered to the US 
forces. Even newspapers with a clear anti-war editorial policy failed to question the US 
military allegations of mass surrenders (e.g. see 'Iraqi soldiers surrender in droves', 
Sunday Tribune, 23 March). Meanwhile, the Independent was more cautious in 
reporting the alleged Scud strikes stating that “[i]t was not clear whether some of the 
weapons were prohibited Scuds.”
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translate into giving more voice to the Iraqi point of view in the conflict – or even those of 
other anti-war states (see table 2). 
Table 7.1. Items quoting US and Iraqi governmental and military sources.
 US Iraqi
 Government Military Government Military
Helsingin Sanomat 17 (8.5%) 17 (8.5%) 13 (6.5%) -
Turun Sanomat 9 (13.8%) - 1 (1.5%) 2 (3.1%)
Ilta-Sanomat 18 (18.4%) 16 (16.3%) 10 (10.2%) 1 (1.0%)
FINLAND (n=363) 44 (12.1%) 33 (9.1%) 24 (6.6%) 3 (0.8%)
Independent 42 (13.9%) 28 (9.3%) 27 (8.9%) 3 (1.0%)
Daily Telegraph 29 (12.1%) 24 (10.0%) 9 (3.8%) 3 (1.3%)
UK (n=542) 71 (13.1%) 52 (9.6%) 36 (6.6%) 6 (1.1%)
Irish Independent 36 (17.8%) 20 (10.0%) 21 (10.4%) 2 (1.0%)
Irish Times 30 (16.1%) 14 (7.5%) 23 (12.4%) 4 (2.2%)
IRELAND (n=388) 66 (17.0%) 34 (8.8%) 44 (11.3%) 6 (1.5%)
Total (n=1293) 181 (14.0%) 109 (8.4%) 104 (8.0%) 15 (1.2%)
Table 7.2.  major anti-war countries and international organisations.
 Anti-war countries
 France Germany Russia UN Aid agencies
Helsingin Sanomat 2 (1.0%) 2 (1.0%) 3 (1.5%) 4 (2.0%) 4 (2.0%)
Turun Sanomat 2 (3.1%) 2 (3.1%) - 2 (3.1%) 2 (3.1%)
Ilta-Sanomat - - - 2 (2.0%) 1 (1.0%)
FINLAND (n=363) 4 (1.1%) 4 (1.1%) 3 (0.8%) 8 (2.2%) 7 (1.9%)
Independent 10 (3.3%) 4 (1.3%) 4 (1.3%) 16 (5.3%) 3 (1.0%)
Daily Telegraph 8 (3.3%) 3 (1,3%) 3 (1.3%) 9 (3.8%) 1 (0.4%)
UK (n=542) 18 (3.3%) 7 (1.3%) 7 (1.3%) 25 (4.6%) 4 (0.7%)
Irish Independent 6 (3.0%) 3 (1.5%) 1 (0.5%) 6 (3.0%) 1 (0.5%)
Irish Times 10 (5.4%) 9 (4.8%) 9 (4.8%) 14 (7.5%) 3 (1.6%)
IRELAND (n=388) 16 (4.1%) 12 (3.1%) 10 (2.6%) 20 (5.2%) 4 (1.0%)
Total (n=1293) 38 (2.9%) 23 (1.8%) 20 (1.5%) 53 (4.1%) 15 (1.2%)
A cross-national study on the 1991 Gulf War argued that Finnish and Swedish media put 
more emphasis on the UN than the US media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 258). However, 
the data indicates that the Finnish press quoted UN sources in only about 2% of the items 
dealing with the Iraq crisis. Meanwhile, over 5% of the items in the Irish sample quoted 
UN sources and even the British sample cited UN sources more frequently than the Finnish 
newspapers. Nevertheless, the Finnish press quoted humanitarian aid organisations more 
frequently than the Irish and British press. The fact that the Irish sample quoted French, 
German and Russian sources the most frequently is largely due to the Irish Times' active 
network of foreign correspondents.
183
7.4.3 Selection of topics
Quantitative  analysis  of  press  coverage  does  not  seem  to  support  the  view  that  the 
government policy line would explain how media select topics. Regardless of the Finnish 
government's  anti-war  stance  and  Finnish  newspapers'  editorial  policies,  which  were 
critical of the invasion, the coverage as a whole did not put greater emphasis on casualties 
than the Irish and British newspapers.  In  fact,  the data  indicates that  the British press 
covered casualties most extensively.
Table 7.3. Number of items with a reference to casualties.
 References to casualties
 US/UK Iraqi military Civilian Journalists Unspecified
Helsingin Sanomat (n=201) 17 (8.5%) 3 (1.5%) 12 (6.0%) 3 (1.5%) 7 (3.5%)
Turun Sanomat (n=65) 3 (4.6%) 1 (1.5%) 9 (13.8%) - 6 (9.2%)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=98) 12 (12.2%) 3 (3.1%) 9 (9.2%) 2 (2.0%) 2 (2.0%)
FINLAND (n=363) 32   (8.8%) 7 (1.9%) 30 (8.3%) 5 (1.4%) 15 (4.1%)
Independent (n=302) 48 (15.9%) 15 (5.0%) 46 (15.2%) 7 (2.3%) 27 (8.9%)
Daily Telegraph (n=240) 34 (14.2%) 9 (3.8%) 25 (10.4%) 6 (2.5%) 14 (5.8%)
UK (n=542) 82 (15.2%) 24 (4.4%) 71 (13.1%) 13 (2.4%) 41 (7.6%)
Irish Independent (n=202) 24 (11.9%) 7 (3.5%) 30 (14.9%) 3 (1.5%) 13 (6.4%)
Irish Times (n=186) 19 (10.2%) 5 (2.7%) 13 (7.0%) 5 (2.7%) 10 (5.4%)
IRELAND (n=388) 43 (11.1%) 13 (3.4%) 43 (11.1%) 6 (1.5%) 23 (5.9%)
Total (n=1293) 158 (12.2%) 44 (8.2%) 144 (11.1%) 24 (1.9%) 79 (6.2%)
There were a large number of references to unspecified casualties (in other words, it was 
impossible to determine whether the article, for instance, referred to military or civilian 
casualties). These cases were also recorded. However, as can be seen in the table 7.4, this 
data also suggests that  the Finnish press emphasised the loss of life the least  although 
humanitarian crisis (refugee problems, lack of clean water, epidemics and other such issues 
were recorded under this category) was the most widely covered in the Finnish sample. In 
this  regard,  the  Irish  newspapers  differed  from each  other.  The  Irish  Times made  16 
references to humanitarian crisis against Irish Independent's two and  humanitarian aid was 
also covered more frequently in the Irish Times (23 items against 14). The Irish Times also 
questioned the argument that the war would lead to a safer international system in 11 items 
while the Irish Independent did this in just 3 times. A similar difference in emphasis could 
be seen in the British sample. The Independent was much more concerned about civilian 
casualties than the  Daily Telegraph (25 against  46). Similarly,  items with references to 
humanitarian aid totalled 39 in the Independent against Telegraph's 12.
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None  of  the  three  Finnish  newspapers,  which  were  analysed  for  this  study,  made  a 
reference to US/UK use of depleted uranium (DU) in US/UK armour-piercing projectiles 
which  leave  behind  radioactive  dust  that  has  been  linked  to  birth  defects  and  cancer 
(Solomon 2004, 160-161). Meanwhile, the Independent mentioned the issue in six items, 
the  Daily Telegraph and the  Irish Independent in three items and the  Irish Times in two 
items.
7.4.4 Justifications, objectives and consequences of war
The Irish press provided the most extensive coverage of the question whether the war is 
justified with nearly 8% of items questioning its justification and over 9% questioning its 
legality.  The  issue  had  implications  for  Ireland's  decision  on  whether  to  continue  the 
stopover  policy  and  the  opposition  parties  and  the  government  had  differing 
interpretations. Understandably, the argument attracted media coverage. The Finnish press, 
in turn, paid less attention to the legal and moral justification of the war. This may have 
been due to lack of domestic controversy on this issue. A very small number of Finnish 
items included the argument that the war is legal and/or morally justified. Meanwhile, this 
argument was much more frequently questioned.  Ilta-Sanomat did not cover the issue of 
legality at  all.  The  Independent and the  Irish Times paid notably more attention to the 
legality of the war than their pro-war counterparts – the  Daily Telegraph and the  Irish 
Independent.178
The Irish press mentioned the disarmament of Iraq most frequently as the objective of the 
war  (table  7.5).  Meanwhile,  the  Finnish and the UK press  regarded regime change or 
“ridding Saddam” as the most important objective. The third most often given objective in 
the UK press was to “free Iraqis” from the tyranny they had suffered under for decades 
while the Finnish and the Irish press mentioned oil-related objectives – a less noble and 
sincere aim.
178The Independent questioned the legality of the war in 31 items against Telegraph's 14. 
Similarly, the Irish Times questioned the legality in 25 items and the Irish Independent 
in 11. Similar pattern was evident in in the number of items questioning the moral 
justification of the war.
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Table 7.4. Legality and moral justification of the war.
 Argument that the war is legal Argument that the war is justified
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=201) 1 (0.5%) 11 (5.6%) 1 (0.5%) 13 (6.5%)
Turun Sanomat (n=65) 1 (1.5%) 9 (13.8%) 1 (1.5%) 4 (6.2%)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=98) - - 1 (1.0%) 1 (1.0%)
FINLAND (n=363) 2 (0.6%) 21 (5.8%) 3 (0.8%) 18 (5.0%)
Independent (n=302) 8 (2.6%) 32 (10.7%) 2 (0.7%) 21 (7.0%)
Daily Telegraph (n=240) 5 (2.1%) 14 (5.9%) 8 (3.3%) 8 (3.3%)
 UK (n=542) 13 (2.4%) 46 (8.6%) 10 (1.9%) 29 (5.4%)
Irish Independent (n=202) 2 (1.0%) 11 (5.5%) 3 (1.5%) 9 (4.5%)
Irish Times (n=186) 4 (2.2%) 25 (13.7%) 6 (3.2%) 20 (10.8%)
 IRELAND (n=388) 6 (1.6%) 36 (9.4%) 9 (2.3%) 29 (7.5%)
Total (n=1293) 21 (1.6%) 102 (8.0%) 22 (1.7%) 76 (5.9%)
Table 7.5. Three most commonly mentioned objectives of the war by country.
FINLAND (n=363) IRELAND (n=388) UK (n=542)
Regime change 14 (3.9%) Disarmament of Iraq 26 (6.7%) Regime change 33 (6.1%)
Disarmament of Iraq 13 (3.6%) Regime change 18 (4.7%) Disarmament 32 (5.9%)
Oil-related objectives 9 (2.5%) Oil-related objectives 11 (2.8%) Free Iraqis 21 (3.9%)





Helsingin Sanomat (n=201) 6 3.0
Turun Sanomat (n=65) 3 4.7
Ilta-Sanomat (n=98) 1 1.0
FINLAND (n=363) 10 2.8
Independent (n=302) 20 6.8
Daily Telegraph (n=240) 5 2.1
UK (n=542) 25 4.7
Irish Independent (n=202) 9 4.5
Irish Times (n=186) 6 3.2
IRELAND (n=388) 15 3.9
Total (n=1293) 50 3.9
In all three countries, the most commonly mentioned consequence of the war was that it 
would incite more terrorism (table 7.6). The Finnish press appears the least pessimistic 
about  the  potential  consequences  of  the  war.  In  fact,  it  seems  that  the  Finnish  elite 
consensus did not encourage substantial debate about possible consequences of the war.
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7.5 CONCLUSION
Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) cross-national analysis of television coverage of the Iraq War 
concluded that national Iraq policies were crucial in determining how the war was covered 
in  a  country.179 However,  the  findings  presented  here  seem to  suggest  that  newspaper 
coverage could be better explained by other factors. 
At least two factors contributed to the fact that the Finnish government did not exert its 
influence on the press. First of all, there was a considerably wide consensus on Finland's 
anti-war position and, consequently, there was no need to persuade the public to support 
this policy.180 On the contrary, there was more public pressure on the government to use 
tougher  rhetoric  against  the  war  –  a  step  the  government  had  not  chosen  in  order  to 
maintain good relations with the US. Secondly, the general elections took place just a few 
days before the beginning of the war and, therefore, the government was preoccupied and 
Iraq was low on the national agenda – the heated debate  on Finland's  Iraq policy had 
virtually died out after the general election on 16 March. Therefore, unlike in Ireland and 
the UK, there was no vocal opposition harshly criticising the government for participating 
or facilitating the war. 
Indeed, the situation in the UK and Ireland was drastically different. The question of how 
to respond to the fact that the Iraq crisis was escalating into a war divided political elites in 
both  countries  and  public  debate  heated  up  ahead  of  crucial  votes  in  the  House  of 
Commons and the Dail. The divisiveness of the issue is reflected in the fact that press was 
also  divided  in  both  countries.  The  Irish  Times and  the  Independent opposed  the  war 
although the latter softened its tone once the decision to participate in the invasion had 
been made. The  Daily Telegraph and the  Irish Independent were more pro-war in their 
approach – the former especially.
Another  important  factor  contributing to differences in  the coverage was the resources 
available  to  the  newspaper  in  covering  the  war.  The  influence  of  the  US/UK  “news 
duopoly” (Tunstall & Machin 1999) varied from one outlet to the other.  Turun Sanomat 
depended on its few foreign correspondents and non-Anglo-American news agencies such 
179However, they conclude that the “convergence between government positions and 
media framing” was particularly strong in countries “in which governments hold strong 
and firm government positions such as in France and in the United States” (Stolle & 
Hooghe 2005, 23).
180This is clearly indicated by the fact that only about 6% of items quoted Finnish 
government sources (including political parties).
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as Finnish STT and German DPA. Meanwhile,  Ilta-Sanomat relied on Anglo-American 
news  agencies  (AP,  Reuters),  news  channels  (CNN)  and  newspapers  (e.g.  the  Sun). 
Helsingin  Sanomat also used wire  copy (a  mix of  Anglo-American  and non-American 
news agencies) but its own correspondents, including one reporter embedded with the US 
forces, allowed it greater autonomy than the other Finnish newspapers had.
Like the UK newspapers, the  Irish Times had adequate resources to cover the war quite 
independently.  However,  the  Irish Independent largely depended on UK newspapers  to 
provide international coverage of the war. It should be mentioned, however, that since the 
war divided the UK press, a mixture of articles from the Independent/Independent News 
Service, Times and Daily Telegraph did not provide uniformly pro-war views.
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Chapter 8
THE FALL OF BAGHDAD AND THE RISE OF 
ANARCHY, 10 – 16 APRIL
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyse how the newspapers covered the fall of the Iraqi polity as the US 
forces penetrated into Baghdad. This chapter will follow the familiar pattern by analysing 
editorial responses to the fall of Baghdad, sourcing, and direction of arguments pertinent to 
the situation.
By early April, the Coalition forces had reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The much feared 
Republican Guard, Saddam's elite forces, had evaporated and it began to seem that there 
was not going to be ”another Stalingrad”  – fierce and bloody street-by-street fighting – 
promised by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz close to the 60th anniversary of the 
Battle of Stalingrad's in February. On 8 April, the US forces penetrated into the heart of 
Baghdad and an American Abrams main battle tank shelled the Palestine Hotel killing two 
journalists  and  seriously  injuring  three  others.  According  to  the  US  army,  the  tank 
responded to sniper fire from the building which the journalists have denied. A French 
camera team happened to be shooting during the incident and it did not record anything 
that indicates sniper fire. Since it  was widely known that international journalists were 
staying in the Palestine Hotel, the shelling raised suspicions that the attack was deliberate. 
Earlier on the same day, Abu Dhabi TV facilities and Al-Jazeera's Baghdad office were 
bombed killing an Al-Jazeera journalist and wounding another (Herman 2005, 10-11). This 
was reminiscent of what happened in Kabul during the Afghan campaign just year and a 
half before. Al-Jazeera's Kabul office was bombed by the US even though the building was 
well-known to host Al-Jazeera's office. Having interviewed top US officials for his book 
(The  One  Percent  Doctrine),  investigative  journalist  Ron  Suskind  concluded  that  the 
attacks on Al-Jazeera had been deliberate (Sparks 2007b, 228).
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In the morning of April 9th, the Iraqi minders of international journalists did not show up to 
work indicating that the Iraqi polity had ceased to exist (Seierstad 2004, 262). Later that 
day, the toppling of the Saddam statue at Firdos Square in Baghdad provided perhaps the 
most iconic images of the Iraq War. Having failed to topple the statue themselves, jubilant 
Iraqis  watched as  the US soldiers  brought  down the statue consolidating the Coalition 
claims that the Iraqi people would welcome regime change and greet coalition forces as 
liberators rather than occupiers.  It  has been suggested that the toppling of the Saddam 
statue  was  a  stage-managed  event  for  international  journalists  residing  in  the  near-by 
Palestine  Hotel.   David  Perlmutter  (2005,  120)  claims  that  what  happened  on  Firdos 
Square ”was in essence a photo-op by the U.S. military, with participants invited in and the 
area closed off.” Some have even argued that reporters and photographers accounted for 
one  third  of  the  crowd  in  the  square  (Major  &  Perlmutter  2005,  42).  According  to 
Knightley  (2003,  544),  at  least  some  of  the  Iraqis  in  the  square  were  members  of 
controversial exiled opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi's Free Iraqi Forces. This suggests 
that it might have not been a spontaneous celebration of 'liberation' but that these members 
of Iraqi opposition were transported there by US forces for the display in front of the 
international media residing in the near-by Palestine Hotel (Major & Perlmutter 2005, 42).
Previous research would suggest that the media responded enthusiastically to the images of 
the falling statue. Larry Kaplow of Cox Newspapers argues that the Iraqis were not exactly 
welcoming the American troops as they entered Baghdad on 9 April and that many of the 
reporters in the city “picked up on the first day a lot of very ambivalent feelings, and those 
feelings were basically completely overwhelmed by the images and, most important, the 
superficial event that took place that day—the statue being taken down, the Americans 
taking over the city” (Hoyt et al 2007, 24). Aday, Cluverius and Livingston (2005, 327) 
argue that television news networks' “continued replaying of close-up images of the statue 
falling gave the false impression that masses of Iraqis participated, that such scenes were 
typical and representative of the state of the war, and that the Iraqi people unflinchingly 
welcomed the Americans as liberators.” Their study also shows that the Fox News Channel 
and the CNN adopted a “victory” frame after the toppling of the statue and the number of 
stories  focusing  on combat  dropped dramatically despite  the fact  that  the  fighting  still 
continued and Saddam's home town Tikrit fell only a few days later.
Major and Perlmutter  (2005, 43) argue that  the media helped to  legitimise the war by 
conveying a pictures of jubilant Iraqis welcoming the regime change while ignoring other 
190
aspects of the fragile situation in the country. While the Saddam statue was toppled on the 
eastern side of the Tigris River, fighting still continued on the western side (Rampton & 
Stauber  2006,  165). However,  the  media  tended to  ignore  this  side  of  the  event  even 
though in retrospect it would have given the audiences a better understanding of what was 
to come. Major and Perlmutter (2005, 42) argue that as a result of several US attacks on 
journalists “many journalists not embedded with the U.S. military were pinned down under 
fire and were not present when the statue was taken down.” They also question whether the 
toppling of the statue had any real news value and point out that few days later 20,000 
Iraqis protested against the US occupation in Nasiriyah in southern Iraq but this did not 
receive extensive media coverage.
Nevertheless, the looting that followed the fall of the Iraqi polity was widely covered. In 
fact, it was covered so extensively that, in a press conference on 11 April, US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003) argued that:
“I picked up a newspaper and I couldn't believe it.  I read eight headlines that talked about 
chaos, violence, unrest. And it was just Henny Penny -'The sky is falling.' I have never seen 
anything like it! And here is a country that is being liberated, here are people who are going 
from being repressed and held under thumb of a vicious dictator, and they're free.” 
Clearly, Rumsfeld was not pleased with the media coverage. Rumsfeld gave examples of 
what  kind  of  journalism  he  would  prefer:  pictures  with  captions  portraying  Iraqis 
welcoming the US troops. He ridiculed the media by arguing that the same footage of a 
looter carrying a stolen vase was aired so many times that there weren't even that many 
vases in the whole of Baghdad. He implied that the media gave a wrong impression of the 
magnitude of the looting and disorder (Woodward 2007, 164-165).
Although the anti-war countries had failed to stop the US/UK from attacking Iraq,  the 
stakes  remained high.  It  was  still  unclear  who would eventually benefit  from the war, 
decide who would govern in Iraq and who would have access to lucrative reconstruction 
deals  and  oil  resources.  On  11-12 April,  Vladimir  Putin,  Jacques  Chirac  and Gerhard 
Schröder  held  a  two-day summit  in  St  Petersburg  to  discuss  how to  best  guard  their 
interests in Iraq. Kremlin, for instance, had considerable interests in Baghdad as Iraq owed 
$8 billion to Russia.  The leaders of the three anti-war countries demanded that the UN 
Security  Council  should  be given  the  responsibility to  organise  the  reconstruction  and 
political  transition.  In  effect,  surrendering the issue  to  the  UN would have  meant  that 
France, China and Russia could veto significant decisions and the US would not be able to 
control Iraq's  political  future and hand out reconstruction deals  to American firms and 
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reward its allies. On 9 April, Rumsfeld announced that retired US General Jay Garner, who 
had  been  appointed  as  the  head  of  the  Office  of  Reconstruction  and  Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) in January 2003, would lead the reconstruction effort. Few days later 
(15 April), Garner chaired the negotiations on an interim government with Iraqi opposition 
and religious groups outside Nasiriyah and the political reconstruction of Iraq began under 
US control – and without UN participation. 
On 17 April, EU member states issued a statement in Athens which “called for increased 
involvement in post-war Iraq by the United Nations, a central UN role in the transitional 
process toward self-government by the Iraqi people” (European Union 2003). However, 
the cautiousness of the statement indicated that France and Germany were not willing to 
strain their relations with Washington any further.
8.2 ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE
A total of 864 items, which were published between 10 and 16 April, were included in the 
sample. The Finnish newspapers published a total of 203 items, Irish newspapers 201 and 
the UK newspapers 460. It is worth noting that the Irish Independent published 23 items 
from the  Times  (of London), 22 from the  Daily Telegraph and 26 from the Independent 
News Service. 
8.2.1 Editorial responses to the fall of Baghdad
In a commentary piece ('Conquered people are not free', 16 April),  Helsingin Sanomat's 
Sami Sillanpää argued that the ”US has assured that the Iraq War is by no means about oil. 
If the Iraqis were allowed to decide on their natural resources from the beginning, it would 
lend credibility to this claim.” He also argued that  the occupiers have an obligation to 
withdraw as soon as possible noting that, if the aggressors were any other states than the 
US and Britain, the UN Security Council would be in the process of passing a resolution 
against  the  illegal  occupation.  In  response  to  Rumsfeld's  statement  that  the  US is  not 
responsible for the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, an editorial in Helsingin 
Sanomat ('The US is responsible', 15.4.) insisted that the invaders are responsible for all 
the events  in  the country.  In  an earlier  editorial  HS also stated that  the invaders  were 
responsible for any civilian casualties since they chose to go to war in the absence of a 
compelling reason.  At  the  same time,  HS defended the  French position  and expressed 
doubts about Bush administration's real motives:
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“The Americans and the Brits have attempted to label France as the guilty party for the whole 
war because it did not stick with them. This accusation is absurd. Countries that wanted the war 
have changed the justifications and goals of the war all the time in a way that shows that the 
decision to go to war had been made long time ago.”
While  Helsingin  Sanomat's  opinion  items  were  largely  critical  of  the  invasion,  an 
unusually pro-US letter-to-the-editor was published on 16 April. It was written by Jutta 
Zilliacus,  a  former  MP of  the  Swedish  National  Party  (RKP),  who  defended  the  US 
position on Iraq by referring to the cruelty of the Iraqi leader and the inefficiency of the 
UN weapons inspections. She suggested that the anti-war stance of Russia, France and 
Germany is due to their selfish interests in Iraq.
Turun Sanomat adopted  perhaps  even a  firmer  stance  than  Helsingin  Sanomat.  On 12 
April,  an  editorial  in  Turun  Sanomat  argued  that  'Anarchy  and  chaos  have  replaced 
Saddam's dictatorship in Iraq': 
“The US attempt to unilaterally decide on Iraq's governance and reconstruction has created 
resentment elsewhere in the world. Especially Germany, France and Russia – which opposed 
the war – have demanded a dominating role for the UN in the Iraqi reconstruction. The demand 
is well-founded and would probably lead to the best result with regard to Iraq's future even 
though it would not be solely based on consideration of Iraqi interests. Each country has its 
own interests to safeguard and, in the above-mentioned countries, a UN-led reconstruction is 
best seen to secure them.”
This editorial was perhaps more moderate than the ones TS had ran in the past few days. 
On 9 April, an editorial demanded a strong role for the UN in the reconstruction effort.181 
On 5 April, Turun Sanomat editor-in-chief Aimo Massinen argued that the US had lost the 
media war in Europe. He argued that the justifications for the war have no grounds and that 
George W. Bush, Tony Blair and the Danish Prime Minister should be tried for crimes 
against humanity. At the same time, he characterised the Finnish Iraq policy as “cautious 
complaining” but acknowledged that it could be a “wise” approach. TS also published an 
opinion piece by Pirkka Kivenheimo under the heading 'The worst fears of the Iraq War did 
not materialise'. He implies that the US might have known that Iraq did not possess WMD 
anymore and, hence, dared to launch the invasion. It would be safe to conclude that Turun 
Sanomat's editorial policy on the Iraq War was highly critical but it accepted the Finnish 
government's policy which regarded the war ”regrettable”.
Ilta-Sanomat also carried critical tones in its opinion items. A letter-to-the-editor ('USA and 
the Great Britain apart from the UN', 11 April) argued that the UN should sanction the 
181On 2 April, TS published yet another editorial ('The Iraq War is not accepted') on Iraq 
discussing fresh survey data which indicated that ¾ of Finns disapproved of the war.
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aggressors  who  invaded  another  country  without  UN  authorisation.  On  12  April,  an 
editorial  ('Iraq  is  a  test  to  the  UN')  demanded  UN  participation  in  the  political 
reconstruction of Iraq. Ilta-Sanomat ran a commentary by Jouko Juonala ('Peace is yet to 
be won', 10 April) who argued that there is no point in arguing about the justification of the 
invasion  any more.  The  humanitarian  situation  and anarchy are  more  urgent  problems 
before the unprecedented challenge of rebuilding the country. Ilta-Sanomat also presented 
the views of a university professor, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, who warned that the war is 
likely to continue as separate attacks against  the coalition forces.  He argued that these 
attacks  could continue as long as the troops  stay in Iraq.  Ruben Stiller,  a  well-known 
Finnish journalist, expressed very rare views in the Finnish press coverage of the war. He 
implied that the popular anti-war sentiment was due to the fact that “a wrong country chose 
to defend the oppressed”. In other words, he claimed that anti-Americanism was to blame 
for the Finns' disapproval of the war. 
The  opinion  material  published  by the  Finnish  newspapers  was  largely  critical  of  the 
invasion and how it was executed. Moreover, apart from Helsingin Sanomat, the Finnish 
newspapers demanded that the UN should be given a central  role in Iraq.  The Finnish 
foreign policy with regard to Iraq was hardly discussed at all although it was – arguably – 
the deciding factor in the general elections less than a month before. Only one letter-to-the-
editor openly criticised Finland's foreign policy line for being too cautious.
The Irish Times published an editorial on Iraq on 12 April ('Bringing peace and order to 
Iraq').  The  editorial  argued  that  the  ”legitimation  of  the  new Iraqi  regime  must  come 
through  the  United  Nations.  [...]  Mr  Tony Blair's  call  for  a  post-war  United  Nations 
conference on Iraq's future is the best way to secure their support and establish regional 
and global legitimacy for a new Iraqi government.” The  Irish Times' also ran an opinion 
piece by Noel Dorr, a former Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who 
argued for a reform of the UN ('Yes, we do need the UN, but a reformed UN', 15 April).
In a commentary piece ('Selective symbolism', Irish Times 12 April), Eddie Holt contrasted 
the pictures of the falling statue and Ali Ismaeel Abbas – a 12-year-old who lost both his 
arms and his family to “US-British weapons of mass destruction”. Holt ends his highly 
critical commentary by arguing that 
“Millions  of  Arabs,  even  those  who  opposed  Saddam  Hussein's  regime,  did  not  see 
Wednesday's spectacle of symbolically toppling the tyrant as it was reported in the West. 'This 
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is a new colonialism,'  one Palestinian told Britain's  Independent newspaper. 'The Americans 
did not come as liberators but to take control of Iraq's oil.' We will see. Perhaps the Iraqis, once 
they stop looting, lynching or barricading themselves in their homes, will be 'given back their 
country'.  But  bombing  Iraq  to  get  rid  of  a  dictator  they  backed  in  the  first  place,  while 
shamelessly awarding lucrative rebuilding contracts to pals, doesn't inspire much confidence in 
US-British intentions - real or even symbolic.” 
Vincent Browne's opinion piece in the  Irish Times, 'A selective attitude to suffering' (16 
April), questioned the sincerity of the US/UK motives to attack Iraq:
“How is it that the humanitarian crusaders of our day, the Americans and the British, who have 
waged war on Iraq for the humanitarian objective of liberating the people of Iraq, don't seem a 
little bit bothered about humanitarian causes elsewhere in the world? The disarmament alibi for 
the war on Iraq is now irrelevant, apparently.  Iraq either had no weapons of mass destruction 
or, if it had, was not prepared to use them, even in the most dire of circumstances. That is the 
same as having no weapons of mass destruction.
So the war has got  to have been about humanitarianism. Touching. Even if it  involved the 
slaughter  of  thousands  of  Iraqis,  the  devastation  of  its  society  and  infrastructure,  mass 
starvation and lawlessness. Even if the majority of Iraqis did not want to be liberated by the 
Americans. Even if it destabilises what  passes for a world order, terrifies people around the 
globe - the Syrians in the first instance - and breeds a new and more cynical colonialism.”
Although the opinion pieces were mostly critical  of the war in the  Irish Times,  Kevin 
Myers's  regular  column,  'An Irishman's  Diary',  expressed very pro-war  views or,  more 
specifically, views that were against the anti-war movement. On 11 April, Myers demanded 
an apology from the anti-war movement together with an acknowledgement that they were 
wrong.
“So no rejoicing from them that  freedom has  come to the people of  Iraq,  courtesy of  the 
greatest democracies in the world. No rejoicing that Saddam's torture chambers are closing. No 
rejoicing that murder and rape have been banished as instruments of state. No rejoicing that 
just 15,000 American soldiers liberated a city of 5 million people, and a couple of thousand 
British (and Irish) troops freed the million people of Basra. NIMNs [Not In My Name] are 
pathetic  people,  about  a  pathetic  purpose,  one  that  survives  in  Ireland  because  of  the 
extraordinary numbers of NIMNs and NWFOs [No War For Oil] in the Irish media. They were 
wrong on the first Gulf War, wrong on Afghanistan, wrong on this war. They'll be wrong on the 
next one. You see.”
On 15 April,  Myers targeted film-maker Michael Moore and,182 a day later, his column 
followed the usual pattern of criticising and ridiculing the anti-war movement by picking 
on a nude protest by female anti-war activists.
182Myers argued: “He belongs to that spectrum of opinion in the US, in Britain and here 
which dominates the media, which hails Noam Chomsky as an intellectual guru, and 
which gets everything wrong. Why are such people so popular? They got it wrong on 
the first Gulf War, they got it wrong on Bosnia, they got it wrong on Kosovo, they got it 
wrong on Afghanistan. And they never say oops, sorry.”
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Like the Irish Times, the Irish Independent/Sunday Independent presented a range of views 
in its opinion pieces.  An editorial in the Sunday Independent, 'A good week in terrorism' 
(13 April), was a condemning critique of the invasion:
“it's  not  about  liberation.  And it's  not  about  statues.  And it's  not  over.  It's  about  strategic 
interests, oil and blood. Always has been, always will be. Iraq is one bloody link in a long 
bloody  chain. [...] On  April  7,  four  2,000lb  missiles  were  dropped  on  the  Al-Mansour 
residential area of Baghdad, on a restaurant where Saddam was expected. I have no idea if he 
was killed, nor do I care. It's hard to know who or how many you kill in such circumstances, 
but it's  believed that  between nine and 14 civilians were turned to mush on that  occasion. 
Whatever you call it, that's terrorism. Whether the missiles dropped on the Al-Shaab and Al-
Nasser markets were similar efforts, I don't know, but I do know that dozens of civilians were 
shredded. I know there were countless similar 'strikes'. 
Some may choose to believe that Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney set out to 'liberate' Iraq. There is 
no history of such laudable crusades. What there is, is a history of installing, supporting or 
removing local thugs, as required to protect the West's commercial and strategic interests. This 
history takes in Chile, Iran, South Africa etc - throw a dart at a map of the world and whatever 
you hit will leak blood.
[...] The USA and Britain want to get out of Iraq as soon as they can establish a dependable 
regime. That  regime  will  if  necessary  be  defended  from  the  vile  designs  of  democratic 
tendencies that threaten our interests.  [...] That defence may involve propping up local thugs 
who torture their citizens, or it may require a form of terrorism that pulps thousands of people 
in  the  course  of  putting  manners  on  the  local  thug.  [...]  Right  now,  angered  people  are 
researching likely targets, consulting airline schedules and assuring themselves that what they 
are about is not terrorism but liberation. It  was a good week for terrorism. Unfortunately, it 
ensures that there will be a great many more such weeks. ”
These critical views were balanced by other commentary pieces in the Sunday Independent 
which expressed contempt toward the anti-war movement and France. For instance, Eilis 
O'Hanlon and Jody Corcoran ('Lefty gloom-mongers who had a bad war') ridiculed some 
predictions by “trendy liberal lefties”. 
"'The disaster is unmitigated,' proclaimed Tin Tin [Fintan] O'Toole in The Irish Times. 'We owe 
them the truth that the quick, clean war they wanted to fight has already been lost and the slow, 
brutal one they are now fighting cannot be won, even when Saddam is dead and Baghdad is 
occupied.' Tell that to the thousands who celebrated his removal.”
Instead of glorifying the coalition war effort, Robert Fisk's reports from Baghdad typically 
focused on the human suffering resulting from the US/UK invasion. In a report headlined 
'Joy as the statue comes down but Saddam remains elusive' (Irish Independent 10 April) he 
wrote  that  “[i]t  was  a  day that  began with shellfire  and  air  strikes  and blood-battered 
hospitals”.183 The next day (11 April), Robert Fisk continued his critical coverage with a 
story headlined 'Tank fire massacre on road to capital'. In addition to Robert Fisk, Rupert 
Cornwell expressed concern about the fragile regional stability ('It's only the end of the 
beginning of Iraqi agony', the Irish Independent 14 April):
183 According to the Red Cross, only three of Baghdad's 35 hospitals remained operational 
despite the looting and violence that followed the fall of Baghdad (Edwards & 
Cromwell 2006, 53).
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“Many of us who opposed the war did so because we believed the risks to regional stability 
outweighed the potential gains. Nothing so far has changed that judgment; indeed Turkey's 
behaviour, the current chaos in Iraq and the American sabre-rattling against Syria only confirm 
it.”
Both Irish newspapers expressed both pro-war and anti-war views in their opinion items. 
The most notable difference to the Finnish press seemed to be the strong polarisation of 
opinion.  Especially  commentators/columnists  holding  pro-war  views  expressed  very 
hostile attitudes toward those who had opposed the invasion.  Moreover,  some of them 
targeted the Irish public broadcasting company RTE for the way it covered the war184 – an 
issue  which  also  drew  considerable  attention  in  the  Daily  Telegraph which  harshly 
criticised  the  BBC's  war  coverage.  This  discussion  was  lacking  in  the  Finnish  press 
coverage.
A leading article in the  Independent, 'Now the war is over, the world must put aside its 
differences and work to help Iraq' (April 12), adopted a rather neutral position which is 
best reflected in the final paragraph: 
“the anti-war countries are asked to accept whatever role for the UN in Iraq the US is prepared 
to grant it. However undesirable, that is the reality. It is pointless to quibble, if the US now 
wants to define the UN's 'vital role' as an advisory one. What matters is that as many countries 
as possible work together to help the Iraqi people, and then to help them take control of their 
own destiny.”
In another leading article, 'It may be years before the US and Britain know what they have 
unleashed in Iraq', the Independent called for restrain from premature triumphalism. On 15 
April,  the Independent published yet another leading article on Iraq ('Justice should be 
meted out by the Iraqi people, not by the victors') which focussed on the issue of how to 
deal with people who had served Saddam's dictatorship.
Independent's Johann Hari continued to defend the invasion on 11 April ('The lesson of this 
conflict: America can be a force for good in the world'). Moreover, a few days later, Hari 
184An American diplomat, Patrick Dempsey, blamed sections of Irish press and 
broadcasters for anti-Americanism singling out RTE and the Irish Times for their 
coverage of the Gulf War. With regard to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the diplomat argued 
that ”Irish attention seemed preoccupied with questions of Ireland's neutrality, as though 
there was a moral case to be made in support of Saddamn's contention that Western 
'imperialism' was behind it all” (quoted in McDonald 2004). Sean Phelan (2005, 182), 
who has analysed Irish media (RTE 9 pm news bulletin and the front pages of the Irish 
Times and the Sunday Independent) coverage of the Iraq War, has also argued that 
”some high-profile Irish media are disposed towards anti-American stances”.
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downplayed the looting ('The looting is ugly, but it's better than torture', 15 April) arguing 
that 
”much  of  what  we  have  been  seeing  is  a  spontaneous  redistribution  of  wealth  from  the 
disgusting, corrupt elite who thrived under Saddam towards the wider population. Very few of 
the people with riches in Iraq today possess them because they have worked hard, or have any 
skill or talent. They have comfortable houses and stocked fridges because they were especially 
willing to point out the 'disloyalty' of their fellow Iraqis. 
[...]The attempt, however, to interpret the current troubles as a sign that Iraq is about to descend 
into  civil  war  reveals  an  absurd  negativism  on  the  part  of  people  who  always  opposed 
removing Saddam by US force. Some people (and I accept they are a minority among those 
who opposed the war) would rather the Iraqi people suffered again than be forced to rethink 
their own prejudices about American power.”185
Most of the other commentaries in the Independent did not share Hari's enthusiasm of the 
'liberation'. Deborah Orr wrote that ”there is no more agreement on how to win the peace 
than there was on whether to wage war. The US may have believed that it wanted to spread 
democracy.  Instead it has spread dissent and resentment, in a world fractured by three 
weeks of folly” ('The chilling metaphor of Saddam's statue', 11 April). Adrian Hamilton 
continued in the same tone and laid out his analysis of the situation ('The obscenity of 
bickering over death and torture', 11 April):
“America's security interests, at least as interpreted by Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney, require an 
Iraq not so much run by the US as obedient to its interests. The Pentagon needs military bases 
in the centre of the Arab world, Cheney wants to break the power over oil of OPEC and Saudi 
Arabia and Rumsfeld wants an Arab world that is no longer a threat to Israel or to America. 
Iraq can provide the bases, the oil flow (including a pipeline to Israel) and the pressure points 
against Iran and Syria.”
In addition, the Independent published a transcription of Tony Blair's televised speech to 
the Iraqi people ('Tony Blair: We did not want this war', 11 April). It is safe to conclude 
that  the Independent continued to  express  both  and pro-war  and anti-war  views  in  its 
opinion pieces.
The  Daily  Telegraph's  opinion  items  were  largely  supportive  of  the  war,  i.e.  they 
emphasised the depravity of the Ba'ath government and downplayed the humanitarian cost 
of the invasion and its potential to destabilise the region. For instance, a leading article in 
185 Hari, who was the Independent's pro-war voice later did a U-turn. In 2006, Hari ('After 
three years, after 150,000 dead, why I was wrong about Iraq', 18 March 2006, 
Independent) wrote that “the truth is that there was no pure Platonic ideal of The Perfect 
Invasion to support, no abstract idea we lent our names to. There was only Bush, with 
his cluster bombs, depleted uranium, IMF-ed up economic model, bogus rationale and 
unmistakable stench of petrol, offering his war, his way. […] The evidence should have 
been clear to me all along: the Bush administration would produce a disaster. […] The 
Bush administration was primarily motivated by a desire to secure strategic access to 
one of the world's major sources of oil.”
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the Daily Telegraph ('A grateful world', 16 April) argued that “the war to rid the world of a 
dictator who threatened the security of free peoples everywhere is at an end. Our first duty 
now is to give thanks to those who brought that victory about.” After expressing gratitude 
to the men and women in uniform, the article noted that 
”[w]e should also remember the scientists and arms manufacturers who developed the smart 
weapons that made victory so certain. They were the ones who gave us our technological edge 
and so ensured that civilian casualties could be kept to the minimum. The British public are 
entitled to congratulate themselves, too. At first they were reluctant to go to war, as peace-
lovers always are. But as the case was properly made to them, they rallied behind our troops.”
John Keegan's commentary piece ('The allies got it so right: how did the pundits get it so 
wrong?',  Daily Telegraph 11 April)  downplayed the potential  risks of the invasion and 
seemed to assume that the conflict was over: 
“perfectly sensible people, who surely know better, clutter up their minds with such irrelevant 
factors as 'the Arab street', 'international opinion', the anti-war movement at home, votes in the 
UN and so on. They then predict that 'American success is not certain', 'this could be a long and 
bitter war' and 'the spectre of Vietnam looms over George W Bush'.”
8.2.2 Sourcing
What is perhaps surprising in the data presented in the table 8.2, is that Iraqi sources were 
quoted in 1/3 of the items and much more frequently than US government or US military 
sources. While the Finnish and Irish governments had argued all along that the Iraq issue 
should be solved through the UN and the Blair government tried to persuade the Bush 
administration to grant the UN ”a central role” in the reconstruction of the country, the data 
also indicates that the UN had been sidelined by the events. UN sources were quoted only 
in 3% of the items included in the sample.
The data indicates that the Finnish press did not emphasise Iraqi or UN views although the 
Finnish foreign policy had all along been based on the centrality of the UN in dealing with 
Iraq. On the other hand, the Finnish newspapers also quoted the US government (13% of 
items) and US military sources (12%) less frequently than the British and the Irish press.186 
Ilta-Sanomat and  Turun Sanomat did not have their own correspondents in Iraq and this 
affected their ability to present Iraqi views. The other newspapers quoted regularly Iraqi 
sources  ranging  from randomly picked civilians  on the  streets  to  religious  leaders  and 
Kurdish fighters in the north of the country. For instance, the  Irish Times published 18 
186Turun Sanomat was the only newspaper which did not quote US/UK military sources at 
all. TS cited Iraqi sources in four items (two of which quoted government sources, one 
military and one cited an Iraqi exile).
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articles which were filed from Iraq. Lara Marlowe in Baghdad, Jack Fairweather in Basra 
and Lynne O'Donnell in Northern Iraq provided extensive coverage from the ground.
Table 8.1. Quoted sources by newspaper, 10-16 April
 Number of items quoting  (percentage of the newspaper's total number of items )
 Iraqi sources UN sources Aid agencies US govt US military
Helsingin Sanomat 38 (33%) 2 (2%) 5 (4%) 12 (10%) 15 (13%)
Turun Sanomat 2 (9%) 0 0 4 (17%) 0
Ilta-Sanomat 14 (22%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 10 (16%) 10 (16%)
FINLAND 54 (27%) 3 (1%) 7 (3%) 26 (13%) 25 (12%)
Independent 98 (39%) 7 (3%) 13 (5%) 39 (16%) 37 (15%)
Daily Telegraph 58 (27%) 5 (2%) 5 (2%) 41 (19%) 37 (17%)
UK 156 (34%) 12 (3%) 18 (4%) 80 (17%) 74 (16%)
Irish Independent 39 (36%) 4 (4%) 3 (3%) 28 (26%) 27 (25%)
Irish Times 36 (38%) 3 (3%) 1 (1%) 16 (17%) 10 (11%)
IRELAND 75 (37%) 7 (3%) 4 (2%) 44 (22%) 37 (18%)
Total 285 (33%) 22 (3%) 29 (3%) 150 (17%) 136 (16%)
8.2.3 Salience of critical topics in press coverage
Were there national differences in the salience given to different aspects of the Iraq War? 
Was  the  Finnish  press  more  sensitive  to  anarchy and  looting  or  civilian  casualties  in 
comparison  to  the  British  press?  Quantitative  content  analysis  does  not  validate  the 
hypothesis  that  the government's  foreign policy line would be directly reflected in  the 
selection (or avoidance) of topics that highlight the negative aspects of the invasion.
Table 8.2. Number of items with references to lawlessness and humanitarian concerns










Helsingin Sanomat (n=116) 38 (33.0%) 12 (10.4%) 15 (12.9%) 13 (11.4%)
Turun Sanomat (n=23) 2 (8.7%) 0 6 (26.1%) 3 (13.0%)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=64) 14 (21.9%) 5 (7.9%) 4 (6.3%) 8 (12.5%)
FINLAND (n=203) 54 (26.7%) 17 (8.5%) 25 (12.3%) 24 (11.9%)
Independent (n=245) 98 (40.2%) 21 (8.6%) 25 (10.2%) 50 (20.5%)
Daily Telegraph (n=216) 59 (27.6%) 18 (8.3%) 13 (6.0%) 29 (13.5%)
UK (n=461) 157 (34.3%) 39 (8.5%) 38 (8.3%) 79 (17.2%)
Irish Independent (n=107) 39 (36.4%) 14 (13.2%) 7 (6.5%) 20 (18.7%)
Irish Times (n=97) 36 (37.1%) 13 (13.5% 12 (12.5%) 19 (19.6%)
IRELAND (n=201) 75 (37.3%) 27 (13.5%) 19 (9.5%) 39 (19.4%)
Total (n=865) 286 (33.2%) 83 (9.7%) 82 (9.5%) 142 (16.5%)
The data presented in table 8.3 does not seem to support the hypothesis that the Finnish 
press  would  have  covered  critical  themes  more  extensively  than  its  British  and  Irish 
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counterparts although humanitarian aid featured slightly more frequently. In fact, the Irish 
press paid the most attention to looting/anarchy, the humanitarian situation and civilian 
casualties.187 If  the  Sunday Tribune had  been  included in  the quantitative analysis,  the 
difference would have been even more prominent. On 13 April, the Sunday Tribune ran the 
following headlines which illustrate well the newspaper's stance on the war: 'Saddam falls 
but anarchy rules the day', '”We can easily win the fight but lose the war”', 'Horrors of war 
replaced by the nightmare of a nation starving', 'Iraq has become a nation humiliated, not 
liberated' and 'The end justifies the means? Tell that to the maimed and the dead'.
These  results  of  the  quantitative  analysis  cannot  be  explained  with  the  manufacturing 
consent paradigm as there does not seem to be a clear correlation between the government 
policy line and the selection of topics in the press coverage.  The UK newspapers clearly 
differed from each other again. The  Daily Telegraph paid much less attention to looting 
and anarchy and civilian casualties than the Independent reflecting their editorial positions 
on the war.  The notable difference between  Helsingin Sanomat in comparison to  Turun 
Sanomat and  Ilta-Sanomat could  be  explained  by  the  fact  that,  on  average,  the  latter 
publish  shorter  articles  and,  therefore,  cover  fewer  topics  per  item.  Ilta-Sanomat is  a 
tabloid  newspaper  and  Turun Sanomat is  a  regional  newspaper  which  is  a  full-service 
newspaper but lacks the kind of resources that  Helsingin Sanomat has for international 
coverage.  Consequently,  Turun Sanomat did  not  file  any reports  from the  country but 
Helsingin Sanomat filed 17 reports from Iraq.  Helsingin Sanomat was the only Finnish 
medium which had an embedded journalist, Petteri Tuohinen, with the US troops.188 His 
reports carried headlines such as 'Destruction and death in Baghdad' (11 April), 'Looting 
spiralled  out  of  control  even  in  Baghdad's  hospitals'  (12  April),  'Baghdad struggles  to 
survive on canned food stock' (15 April) and 'Tikrit still vows in the name of Saddam' (16 
April). 
Meanwhile,  Ilta-Sanomat continued  to  rely  heavily  on  Anglo-American  news  agencies 
(AP, Reuters)  and Åsne Seierstad – a Norwegian journalist  whose reports  were widely 
published by Scandinavian newspapers. Åsne Seierstad's report from Baghdad ('At last one 
can speak freely',  Ilta-Sanomat 10 April)  included views of several  Iraqi civilians who 
187Iraqi civilian casualties entered the national political agenda in Ireland when the 
Labour Party demanded that the  government should pressure the EU take up the task of 
investigating how many civilians had lost their lives in the war. This partly explains the 
high number of items on civilian casualties.
188Tuohinen replaced Sami Sillanpää as Helsingin Sanomat's embedded journalist in early 
April (see Helsingin Sanomat 5 April).
201
were glad that Saddam's rule had come to an end.189 Out of 49 items that  Ilta-Sanomat 
published on Iraq, 17 acknowledged solely Anglo-American news agencies as sources. In 
comparison, French AFP was only acknowledged in one item. Previous research indicates 
that the criticism of the US/UK invasion could be more prominent in editorials and opinion 
pieces than actual news coverage because the latter often rely on Anglo-American sources 
and media organisations (Mucungunzi 2005, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005). Therefore, the 
low number of opinion items on the Iraq War in Ilta-Sanomat (only three during the week 
following the fall of Baghdad) explains why some of the critical themes did not receive as 
extensive coverage as they did in some of the other newspapers. 
Finally, it should be noted that, although references to looting/anarchy were considered as 
negative aspects of the war in the development of the coding protocol, some journalists 
saw  the  looting  in  a  rather  positive  light  –  as  did  Rumsfeld.  For  instance,  Andrew 
Buncombe's report from Baghdad ('Few mourn loss of leader in the poorer Shia quarter', 
the Independent 10 April) argued:
“While the looting is something the US and British forces are keen to stop as soon as possible, 
there appears to be nothing menacing about it. It seems people are looting almost as a form of 
celebration, making the most of a power vacuum which they have never before experienced. 
The  looting  has  been  almost  entirely  from  military  and  government  premises  rather  than 
private homes.”
8.2.4 Direction of arguments
Another way in which differences in press coverage could be measured is the incidence in 
which certain arguments appeared in the coverage. However, counting the number of times 
certain  arguments,  such as the Bush administration's  claim that the Iraqi people would 
welcome  the  regime  change,  does  not  tell  anything  about  the  manner  in  which  they 
appeared. Consequently, the coding protocol differentiated between the cases in which the 
argument was challenged in some way from the ones that merely invoked the claim.
As can be seen in table 8.3, the Irish Times and Turun Sanomat keenly endorsed stronger 
UN role in Iraq. (At this stage of the conflict, the discussion about the role of the UN in 
Iraq related to political and economic reconstruction and, to a lesser degree, the return of 
the  UN weapons  inspections  to  finish  their  work in  Iraq.)  Equally striking  is  the  low 
189Ilta-Sanomat also ran an article ('The toppler of the statue became a hero') on a US 
soldier who climbed on the statue to help bring it down. Critical tones were expressed in 
articles headlined 'Little Ali's hospital was looted', 'The Finnish embassy was looted in 
Baghdad' and 'The number of victims will remain a mystery'.
202
number of items in which the Daily Telegraph and Ilta-Sanomat dealt with the role of the 
UN. Although it was becoming increasingly clear that the alleged casus belli, i.e. WMD, 
would never be found, Ilta-Sanomat made only one reference to the issue. The newspapers 
to question the existence of Iraqi WMD most frequently were the  Independent  and the 
Irish Times. 
Table 8.3. The role of the UN and Iraqi WMD in press coverage, 10-16 April
 
Argument that there should be 
a UN solution in Iraq Argument that Iraq has WMD
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat 12 (10%) - 5 (4%) 8 (7%)
Turun Sanomat 7 (30%) 3 (13%) 2 (9%) 1 (4%)
Ilta-Sanomat 2 (3%) - 1 (2%) 1 (2%)
FINLAND 21 (10%) 3 (1%) 8 (4%) 10 (5%)
Independent 22 (9%) 8 (3%) 22 (9%) 31 (13%)
Daily Telegraph 8 (4%) 2 (1%) 13 (6%) 9 (4%)
UK 30 (7%) 10 (2%) 35 (8%) 40 (9%)
Irish Independent 4 (4%) 2 (2%) 5 (5%) 8 (8%)
Irish Times 25 (27%) 5 (5%) 4 (4%) 10 (11%)
IRELAND 29 (15%) 7 (4%) 9 (5%) 18 (9%)
Total 80 (9%) 20 (2%) 52 (6%) 68 (8%)
The Finnish press seemed the least concerned about the Iraqi opinions on the desirability of 
the regime change through foreign invasion while the Irish newspapers dealt with the issue 
by far the most frequently (table 8.4). All newspapers invoked the argument that the Iraqi 
people will welcome regime change more frequently than they questioned it.
One of the arguments to justify the war was that it would spread democracy and this was 
the most commonly invoked implication of the invasion in the press coverage during this 
period of analysis (table 8.4). However, this argument did not feature very prominently in 
the  press  coverage although the  obstacles  to  creating a  stable  democracy in  Iraq were 
acknowledged in several articles such as Hamish McRae's ('Massive oil wealth factor fuels 
race to rebuild Iraq', Irish Independent 16 April): “the region is unstable and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. Whatever view you take about the balance of blame, the fact 
remains  that  external  instability makes the creation of a  viable,  orderly,  enduring state 
vastly more difficult.”
The Finnish press put the least emphasis on the depravity of the Iraqi regime while making 
positive references to it more frequently than the British and the Irish press (table 8.5). 
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Meanwhile the nature of the Iraqi government featured the most prominently in the Irish 
Times where nearly one third of the analysed items made a reference to the cruelty and/or 
aggression of the Iraqi government.
Table 8.4. Iraqi views on the regime change and democratisation of Iraq/Middle East in  
the press
 
The argument that the Iraqis 
will welcome regime change
The argument that the war will lead 
to a democratisation of Iraq/Middle 
East
 invoked questioned invoked questioned
Helsingin Sanomat 16 (14%) 7 (6%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%)
Turun Sanomat 2 (9%) 2 (9%) 2 (9%) 1 (4%)
Ilta-Sanomat 8 (13%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%) 1 (2%)
FINLAND 26 (13%) 11 (6%) 6 (3%) 3 (1%)
Independent 37(15%) 19 (8%) 14 (6%) 9 (4%)
Daily Telegraph 37(18%) 13 (6%) 8 (4%) 3 (1%)
UK 74 (16%) 32 (7%) 22 (5%) 12 (3%)
Irish Independent 26 (25%) 10 (10%) 6 (6%) 5 (5%)
Irish Times 23 (25%) 7 (8%) 3 (3%) 4 (4%)
IRELAND 49 (25%) 17 (9%) 9 (5%) 9 (5%)
Total 149 (18%) 60 (7%) 37 (4%) 24 (3%)
Table 8.5. Number of items with references to the cruelty/aggression of the Iraqi regime 
and positive references to the regime190
 References to the Iraqi regime
 cruelty/aggression Positive
Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat 18 (16%) 8 (7%)
 Turun Sanomat 6 (27%) 2 (9%)
 Ilta-Sanomat 12 (19%) 1 (2%)
FINLAND 36 (18%) 11 (5%)
 The Independent 65 (27%) 8 (3%)
 The Daily Telegraph 60 (29%) 10 (5%)
UK 125 (27%) 18 (4%)
 The Irish Independent 28 (26%) 2 (2%)
 The Irish Times 34 (36%) 5 (5%)
IRELAND 62 (31%) 7 (3%)
Total 223 (26%) 34 (4%)
No clear national patterns emerge from the data to validate the argument that the medium's 
host country's foreign policy line is the single most important factor in determining how 
the media cover international politics. Instead, the differences with regard to the direction 
of arguments seem to be more closely related to the newspapers' editorial policies.
190References to issues such as the regime being a former Western ally and constructing a 
well-functioning national health system were coded as 'positive'.
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8.3 CONCLUSION
As suggested in the previous chapters which dealt with earlier stages of the conflict, there 
were notable differences between newspapers which operated in the same political system. 
In the case of Britain, the differences were very distinctive and seemed to derive from the 
newspapers'  editorial  positions  on  the  war  although  some  of  the  commentary  pieces 
provided more varied range of opinions. With regard to the Irish newspapers, the opinion 
pieces were equally diverse and opinions often polarised into pro-war and anti-war camps. 
Such range of opinions in the press suggests that the coverage does not merely follow the 
official foreign policy line of the medium's host country as is suggested by the executive 
version of the manufacturing consent paradigm. Rather, the Irish and British newspapers 
reflected the divisions within the political elites in their respective countries. 
The  Finnish press,  in  turn,  expressed  pro-war  views  in  its  opinion  items  on  very few 
occasions reflecting the level of national consensus on the war. However, regardless of the 
united anti-war stance of the government, political elite and the public, the quantitative 
content analysis does not suggest that the Finnish newspapers would have emphasised Iraqi 
views, civilian casualties or some of the other critical topics to a greater extent than the 
British and Irish newspapers.  To some extent  this  could be explained  by the fact  that 
neither Ilta-Sanomat nor Turun Sanomat had their own correspondents in Iraq to provide 
extensive coverage on general  lawlessness,  casualties,  the state  of medical  care  and to 
interview Iraqi people. Yet, Helsingin Sanomat had presence in Iraq but, according to the 
qualitative  content  analysis,  it  did  not  strike  as  being  more  critical  than  the  British 
Independent or the Irish Times which operated in a notably different political situation than 
the Finnish press.191 
191Nevertheless, according to Anssi Männistö (2004) 40% of pictures in Helsingin 




THE AFTERMATH, 2 – 8 MAY
9.1 INTRODUCTION
On 1 May, President Bush had his ”Top Gun moment” when he landed on the deck of USS 
Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier, on the coast of California. He changed from his flight 
suit and declared the end of ”major combat operations” in Iraq. The carefully staged media 
event  was  geared  for  re-election  in  2004.  A  huge  banner  with  the  text  ”Mission 
Accomplished” was waving behind Bush when he praised the US forces who had brought 
”freedom” to the Iraqi people (Bush 2003b):
”In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our 
nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment -- yet, it is you, the members of the 
United States military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your 
country and for each other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. 
Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.
In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. 
Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire 
their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and 
water  and  air.  Everywhere  that  freedom  arrives,  humanity  rejoices;  and  everywhere  that 
freedom stirs, let tyrants fear.”
In the absence of the smoking gun, liberation of the Iraqi people as a justification for the 
invasion  begun to  overshadow the  WMD issue.  Yet,  the  earlier  justifications  were  not 
abandoned:
”The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and 
still  goes on.[...]  The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against  terror. 
We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is 
certain: No terrorist  network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, 
because the regime is no more.”
Despite the lack of evidence on the alleged link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, President Bush 
kept on insisting that the invasion of Iraq was part of the War on Terror. He also countered 
claims that the invasion was essentially an imperial war: ”Other nations in history have 
fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, 
want nothing more than to return home.” Indeed, the absence of WMD had begun to fuel 
the suspicions that the US had other motives to invade Iraq. 
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During  the  week  following  Bush’s  speech,  it  was  also  reported  that  Washington  was 
planning  to  send  a  former  diplomat,  Paul  Bremer,  to  take  over  the  US-led  Office  of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) from Jay Garner, a former three-star 
general.192 This was part of the infighting within the Bush administration. Similarly on the 
international level, the major powers continued to twist arms over the future of Iraq and 
what kind of roles the UN and possibly NATO could play in the country. In addition, on 2 
May, EU foreign ministers gathered in Rhodes to discuss EU's role in humanitarian aid 
efforts as well as UN role in the reconstruction. According to Bush administration plans, 
Iraq's  massive  oil  reserves  were  supposed  to  finance  the  reconstruction.193 The  US 
demanded that all sanctions against Iraq are lifted and, together with the UK, the Bush 
administration drafted a proposal for the UN Security Council  which would give them 
authority to run the Iraqi economy for a year. To complicate matters further, both French 
and Russian oil companies had made significant deals with the Iraqi government which the 
US invasion put in jeopardy. On 8 May, the last day included in the sample, President Bush 
declared that the US, together with the UK and Spain, were preparing a draft resolution for 
the UN Security Council to lift the sanctions on Iraq.
Eventually, on 22 May, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483 which allowed 
the  US  to  spend  Iraq's  oil  revenue  on  reconstruction  and  effectively  legalised  the 
occupation. As a concession to France and Russia, the resolution also encouraged the US to 
”work with” the UN. The role of the UN in Iraq did not become ”vital” as Bush and Blair 
had promised in April. For example, despite Russia's insistence, the US did not allow UN 
weapons inspectors to return to Iraq to finish their job (Williams 2003). In late May, newly 
appointed  top  US envoy Bremer  disbanded  the  Iraqi  military forces  together  with  the 
defence  and  information  ministries  leaving  hundreds  of  thousands  soldiers  and  public 
sector employees unemployed. This contributed to the increasing violence in Iraq later on 
as many former soldiers joined the insurgency.
192The British newspapers gave a little conflicting reports on Bremer's loyalties. The 
Daily Telegraph wrote: ”Mr Bremer is viewed as an ally by several prominent neo-
conservatives, the idealistic advocates of enlarging America's role in the world and 
spreading democracy in the Middle East by military means if necessary” ('Former 
diplomat to be Iraq ruler', May 3). However, the Independent (2 May) took a different 
view: “The choice, if confirmed, would represent a significant victory for Colin Powell, 
the Secretary of State, and his embattled department in the running skirmishes with Mr 
Rumsfeld's Pentagon which has tried - usually successfully - to get its own men into 
influential posts.” 
193However, the production has remained at low levels for years after the invasion.
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It is worth noting that Irish Times' correspondent Lara Marlowe later argued that “[d]uring 
the bombardment it was obviously pretty grim, with explosions happening all the time, but 
in May 2003 when George Bush declared 'Mission Accomplished', things were chaotic, 
there was looting and arson and those sorts of things going on.” 
9.2 THE SAMPLE
Because the number of items during this last period of analysis was rather small, a slightly 
more  qualitative  approach  has  been  adopted  than  in  the  previous  chapters.  283  items 
published  between  2–8  May  were  included  in  the  sample.  The  newspapers  published 
between 77 (Independent/Independent  on Sunday)  and 16 (Turun Sanomat194)  items on 
Iraq. The UK newspapers totalled 136 items, Finnish newspapers 87 items and the Irish 
newspapers 60 items. 213 were categorised as news stories, 31 as letters-to-the-editor and 
23 as other opinion pieces. As for the origin of the stories, the UK newspapers had their 
own correspondents in Iraq who filed about a dozen reports for both newspapers (inclusive 
of their Sunday editions) within the week period. 
The Irish newspapers  had very different  strategies  in  international  coverage.  The  Irish 
Independent relies heavily on UK newspapers. It published 13 stories from the Times, four 
from the  Daily Telegraph and 3 from the Independent News Service. In comparison, the 
Irish Times ran one story by the  Los Angeles Times, which was filed from Baghdad, but 
mainly relied on its own correspondents Denis Staunton, Conor O'Clery, and others. They 
contributed  nine  stories  during  the  week  against  just  three  by the  Irish  Independent's 
correspondents.
Helsingin Sanomat's superior resources in relation to Turun Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat was 
reflected in the fact that its foreign correspondents provided 11 reports while IS and TS put 
together published only one report on Iraq from a foreign correspondent. Therefore, the 
194'Iraq' produced 20 hits between 2-8 May in Turun Sanomat's online search engine. 
After exluding duplicates and stories with only minor references to Iraq, 16 stories were 
selected for coding. With regard to Turun Sanomat's coverage of the war, it has to be 
noted that the small number of stories on Iraq is partly explained by the fact that it 
preferred to publish one long article on Iraq rather than several short stories. For 
instance, on 8 May, it ran an article ('The post-Saddam chaos prevents Iraq's return to 
normalcy') which had three subheadlines ('Soldiers are accused of encouraging the 
looters', 'WHO expects a cholera epidemic', 'A Newspaper: Saddam on a new tape'). 
Other newspapers tended to deal with these issues in separate articles. Ultimately, the 
lowest number of stories among all newspapers included in the study is explained by the 
fact that, as a regional newspaper, its output cannot compete with the larger national 
newspapers.
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Finnish  press  depended on news  agencies  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  British or  Irish 
newspapers. Unlike Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat,  Turun Sanomat did not rely on 
Anglo-American news agencies or other news organisations. TS only referred to Finnish 
STT and French AFP. In contrast, Helsingin Sanomat acknowledged Anglo-American news 
agencies (AP and Reuters) and newspapers (The Washington Post, the New York Times) in 
15 items. Only 4 items acknowledged either STT, AFP and/or DPA. Ilta-Sanomat also used 
AP, Reuters and other Anglo-American media more than its own correspondents and non-
Anglo-American media.
9.3 ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE
As discussed in the previous chapters, existing research would suggest that the media tend 
to  cover  wars and other  foreign policy issues from a national  point  of  view reflecting 
national foreign policy line and elite opinion (e.g. Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2008). On the 
other hand, previous research also suggests that media coverage of wars becomes more 
critical when the fighting is over. The argument goes that it  is easier for journalists to 
pursue critical topics and investigate the events without the constraints imposed on them 
during  the  actual  war.   For  instance,  David  McQueen's  (2008,  64)  study  on  BBC's 
Panorama coverage of the Iraq War supports the “view that it is in the ‘post-war’ phase that 
‘critical’ investigative  journalism  is  most  likely  to  take  place.”  Using  Daniel  Hallin's 
(1986)  concepts,  the  war  moves  from  the  “sphere  of  consensus”  to  the  “sphere  of 
legitimate controversy”.195 So, the question is whether the newspapers begun to include 
critical  sources and issues to greater extent  than during the earlier  periods of analysis. 
Clearly, by early May, it was possible to reflect on the war in a new light. The absence of 
WMD provided reasonable grounds to re-evaluate how solid the evidence against Iraq was 
and raise questions on whether the US/UK governments deliberately misled the public. 
Doubts regarding these issues also lead to the question whether the war was about the 
weapons of mass destruction in the first place. The differences between the countries and 
195Hallin (1986, 116-117) defines the sphere of consensus in the following way: ”it 
encompasses those social objects not regarded  by the journalists and most of the society 
as controversial. Within this region journalists do not feel compelled either to present 
opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary, the journalist's 
role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values.” Sphere of legitimate 
controversy, in turn, is ”the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues 
recognized as such by the major establishment factors”. Finally, there is the sphere of 
deviance: ”the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the 
political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard”
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media outlets could also be reflected in the salience of topics such as civilian casualties, 
humanitarian situation and the general lawlessness in Iraq.
9.3.1 Coverage of President Bush's declaration of the ”end of combat missions”
President  Bush's  speech  provided  several  controversial  claims  which  investigative 
reporters  could  easily  have  challenged  if  they  chose  to  do  so.  An  editorial  in  Turun 
Sanomat (”Iraq  is  moving  from  the  war  to  the  age  of  reconstruction”,  3  May),  in 
accordance  with  its  anti-war  editorial  policy,  took  a  highly  critical  stance  on  Bush's 
”Mission Accomplished” speech:
”Bush's pompous speech was inflated with words such as freedom, democracy, tyranny and 
fight against evil, which he likes to use. To large extent, the speech praised the US forces that 
had took part in the war. Bush stated that the nation and the coalition were proud of what had 
been accomplished in Iraq.
It is certainly true that very few will miss Saddam Hussein's dictatorship which was based on 
the violence of the rulers and the fear of the ruled. However, some of the things that happened 
during  the  war  give  no  reason  for  pride  including  killing  of  civilians  and  the  looting  of 
priceless museum collections which will remain on American conscience. 
The toppling of the Saddam regime as a goal of the war surfaced in a rather late stage. Earlier, 
the US had emphasised the removal of WMD as a reason. Now that the war has practically 
come to an end,  there is  still  no sign of the WMD. Many are ready to  believe that  these 
weapons do not even exist. In his speech, Bush assured that the Americans will continue to 
search for them. The justification of the war is  highly questionable if  the weapons are not 
eventually found.”
Neither Helsingin Sanomat nor Ilta-Sanomat published an editorial directly addressing the 
speech and their coverage of the speech was far less critical than TS's. HS's Washington 
correspondent Jyri Raivio failed to question Bush's claims about Iraq's alleged links with 
terrorists: ”The US has fought its war [on terror] on many fronts after the strikes in the 
autumn of 2001. Two countries harbouring terrorists have been beaten in victorious wars” 
('Bush: Iraq War was only one victory in a campaign', 3 May).  Ilta-Sanomat ('Top Gun 
President  is  aiming at  electoral  victory in  2004',  3  May)  analysed  Bush's  speech as  a 
spectacle  aiming at  re-election.  At  the same time,  the story did not  discuss  the actual 
content of the speech. In contrast, a news story in  Turun Sanomat (”Bush continues his 
battle against terrorism”), accompanying the editorial, questioned Bush's main points. The 
story argued that no WMD had been found and some Iraqis were already revolting against 
the  presence  of  the  US forces.  Moreover,  it  argued that  President  Bush ”attempted  to 
weave a connection between the hated al-Qaeda organisation and Iraq” and interprets the 
speech as a warning to Syria and other states which Bush labelled as a part of axis of evil 
in his 2002 State of the Union address.
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Conor O'Clery, North America Editor of the Irish Times, commented on the Bush's speech 
in the following way (”Bush gives war speech on carrier”, 2 May):
”The theatrical setting symbolised victory, though that word was carefully omitted from Mr 
Bush's text.
The mission of  the US-led forces in  Iraq has yet  to be fully achieved.  No unconventional 
weapons have been found and Mr Hussein has not been captured. A declaration of the end of 
the war would require the US, under the Geneva Convention, to release the thousands of Iraqi 
prisoners captured in the last six weeks and designate the US as the occupying power. It would 
impose international-law obligations on the American military.
The speech  was a  way to  formally proclaim that  the military operation had improved the 
security of the United States and brought freedom to the Iraqi people after three decades of a 
dictatorship under  Saddam Hussein, officials said. Mr Bush wanted to underline the striking 
US-British military success in  toppling the regime in four weeks, and to give Americans a 
sense of finality to the air and ground war and prepare for the next phase of reconstruction.”
O'Clery distanced himself from the most controversial arguments by adding ”officials said” 
but did not go any further in analysing the future prospects of Iraq or Bush's claims. For 
example, O'Clery made no reference to terrorism despite Bush's heavy emphasis on Iraq 
being part of the larger war on terror. 
In the Irish Independent, Roland Watson's report from Washington, reminded the readers of 
the fragility of the situation in Iraq ('Welcome to US new world order', 2 May): 
”The political dangers of the declaration were highlighted yesterday when a grenade attack left 
seven Americans injured. It happened in Fallujah, a Sunni Muslim city west of Baghdad, in 
apparent revenge for the deaths of 15 residents when US troops fired into angry crowds in two 
incidents this week. 
In  another  indication of  the fragility in Iraq,  at  least  seven people were killed and dozens 
burned when Iraqis celebrating the return of electricity in Baghdad shot at a petrol  tanker, 
sparking a fire that engulfed a petrol station. As US troops tried to hold back crowds, residents 
blamed them for failing to keep order.”
The following day,  Irish Independent ran another story by Watson on Bush's speech. The 
report ('”Top Gun” Bush lands ace publicity stunt for poll', 3 May) emphasised the event as 
a public relations stunt. 
While  another  Irish  Sunday  newspaper,  the  Sunday  Tribune,  was  not  included  in  the 
quantitative  analysis,  the  way  it  covered  the  Bush  speech  would  indicate  that  the 
newspaper retained its critical editorial policy with regard to the war. Marion McKeone, 
US editor of the  Sunday Tribune,  expressed severe scepticism on the prospect of Iraqi 
democracy which ”would effectively lead to an Islamic fundamentalist theocracy”:
”There are three main ethnic groups in Iraq. The Kurds in the northern region, the Shi'ites in 
the south and the Sunnis in the middle. The Shi'ites, who resisted the US army most vigorously 
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are also the majority group in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and most of his leadership were members 
of the Sunni minority. If the US allows democracy to take root, the results would likely prove 
unpalatable. There is little doubt that unbridled democracy would produce a theocracy in Iraq 
similar to that in Iran, which would be anathema to US interests in the region. The Ba'ath Party 
was a secular party with a Stalinist bent, but a new government that proportionally represented 
the Shi'ite majority would move towards a fundamentalist state that would likely prove hostile 
to US interests.
This week, Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer flatly ruled out any prospect of allowing the Iraqi 
people to elect a theocracy, arguing with some irony considering the ever more blurred lines 
between church and state in the US that the separation of church and state in a new Iraq cannot 
be breached.
What is in the US national interest, however,  may not coincide with what the Iraqi people 
decide is in their best interest, and if that is the case there could be plenty more blood spilled in 
the region.
[...]  the US wants  to  keep  the  peace  in  the  newly liberated  Iraq but  at  the moment,  with 
suspicion and enmity deepening among sectors of the Iraqi population, more trouble certainly 
lies ahead.” (”Bush's real battle has only begun”, 4 May)
It seems that the coverage of Bush's speech varied in Irish newspapers. The  Irish Times' 
report retained an objective approach and neither endorsed Bush's claims nor questions 
them.  Meanwhile,  the  Irish  Independent's  coverage  of  the  speech  contrasted  Bush's 
arguments with the reality in Iraq and the Sunday Tribune provided very critical analysis of 
the chances of democracy taking root in Iraq.
With  regard  to  the  British  newspapers,  neither  the  Daily  Telegraph nor  the  Sunday 
Telegraph published a leading article focusing on Bush's speech or the future of Iraq. In 
fact, the  Daily Telegraph did not pay much attention to Bush's speech and more words 
were devoted to a story which dealt with the growing anger against the occupiers in Iraq 
('Iraqis vow revenge as hatred of the US grows', May 2). A relatively short report from 
Washington correspondent Toby Harnden focused on the highlights of Bush's speech with 
several  direct  quotations  presenting  Bush's  take  on the  war.  None of  the  controversial 
claims were questioned in this story.  
The Independent did not respond to ”the end of major combat operations” with a leading 
article  either.  However,  Independent's  Washington  correspondent  Rupert  Cornwell  saw 
Bush's declaration as a launching of reconstruction: 
“Because both Saddam Hussein and Iraq's alleged chemical and biological weapons have yet to 
be found - and for the sake of diplomatic convenience - Mr Bush is stopping short of claiming 
definitive victory in his primetime address to the nation. But the thrust will be the same as that 
of Mr Rumsfeld in Afghanistan: only mopping-up remains, and the task now is to rebuild a 
country devastated by decades of misrule and oppression.
[...]  A 15-man US Treasury team is now in the Gulf region, examining how to redesign the 
Iraqi central bank, finance ministry, commercial banking system and stock markets. The US is 
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also working on devising a new national currency to replace the US dollars, pre-Saddam Swiss 
dinars' and Saddam dinars now in circulation.
But these measures are only part of a far more sweeping overhaul, aimed at giving Iraq a US-
style economic system. This would see wholesale privatisation (perhaps even of state-owned 
Iraqi oil concerns), the training of Iraqis in the ways of Western capitalism, and a new tax code 
covering both direct and indirect taxes.
[...]  Critics say that if the US persists in a narrow, ideologically driven approach, rebuilding 
Iraq could run into even worse problems than the sweeping privatisation foisted on Russia after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.” (”Iraq: The Aftermath: Bush launches reconstruction of Iraq 
and Afghanistan”, 2 May)
The  Independent was the only newspaper included in the sample which dealt  with the 
reconstruction in this much detail. Other articles investigating the reconstruction in depth 
appeared in the  Independent ('Oil deals for Halliburton's subsidiary are wider than first 
declared', 8 May) and the Irish Times ('US oil subsidiary to operate Iraqi fields', 8 May). 
Conor O'Clery reported in the latter that ”the US army has revealed for the first time that a 
government contract given to the giant oil company, Halliburton, will allow a Halliburton 
subsidiary to operate the Iraqi oil fields for a time and distribute petroleum, rather than just 
extinguish oil well fires and carry out repairs as initially reported”. Helsingin Sanomat only 
reported this on 16 May at the very end of an article focusing on the forthcoming UN 
Security Council meeting ('US plans to have a vote on its draft proposal on Iraq as early as 
next week').
9.3.2 Range of views, topics and sources
It is noteworthy that the number of opinion items was rather small at this stage of the Iraq 
conflict. This was especially the case with Finnish and Irish newspapers. Nevertheless, the 
Independent still  published 32 opinion items followed by the  Daily  Telegraph with  13 
items. In comparison, the Finnish newspapers together published only 10 opinion items 
and the Irish newspapers even less with 7 opinion items. Inevitably, this limited the range 
of views presented in the coverage – at least to some extent.
With  regard  to  Finnish  and Irish press  coverage,  the  relatively low number  of  critical 
themes,  such  as  the  humanitarian  situation  in  Iraq,  general  lawlessness  and  civilian 
casualties, can be best explained by the fact that they had very limited presence in Iraq – if 
at all. Even though both HS and the Irish Times had their own correspondents covering the 
EU foreign minister meeting in Rhodes, which resulted in rather comprehensive coverage 
of EU policies, their coverage of the situation on the ground in Iraq was rather limited. 
Nevertheless,  Helsingin  Sanomat published  stories  which  were  critical  of  the  US.  For 
instance, it ran a story (4 May) on a report by Medicines sans frontiers which criticised the 
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US for the chaotic state of health care system under the US occupation.  Other critical 
reports included 'Red Cross demands access to Iraqi prisoners of war' (5 May), 'US does 
not allow UN weapons inspectors in Iraq' (7 May), 'Cholera outbreak feared in Basra' (8 
May), and 'USA fears Iranian influence in Iraq'. The latter raised questions about a US deal 
with an Iranian militant group MEK which the State Department has labelled a terrorist 
organisation. Finally,  Helsingin Sanomat published a long story 'Nation does not approve 
the war' (8 May) which dealt with new poll findings. 18% of Finns approved of the war 
while 69% disapproved. 
The survey also provided data on opinions on media coverage of the war. More than half of 
the respondents said the coverage was balanced but nearly one in four thought that the 
coverage favoured the US. With regard to different outlets, the Finnish Public Broadcasting 
Company was considered the most balanced followed by national newspapers. Nelonen, a 
commercial television channel, and the tabloids were considered the least balanced in their 
coverage. 40% of the respondents said that the tabloids favoured the US. However, the 
analysis of the coverage does not give strong support that Ilta-Sanomat's coverage would 
have  significantly  differed  from  Helsingin  Sanomat in  this  respect  at  this  stage. 
Nevertheless, there were some differences. Unlike Helsingin Sanomat and Turun Sanomat, 
Ilta-Sanomat ran a story on the brutality of the Iraqi government,  ”Mass graves reveal 
Saddam's horrific deeds” (5 May). On the other hand, another story (5 May) pointed out 
that the Iraqi women enjoyed many liberties and, for instance, received the same pay for 
the  same  work  with  men.  Overall,  it  is  noteworthy  that  much  of  Ilta-Sanomat's  Iraq 
coverage  dealt  with  the  Finnish  foreign  policy  controversy  (7  items  out  of  25)  and, 
therefore,  the  international  coverage  was  not  extensive  enough  to  draw  far-reaching 
conclusions merely based on the last period of analysis.
According to Couldry and Downey (2004, 271) “the Daily Telegraph's discourse position 
was consistently adopted across genres (news reports, comment columns, and editorials)” 
in the run-up to the war. However, they argue that this position had not been entirely in 
harmony with the government position. The Daily Telegraph had supported the war from a 
different point of view than the Blair government as the official line had been constrained 
by the desire to secure a UN sanction for the invasion. In an editorial on 27 January, the 
Daily  Telegraph called  for  making a  case  for  war  from the  point  of  view of  national 
interest  in not having a dictator in control of significant share of world's oil  resources 
(Couldry & Downey 2004, 271). However, during the fourth period of analysis, the Daily  
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Telegraph published couple of commentary pieces which were uncharacteristically critical 
of the Bush administration. Irvin Welsh's article, 'Fratboy Dim and his buddies are told lies' 
(5 May), was very critical of how the Bush administration and the media sold the war to 
the American public:
“George W Bush graduated with an MBA in management. It seems almost certain that he is 
aware of the 'mushroom theory' of management: 'Keep them in the dark and feed them shit.' It's 
just a pity that so much of our 'free' television news media seem to agree with him.”
Margaret Drabble's comment piece, “I loathe America, and what it has done to the rest of 
the world” (8 May), was an equally harsh condemnation of the US policy: “America uses 
the word 'democracy' as its battle cry, and its nervous soldiers gun down Iraqi civilians 
when they try to hold street demonstrations to protest against the invasion of their country. 
So much for democracy.” Daily Telegraph's enthusiasm of the war may have waned with 
the frustrating search for the WMD and the blatant  mismanagement  of the occupation 
which had led to widespread looting and general lawlessness. 
The Independent published some commentary pieces on the future of Iraq. Fergal Keane, 
special  correspondent  at  the  BBC,  expressed  scepticism  about  the  introduction  of 
democracy in Iraq:
“Nobody has any idea of how to deal with the looming possibility of an Islamic state. Have 
democratic elections and the religious parties will likely win. Have no democratic elections and 
you will have a guerrilla war some time soon.” ('When the Americans go home, what will they 
leave behind in Iraq?', 3 May)
In  stark  contrast  to  these  views,  Johann Hari  ('Rejoice,  Rejoice  -  There  Has  Been an 
Explosion of Democracy in Iraq', the Independent, 7 May) argued that democracy is taking 
hold in the Middle East:
”Le Monde (hardly a font of pro-US propaganda) reported last week that Iranian officials are 
worried about the 'solid pro-Americanism' of the Iranian people, and that - with a new pro-
American neighbour - they might enact revolutionary change. This is heartening evidence that 
the second Gulf War is already helping to spread democracy throughout the region - exactly the 
kind of 'destabilisation' that we should all hope for. Let's hope Egypt is next.”
Hari  even  suggests  that  the  opponents  of  the  war  should  repent  now  that  Iraqis  are 
celebrating the fall of Saddam: 
“Of a representative sample of Iraqis, asked last week, "Was the US-led war to remove Saddam 
correct?", 54 per cent said yes; only 32 per cent said no. So if you opposed the war, no matter 
how benevolent your motives, you opposed the Iraqi people and their clear will. Why are so 
few of you repenting?” 
The next day the Independent published a letter to the editor criticising Hari's view: ”it's 
about five years too soon to say whether the invasion of Iraq will benefit anybody, starting 
215
with the Iraqi people - or whether in the long term it will prove to be an utter catastrophe 
for the Middle East and the world in general.” Another letter to the editor argued that
“In his glowing report on the current progress of democracy in Iraq, Johann Hari chooses to 
ignore one significant detail: that if you protest at the occupation of your kids' school by an 
invading army you may well  end up being shot dead as happened in the town of Falluja. 
Fifteen dead and over 50 wounded in two separate incidents does not bode well for the newly 
regained freedom to protest in Iraq. 
Some 30  years  ago  British  troops  opened  fire  on  demonstrators  in  Ireland  killing 13  and 
fuelling  a  war  against  occupation  which  was  to  last  another  20  odd  years,  the  original 
circumstances of which an independent enquiry has still yet to establish.
What hope for real democracy in Iraq when such outrages are buried by such condescending 
liberalism?” 
Robert  Fisk was  highly sceptical  of  President  Bush's  announcement  of  the  end of  the 
combat operations in the Independent on Sunday ('So he thinks it's all over... George Bush 
has announced the end of the war. But try telling that to the Shias and the Badr Brigade', 4 
May):
“The Americans, he [Rumsfeld] said, still had 'to root out the terrorist networks operating in 
this  country'.  What?  What  terrorist  networks?  And  who,  one  may  ask,  are  behind  these 
mysterious  terrorist  networks 'operating'  in Iraq? I have a pretty good idea.  They may not 
actually exist yet. But Donald Rumsfeld knows (and he has been told by US intelligence) that a 
growing resistance movement to America's occupation is gestating in Iraq. The Shia Muslim 
community, now supported by thousands of Badr Brigade Iraqis trained in Iran, believes the 
US is in Iraq for its oil. It is furious at America's treatment of Iraq's citizens; in three days last 
week at least 17 Sunni demonstrators were killed, two of them less than 11 years old. And it is 
not  impressed  by  Washington's  attempts  to  cobble  together  an  'interim'  pro-American 
government. 
Overall,  the  Independent on Sunday (4 May) continued to take a critical stance on the 
invasion which becomes evident even by looking at the headlines: “Iraqi rage grows after 
Fallujah  massacre”,  'More  false  leads,  but  no  smoking  gun”,  “Security;  Baghdad  still 
restless as Bush claims victory”. Similarly, the Independent ran headlines such as 'Children 
of Sadr City bear brunt of crisis made worse by war' (2 May), 'American denials enrage 
Fallujah' (2 May), 'Boy, 14, is shot dead by British soldier' (5 May), and 'Protests over 
health chief as cholera hits Basra' (8 May). 
The  Daily  Telegraph,  in  turn,  took a  more  positive  take  on  the  situation  in  Iraq with 
headlines such as 'Return of the exiles as hope flows again Saddam's efforts to eradicate 
the Marsh Arabs and destroy their land have failed, reports Kate Connolly in Al-Islah' (2 
May). Moreover, the Daily Telegraph kept on justifying the invasion by putting emphasis 
on the cruelty of the toppled Iraqi government ('City cries for victims of Mohammed the 
Shovel – Kate Connolly in Nasiriyah sees Saddam's political enemies laid to rest', 3 May) 
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and ridiculing the anti-war movement ('Judge tells ”silly” anti-war girl to go back to school 
– Suspended pupil urged to put on uniform and return to studies', 3 May). 
Generally  speaking,  it  seems  that  a  wide  range  of  opinions  appeared  in  both  UK 
newspapers although they emphasised different issues. Hari was rather alone in defending 
the invasion in  the  Independent and,  so too,  were Margaret  Drabble and Irvin Welsh's 
opinion  pieces  clear  deviations  from  the  mainstream  of  Daily  Telegraph's  coverage. 
Especially in the case of Independent, the range of views was guaranteed by the fact that it 
published the highest number of opinion items on Iraq (2 leading articles, 12 commentaries 
and 18 letters-to-the-editor). Even without the significant contribution from the readership, 
Robert Fisk and Johann Hari alone guaranteed some level of diversity in the points of view 
throughout the Iraq crisis. Ian Taylor (2008), who has applied frame analysis to develop 
multidimensional reading of foreign policy debates, labels Hari as a liberal hawk together 
with Nick Cohen (Observer), David Aaronovitch (Guardian) and Thomas Friedman (New 
York Times).  They justified the use of military force with Saddam Hussein's ”appalling 
human rights record”. While they may have had some reservations with regard to Bush 
administration and its case for war, the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam's rule 
outweighed all other arguments for liberal hawks (Taylor 2008, 83).
The UK newspapers were keener on making references to the cruelty and aggression of the 
Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein. This was clearly an issue which the US and the 
UK governments wanted to feature prominently in the media coverage because the most 
important justification for the war, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, had not been found.
Table 9.1. Number of items with references to the nature of the Iraqi government and Iraqi 
opinion of regime change.






Helsingin Sanomat (n=46) 3 2 - -
Turun Sanomat (n=16) 1 1 - 1
Ilta-Sanomat (n=25) 3 1 1 -
FINLAND (n=87) 7 (8.0%) 4 (4.6%) 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%)
The Independent (n=77) 13 1 6 5
The Daily Telegraph (n=59) 10 - 4 3
UK (n=136) 23 (16.9%) 1 (0.7%) 10 (7.4%) 8 (5.9%)
The Irish Independent (n=36) 2 - - -
The Irish Times (n=24) 4 - - -
IRELAND (n=60) 6 (10.0%) - - -
Total (n=283) 36 (12.7%) 5 (1.8%) 11 (3.9%) 9 (3.2%)
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9.3.3 Iraqi views
On 7 May, an Australian newspaper  Sydney Morning Herald said that it had retrieved a 
tape of Saddam Hussein who was still missing and would keep on hiding for another six 
months only to be trialled and hanged. The voice on the tape urged Iraqis to resist the 
occupation (Hussein 2003):
”The Zionists are baffled how to fight the Palestinian people and you the Iraqi people, men and 
women, stand together  against  the invasion and show your stance as much as you can by 
writing on walls, or making positive demonstrations or not selling them anything or buying 
anything from them, or by shooting them with your rifles and trying to destroy their cannons 
and tanks.”
While  Saddam preferred  to  emphasise  the  Iraqi  resistance  against  the  occupiers,  Bush 
argued  that  the  Iraqi  people  were  welcoming  the  Americans.  Nevertheless,  there  is 
evidence  to  suggest  that  the  Iraqis  had  mixed  feelings  about  the  regime  change  and 
occupiers. In September 2003, a poll indicated that the majority thought that getting rid of 
Saddam was worth the hardship they had experienced since the invasion. However, 44% of 
Baghdad residents held a negative view of the Americans and nearly half of Iraqis said that 
they were worse off after the invasion (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 22). The interviews that 
the  correspondents  conducted  in  early May are  congruent  with  the  poll  findings.  In  a 
typical quote from the sample,  Iraqis  said they were happy to see Saddam gone while 
simultaneously rejecting the presence of occupying forces.
The  British  newspapers,  in  turn,  dealt  with  Iraqi  views  on  several  occasions.  The 
Independent presented the argument that the Iraqis were welcoming the regime change in 
six  articles  and  the  Daily  Telegraph in  four  articles.  The  Independent questioned  this 
argument in five articles and the Daily Telegraph in three articles. Johann Hari's pro-war 
views explain to some extent the salience of this issue. After all, his pro-war stance was 
largely built  on  the  Iraqi  opinion.  On the  other  hand,  Robert  Fisk's  reports  from Iraq 
balanced Hari's views. For instance, Fisk argued that ”When Iraqi civilians look into the 
faces of American troops, President Bush famously told the world on Thursday, 'they see 
strength and kindness and goodwill'. Untrue, Mr Bush. They see occupation”('So he thinks 
it's all over... George Bush has announced the end of the war. But try telling that to the 
Shias and the Badr Brigade', 4 May). He argued that several incidents in which the US 
forces killed civilians were already forming a familiar pattern not too dissimilar to other 
occupations in places like West Bank and Gaza.
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Both UK newspapers published about a dozen articles filed from Iraq and Iraqi sources 
were quoted frequently especially in the  Daily Telegraph. On occasion, the only quoted 
Iraqi sources in  Daily Telegraph's coverage were either living in exile or presenting the 
Iraqi  National  Congress  (INC).  Overall,  13  items  in  the  Daily  Telegraph quoted  Iraqi 
sources while the Independent quoted Iraqis in only seven items. 
The Iraqi opinions on the regime change and the occupying forces did not receive much 
attention in the Irish and Finnish newspapers. Only  Turun Sanomat once questioned the 
Bush administration claims that the Iraqis were welcoming the change but otherwise the 
whole issue was ignored.  This can be explained by the lack of presence in Iraq which 
would have allowed the newspapers to explore what the Iraqis were thinking about the war. 
For example,  Turun Sanomat and the  Irish Times published only one item each which 
quoted  Iraqi  sources.  The  Irish Independent,  in  turn,  published  11  items  quoting  Iraqi 
sources.  This  is  explained  by  the  large  number  of  stories  it  published  from  British 
newspapers, especially the Times (13 items). On another occasion, a commentary piece in 
the  Irish Independent ('They're dancing in the streets of Karbala',  May 4), which some 
might find racist, expressed complete disregard of Iraqi views:
”Personally, I had favoured the original notion of General Tommy Franks running Iraq for the 
foreseeable future. I'm sure that Iraq and Iran and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Yemen would all 
be infinitely better off if they were run by Tommy, if only the locals could get their heads 
around that. Alas, they have other ideas, and a bunch of famously mad religions to support.”
Nevertheless,  the  US  military  rule  in  Iraq  had  a  rough  start  because  of  Rumsfeld's 
insistence on employing a rather small but mobile force which failed to restore the order 
when Saddam's rule crumbled. The newspapers which had correspondents in Iraq had more 
references to looting and anarchy. In the case of the Irish Independent, the relatively high 
number  of  references  to  this  issue is  due to  its  reliance  on correspondents  of  the  UK 
newspapers. Again, there is no clear pattern to indicate national differences.
9.3.4 Terrorism
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Bush administration insisted that the Iraq War 
was part of the war on terror. Although Blair's rhetoric on the subject may have been a bit 
more  toned down,  the  British case  for  war  also relied very much on Iraq's  links  with 
terrorists – or at least the possibility of such links materialising. On 20 March, Tony Blair 
(2003) argued that 
”this new world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, 
armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of 
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life, our freedom, our democracy.
My fear, deeply held, based in part on the intelligence that I see, is that these threats come 
together and deliver catastrophe to our country and world. These tyrannical states do not care 
for the sanctity of human life. The terrorists delight in destroying it.
Some say if we act, we become a target. The truth is, all nations are targets. Bali was never in 
the  front  line  of  action  against  terrorism.  America  didn’t  attack  Al  Qaida.  They  attacked 
America.”
Overall, it has to be said that the issue of Iraq's links to terrorism did not feature very 
prominently in any of the analysed newspapers in early May. For example, the Irish Times 
neither suggested that the links existed nor did it question the claim which, after all, had 
played an important role in justifying the war. The British newspapers differed in their 
coverage of the alleged Iraqi links with terrorism. The  Daily Telegraph referred to these 
links three times but failed to question them. Meanwhile, the  Independent presented the 
argument that  Iraq has links to  terrorism only once and questioned the claim on three 
occasions. The Finnish newspapers, in turn, may not have felt the need to question the 
terrorism claim yet again when reporting on the Bush's speech. After all, the Finnish press 
had widely contested this view already in the run-up to the war.
Table 9.2. Number of items presenting the argument that Iraq has links to terrorism.
 Terror links
 invoked questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=46) 1 0
Turun Sanomat (n=16) 1 1
Ilta-Sanomat (n=25) 1 0
FINLAND (n=87) 3 1
The Independent (n=77) 1 4
The Daily Telegraph (n=59) 3 0
UK (n=136) 4 4
The Irish Independent (n=36) 3 2
The Irish Times (n=24) - -
IRELAND (n=60) 3 2
Total (n=283) 10 7
There was another aspect to terrorism with regard to the Iraq War. A leading article in the 
Independent  on  Sunday ('The  real  war  on  terror',  4  May)  criticised  the  UK  and  US 
governments for how they were tackling terrorism and alienation of Muslim communities 
against the background of the revelation that a British suicide bomber had been responsible 
for a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv:
”The 'war against terrorism', rather than the destructive war against Iraq, should have been at 
the top of George W Bush and Tony Blair's agenda. One of the more potent arguments against 
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the attack on Iraq was that, rather than diminishing terrorism, the pre-emptive strike would fuel 
it. The war divided governments and alienated large communities when co-operation and co-
ordination were essential. In spite of Saddam's removal the world seems no safer.
[...]  If  terrorism is  the  problem, illegally removing regimes  is  not  the  answer.  As  well  as 
improving security and international intelligence, the main objective for President Bush and Mr 
Blair, both internationally and domestically, must be to confront alienation by working to bring 
communities together.” 
It is noteworthy that the Daily Telegraph's report on British suicide bombers only makes 
one passing reference to Iraq. Hence the story was not coded unlike the articles on the 
issue in the  Independent which was more explicit about the possibility that the Iraq War 
might incite terrorism.196 
9.3.5 Elusive weapons of mass destruction
On 7  May,  the  US  military  reported  that  it  had  found two  mobile  biological  warfare 
laboratories  in  Iraq  but  these  later  turned  out  to  be  atmospheric  hydrogen  balloon 
laboratories for artillery aiming purposes (Clark 2004, 30). In this regard, the finding fitted 
the pattern in which the US army reported suspicions findings none of which turned out to 
be the smoking gun. For example, on 4 April the US troops reached an explosives plant 
south  of  Baghdad  and  reported  of  boxes  of  white  powder  which  were  ”suspicious”. 
Nevertheless,  chemical  analysis  showed  that  the  powder  was  merely  conventional 
explosive.  In  another  case,  the  alleged chemical  agent  turned  out  to  be  farm pesticide 
(Rampton  &  Stauber  2006,  75-77).  In  the  US,  the  media,  especially  the  Fox  News 
Channel, were so keen on reporting these alleged findings that, around mid-April, one third 
of Americans believed that the WMD had been found (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 82). 
Despite the lack of hard evidence the Bush administration kept on pushing the issue. As 
late as 30 May, President Bush insisted that ”those who say we haven't found the banned 
196The impact of the Iraq War on terrorism remained debatable in May 2003 but, by 2005, 
it  had  become clear  that  Iraq  had  become a  training  ground for  terrorists  and  new 
techniques  to  build  improvised  explosive  devices  (IED)  spread  from  Iraq  to 
Afghanistan. According to the former chief of CIA's Osama bin Laden unit,  the US 
invasion and occupation of Iraq was a gift to al-Qaeda.(Rampton & Stauber 2006, 156-
157). In fact, al-Qaeda had rejoiced when the war begun: ”The enemy is now spread 
out, close at hand, and easy to target” (quoted in Anonymous 2004, 96). Terrorists hit 
public transport systems in Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) and 
there was also an attempted bombing in London on 21 July 2005. Spain withdrew its 
troops from Iraq after the conservative Spanish government lost the election which took 
place shortly after the  terrorist attack. The British government has vehemently denied 
any allegations  that  the  Iraq  War  could  have  played  a  part  in  radicalising  Muslim 
population home and abroad.  According to  a MORI poll,  more than half  of British 
Muslims thought that the Iraq War was the main reason for the London bombing on 7 
July 2005 (MORI 2005). 
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manufacturing devices or banned weapons,  they're wrong. We found them.” (quoted in 
Rampton & Stauber 2006, 85).
Table 9.3. Number of items presenting the argument that Iraq has WMD.
 Argument that Iraq has WMD
 Invoked Questioned
Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (n=46) 2 4
 Turun Sanomat (n=16) 1 2
 Ilta-Sanomat (n=25) 1 2
FINLAND (n=87) 4 8
 The Independent (n=77) 4 11
 The Daily Telegraph (n=59) 7 4
UK (n=136) 11 15
 The Irish Independent (n=36) 3 5
 The Irish Times (n=24) - 2
IRELAND (n=60) 3 7
Total (n=283) 18 30
Iraq's elusive weapons of mass destruction received fair amount of coverage. As expected, 
the Daily Telegraph came first in suggesting that Iraq has WMD with seven items making 
the  claim  while  only  questioning  this  assumption  in  four  items.  In  comparison,  the 
Independent implied the existence of the weapons in four articles and questioned their 
existence  in  11  articles.  For  instance,  a letter  to  the  editor  published  in  the  Irish 
Independent (”Show  us  the  weapons”,  2  May)  mocked  the  US/UK  hunt  for  WMD: 
”Curious how not one grateful liberated Iraqi has led any of the coalition forces in Iraq to 
the sites where the weapons of mass destruction are stored. You would almost think such 
weapons didn't exist.”
On 7 May, the Independent ran a news article ('Blame game erupts over failure to uncover 
weapons')  which  reported  that  some  members  of  the  US  intelligence  community  had 
claimed that “a small number of powerful neo-conservative ideologues in the Pentagon 
were so determined to prove the existence of a banned weapons programme and links to al-
Qaeda that they manipulated intelligence.”
Overall,  the  coverage  of  the  WMD issue  did  not  indicate  clear  national  patterns.  All 
newspapers,  with  the  exception  of  the  Daily  Telegraph,  questioned  the  claim  more 
frequently than suggesting the existence of the Iraqi WMD.
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9.3.6 Coverage of casualties
By 1  May,  140  Americans  and  33  British  had  died  in  Iraq.  The  Bush  administration 
strategy was to minimize coverage of the casualties and, hence, no ceremonies were held 
upon their  arrival  on  the  US soil.  No pictures  of  coffins  coming from the  Gulf  were 
allowed  and,  unlike  many previous  presidents,  Bush  did  not  attend  funerals  of  fallen 
soldiers (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 166-167). The US military did not keep records on 
Iraqi casualties either. As a result, the only systematically collected data was provided by 
US and UK volunteers established Iraq Body Count (IBC)197 which has recorded violent 
civilian deaths since the invasion.  Their  data,  which is  mainly based on cross-checked 
media reports, suggests that 545 civilians died violently in May 2003 – down from about 
3,500 the previous  month.  This  drop was also reflected in  the newspaper  coverage as 
civilian casualties did not receive extensive coverage in any of the analysed newspapers. 
Quantitative  analysis  indicates  that,  in  accordance  with  their  editorial  policies,  the 
Independent was more concerned with the negative side of the conflict  than the  Daily  
Telegraph. For example,  Independent's correspondent Phil Reeves tracked down an uncle 
of a teenage boy who was shot by American soldiers in a demonstration for his report from 
Fallujah on 2 May ('American denials enrage Fallujah').
Clearly,  the European press was not interested in the fate of the Iraqi soldiers and the 
extent of the casualties of the Iraqi army is still  not known. Despite Finland's anti-war 
policy, the Finnish press was no more concerned about the Iraqi deaths than British or Irish 
newspapers. However, the  Daily Telegraph stood out in the number of items referring to 
US/UK casualties. It was the only newspaper which referred more frequently to coalition 
casualties than to Iraqi casualties.
197Available at www.iraqbodycount.org. In 2004, the Lancet researchers employed 
statistical sampling methods which suggested that the invasion could have contributed 
to over 100,000 excess deaths. In 2006, the Lancet researchers estimated that the Iraq's 
'excess' death toll had reached 655,000 (Brown 2006). Indymedia has criticised the Irish 
Times for downplaying Iraqi casualties. They searched articles between June 2005 and 
June 2006 with the search term ”Iraq” and ”Lancet”. This produced only three hits. In 
comparison, they found that US casualties were reported 8 times in less than a two 
months. Indymedia also argued that the Irish Times consistently preferred to refer to 
Iraq Body Count figures which only include violent civilian deaths which have been 
verified by two independent media reports. Due to this methodology, IBA's own 
estimate is that their figure includes only about half of violent deaths in Iraq (Indymedia 
2006).
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Table 9.4. Number of items referring to casualties and looting/anarchy.




looting/ anarchy civilian military
Helsingin Sanomat 
(n=46) 3 - 1 4
Turun Sanomat (n=16) 1 - - 3
Ilta-Sanomat (n=25) 2 - 1 -
FINLAND (n=87) 6 - 2 7
The Independent (n=77) 10 2 2 11
The Daily Telegraph 
(n=59) 5 1 8 9
UK (n=136) 15 3 10 20
The Irish Independent 
(n=36) 2 - 1 8
The Irish Times (n=24) 2 1 1 2
IRELAND (n=60) 4 1 2 10
Total (n=283) 25 4 14 37
9.3.7 Coverage of the UN
The UN and the respect for international law are the cornerstones of the foreign policies of 
small non-aligned countries such as Finland and Ireland. In the case of the UK, it is not as 
clear  cut.  Blair  had  emphasised  the  importance  of  the  second  UN  Security  Council 
resolution but joined the US forces in the invasion despite having failed to secure UN 
sanction in the run-up to the war. After the fall of Baghdad, Blair was ready to return to 
UN. According to the Daily Telegraph ('Peace force for Iraq may take half the army', 5 
May), a British official said that "It is up to the UN to decide whether it wants to play a 
vital role or stand on the sidelines. We do not need it in terms of legality." However, the 
official acknowledged that Britain “would love to have UN endorsement, but if it is not 
available at this stage that is unfortunate”.
The  Independent quoted  UN sources  in  5  items  while  the  other  newspapers  used  UN 
sources only in one item each – apart from Ilta-Sanomat which did not quote UN sources 
at  all.  However,  quantitative  analysis  of  the  press  coverage  did  not  reveal  significant 
differences in how the newspapers emphasised the role of the UN in Iraq. 
Ilta-Sanomat (3  May)  commented on the state  of  the UN by presenting  views of  two 
professors (British and American) under the headline, “UN was a cripple even before the 
Iraq War”.  On 8 May,  Helsingin Sanomat published an opinion piece by a former UN 
weapons inspector Jonathan B. Tucker who demanded that UNMOVIC should be allowed 
to return to Iraq. 
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Table 9.5. Number of items presenting the argument that there should be a UN solution in  
Iraq.
 
Argument that there should be some 
kind of UN solution in Iraq
 invoked questioned
Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (n=46) 4 1
 Turun Sanomat (n=16) 2 -
Ilta-Sanomat (n=25) - -
FINLAND (n=87) 6 1
 The Independent (n=77) 4 2
 The Daily Telegraph (n=59) 3 1
UK (n=136) 7 3
 The Irish Independent (n=36) 2 -
 The Irish Times (n=24) 1 1
IRELAND (n=60) 3 1
Total (n=283) 16 5
Irish Times also expressed views on the UN. Paul Gillespie wrote in the Irish Times ('Blair 
needs to take bold measures to preserve his influence in Europe', 3 May): “Chirac's refusal 
to give UN endorsement to the war was the UN's - and the EU's - Abyssinian moment, 
after which nothing will ever be the same again in world politics. France must bear the 
costs of Chirac's historic error and deserves to do so.” On another instance, Kevin Myers 
wrote on his Irishman's Diary on 2 May that 
“The UN is no longer the sole authoriser of force. The world has had its Abyssinian moment 
yet again: henceforth states will pursue their own self-interests, with the occasional visit to the 
big building in New York to see if they've changed the coffee there. The UN, meanwhile, will 
simply become a large aid agency, with the difference that its officials will still all fly first 
class, and retire at 50.”
Myers's  also  participated  in  the  French  bashing  which  had  become  popular  among 
conservative commentators in the lead-up to the war. Astonishingly, Myers suggested that, 
instead of  killing a  duck to  make pressed duck, “bumbling,  conceited criminal  Chirac 
should have been strangled, half roasted, his liver removed, his carcass pressed, and the 
entire President Presse fed to the bird”. He continues:
“The EU is lying on the canvas, wondering what hit it, and NATO might as well be our own 
National  Association  of  Tenants  Organisations  for  all  its  military  value.  And  the  Rapid 
Reaction Force should now be renamed Don't Do Anything Rash Until We've Made Up Our 
Minds No-Reaction Force.
This farce has directly proceeded from Chirac's decision to veto any UN amendment justifying 
US force against Iraq regardless of the circumstances.”
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Myers repeats the very simplistic US/UK argument of the French veto either deliberately 
or out of ignorance. Truth is that the majority of the UN Security Council members would 
not have backed a resolution which would have authorised the use of force by the US-led 
forces. Unlike the British and Irish newspapers, the Finnish press did not have a similar 
resentment of the French and their policies in the Iraq crisis.
9.4 CONCLUSION
Overall, the newspapers expressed a wide range of views. The variation in the commentary 
pieces was especially noticeable in the  Independent,  the  Daily Telegraph and the  Irish 
Times. Moreover, the large number of letters-to-the-editor, particularly in the Independent, 
ensured that a wide spectrum of views were present in the coverage. On the other hand, the 
debate  about  possible  coalition  motives  to  attack  Iraq  were  hardly  mentioned  in  the 
coverage even though it had become increasingly likely that the alleged stocks of weapons 
of mass destruction would never be found.
Overall,  the  analysis  would  suggest  that  in  the  post-war  situation  the  press  coverage 
became less uniform both within the newspapers and countries. For instance, it would be 
difficult to clearly identify the Finnish newspapers presenting more critical views on the 
war and the occupation than the UK newspapers taken as a whole.  And yet,  a bulk of 
previous research would argue that the national foreign policy stance would be clearly 
reflected in the press coverage. For example, with regard to the views on the UN were not 
always  in  line  with  official  foreign  policy line.  What  is  noteworthy is  that  the  Daily  
Telegraph began to express very critical views on the how the war was sold and conducted. 
Even Johann Hari noted that “The gung-ho conservative press is now only interested in the 
Iraqi  people  as  bad news:  either  they are  mutating  into  evil,  money-grabbing  asylum-
seekers as they cross the Channel, or they stay at home and become looting thugs.” Even 
though this was not a fair assessment of  Daily Telegraph's  coverage, there was a trend 
toward expressing more views and issues which were critical of the war. Nevertheless, the 






The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise the findings of the previous chapters 
while  also  reviewing  the  data  as  a  whole  with  greater  focus  on  theoretical  reflection. 
Similar to previous chapters, the use of sources, topic selection and direction of arguments 
will be discussed with regard to issues such as the US/UK case for war and legality of the 
invasion. 
10.2 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS THE GOVERMENT POLICY LINE? 
This section will deal with hypotheses 1 and 2. It discusses the use of sources, selection of 
topics and direction of arguments.
10.2.1 Use of sources
Previous research indicates that it is the range of sources that largely determine what and 
how is covered by the media (Rantanen 2004, 302; Archetti 2007, 12). Two contradictory 
hypotheses on the selection of sources were outlined above. Hypothesis 1a argued that the 
UK press would use US governmental sources more than the Irish and the Finnish press as 
the US government held very similar views to those of the Blair government. This was not 
the case, however, as the Irish press quoted US government sources in nearly one fourth of 
the  items  (23%)  leaving  the  UK newspapers  far  behind  with  about  17-18% of  items 
quoting US government sources. Of the Finnish newspapers Helsingin Sanomat quoted US 
government sources the least (less than 13% of items) and  Ilta-Sanomat the most (over 
18% of the items).
The Iraqi government sources were quoted much less than the US sources – 9–10% of the 
items at most (Irish Times and the  Irish Independent). Only the Finnish press used Iraqi 
sources  more  than  UK  sources.  Although  it  was  at  the  heart  of  the  crisis,  the  Iraqi 
government had rather limited control over the events and its 'newsworthiness' may have 
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been further eroded by its lack of credibility. In fact, the statements of the Iraqi Information 
Minister  were  widely mocked in  the  press  coverage.198 In  this  regard  the  findings  are 
similar  to  Nohrstedt  and Ottosen's  cross-national  analysis  of  Gulf  War coverage.  They 
argued that the Western media treated all Iraqi information as propaganda (Nohrstedt & 
Ottosen 2000b, 259).
Table 10.1. Use of the warring parties as sources (percentage in brackets).199
 United States Iraq UK
 Govt Military Govt Military Govt Military
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 56 (12.6) 33 (7.4) 24 (5.4) - 7 (1.6) 3 (0.7)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 19 (15.0) 1 (0.8) 7 (5.5) 5 (3.9) 2 (1.6) 2 (1.6)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 41 (18.3) 28 (12.5) 18 (8.0) 2 (0.9) 14 (6.3) 7 (3.1)
FINLAND (n=797) 116 (14.6) 62 (7.8) 49 (6.1) 7 (0.9) 23 (2.9) 12 (1.5)
Independent (n=745) 126 (16.9) 73 (9.8) 42 (5.6) 8 (1.1) 170 (22.8) 42 (5.6)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 109 (17.8) 66 (10.8) 26 (4.2) 10 (1.6) 137 (22.3) 58 (9.5)
UK (n=1358) 235 (17.3) 139 (10.2) 68 (5.0) 18 (1.3) 307 (22.6) 100 (7.4)
Irish Independent (n=430) 105 (24.4) 50 (11.6) 43 (10.0) 5 (1.2) 49 (11.4) 23 (5.3)
Irish Times (n=375) 80 (21.3) 27 (7.2) 35 (9.3) 6 (1.6) 38 (10.1) 17 (4.5)
IRELAND (n=805) 185 (23.0) 77 (9.6) 78 (9.7) 11 (1.4) 87 (10.8) 40 (5.0)
Total (n=2960) 536 (18.1) 278 (9.4) 195 (6.6) 36 (1.2) 417 (14.1) 152 (5.1)
The  notion  that  the  media  prefer  foreign  sources  that  support  the  views  of  their  host 
government was presented in hypothesis  2a.  However,  the data presented in table 10.2 
indicates that the Finnish press did not prefer anti-war states as sources any more than the 
British press. Overall, the most vocal anti-war states were not very widely quoted in any of 
the newspapers perhaps apart from France in the case of the Irish Times. While France was 
quoted in nearly four per cent of the total number of items, Germany and Russia had to 
settle for just two per cent and China and Belgium even much less.
Both  Finnish and Irish governments  emphasised  the  role  of  the  UN in the  process  of 
disarming Iraq. However, in the Finnish case, this did not translate into frequent use of UN 
sources in the press coverage – little over three per cent of the Finnish items quoted UN 
sources (table 10.2). Meanwhile, the Irish press did so in nearly six per cent of the items 
and even the UK press quoted the UN more often than the Finnish press. In fact, the pro-
war  Telegraph and supposedly anti-war  Helsingin Sanomat quoted UN sources equally 
198It is worth noting, however, that the Iraqi government did not exist after mid-April 
which, in part, explain the relatively low percentage of items quoting it.
199'Governmental' sources include the executive branch of the government (leading 
politicians, ministry spokesmen and so on) and political parties and, therefore, include 
also opposition sources.
228
often. Perhaps surprisingly, the pro-war Telegraph seemed keener on quoting the anti-war 
states than the Independent which opposed the war. However, the differences were rather 
small. Yet, it is safe to argue that Independent's anti-war editorial stance did not translate 
into  frequent  use  of  anti-war  countries  as  sources.  Perhaps  the  difference  of  approach 
between the Independent and the Telegraph was reflected more clearly in the use of the UN 
and humanitarian aid agencies as sources. 
Table 10.2. Use of anti-war state, UN and aid organisation sources (percentage in 
brackets).
 France Germany Russia China Belgium UN
Aid 
agencies
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 9 (2.0) 6 (1.3) 9 (2.0) 4 (0.9) 1 (0.2) 14 (3.1) 10 (2.2)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 6 (4.7) 4 (3.1) 2 (1.6) 1 (0.8) - 7 (5.5) 3 (2.4)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 1 (0.4) - - - - 5 (2.2) 5 (2.2)
FINLAND (n=797) 16 (2.0) 10 (1.3) 11 (1.4) 5 (0.6) 1 (0.1) 26 (3.3) 18 (2.3)
Independent (n=745) 9 (1.2) 12 (1.6) 10 (1.3) 2 (0.3) 1 (0.1) 38 (5.1) 17 (2.3)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 10 (1.6) 12 (2.0) 11 (1.8) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 19 (3.1) 7 (1.1)
UK (n=1358) 19 (1.4) 24 (1.8) 21 (1.5) 3 (0.2) 2 (0.1) 57 (4.2) 24 (1.8)
Irish Independent (n=430) 16 (3.7) 10 (2.3) 7 (1.6) - 3 (0.7) 20 (4.7) 4 (0.9)
Irish Times (n=375) 26 (6.9) 16 (4.3) 17 (4.5) 2 (0.5) 4 (1.1) 25 (6.7) 5 (1.3)
IRELAND (n=805) 42 (5.2) 26 (3.2) 24 (3.0) 2 (0.2) 7 (0.9) 45 (5.6) 9 (1.1)
Total (n=2960) 111 (3.8) 60 (2.0) 56 (1.9) 10 (0.3) 10 (0.3) 128 (4.3) 51 (1.7)
To  summarise,  the  analysis  of  sources  does  not  seem  to  support  the  notion  that  the 
government policy line of the newspapers' host government would explain the selection of 
sources. This is evident if one considers how notable differences there were between the 
Finnish  newspapers  for  instance  (see  e.g.  the  use  of  US  military  sources  in  table  1). 
Consequently, hypotheses 1a and 2a are not confirmed. 
10.2.2 Topic selection
It  was  hypothesised  above  that  the  UK  press  would  avoid  topics  that  dealt  with 
uncomfortable aspects of the war (H1b) while the Finnish press would cover them more 
extensively  (H2b).  However,  it  was  the  UK  press  that  paid  most  attention  to 
looting/anarchy as well  as the US/UK use of depleted uranium ammunition – although 
references to this issue were very few in the entire sample. The Irish press, in turn, made 
references to humanitarian crisis, humanitarian aid and reconstruction most frequently. Of 
all the topics included in the coding protocol, the Finnish press topped only in making 
references to US/UK troops advancing (7.3% of the Finnish items).  Helsingin Sanomat's 
coverage especially seemed to have focused on the tactical aspects of the war. 
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Use of DU 
ammunition
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 43 (9.7) 34 (7.7) 36 (8.1) 41 (9.2) 36 (8.1) 1 (0.2)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 5 (3.9) 7 (5.6) 14 (11.1) 19 (15.0) 8 (6.4) -
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 14 (6.3) 9 (4.1) 9 (4.0) 10 (4.5) 14 (6.3) -
FINLAND (n=797) 62 (7.8) 50 (6.3) 59 (7.4) 70 (8.8) 58 (7.3) 1 (0.1)
Independent (n=745) 113 (15.2) 46 (6.2) 73 (9.8) 83 (11.2) 47 (6.3) 8 (1.1)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 70 (11.5) 30 (4.9) 29 (4.8) 43 (7.0) 40 (6.6) 5 (0.8)
UK (n=1358) 183 (13.5) 76 (5.6) 102 (7.5) 126 (9.3) 87 (6.5) 13 (1.0)
Irish Independent (n=430) 50 (11.6) 17 (4.0) 24 (5.6) 27 (6.3) 33 (7.7) 3 (0.7)
Irish Times (n=375) 44 (11.7) 38 (10.2) 39 (10.4) 51 (13.6) 22 (5.9) 3 (0.8)
IRELAND (n=805) 94 (11.7) 55 (6.9) 63 (7.8) 78 (9.7) 55 (6.8) 6 (0.7)
Total (n=2960) 339 (11.5) 181 (6.2) 224 (7.6) 274 (9.3) 200 (6.8) 20 (0.7)
With regard to the topics covered in the news articles and opinion items, it is striking how 
similar the figures for national coverage are. At the same time, the data clearly indicates 
that  there  were  bigger  differences  between  newspapers  which  operated  in  the  same 
political system with each other. For instance, the Independent covered topics that showed 
the  undesired  consequences  of  the  invasion  (looting/anarchy  and  humanitarian  crisis) 
notably  more  frequently  than  the Telegraph.  Similarly,  the  Independent emphasised 
reconstruction and humanitarian aid efforts to a greater extent than its competitor. With 
regard to  the Irish newspapers,  the  Irish Independent showed more interested in  troop 
movements while the Irish Times focused more on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. 
Over ten per cent of its coverage dealt with issues such as displacement or lack of clean 
water or food supply. In Finland, the tabloid  Ilta-Sanomat was the least concerned with 
humanitarian issues which affected the results for Finland. Turun Sanomat stood out from 
other  newspapers  with  its  coverage  of  humanitarian  aspects  of  the  conflict.  However, 
although there seems to be an emphasis on these issues, the data indicates that its lack of 
presence in Iraq directed its coverage in humanitarian aid and reconstruction while it was 
ill-equipped to cover the looting, anarchy and human suffering on the ground.
Contrary to expectations, the UK press provided the most extensive coverage of casualties 
and the Finnish press paid the least attention to this topic. Again, national differences were 
quite prominent in Finnish and British cases. While Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat 
gave almost equal coverage to US/UK military casualties and civilian casualties,  Turun 
Sanomat heavily emphasised civilian casualties. In Britain, the Telegraph covered US/UK 
military  casualties  more  frequently  than  the  Independent but  the  latter  paid  the  most 
attention to Iraqi military and civilian casualties.
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Table 10.4. Coverage of casualties of war.
 US/UK Iraqi military Civilian Journalists Unspecified
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 27 (6.1%) 11 (2.5%) 32 (7.2%) 6 (1.3%) 8 (1.8%)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 3 (2.4%) 1 (0.8%) 16 (12.6%) - 6 (4.7%)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 19 (8.5%) 6 (2.7%) 21 (9.4%) 3 (1.3%) 3 (1.3%)
FINLAND (n=797) 49 (6.1%) 18 (2.3%) 69 (8.7%) 9 (1.15) 17 (2.1%)
Independent (n=745) 83 (11.2%) 30 (4.0%) 116 (15.6%) 22 (3.05) 53 (7.1%)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 72 (11.8%) 17 (2.8%) 61 (10.0%) 10 (1.6%) 27 (4.4%)
UK (n=1358) 155 (11.4%) 47 (3.5%) 177 (13.1%) 32 (2.4%) 80 (5.9%)
Irish Independent (n=430) 39 (9.1%) 13 (3.0%) 57 (13.3%) 6 (1.4%) 24 (5.6%)
Irish Times (n=375) 37 (9.9%) 11 (2.9%) 39 (10.4%) 9 (2.4%) 24 (6.4%)
IRELAND (n=805) 76 (9.5%) 24 (3.0%) 96 (11.9%) 15 (1.9%) 48 (6.0%)
Total (n=2960) 280 (9.5%) 89 (3.0%) 342 (11.6%) 56 (1.9%) 145 (4.9%)
10.2.3 Direction of arguments
Hypothesis 1c argued that the UK press would widely reproduce the pro-war arguments 
without much criticism. As can be seen in table 10.5, some of the main arguments for war 
were most frequently invoked in the UK press. Yet,  they did not go without criticism. 
Thanks to the  Independent,  the US/UK case for war was challenged in the British press 
especially  with  regard  to  Iraq's  alleged  links  to  international  terrorism.  In  fact,  the 
arguments  about  Iraqi  threat,  its  WMD  capability  and  links  to  terrorism were  widely 
questioned in all newspapers with the exception of the Telegraph. 
There is no conclusive evidence to support hypothesis 2d, which argued that the Finnish 
press would underpresent and/or heavily criticise the arguments to credit the war, either. 
While the Finnish press frequently questioned the arguments for war, only the argument 
about Iraqi links to terrorism was challenged more often than merely invoked and, in fact, 
the Irish press was more critical of the claim that Iraq is a threat.
However, the analysis would not be complete without looking at how the arguments of 
proponents of the anti-war position were covered by the press. Often the anti-war stance 
was based on legal  or  moral  considerations  or commitment  to  multilateral  cooperation 
within the UN framework. The hypotheses 1c and 2d argued that the UK press would pay 
least attention to anti-war arguments and that the Finnish press would present them without 
much criticism. 
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Table 10.5. The case for war in the press (percentage in brackets).
 
Argument that Iraq is a 
threat
Argument that Iraq has 
WMD capability
Argument that Iraq has 
links to terrorism
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 12 (2.7) 10 (2.3) 39 (9.0) 39 (8.8) 9 (2.0) 8 (1.8)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 7 (5.5) 5 (4.0) 11 (9.0) 11 (8.8) 6 (4.8) 10 (7.9)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 4 (1.8) 3 (1.4) 20 (9.1) 7 (3.1) 8 (3.6) 6 (2.7)
FINLAND (n=797) 23 (2.9) 18 (2.3) 70 (9.0) 57 (7.2) 23 (2.9) 24 (3.0)
Independent (n=745) 30 (4.1) 24 (5.6) 85 (11.6) 73 (9.9) 22 (3.0) 37 (5.0)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 26 (4.3) 5 (0.8) 78 (13.0) 28 (4.6) 25 (4.1) 10 (1.6)
UK (n=1358) 56 (4.2) 29 (2.1) 163 (12.3) 101 (7.5) 47 (3.5) 47 (3.5)
Irish Independent (n=430) 6 (1.4) 12 (2.8) 42 (10.0) 23 (5.4) 15 (3.5) 14 (3.3)
Irish Times (n=375) 9 (2.4) 15 (4.0) 34 (9.3) 26 (6.9) 12 (3.2) 10 (2.7)
IRELAND (n=805) 15 (1.9) 27 (3.4) 76 (9.6) 49 (6.1) 27 (3.4) 24 (3.0)
Total (n=2960) 94 (3.2) 74 (2.5) 309 (10.7) 207 (7.0) 97 (3.3) 95 (3.2)
The Finnish press appeared the least concerned about the issue of legality. The Finnish 
position  on  the  war  was  that  it  was  ”unacceptable”  and  the  government  fell  short  of 
declaring the war illegal. As the table 10.6 shows, the Finnish press did not press the issue 
of  legality  either.  Ilta-Sanomat dealt  with  the  issue  in  only two items  during  the  four 
analysed weeks.  Over three per cent  of items in  Helsingin Sanomat cast  doubt  on the 
legality of the invasion but this was less than the UK press (nearly five per cent) and about 
the same level as the relatively pro-war Irish Independent. Together with the Irish Times, 
Turun Sanomat stood out once again as the most critical. 8–9% of the items in these two 
newspapers questioned the legality of the military action.
When  one  considers  the  political  situation  in  Ireland  and  the  UK,  it  is  perhaps  not 
surprising at all that the issue of legality and moral considerations received more press 
coverage in these countries.  After  all,  the UK participated in  the invasion after  a very 
divisive public debate in the run-up to the war. Ireland, in turn, was also more directly 
involved in the war than Finland because the US military had fly-over and landing rights in 
Ireland – an issue which fuelled debate on the legal and moral aspects of the war. 
On the issue of moral case for war, both the Irish and the British press were divided with 
the  Independent and the  Irish Times questioning the moral justification more frequently 
than their national competitors. In Finland, in turn, Ilta-Sanomat hardly touched upon the 
argument while Turun Sanomat was the most doubtful of the moral case for war.
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Table 10.6. Legal and moral views on the war.
 
Argument that the war 
is legal
Argument that the war 
is justified
Argument that there 
should be a UN solution
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 2 (0.4) 15 (3.4) 3 (0.7) 19 (4.3) 32 (7.2) 3 (0.7)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 1 (0.8) 10 (7.9) 1 (0.8) 7 (5.5) 17 (13.4) 4 (3.2)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) - 2 (0.9) 1 (0.4) 3 (1.3) 2 (0.9) 1 (0.4)
FINLAND (n=797) 3 (0.4) 27 (3.4) 5 (0.6) 29 (3.6) 51 (6.4) 8 (1.0)
Independent (n=745) 10 (1.3) 46 (6.2) 14 (1.9) 51 (6.9) 59 (8.0) 14 (1.9)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 5 (0.8) 17 (2.8) 14 (2.3) 18 (2.9) 28 (4.6) 15 (2.5)
UK (n=1358) 15 (1.1) 63 (4.6) 28 (2.1) 69 (5.1) 87 (6.5) 29 (2.2)
Irish Independent (n=430) 2 (0.5) 14 (3.3) 3 (0.7) 19 (4.5) 18 (4.3) 8 (1.9)
Irish Times (n=375) 5 1.3) 34 (9.2) 8 (2.1) 32 (8.5) 48 (13.0) 13 (3.5)
IRELAND (n=805) 7 (0.9) 48 (6.0) 11 (1.4) 51 (6.4) 66 (8.4) 21 (2.6)
Total (n=2960) 25 (0.8) 138 (4.7) 44 (1.5) 149  (5.1) 204 (7.0) 58 (2.0)
Many actors, the Finnish and Irish governments included, emphasised the role of the UN in 
dealing  with  the  Iraq  crisis.  Yet,  the  Finnish press  did  not  feature  the  argument  more 
frequently than the UK press. Once again, Ilta-Sanomat had a different approach than the 
other Finnish newspapers and it hardly dealt with the demands for a UN-led process. Yet 
again, the Irish Times and Turun Sanomat appeared to be most critical of unilateral military 
action and differences especially between the Irish newspapers were significant.
Finally, table 10.7 presents how the potential consequences of the invasion were covered. 
The UK press dealt with the prospect of democratic Iraq and heightened threat of terrorism 
most  frequently.  Again,  the  different  editorial  policies  on  the  war  are  reflected  in  the 
results. The Independent made far more references to the possibility that the invasion will 
incite more terrorism than the Telegraph which focused mainly on the positive effects of 
the invasion. In addition, although the Independent was enthusiastic about the possibility of 
democracy taking root in Iraq, it was more sceptical than the  Telegraph. Meanwhile, the 
Irish  Times discussed  the  possibility  of  a  civil  war  in  Iraq  more  often  than  the  other 
newspapers. For instance, Lara Marlowe's report, 'Bloody reprisals may follow Saddam's 
end'  (19 March),  from Baghdad discussed the violence that  could follow the invasion. 
Overall, however, the prospect of civil war was only mentioned in less than one per cent of 
the items. Once again the government policy line does not seem to predict the results as the 
Finnish press did not focus on the possible negative consequences of the war more than the 
Irish and the British press.
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Table 10.7. References to possible consequences of the war (percentage in brackets).
 Democratic Iraq
Increased threat of 
terrorism Civil war
 Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned Invoked Questioned
Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 6 (1.4) 6 (1.3) 7 (1.6) - 3 (0.7) -
Turun Sanomat (n=127) 2 (1.6) 4 (3.1) 3 (2.4) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) -
Ilta-Sanomat (n=224) 4 (1.8) 1 (0.4) 2 (0.9) - 2 (0.9) -
FINLAND (n=797) 12 (1.5) 11 (1.4) 12 (1.5) 1 (0.1) 6 (0.8) -
Independent (n=745) 26 (3.5) 16 (2.2) 38 (5.2) 3 (0.4) 10 (1.3) 2 (0.3)
Daily Telegraph (n=613) 18 (3.0) 6 (1.0) 9 (1.5) 2 (0.3) 2 (0.3) -
UK (n=1358) 44 (3.3) 22 (1.6) 47 (3.5) 5 (0.4) 12 (0.9) -
Irish Independent (n=430) 12 (2.8) 5 (1.2) 12 (2.8) - 2 (0.5) -
Irish Times (n=375) 8 (2.2) 5 (1.3) 12 (3.2) - 8 (2.1) -
IRELAND (n=805) 20 (2.5) 10 (1.2) 24 (3.0) - 10 (1.2) -
Total (n=2960) 76 (2.6) 43 (1.5) 83 (2.8) 6 (0.2) 28 (0.9) 2 (0.1)
10.3 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS ELITE OPINION?
H3.  In Finland, the elite and the public shared the anti-war position. Therefore, the  
coverage should have been  uniformly  and unambiguously  anti-war and also 
reflect the opposition's criticism of the government.
The Finnish case clearly indicates that a national consensus on a foreign policy issue is not 
necessarily  enough  to  guarantee  media  coverage  which  unambiguously  reflects  the 
uniformity of views between domestic foreign policy elite and the public. Regardless of the 
Finnish government's anti-war stance, the Finnish press coverage of the war did not strike 
as  particularly  critical  of  the  invasion  in  comparison  to  the  Irish  Times or  Britain's 
Independent which operated in a very different and polarised political environments. Yet, 
Turun Sanomat's coverage of the crisis was sympathetic to anti-war views and none of the 
Finnish newspapers adopted a pro-war editorial policy.
What clearly sets Finland apart from Ireland and the UK is that the Finnish foreign policy 
elite hardly engaged in a debate over Iraq. The executive branch of the government said 
very little  of the crisis.  Statements adopted by the Cabinet  Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy were very short and avoided choosing sides between the US and European 
anti-war states.  This was not surprising considering that (at least)  since President Urho 
Kekkonen's famous speech in the United Nations in 1961, caution has been the foundation 
of Finnish foreign policy. He argued that ”[r]ather than as judges we see ourselves here as 
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physicians: it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and 
try to cure” (quoted in Vogt 2004, 63).






























Helsingin Sanomat (n=446) 1 (0.2) 7 (1.6) 5 (1.1) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) - - 1 (0.2)
Turun Sanomat (n=127) - 1 (0.8) 4 (3.1) 1 (0.8) - - 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8)
Ilta-Sanomat (n=240) - 3 (1.3) - 3 (1.3) - 2 (0.8) 2 (0.8) -
FINLAND (n=797) 1 (0.1) 11(1.4) 9 (1.1) 5 (0.6) 1 (0.1) 2 (0.3) 3 (0.4) 2 (0.3)
In accordance with the Finnish foreign policy tradition, the emphasis of the Finnish policy 
in  the  Iraq  crisis  was  on  the  United  Nations.  For  example,  Foreign  Minister  Erkki 
Tuomioja said in mid-February that ”journalists  came to ask whether we support Tony 
Blair  or  the  French-German proposals  [about  strengthening  the  arms  inspections].  The 
answer one must give, of course, that we support the United Nations” (quoted in Vogt 
2004, 65). In fact, Henri Vogt argued in the Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2004 (p. 
66) that 
”Apart from this emphasis on the desired leadership of the United Nations, and the argument 
that  Iraq had to  comply unconditionally with the resolutions  of  the Security Council,  it  is 
strikingly difficult to find any general pattern of argumentation in the pre-war Finnish official 
debate.  In  fact,  leading  Finnish  politicians  seemed  none  too  willing  to  engage  in  public 
intellectual  debate  about  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  possible  war  against  Iraq.  Surprisingly 
seldom did they, and those in government in particular, try to argue in terms of international 
law, ponder what the war might mean to the international order or take any strong normative 
positions either in favour of or against the war; these tasks were left to a few intellectuals.”
The analysis of newspaper coverage for this study supports Vogt's observation. In effect, 
the Finnish political elite let foreign actors, of which the US was the most important, to 
define  the  situation  to  great  extent.  Only about  5% of  Finnish  items  quoted  domestic 
governmental sources (executive branch of the government and representatives of political 
parties).  Finnish anti-war  activists/demonstrators/human shields  did not  have much say 
either. They were quoted in only six items (0.8% of items) and religious leaders in five 
200Although  Lipponen  and  Tuomioja  are  in  the  executive  branch  in  the  table,  they 
resigned from their post on 17 April 2003 and, therefore, did not continue in their posts 
during the final week of analysis (2-8 May 2003). By then, Centre Party Leader Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki had taken up the duties of the prime minister. Of the eleven items that 
quoted  Lipponen,  four  were  published  in  May  when  his  government  had  already 
resigned. In the case of Tuomioja two out of nine items quoting him were published in 
May.  Half  of  the items quoting Jäätteenmäki  were published in  May when she had 
already taken up the premiership.
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items. Less than two per cent of the items quoted Finnish expert sources such as university 
professors although they did write several articles for the newspapers. For instance, Juha-
Antero  Puistola  from  the  Finnish  National  Defence  University  wrote  in  Ilta-Sanomat 
regularly during the war.
Nevertheless, with regard to the controversy over the Finnish Iraq policy, the media did 
seem to side with the executive branch of the government  rather than with opposition 
leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki. Centre Party leader Jäätteenmäki was alone in challenging the 
government's Iraq policy and did not receive much support for her views even from the 
senior figures of her own party. Her views lacked support from the rest of the political elite 
and, consequently, she lost the argument. 'Iraqgate' did not become a story of PM Lipponen 
promising President Bush support in the US campaign against Iraq but a story of her own 
lack of judgment in using an advisor to the President as a source of classified information 
in an effort to politicise a serious foreign policy issue ahead of general elections.
The coverage of the Finnish 'Iraqgate'  was sporadic and the issue did not attract much 
attention during the four periods of analysis. A clear indication of this is that Jäätteenmäki 
was quoted in  only five items in the entire  Finnish sample.  The critical  period in this 
argument  was  in  early  March  when Jäätteenmäki  openly criticised  PM Lipponen in  a 
televised election debate (6 March) for aligning Finland with US-led coalition against Iraq 
in his trip to Washington – against the instructions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
and Security Policy which emphasised that Finland would participate in any potential post-
war activities only under the UN framework. Jäätteenmäki also argued that the fact that 
Finland was invited to a so-called coalition briefing by US Under Secretary State Marc 
Grossman in February was further evidence in support of her argument. Grossman had said 
that  countries  that  had  promised  some kind  support  for  the  US against  Iraq  had  been 
invited to the briefing. For instance, Germany, France and Sweden had not been invited.
An  editorial  in  Helsingin  Sanomat (8  March)  argued  that  ”despite  repeated  attempts 
Jäätteenmäki has failed to show where the beef is” in her criticism of PM Lipponen's Iraq 
policy. It concluded that Jäätteenmäki's accusations miss the target and only jeopardize her 
credibility as a PM candidate. Strangely, on the same day, another story in the newspaper 
headlined “Finnish government  took a more critical  stance on the Iraq War – The US 
interpreted Finland as her supporter till last week”. Foreign Minister Tuomioja confirmed 
that the US had misinterpreted the Finnish Iraq policy which was consequently revised. 
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Previously it had only stated that military action requires a UN mandate but now it was 
added that unilateral use of force is “unacceptable”.  Former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri 
defended  Lipponen  in  Helsingin  Sanomat on  7  March  and  Max  Jakobson,  a  former 
ambassador,  discredited  Jäätteenmäki's  argument  in Ilta-Sanomat on  11  March.  Ilta-
Sanomat quoted  Jakobson  who  argued  that  it  is  ”completely  foolish  to  think  that  an 
invitation to the briefing would mean joining the US-led coalition”. On 8 March, Tampere-
based  Aamulehti published a column ('Brave, but not wise') which also took the position 
that Jäätteenmäki's argument did not make any sense. On 9 March,  Helsingin Sanomat 
shortly reviewed the editorials of other Finnish newspapers. It published extracts from Ilta-
Sanomat and Turun Sanomat both of which criticised Jäätteenmäki for playing with foreign 
policy in a way that harms Finland's relations with the US. Turun Sanomat went as far as 
stating that the pieces of information that Jäätteenmäki presented in the televised election 
debate are ”most likely false”. Ilta-Sanomat was equally harsh arguing that ”Jäätteenmäki's 
statements are not based on facts”. 
On  10  March,  classified  documents  were  leaked  to  national  tabloid  newspapers Ilta-
Sanomat and Iltalehti which published extracts of them on the following day. Ilta-Sanomat 
('Bush  thanked  Finland  for  ”joining  the  coalition”',  11  March)  reported  on  the  secret 
memorandum but was careful not to interpret the content in any way. Instead, the report 
settled to interviewing the Finnish diplomat in Washington who had drafted the leaked 
memorandum on the Grossman briefing. On the same day,  Helsingin Sanomat published 
another editorial ('The Iraq Crisis requires a careful handling also in Finland', 11 March) 
with softened criticism of Jäätteenmäki. It merely repeated Jäätteenmäki's allegations and 
continued  by stating  that  ”whatever  one  thinks  of  Jäätteenmäki's  criticism it  targets  a 
sensitive issue at a sensitive time.”  Helsingin Sanomat argued that slight adjustment of 
Finnish policy line was welcomed but the domestic row over relations with the US was 
not. 
Meanwhile, Lipponen insisted that the situation was different in December 2002 and the 
“coalition” refers to the international coalition behind the UN Security Council Resolution 
1441 and the coalition against terror ('Lipponen criticises the Centre Party for deliberate 
confusion', Helsingin Sanomat, 12 March).
Seppo Huiku (2004) has analysed how regional newspapers covered the argument over 
Finland's Iraq policy between 7–18 March. He argues that the editors-in-chief of regional 
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newspapers were exercising caution in commenting on the argument between Jäätteenmäki 
and Lipponen. For instance, Pohjolan Sanomat and Keskipohjanmaa, both of which used 
to  be  affiliated  with  the  Centre  Party  until  declaring  to  be  free  from  party  political 
affiliations, adopted quite neutral positions (Huiku 2004, 57). However,  Turun Sanomat 
continued to criticise Jäätteenmäki even after the tabloids had published extracts from the 
classified memos which arguably lent some credibility for her allegations. In its editorial 
on 13 March, Turun Sanomat basically argued that Jäätteenmäki had made a mountain out 
of  a  molehill  in  the  Iraq  policy  dispute.  Nevertheless,  Jäätteenmäki  received  sporadic 
support in the media. For instance, a radio column on YLE1 by Jaana Airaksinen (2003) on 
11 March argued that “we know for certain that Prime Minister Lipponen has given the 
impression in December that Finland has joined the US-led coalition that supports a war 
against  Iraq”.  Also  an  editorial  in  Ilkka (8  March),  a  regional  newspaper  based  in 
Seinäjoki,  argued that Jäätteenmäki's criticism led to the adjustment of the government 
policy.
While Jäätteenmäki's allegations about PM Paavo Lipponen's promises to President Bush 
in December 2002 might have secured the victory for the Centre Party in very closely 
contested general elections in March 2003 (e.g. Vogt 2004),201 the strategy soon backfired. 
With  rest  of  the  media  following  Ilta-Sanomat's  lead,  the  attention  soon turned  to  the 
question  of  who  had  given  Jäätteenmäki  access  to  secret  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
documents.202 Eventually, her political credibility eroded with evasive answers to reporters' 
201 The Centre Party got 6,300 votes – and two parliamentary seats – more than the Social 
Democratic Party (Downs & Riutta 2005, 424).
202During the final period of analysis (2-8 May),  Ilta-Sanomat continued to investigate 
whether Jäätteenmäki had received classified Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents on 
the Finnish Iraq policy. In fact, 7 out of the 25 items included for analysis in May dealt 
with the Finnish foreign policy controversy over Iraq. Meanwhile,  Helsingin Sanomat 
and Turun Sanomat were not aggressively pursuing this story.
On 5 May, one of the articles in Ilta-Sanomat (“The Iraq debate has not weakened 
Finland's relations with the US”) defended Jäätteenmäki. Two prominent foreign policy 
experts  were  interviewed  for  the  article  for  their  response  to  former  PM  Paavo 
Lipponen's claims in a television interview that the row over Finland's Iraq policy has 
severely harmed relations with the US. Both experts rejected this claim. Moreover, Ulla 
Appelsin's opinion piece (“No more Iraq dispute, thank you!”,  Ilta-Sanomat, 5 May) 
argued that the debate on the controversy over Finland's Iraq policy is getting tiresome. 
She asked why the former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen continues the Iraq debate 
which he finds so harmful to Finnish-US relations and suggested that “Paavo” should 
stop whining about how Jäätteenmäki challenged him during the election campaign and 
“change  the  record”.  These  were  among  the  few  articles  that  were  supportive  of 
Jäätteenmäki.
On 8 May, Pekka Ervasti wrote an article ('Secret Iraq memo was first leaked to 
Jäätteenmäki?') which argued that the police has to consider hearing Jäätteenmäki in 
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questions and the realisation that she had received the classified document from Martti 
Manninen – an advisor to President Halonen. Consequently, Jäätteenmäki resigned on 24 
June. Henna Virkkunen (2004), who has analysed media coverage of the Iraqgate in June 
2003, argues that the media played a central role in the events that led to Jäätteenmäki's 
resignation – especially  Ilta-Sanomat which seemed determined to prove that she was a 
liar. Ilta-Sanomat ran a headline ”Resign, Anneli [Jäätteenmäki]!” on 10 June and a week 
later it revealed that President's advisor had leaked classified memos to her (Virkkunen 
2004).  Virkkunen (2004,  18) argues  that  ”the most  central  question,  the disagreements 
within the political elite over Iraq policy and coalitions in general, were ignored by the 
media which were focussed on tracking who had leaked the memos to Jäätteenmäki”.
The tabloid newspapers (Ilta-Sanomat and  Iltalehti), which had the classified memos in 
their possession, failed to challenge the government on another but related issue. When 
Hymy magazine published the leaked memos unedited in 2004, it was revealed that the 
memo on Lipponen's Washington meetings also dealt with plans to sell AMOS-mortars to 
the US. Ilta-Sanomat's journalist Pekka Ervasti (2004) later argued that the newspaper did 
not see a point in writing about the AMOS-mortar sales because the issue had received 
wide  media  coverage  already.  However,  a  search  in  the  Ilta-Sanomat database did  not 
produce any hits for “AMOS” mortars between December 2002 and March 2003. A search 
in the Helsingin Sanomat database produced only three hits with search words “AMOS” 
and “mortar” between the 1 December 2002 and 31 June 2003. The first two articles were 
published in the business section of the newspaper on 23 January and 21 February. Neither 
story discussed the potential moral and legal implications of selling weapons to a country 
which  was  clearly  preparing  to  invade  another  country.  In  the  first  story ('Vilén  sells 
mortars in the US') the Minister of Foreign Trade mentions that PM Lipponen had also 
order to find out who leaked the classified documents. The article does not discuss the 
actual policy controversy and bypasses the issue merely by noting that Jäätteenmäki 
used the documents to accuse Lipponen for attaching Finland to the war coalition or, at 
minimum, giving such an expression. The headline of the story is also strange as it 
carried  no new information.  In  fact,  Ilta-Sanomat  had  ran  almost  identical  headline 
already in March.  The same day  Ilta-Sanomat ran another  story on what eventually 
become  known  as  the  Iraqgate.  Mika  Lehto  reported  from  Tallinn  where  PM 
Jäätteenmäki  was  preparing for a  meeting with Lennart  Meri –  former President  of 
Estonia. Lehto asked her how it was possible that she had published exact quotes from 
classified documents in her blog in the run-up to the election. She insisted that she did 
not possess any classified documents and that the information was based on hearsay: “I 
have two ears.” The third story explained date by date how the dispute over the Iraq 
policy had evolved. On 14 May, Ilta-Sanomat reported on its front page that the police 
wanted to question Jäätteenmäki. She resigned little over a month later.
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talked about the mortars with the Bush administration during his Washington visit. The 
second story was about the government granting a permission to Patria, the manufacturer 
of the weapons systems, to sell the license of the AMOS mortar to a US company. The 
third  article  was  published  in  the  national  section  on  15  March.  It  focused  on  a  deal 
between the manufacturer Patria and the Finnish Defence Forces and made no reference to 
the  US.  So,  Ervasti's  argument  about  wide coverage  of  the issue  seems rather  strange 
considering that the biggest tabloid newspaper (IS) had not mentioned the issue at all and 
the nation's leading newspaper (HS) had barely mentioned the mortar sales. The guiding 
principle in Finnish arms sales is that Finland does not sell weapons to conflict areas or 
countries  that  are  engaged  in  a  war  (Niskasaari  2004)  and  Lipponen's  conduct  in 
Washington  is  questionable  in  this  regard.  After  all,  the  US  was  clearly  engaged  in 
Afghanistan,  it  seemed determined to  attack Iraq and,  in  fact,  had secretly stepped up 
bombing campaign in  Iraq's  no-fly zones  in  August  2002 – several  months before the 
actual  invasion begun (Tiedonantaja 2004;  Curtis  2003, 41).  Nevertheless,  the tabloids 
ignored this issue.
In sum, the national consensus – which seemed to include the political elite, the media and 
the public – did not lead to one-sided anti-war reporting. This was largely because the 
political elite were unwilling to engage in a substantial debate over Iraq. The media seemed 
largely  willing  to  retain  same  kind  of  caution  as  the  government.  With  regard  to  the 
national controversy, there was no genuine elite dissensus as Jäätteenmäki was left alone 
with her criticism of PM Lipponen. The media was largely dismissive of her criticism and 
soon  became  more  interested  in  her  source  of  information  rather  than  in  Lipponen's 
promises to the Bush administration. The media's subservience to the official policy was 
further demonstrated in  Ilta-Sanomat's decision not to write about the mortar sales – let 
alone to investigate the issue with similar enthusiasm as its reporters were working on 
finding out who had leaked the classified documents to Jäätteenmäki.
H4.  If  media  coverage  reflects  ”the  range  of  views  expressed  in  mainstream  
government debate” in accordance with Bennett's indexing hypothesis (Bennett  
1990, 106), the Irish and British press coverage should convey a wide range of  
opinion on the US/UK invasion and Ireland's stop-over policy.
The results of the content analysis clearly showed that Iraq was an issue which divided 
both the Irish and the British press. The Telegraph was largely supportive of the war while 
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the  Independent heavily  criticised  the  invasion  especially  in  the  run-up  to  the  war. 
Although the contrast between the Irish newspapers was not as dramatic as in the UK, a 
similar difference in approach can be seen between them. For instance, the  Irish Times 
emphasised humanitarian concerns to a much greater extent than its competitor the  Irish 
Independent.  Yet,  all  newspapers  included  both  pro-war  and  anti-war  opinion  pieces 
although the Telegraph tended to run critical commentaries mostly in April and May rather 
than in the run-up to the war.
The  Irish Times and  the  Independent, which  were critical  of  the war,  tended to  quote 
oppositional sources slightly more than their national competitors. On the other hand, the 
Independent also quoted executive branch sources more frequently than the Telegraph. The 
Independent quoted  Conservative  party  sources  in  2.6%  of  the  items  while  the 
corresponding number for the Telegraph was 3.6%. Labour party sources were quoted in 
3.4% in the  Independent and in  3.9% of  the items in  the  Telegraph.203 With regard to 
quoting the views of anti-war activists or protesters, 2.1% of  Independent items quoted 
them and 1.8% of Telegraph items. So, the newspapers did not differ very much in terms of 
the use of domestic sources apart from the Independent's reliance on Blair and the relevant 
cabinet ministers. Overall, domestic elite sources were used a lot more than in the Finnish 
press.
Table 10.9. Use of domestic political elite sources in the UK newspapers (percentage in  
brackets).204

















Independent (n=745) 60 (8.1) 21 (2.8) 25 (3.4) 17 (2.3) 12 (1.6) 7 (0.9) 4 (0.5) 12 (1.6)
Daily Telegraph  (n=613) 38 (6.2) 12 (2.0) 12 (2.0) 11 (1.8) 8 (1.3) 5 (0.8) 5 (0.8) 4 (0.7)
UK (n=1358) 98 (7.2) 33 (2.4) 37 (2.7) 28 (2.1) 20 (1.5) 12 (0.9) 9 (0.7) 16 (1.2)
With regard to the Shannon issue in Ireland, the Irish Independent avoided picking sides in 
its editorial on 23 March ('Cracks appear in Dail argument for use of Shannon airport') 
following the Dáil debate. Instead it presented the government and opposition views and 
pointed out some problems with both points of view.
203The Labour party members which were coded separately can be seen in the table above 
and they were not included in these figures.
204Although Clare Short was a part of the executive branch as a Secretary of State for 
International Development, she mostly appeared in the news as a critic of Blair's Iraq 
policy.
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”Originally, the Government had defended the Shannon arrangement largely on the grounds 
that the facility bolstered the credible threat of force that underpinned Resolution 1441. This 
warned of "serious consequences" (military action) if Iraq failed to disarm. 
This,  however,  now raises  an  obvious  question  for  the  Government.  If  the  overflight  and 
landing facilities for the US military were justified on that basis of that UN authority, then how 
are the continuance of those arrangements now justified, given the lack of any UN authority for 
US military action. 
Irish  military  neutrality,  never  a  very  meaningful  concept,  has  become  increasingly 
meaningless.”
Similarly,  the  Irish  Times presented  views  for  and  against  the  stop-over  policy.  For 
instance,  ahead  of  an  anti-war  protest  at  Shannon  airport,  the  newspaper  ran  two 
commentary pieces with the headline 'Are the Shannon protesters right?' (17 January) and 
with different answers to the question. Richard Boyd Barrett, Chair of the Irish Anti-War 
Movement, was among those who defended the protest together with one participant in the 
Shannon peace camp who argued that:
”In our democratic society peace activists have been thrown out of the airport, had camera film 
taken and have even been arrested for merely watching military planes. We believe that larger 
weapons such as hand-held anti-aircraft weapons are on board the chartered cargo planes. The 
police will not inspect these planes even though it is required by law. We must wait for Mr 
Cowen's [Foreign Minister] next admission to find out what they are carrying. ”
Fine Gael TD (member of the Irish parliament) John Deasy, in turn, adopted completely 
different approach205:
”Let's not forget who stopped Hitler, Milosevic and the Communist dictatorships that murdered 
millions and deprived millions of others their basic freedoms. It wasn't our home-grown, left-
leaning smug intellectuals who revel in portraying American policy-makers as trigger-happy 
land-grabbers. The people who have done more to promote global democracy and stability are 
the  ones  going  through  Shannon  right  now.  They  are  our  best  hope  of  combating 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons into 
the hands of madmen. We need them more than they need us. Our neutrality will not protect us 
from religious extremism and despots. I am not a warmonger but I believe that action may need 
to  be  taken  against  a  man who has  engaged  in  genocide  against  his  own people  and  has 
consistently threatened chaos in the Middle East.”
In  an  editorial  on  5  February  ('Complacency  over  Shannon  airport'),  the  Irish  Times 
defended the right to protest but supported the government policy by arguing that 
”The movement of US troops through Shannon is taking place under the terms of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 which, under threat of troop deployment and other measures, gave 
Iraq a final opportunity to comply with arms inspections and to destroy any weapons of mass 
destruction. Ireland supported that resolution and it passed unanimously. Some weeks ago, in 
order to facilitate the United States, long-standing regulations which prohibited the passage of 
armed foreign troops through our airports were amended.” 
205 Fine Gael leadership criticised the government policy but the party was divided over 
the stop-over policy.
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However, as discussed in chapter 7, by the time the war begun, the Irish Times expressed 
more critical views on the Shannon decision than the Irish Independent.
Table 10.10. Use of domestic political elite sources in the Irish newspapers (percentage in  
brackets).
















Irish Independent (n=430) 15 (3.5) 6 (1.4) 2 (0.5) 9 (2.1) 5 (1.2) 4 (0.9)  -
Irish Times (n=375) 16 (4.3) 8 (2.1) 4 (1.1) 10 (2.7) 7 (1.9) 6 (1.6) 6 (1.6)
IRELAND (n=805) 28 (3.5) 14 (1.7) 6 (0.7) 19 (2.4) 12 (1.5) 10 (1.2) 6 (0.7)
10.4 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS THE US GOVERNMENT VIEW?
H5.  US  government  and  military  sources  are  the  main  sources  of  information  
regardless of national foreign policies.
Hypothesis 5 argued that the media rely heavily on US government and military sources 
regardless  of  their  foreign  policy  orientation.  As  can  be  seen  in  table  10.1,  the  US 
government was the most important foreign news source for all seven newspapers. The 
confirmation of this hypothesis points to a major difference between the US and smaller 
nations in the world. According to previous research, foreign sources only play a role if 
there is a consensus within the national foreign policy elite in the US (Althaus et al 1996). 
When looking at other countries, however, the US is a major source of information for the 
world media as its power over the events is translated into newsworthiness. As Zaller and 
Chiu (1999, 24) have argued, the ”capacity to foretell or affect future events” increases the 
newsworthiness of the source. Consequently, the governments of smaller nations cannot 
expect to have such dominance over their domestic media as the US government has. Only 
in the UK, which took part in the military invasion thus being able to control information 
flows, the domestic elite and military was on equal footing with US sources.
H6. US views are widely reproduced in media coverage regardless of national 
foreign policies.
Another  hypothesis  considering  the  case  for  war  assumed  that  the  US/UK allegations 
would be widely reproduced regardless of the government policy of the medium's host 
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government. They did receive moderate coverage but only the argument about Iraqi WMD 
capability was very widely covered. It was very high on the agenda in the first two weeks 
of analysis (in early February and in mid-March) and became increasingly challenged in 
April and May as the US/UK forces were unable to find forbidden weapons in Iraq. The 
arguments about the Iraqi threat and links to terrorism did not stay on the agenda in April 
and May which explains fewer references to these issues. To conclude, H6 is confirmed in 
a sense that the US/UK arguments were widely reproduced in the run-up to the war and the 
first few days of the invasion but, as the arguments did not serve a similar purpose in April 
and May, they received much less coverage. However, the argument about Iraqi WMD 
stayed on the surface but mainly in the context of the US/UK ability to deliver the evidence 
of their existence. Moreover, the UK press reproduced the arguments for war more often 
than the Finnish and the Irish press indicating that government policy line may have been a 
factor.
H7. Finnish and Irish newspapers that depended on Anglo-American news agencies  
or organisations as the origin of their articles are more sympathetic to US/UK views  
than newspapers that relied on their own foreign correspondents.
Studies  that  analysed  media  coverage  of  the  Iraq  War  in  South  East  Asian  countries 
suggested that articles relying on news agency copy tended to be more supportive of the 
war than stories provided by newspapers' own correspondents (Maslog et al 2006, Lee et al 
2006). This study produced similar results.
Ilta-Sanomat was the least critical of the Finnish newspapers. In part, this resulted from the 
small number of opinion pieces on Iraq: over 80% of the items dealing with Iraq were 
news  articles.  Another  reason  for  the  apparent  lack  of  critical  coverage  was  that  its 
coverage in general was more superficial than the coverage of quality dailies. Besides the 
few reports from the Norwegian unilateral journalist in Baghdad,  Ilta-Sanomat relied on 
Anglo-American news organisations in its Iraq coverage. Nearly one fifth of its coverage – 
18% of  its  items  –  acknowledged  only Anglo-American  news  agencies  or  other  news 
organisations such as the CNN and the British tabloid the Sun.  
Helsingin Sanomat also largely depended on its own network of foreign correspondents. 
Nearly 8% of the items were filed from Iraq (including those that an embed reporter filed 
from the Kuwaiti border) and other foreign correspondents provided another 24% of the 
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items. Yet, Anglo-American news agencies were acknowledged in 17.5% of the articles. 
Meanwhile,  only  5.4%  of  the  items  acknowledged  other  than  Anglo-American  news 
agencies and little over one per cent acknowledged both Anglo-American and non-Anglo-
American news agencies. In contrast, Turun Sanomat tended to favour the Finnish STT and 
French  AFP over  Anglo-American  AP or  Reuters.  11% of  articles  in  Turun  Sanomat 
acknowledged only non-Anglo-American news agencies and nearly 16% acknowledged 
both.  None  of  the  articles  in  Turun  Sanomat acknowledged  an  Anglo-American  news 
agency as a sole source. As shown in this and previous chapters, Turun Sanomat was more 
critical of the war than its competitors.
The  Irish  Times published  132  (35.2%)  items  which  were  filed  by  its  own  foreign 
correspondents. The corresponding number for the Irish Independent was just 25 (5.8%). 
However,  unlike  the  Finnish  newspapers,  the  Irish  Independent did  not  rely  on  news 
agencies. Instead it published a total of 77 items from the Times (of London), 65 from the 
Telegraph  and 71 from the  Independent/Independent News Service. While these articles 
did not provide uniformly pro-war views (due to the divisions in the UK press over Iraq), 
the high number of Telegraph articles alone ensured that the Irish Independent's coverage 
of the war was more sympathetic to the invasion than that of the Irish Times'.206 
To conclude, there seemed to be a connection between the dependence on Anglo-American 
news organisations and the coverage being sympathetic to the US/UK views – or at least 
being less critical of the war.
10.5 CONCLUSION
Empirical analysis of Irish, Finnish and British newspaper coverage seems to suggest that 
there are several factors besides the government policy line that influence the way in which 
the  media  covers  international  politics.  Government  policy  alone  did  not  explain  the 
findings on the use of sources, selection of topics or how some of the main arguments 
concerning the war were covered. Consequently, the analysis fell well short of validating 
the executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm. 
206One of the most striking differences between the Telegraph and the Independent is also 
worth noting. Embedded reporters provided nearly seven per cent of Telegraph's Iraq 
coverage. The Independent had not embraced the embedding programme to the same 
degree. Less than one per cent of the its Iraq coverage was provided by embeds.
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This  chapter  also  discussed  the  US  ability  to  influence  media  coverage  in  European 
countries. The analysis indicated that the US government was the most important foreign 
source for all newspapers. Moreover, the Bush administration was able to set the agenda 
but its arguments did not go without criticism. For instance, the argument about Iraqi links 
to terrorism was widely questioned while the WMD claim was more successful – at least 
initially.
The findings were largely consistent with the elite version of the manufacturing consent 
paradigm in the Irish and British cases.  Elite dissensus in both countries led to criticism of 
the government policies in the press. Especially in Britain, the newspapers chose sides in 
the argument. In Ireland, the Irish Independent tended to side with the government on the 
Shannon issue and be more sympathetic toward US/UK views than the Irish Times which 




11.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH SETTING
From the beginning, it  was clear that Iraq posed more of public relations than military 
challenge for the US-led coalition. While the US struggled to mobilise support for military 
action, European governments had to determine their positions. The dissensus over Iraq on 
both international and national levels offered a rich setting for a cross-national research to 
test  some assumptions about media-foreign policy relationship originating mainly from 
American  political  communication  literature.  This  line  of  research  suggests  that  the 
government  policy  line  and  national  elite  opinion  are  the  most  important  factors  in 
explaining how the media cover international politics. The aim was to investigate whether 
they have explanatory power in democracies in more general terms. 
This study focused on three European states which adopted different policies with regard to 
Iraq: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). The study employed both 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis in order to determine the range of sources, 
selection of topics and the tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and controversial 
national Iraq policies. The content analysis procedure was designed to capture the actual 
substance of the foreign policy debates rather than adopting a somewhat simple content 
categories along the lines of 'critical'/'uncritical' or 'hawkish'/'dovish' which have been used 
in  some  earlier  studies.  The  sample  consisted  of  two  daily  quality  newspapers  from 
different ends of the political spectrum in Ireland and the UK. In the case of Finland, the 
only national quality daily Helsingin Sanomat was selected for the study. However, in the 
absence of another national daily,  a regional quality newspaper  Turun Sanomat and the 
biggest national tabloid newspaper Ilta-Sanomat were included from Finland. Main periods 
of analysis covered four weeks at critical phases of the Iraq crisis between February and 
May 2003.
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11.2 SUMMATION OF FINDINGS
Based on previous research, it was assumed that the government policy together with elite 
opinion would explain how the Iraq crisis and controversies relating to national Iraq policies 
were covered by the press. The analysis of nearly 3000 news and opinion items showed, 
however,  that  governments'  foreign  policy  line  did  not  explain  the  differences  in  press 
coverage very well as there were clear differences between newspapers operating in the same 
political system in Ireland and the UK. In those two countries, elite dissensus had both a 
polarising and stimulating effect on the press coverage of controversial foreign policies. 
The UK was America's junior partner in the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, PM Tony Blair 
faced considerable opposition to his policy from the Liberal Democrats and sections of his 
own Labour Party. As predicted by US-originating political communication research, elite 
dissensus brought the issue into a 'sphere of legitimate controversy'. This study confirmed 
the notion that the British press was polarised on the use of military force. There were quite 
striking differences between the Independent and the Telegraph's coverage of the Iraq crisis 
in terms of topic selection, sourcing and direction of arguments. Overall, the Independent 
adopted a critical position toward the invasion although, with the commencement of the 
invasion,  it  moderated its views in its leading articles.  Ravi (2005, 57) made a similar 
observation in his analysis of the Guardian's coverage of the war. In fact, the Independent's 
editorial on 22 March was reminiscent of the extract from the Manchester Guardian at the 
beginning of the First World War (quoted on page 18 of this study). Yet, the Independent 
continued to publish critical views even during the war. 
The  Daily Telegraph, in turn, was quite unambiguously pro-war and its criticism of the 
government, when it appeared, dealt with the way it was selling the war to the British 
people  in  the  pre-war  stage.  However,  towards  the  later  stages  of  the  invasion,  the 
Telegraph begun to include more critical voices in its commentary pieces which mostly 
expressed dissatisfaction with the way that  the aftermath of the invasion was handled. 
Although this research indicates that the Telegraph largely failed to challenge controversial 
Blair government claims, the judges of the British Press Awards granted a Team of the Year 
award to the  Telegraph journalists that covered the invasion (Daily Telegraph, 18 March 
2004).  Unlike  the  Independent,  the  Telegraph had  fully  embraced  the  embedding 
programme  and  the  Daily  Telegraph and  the  Sunday  Telegraph both  had  embedded 
reporters.
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The Irish government  avoided  taking  a  clear  position  on the US/UK invasion of  Iraq. 
While it neither officially supported nor disapproved of the use of military force, it allowed 
US  military  aircraft  to  refuel  at  Shannon  airport  despite  harsh  criticism  from several 
opposition parties and public protest.  The Irish press reflected these divisions. Both the 
Irish  Times and  the  Irish  Independent presented  pro-war  and  anti-war  views  in  their 
opinion items although the former was more likely to present critical views while the latter 
tended to adopt positions which were sympathetic to the US/UK case for war. The Irish 
press also presented both supportive and hostile views on the Irish government's stop-over 
policy although the  Irish Independent tended to be more supportive of the government 
policy.  Meanwhile,  the  Irish  Times was  sympathetic  to  the  opposition  views  on  the 
Shannon issue. Overall, the fact that the Shannon airport linked Ireland to the invasion had 
a stimulating effect on public debate. In contrast to Finland, the controversy over national 
foreign policy on Shannon airport fuelled debate about the legal and moral aspects of not 
only the stop-over policy but also the US/UK invasion. 
In Finland, the government, the political elite and the public opinion were against the use 
of  force.  Accordingly,  the  Finnish  newspapers  adopted  anti-war  editorial  policies  and 
expressed  scepticism on the  US/UK case  for  war  especially  in  the  run-up to  the  war. 
However, the news stories in the Finnish press did not seem to prioritise anti-war voices, 
topics  or  arguments  to  the  same extent  as  the  Independent and  the  Irish  Times which 
operated in very different political environments.  Although Professor Heikki Luostarinen 
(2004, 157) from University of Tampere has complimented Helsingin Sanomat's coverage of 
the  invasion  for  the  variety  of  views  and critical  judgement,  it  was  the  second  largest 
regional newspaper  Turun Sanomat that stood out as the most critical of the three Finnish 
newspapers  analysed  in  this  study.  However,  it  did  not  seem to  have  the  resources  to 
independently report on the situation on the ground and, therefore, its coverage put little 
emphasis on issues such as looting that followed the fall of Baghdad. At the same time, 
Helsingin Sanomat focused on troop movements more than any of the other newspapers 
analysed here which indicates that it frequently approached the war from a tactical point of 
view once the attack was launched.  Helsingin Sanomat was also the only Finnish media 
outlet that had an embedded reporter with the US troops which might, in part, explain the 
focus on troop movements. 
Ilta-Sanomat, in turn, largely avoided such issues as legal and moral justification of the 
invasion. Perhaps one should expect a tabloid newspaper to focus on the spectacle of war 
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rather than more complex issues but, interestingly, a number of European tabloids adopted 
a different approach. For instance, an Austrian tabloid Neue Kronen Zeitung voiced pacifist 
and anti-American sentiments (although it shifted its focus toward sensational journalism 
when the war  began)  (Carfora  et  al  2005)  and Britain's  Daily  Mirror also  adopted  an 
aggressive anti-war position (Freedman 2009). Certainly, the Finnish public opinion, which 
was highly critical  of  the invasion,  would have enabled  Ilta-Sanomat to  adopt  a more 
critical approach.
It is also worth noting that although the Finnish government considered the use of force 
”unacceptable”,  the  policy was eventually very cautious  in  accordance  with the  Finnish 
foreign policy tradition. For example, the Finnish government refrained from declaring the 
war illegal as the Swedish government did.207 The newspapers voiced anti-war views in their 
editorials and commentaries albeit with almost a similar restraint as the Finnish government. 
This study shows that national governments are not necessarily important sources for the 
national  press in  times of international  conflict.  This assumption has been an essential 
element of the notion of the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990). Instead, states (and their 
political elites) that do not directly participate in the hostilities could choose to say very 
little  about  an  international  conflict.   In  Finland,  the  national  political  elite  had  little 
interest in engaging into a public debate on such issues as US motivations, the war's legal 
repercussions or potential consequences for the fragile Middle Eastern security system let 
alone publicly challenge US/UK claims. With the public opinion strongly against the war 
and none of the political parties defending the US/UK decision to invade Iraq, the Finnish 
government  had  no need  to  persuade  the  public  behind  the  official  moderate  anti-war 
policy. Consequently, it was largely left to foreign news sources to define the situation and 
the  Finnish  press  coverage  did  not  stand  out  as  particularly  critical  of  the  invasion  – 
although the US/UK claims did not go uncontested in the Finnish newspapers either. In 
fact,  if  there  had  not  been general  elections  in  Finland just  couple of  days  before the 
US/UK launched their attack on Iraq, there probably would not have been the controversy 
over Finnish Iraq policy and, consequently, there would have been even less public debate 
on Iraq.  Overall,  the findings  of  this  study on Finnish press  coverage are  in  line with 
207Over a year later, however, President Tarja Halonen (2004) delivered a speech at the 
UN General Assembly in which she stated that ”Before the war in Iraq, the international 
community failed, however. Conflicting national interests prevailed over common will. 
There was not enough commitment to act within the boundaries of Security Council 
resolutions. Some nations resorted to use of force, which was not compatible with 
international law.”
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Kristensen and Ørsten's (2007, 340) analysis of Danish media coverage of the Iraq War 
which concluded that ”the use of sources and the thematic priorities in the Danish media 
coverage, particularly after the invasion had begun, can be seen as yet another illustration 
of the difficulty and rarity of genuinely independent media performance in times of war”. 
In general, the findings of this study also point out once again that one should be cautious 
in  making  generalisations  about  media  coverage  of  international  affairs.  There  were 
significant differences between newspapers especially in the UK and Ireland where elite 
consensus was lacking. Yet, elite opinion did not seem to explain all of the differences 
between news  outlets.  To some extent,  this  study validates  Cristina  Archetti's  (2008b) 
argument that much of the variation in the news is due to factors at organisational (or even 
individual) level such as editorial decisions.208 The sample used in this study indicated that 
many journalists seemed to have the freedom to express their views even when they were 
at odds with the editorial line of the newspaper or other staff writers. For instance, the 
Independent adopted an anti-war stance in its editorials, ran Robert Fisk's highly critical 
articles while also allowing Johann Hari  to defend the US/UK decision to use military 
force  against  Iraq.  Similarly,  Kevin  Myers's  regular  column  may  not  have  been 
representative of the Irish Times' editorial position on Iraq and neither were Robert Fisk's 
reports from Iraq in line with the  Irish Independent's editorial statements. Consequently, 
the views of independent journalists seem to explain the range of opinion in the coverage 
to some extent. Yet, one should keep in mind that the findings also clearly indicate that 
newspapers  operating in  the same political  system may opt for  very different  editorial 
positions along the divisions within the elite. Especially in the case of the Daily Telegraph, 
the editorial position was reflected in much of the news and opinion content. It is worth 
noting that both the  Independent and the Irish Independent were owned by Independent 
News & Media but they adopted different editorial positions on the war. So, at least in this 
case, ownership did not seem to dictate editorial positions let alone news making.
There seems to be another factor that needs to be taken into account in explaining the 
differences between media outlets' coverage of the conflict. The newspapers had different 
levels of resources available to them and had adopted different strategies in how to acquire 
the content for publication. For instance, the  Irish Times had quite extensive network of 
208Her analysis of international news coverage of 9/11 found little evidence to support the 
media flows ('Americanization' of news) localisation (newspapers within a country 
present the same news) and globalisation (newspapers across different countries present 
all the same news) hypotheses.
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correspondents around the world and could, therefore, report on international diplomacy 
rather independently – especially in comparison to the  Irish Independent  which heavily 
relied on British quality dailies to provide international coverage. The Finnish newspapers, 
in turn, were quite dependent on news agencies.
The interesting question, however, is whether the Irish and British newspapers would have 
expressed  their  critical  views  without  the  elite  dissensus  that  brought  the  issue  in  the 
'sphere of legitimate controversy'? Analysis of the Finnish press coverage would suggest 
that they probably would not have. There were hardly any opinion pieces in the Finnish 
newspapers that unambiguously supported the invasion although the critical view on the 
war  was  not  always  reflected  in  the  actual  news coverage.  Unlike  wire  copy,  opinion 
content  is  produced  locally  with  the  local  audience  in  mind.  Apart  from  Helsingin 
Sanomat,  the  Finnish  newspapers  had  quite  limited  resources  to  cover  the  crisis 
independently of Anglo-American content provides. This holds true also with regard to the 
Irish  Independent  which  heavily  relied  on  British  quality  dailies  in  its  international 
coverage.  Thus,  these  newspapers  (Turun  Sanomat,  Ilta-Sanomat and  the  Irish 
Independent) were dependent on content that was filtered through the news judgements of 
external actors. The other reason for the Finnish press not standing out more critical of the 
invasion than the Independent or the Irish Times is that the kind of heated debate that took 
place in Britain and Ireland was lacking in Finland due to the high level of elite consensus 
on the issue. Consequently, the Finnish journalists could not rely on constant supply of 
critical comments by elite sources. 
11.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
With regard to the theoretical contribution, this study addressed the issue of the generality 
of the theories of media-state relations by investigating whether the US-originated theories 
of media-state relations have explanatory power in European context and whether they 
could  serve  as  a  basis  for  providing  accurate  predictions  on  how  the  media  covers 
international  conflicts  across  countries.  Apart  from  American  political  communication 
research, the problem with many previous studies in the field is that they have been rather 
descriptive not having set themselves an explicit objective to theorize the media-foreign 
policy relationship and make predictions about media behaviour in future conflicts or other 
foreign and security policy issues (see e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & Hakanen 
2006, Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, cf. Riegert 1998, Stolle & Hooghe 2005, Archetti 2008). 
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Another problem with much of previous academic work in this field is that there has been a 
lack of emphasis on comparative research.
The findings of this study indicate that the states that participate in a conflict can control 
the information flows.  In  this  particular  case,  the match was uneven because the Iraqi 
strategic communications lacked credibility to begin with and the Iraqis did not have the 
resources and skills that the US-led coalition had. Indeed, the US/UK coalition was rather 
successful in getting its message across especially after the invasion begun. This was, at 
least  in  part,  due  to  the  fact  that  many  newspapers  relied  on  Anglo-American  news 
organisations  as  content  providers.  Meanwhile,  locally  produced  content,  especially 
opinion content,  tended to be more critical  of the invasion in  Finland.  This  study also 
indicated  that  states  that  participate  in  the  hostilities  are  more  motivated  to  control 
perceptions than non-participating states which might choose to say very little about the 
conflict. To some extent, this explains why the Finnish press coverage did not stand out as 
particularly critical of the invasion in comparison to Britain's Independent, for example.
What we can also learn from this study, is that when methodological choices aim to capture 
the actual substance of the foreign policy debate, the findings could be less clear-cut than 
in studies that  adopt simple critical/uncritical  dichotomies.  There is more variation and 
nuance in the media coverage than such studies  would suggest.  Nevertheless,  in  some 
respects the coverage was quite similar across countries and outlets. For instance, many 
critical issues that were not raised by elite sources tended to remain in the margins of the 
debate. This was the case with the question of oil in the invasion of Iraq. By and large, 
references to possible oil-related motives for the invasion were confined to one obscure 
sentence with very little in-depth analysis of the issue. Meanwhile, opinion polls indicated 
that the public believed oil was an important factor in the events. In this regard, this study 
gives  support  to  Thussu's  claim  that  the  geopolitical  interests  of  the  West  often  go 
unreported in war coverage (see Thussu 2002 and 2004).
The empirical contribution of the study shows how the invasion of Iraq was covered by 
selected European press and how the coverage might have differed across countries and 
dailies. The empirical research done on the Finnish and Irish media coverage of foreign 
policy issues, let alone the Iraq War, is very limited for the time being.209 In this regard, this 
209Phelan's (2005) article on Irish media coverage and Männistö's (2004) analysis of news 
photography in Helsingin Sanomat and Aamulehti are exceptions in this regard.
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study is an important step towards cumulative knowledge of press-state relations during 
international crisis in these countries. Clearly, the literature on British coverage of the Iraq 
War is much more extensive including both print and electronic media but the Independent 
has often been excluded from the analysis (see e.g. Ravi 2005, Tumber & Palmer 2004, 
Robertson 2004). Moreover, much of the existing research done on the subject in Britain 
has been descriptive rather than theoretically informed.
11.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
It is important to bear in mind the limitations of this study. First of all, this study is not an 
audience  study and,  consequently,  it  does  not  really make a  direct  contribution  to  the 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  media  coverage  and  public  opinion. 
Undoubtedly, research that deals with the foreign policy–media–public opinion triangle is 
in  great  demand but  such  ambition  is  beyond this  research  project.  Another  important 
limitation is that this thesis is not a newsroom study either. In other words, it does not 
make a direct contribution toward understanding how choices are made in the newsrooms.
Instead, this study focuses on the journalistic output and identifies patterns in the press 
coverage of the Iraq crisis in the spring of 2003. However, even in this regard, there are 
some caveats. The analysis is largely limited to two quality dailies in the UK and Ireland 
(although the  Sunday Tribune was included in the qualitative analysis) and three Finnish 
newspapers  during  four  seven-day  periods.  Although  analysis  of  electronic  media  – 
television and radio – during the same period could produce similar results, this is by no 
means certain. Previous research seems to indicate that, by and large, television coverage 
tends to take a less critical approach to wars than print media in the US (Peer & Chestnut 
1995). However, it is worth noting that European media systems significantly differ from 
the US media system in this regard. The three European countries that were the subject of 
this study have strong public broadcasting traditions. 
A further  limitation  is  that  this  study  did  not  include  analysis  of  news  photography. 
Photographs were excluded because they are not readily available via electronic databases 
and retrieving hard copies of seven newspapers in three different countries would have 
been too costly and time-consuming in relation to the potential  benefits of such effort. 
Finally, the validity of the findings could always be enhanced by including more media 
outlets and extending the periods of analysis.
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11.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
Three  steps  need  to  be  taken  to  improve  our  understanding  of  media-foreign  policy 
relationship across countries. First, looking at more cases would be helpful. For instance, 
an analysis of how the press in these three countries has covered the Afghanistan conflict at 
its different stages would be interesting for several reasons. This would eliminate one of 
the major differences that existed in the Iraq Crisis between Finland and the UK especially. 
While the UK participated in the Iraq invasion, Finland did not. In the case of Afghanistan, 
however,  Finland  has  sent  troops  to  assist  the  International  Security  Assistance  Force 
(ISAF).  In  turn,  Ireland's  contribution  to  ISAF  has  been  minimal  but  a  contribution 
nevertheless.  Has  the  Afghanistan  coverage  differed  across  countries?  How  the 
participation in the international operation has been justified to domestic audiences? Who 
have participated in the public debate (if there has been one)? Has there been criticism of 
government policy in the media coverage?
Secondly, looking at more countries would give clearer indications of the similarities and 
differences  of  media-foreign  policy  relationship  across  countries.  This  would  also  be 
helpful in identifying the factors that determine the nature of this relationship. With regard 
to the example in the previous paragraph, Denmark, for instance, would be an interesting 
case because it has suffered heavy casualties in Afghanistan and, yet, public support for 
participation in ISAF has remained high until very recently. At the same time, it is not too 
dissimilar to the countries analysed in this study.
Finally, looking at other foreign policy fields such as environmental policy is needed. As 
Mette  Anthonsen  (2003,  301)  notes  drawing  general  conclusions  about  media  foreign 
policy relationship would ultimately require looking also other foreign policy fields than 
military  conflict.  So  far,  cross-national  research  on  other  policy  areas  in  this  field  of 
research is rather thin. 
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Instruction:  Code  only  stories  about  the  Iraq  crisis/war  and  national  Iraq  policies  in 
Finland, Ireland and the UK.
Use the codes specified for each category, but in cases of severe doubt or where it is not 
possible to determine the right code, use:
99. Not possible to determine








04 The Independent/Independent on Sunday
05 The Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph
06 The Irish Independent/Sunday Independent
07 The Irish Times




04 Letter to the editor
05 'Quotes of the Day'
06 Other
V5 Origin of the text
01 Unilateral correspondent in Iraq
02 Embedded correspondent 
03 Other foreign correspondent
04 Anglo-American news agency (e.g. AP, Reuters)
05 Other news agency (e.g. AFP, STT)
06 Mixed news agency (both Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American)
07 Other newspaper, which ____________?
08 Other
V6 Is there a reference to the cruelty and aggression of the Saddam regime?
Yes No
V7 Is there positive reference to the Saddam regime (for instance being a former 
Western ally)?
Yes No
V8 Are anti-war protests/movement mentioned in neutral or positive way?
Yes No
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V9 Are anti-war protests/movement portrayed negatively (e.g. as a threat to public 
order)?
Yes No
V10 Is the Franco-German peace plan mentioned in neutral or positive way?
Yes No
V11 Is the Franco-German peace plan portrayed negatively?
Yes No
V12  Which of the arguments are mentioned (multiple answers possible) 
01 Iraq has links to terrorism mentioned
02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction
03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change
04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit
05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community
06 War against Iraq is legal
07 War against Iraq is justified (not in a legal sense)
08 Iraq is cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors
09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient
10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN
V13 Which of the following arguments are questioned (multiple answers possible)
01 Iraq has links to terrorism mentioned
02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction
03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change
04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit
05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community
06 War against Iraq is legal
07 War against Iraq is justified (not in a legal sense)
08 Iraq is cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors
300
09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient
10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN
V14 Which of the possible rationales for war are mentioned? (multiple answers 
possible)
01 Disarmament of Iraq: preventing Iraq from developing and using WMDs
02 Hurt terrorist: deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support
03 Exporting democracy:  portrayed as an attempt to introduce democracy in the Middle 
East
04 Enforcement of UNSC resolutions/warning of non-compliance
05 Oil-related objectives
06 Expansion of US sphere of influence
07 Supporting Israel
08 Regime change: removal of Saddam Hussein from power
09 Free Iraqis from Saddam's rule
10 Other, what?___________________________________________________________
V15 Which of the possible rationales for war are mentioned NOT to be objectives? 
(Multiple answer possible)
01 Disarmament of Iraq: preventing Iraq from developing and using WMDs
02 Hurt terrorist: deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support
03 Exporting democracy:  portrayed as an attempt to introduce democracy in the Middle 
East
04 Enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions/warning of non-compliance
05 Oil-related objectives
06 Expansion of US sphere of influence
07 Supporting Israel
08 Regime change: removal of Saddam Hussein from power
09 Free Iraqis from Saddam's rule
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10 Other, what?___________________________________________________________
V16 Which of the possible measures are mentioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Military force
02 Continuation/enforcement of weapons inspections
03 Nothing: the international community should not take any new action with regard to 
Iraq
04 Something/Unspecified: should be done to Iraq
05 Employment of UN peacekeepers and/or expansion of no-fly zones
06 Other, what?________________________________________________________
V17 Which of the possible measures are questioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Military force
02 Continuation/enforcement of weapons inspections
03 Nothing: the international community should not take any new action with regard to 
Iraq
04 Something/Unspecified: should be done to Iraq
05 Employment of UN peacekeepers and/or expansion of no-fly zones
06 Other, what?__________________________________________________________
V18 Which of the following themes are mentioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Looting/anarchy
02 Humanitarian crisis: e.g. displacement, starvation, epidemics, lack of clean water
03 US/UK military advancement in Iraqi territory
04 US/UK military casualties




08 Reconstruction/Rebuilding of Iraq
09 Humanitarian aid
10 Use of depleted uranium in US/UK ammunition
11 Casualties unspecified: use this code only when its impossible to determine between 4-7
V19 Which of the possible implications of the war are mentioned? (Multiple answers 
possible)
01 Safer international system
02 Safer Middle East
03 Introduction of democracy in the Arab World
04 Weakening of the UN authority
05 Harm to Western relations with the Muslim world and/or minorities in the West
06 Increasing threat of terrorism 
07 Sets a dangerous precedent of pre-emption and/or regime change
08 Long occupation of Iraq
9 Civil war
10 Unspecified negative implications
11 Unspecified positive implications
12 Other, what?_________________________________________________________
V20 Which of the possible implications of the war are questioned? (Multiple answers 
possible)
01 Safer international system
02 Safer Middle East: e.g. “destabilisation of the region”
03 Introduction of democracy in the Arab World
04 Weakening of the UN authority
05 Harm to Western relations with the Muslim world and/or minorities in the West
06 Increasing threat of terrorism 
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07 Sets a dangerous precedent of pre-emption and/or regime change
08 Long occupation of Iraq
09 Civil war
10 Other, what?________________________________________________












12 Iraq: Iraqi National Congress (US-supported opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi)
13 Iraqi civilian
14 Finland: President Tarja Halonen
15 Finland: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (resigned on 17 April)
16 Finland: Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (resigned 17 April)
17 Finland: Centre Party leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki (Prime Minister from 17 April)
18 Finland: National Coalition Party
19 Finland: Social Democratic Party
20 Finland: Centre Party
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21 Finland: other political party, which? ____________________
22 UK: Prime Minister Tony Blair
23 UK: Foreign Minister Jack Straw
24 UK: Defence Minister Geoff Hoon
25 UK: PM's spokesman
26 UK military
27 UK: Robin Cook
28 UK: Clare Short
29 UK: George Galloway
30 UK: Labour Party source (excluding the three above: Cook, Short, Galloway)
31 UK: Conservative Party
32 UK: Liberal Democratic Party
32 UK: other governmental (diplomats, ministry sources, 10 Downing street aides etc)
34 Ireland: Taoiseach Bertie Ahern
35 Ireland: Foreign Minister Brian Cowen
36 Ireland: Progressive Democrat Party
37 Ireland: Fianna Fail party
38 Ireland: Fianna Gail party
39 Ireland: Labour Party
40 Ireland: Green Party
41 Ireland: Socialist Party
42 Ireland: Sinn Fein Party






47 Humanitarian aid organisations (e.g. International Red Cross) 










56 US: anti-war protester/activist
57 UK: anti-war protester/activist
58 Finland: anti-war protester/activist
59 Ireland: anti-war protester/activist
60 Other, what/who _________________________?
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